Journal of Peace Research

The paper attempts to formulate a conceptual framework for understanding the nature of the ethnic conflicts that have become endemic to South Asian social formations. Emphasis is put on the identification of mechanisms that need to be evolved and consolidated if these conflicts are to be resolved. Ethnic stratification in these societies is placed and analysed within the wider context of protracted social conflicts in post-colonial state formations under the transition to capitalism In the second part of the paper an attempt is made to concretize this conceptual framework in an on-going conflict in the region — namely the case of Sri Lanka and the role of the Indian Peace-keeping Forces (IPKF) The Indo-Sri Lankan accord, which recognizes the Sri Lankan state as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual society, is examined along with the various problems and prospects pertaining to the process of the restoration of peace and normalcy on the island The specific role of the IPKF in carrying out its mandate is analysed within the context of the internal processes that need to be activated if the Indo-Sri Lankan accord is to pave the way for long-lasting peace.

The author draws on Cox and Schurmanns' differing conceptions of hegemony to analyze the exercise of American nuclear power in the Pacific. American hegemony was nuclear because strategic weapons were integral to alliance ideology, institutional integration, and force structures. In many ways, nuclear weapons became the military pnnciple around which regional security alliances were organized, just as capitalist production was the essence of economic hegemony. By the same token, he argues that allied elite consent is the key characteristic of a system of hegemomc nuclear alliances While the South Korean military is increasingly integrated with American nuclear strategy, the South Korean state has not publicly legitimated the strategy. To mimmize public opposition, the South Korean and American military have kept secret details of American nuclear forces in Korea. The United States especially values nuclear weapons in Korea for the message they send to the Japanese security elite, itself unable to overcome public opposition to ground-based nuclear weapons in Japan. Across the Pacific as well as in Korea, the hegemomc alliance ideology of nuclear deterrence is increasingly contradicted by the American strategy of nuclear war-fighting. As a result, American nuclear hegemony in the Pacific is vulnerable to counter-hegemonic challenges. In the short term, however, Korea is arguably the only place where an irreparable fracture could emerge in the American system of regional nuclear hegemony.

The People's Republic of China, as one part of comprehensive changes which extend to the economy and social policy, has moved to change the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to a smaller, more efficient, better-educated force relying more heavily on advanced weapons and high technology. Although Chinese spokesmen insist that war is a continuing phenomenon and that China must be prepared for war, they describe small-scale wars as more likely and deride prior expectations of massive, large-scale war. Policy statements and China's experience since 1949 suggest that the PLA will prepare for defensive war at the border and assertion of Chinese claims in the western Pacific. For the present, however, China insists on the need for a peaceful environment to achieve economic aims. Globally, China urges 'complete prohibition and thorough destruction' of nuclear weapons and criticizes moves to base weapons in space, but pending deep cuts in superpower strategic systems insists on gradual enhancement of China's own nuclear forces. China could encourage moves toward a largely disarmed world, or could insist on sovereign military capabilities re-enforcing today's heavily armed global stalemate

The article examines militarization in contemporary Japan, as most saliently mamfest in increases in military spending and the buildup of military might, by focusing on the erosion of anti-militaristic principles. This includes the broader interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, which now permits certain 'offensive weaponry' and 'collective defense' type arrangements; the weakening of the 'three non-nuclear principles', which are not effective against port calls by US vessels laden with Tomahawk missiles and other nuclear-capable weapons; the relaxation of the ban on the export of defense-related technology, which from 1983 onwards makes an exception of exports to the United States; and the scrapping of the '1% ceiling' on military expenditures in the 1987 budget, which put an end to an important barrier to increases in military spending. The erosion of these principles has been facilitated by external factors — American pressure, the Soviet military buildup in the region, and the decline in Asian criticism of Japan's military presence — as well as by internal factors — a greater acceptance of the Self Defense Forces and the US-Japan Security Treaty on the part of the opposition parties as well as the public.

The election of the Fourth Labour government in 1984, the imposition of a ban on nuclear powered/ armed ship visits to New Zealand and the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear-free Zone Act in 1987 represented the culmination of eleven years of campaigning by the New Zealand Peace Movement in collaboration with the New Zealand Labour Party, the Social Credit League and the Values Party. The unique structural features of this development are outlined and attention is paid to the evolution of anti-nuclear orthodoxy in New Zealand. There is an analysis of the extent to which New Zealand's experience is transferable to other countries and the necessary preconditions for the 'Kiwi disease' to spread elsewhere International political reactions to the ship ban are outlined and a brief evaluation made of its significance for disarmament, arms control and confidence building.

This essay presents a critique of the primary drawback, seen as normative weakness, of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). It begins with an overview of the conceptual foundation of N(W)FZs and of their political and normative significance for our times. The essay then goes on to describe the content of the Rarotonga Treaty which established the SPNFZ, as well as the criticisms against it The essay uses an analytical framework in which notions like 'aspirations' and 'normativity' figure as key concepts, in order to ascertain the real problems with the zone The main questions asked here are: who aspired to what, at which level, and who or what hindered these aspirations? The analysis shows, on the one hand, that the framers of the SPNFZ were hedged in by certain constraints that they themselves could not overcome easily, like some rules of international law. On the other hand, it also demonstrates that the shortcomings of the SPNFZ are more deep-rooted, in the sense that the bedrock of the entire undertaking was a self-contradictory presumption, i. e. a nuclear-deterrence-based nuclear free zone. The essay thus draws the conclusion that the real weakness of the SPNFZ lies in this inherent contradiction, particularly when compared with New Zealand's endeavor to become nuclear-free.

The foreign military relations of Thailand and the Philippines are analysed against a hypothesis of military dependency. Attempts by both countries to diversify their military supplies have so far not had any significant effects. Both countries are highly dependent especially upon the US. Their individual profiles differ, however. Thailand has received more US security assistance than has the Philippines. At the same time the Philippines has been financially favored by way of relatively more grant assistance and financial support. The main explanation given is that this is a way for the US to 'pay for' the base rights. This direct linkage between the US bases and assistance might be a complicating factor in the negotiations concerning the future of the bases. A 'compromise' rather than a 'refusal' policy is therefore seen as the most likely outcome for the near future after 1991 In the long run, however, several factors become important, such as the development of national and international tension, war, and the possible creation of 'cooperative forces' between the US and Third World countries. US training support might in the long run become one of the most important factors shaping future military dependency upon the US and of keeping security perceptions in these countries 'aligned' with American interpretations. This will put severe stress particularly upon those governments trying to change their defense policy away from foreign military dependency.