Journal of Peace Research

Alliances are often presumed to serve the dual purpose of restraint and deterrence, though few existing studies examine their relationship and the connection with defense burden-sharing. This research employs a three-player game-theoretic model, which endogenizes the process of alliance formation and arms buildups, to demonstrate how intra-alliance burden-sharing allows the alliance to preserve the status quo. The results suggest that alliance burden-sharing may exert the deterrence and restraining effects, while at most one effect is observable at a time because the effects occur in separate parameter spaces. If a prospective ally’s cost of arms buildups is relatively low, a status-quo-oriented superpower may form an alliance even by shouldering a disproportionately heavy burden to dissuade the ally from overturning the status quo (the restraining effect). Conversely, if the cost is relatively high, the superpower may form an alliance to protect the ally from external threats (the deterrence effect). However, to prevent being exploited by this ally, the superpower provides only the units of armed forces that are sufficient to incentivize the ally to bolster its military capabilities to deter the threats. Their alliance entails power aggrandizement, but it does not provoke a non-signatory as the ally remains too weak to act unilaterally.

Do United Nations peacekeeping operations improve the security of humanitarian aid workers during conflict? Answering this question is important given the critical assistance that humanitarian personnel provide in conflict zones, the increased integration of humanitarian activities in UN operations in recent decades and the growing incidence of attacks against aid workers worldwide. Researchers have found that the presence of peacekeepers does not positively affect aid worker security and may even make humanitarian personnel more vulnerable to violent attacks. However, previous studies have not examined whether the effect of peacekeeping operations on aid worker security is influenced by the personnel composition of UN missions. I hypothesize that operations with more troops are likely to reduce attacks against aid workers, while similar security gains are unlikely to be realized with larger numbers of police or observers. This is due to troops’ specific capabilities, which increase their ability to mitigate high-intensity conflict environments and protect humanitarian personnel traveling on roads. Statistical analyses of monthly data between 2000 and 2015 indicate that greater numbers of UN troops, but not police and observers, are correlated with fewer attacks against aid workers. The implications of these findings are discussed, with an eye toward addressing challenges facing the UN’s force-generation process.

Is the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) an independent actor in conflict diplomacy, or are his political interventions influenced by the parochial interests of the UN Security Council (UNSC) permanent member states – the P5? Previous studies have suggested that the political independence of the UN is constrained whenever a conflict evokes the strong parochial interests of individual P5 states. Using a newly compiled dataset, this article presents the first large-N historical study on the SG’s conflict interventions. The study quantifies the interventions while distinguishing between interventions mandated by the UNSC, which have always been high-profile in nature, and nonmandated interventions, with key emphasis on high-profile nonmandated interventions. The study ascertains whether both types of intervention were inhibited by the parochial interests of individual P5 states or whether the nonmandated interventions were uninfluenced by P5 interests. The results reveal that while parochial P5 interests have a significant bearing on UNSC-mandated interventions, they do not influence nonmandated interventions. Crucially, UN Charter dictates generally exert a greater influence on nonmandated interventions than on UNSC-mandated interventions. These findings present a strong case for the formal autonomy of the UN Secretariat and contribute to the growing literature on the role of executive heads in international organization secretariats.

The inclusion of conflict parties in independent commissions through power-sharing has been found to reduce the reoccurrence of conflict. Yet, the theoretical and empirical literature explaining why independent commissions include power-sharing is very limited. Previous publications have focused on in-depth case studies that explain how power-sharing prevents conflict recurrence in specific post-conflict societies but do not provide a general argument or widescale testing beyond individual case studies. This article provides a new systematic, general theoretical argument and novel empirical testing that explains why there is power-sharing on some commissions but not others. We argue that conflict parties adopt power-sharing provisions in independent commissions because doing so allows them to overcome significant credible commitments problems that are inherent to the ending of intrastate conflict. Using a new and comprehensive dataset, Independent Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies, which includes information on 580 commissions (1990–2016), this article applies a combination of decision trees and regression analysis to test our hypotheses. The findings indicate that power-sharing is adopted where credible commitment problems are acute and show that commissions working on political or security issues and those with monitoring or verification roles, or that work on the implementation of peace agreements, are more likely to include power-sharing arrangements.

Why do some jihadist organizations engage in beheadings while others do not? Although beheadings have become a signature tactic of the contemporary global jihadist movement, I show that most jihadist groups perpetrate few or no beheadings and only a minority have adopted beheading as a consistent part of their repertoire of violence. Such variation exists even among ideologically similar ‘Salafi-jihadist’ groups, suggesting that ideology alone cannot explain why such violence occurs. Instead, I argue that the use of beheadings is shaped by a combination of local strategic context and transnational ties. Beheadings are strategically useful to jihadist groups engaged in insurgency as a means of deterring civilian collaboration with the enemy, demoralizing enemy combatants and attracting foreign recruits. But the use of beheading is also costly for such groups, notably because of its tendency to alienate potential civilian supporters. Whether or not particular jihadist groups use beheadings depends largely on whether they can afford to ignore these costs. Jihadist insurgents who control significant territory are less sensitive to civilian attitudes because of their ability to obtain support through coercion and are therefore more likely to perpetrate beheadings. The use of beheadings is also shaped by transnational ties: organizations that seek formal affiliation with transnational jihadist networks are more likely to calculate that the benefits of using extreme violence to attract transnational support outweigh its costs. I test this theory using an original dataset of over 1,500 beheading events perpetrated by jihadist organizations between 1998 and 2019.

Why do states engage in violence against marginalized social groups? State violence is typically explained as a calculated response to dissent or as a means of preventing dissent. However, many instances of state violence against members of marginalized groups appear to be unconnected to dissent or anti-state mobilization. We examine this dimension of state violence and connect it to control of the government by nationalist political parties and the preferences of their voting bases. We argue that governments in which nationalist parties hold substantial influence are more likely to adopt policies that lead to abuse. Such policies include more aggressive policing of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and lax oversight and punishment of agencies responsible for policing. To test our argument, we examine the Ill-Treatment and Torture data, which record allegations of state violence and also information about the victim’s identity. We find that states with nationalist governments are more frequently accused of abuse against marginalized groups. Our results suggest that, rather than constraining abusive behavior through electoral accountability, the public in democratic countries sometimes prefer leaders who create a more abusive environment for marginalized groups.

Does human rights advocacy make a difference? Many are skeptical. Studies often find that advocates have an impact only under limited circumstances. I argue that these underwhelming results are a by-product of an identification problem. Research so far has effectively focused on whether shaming campaigns reduce ongoing abuse. But such cases are only part of the story. Another big aspect of advocacy is preventing abuse from ever starting. We must then pay attention to the deterred, those who chose not to violate human rights because of the threat of shaming. These cases do not repress and are never shamed. They are easy to miss because they look the same as those who never considered abuse in the first place. However, identifying deterred cases is crucial for judging the effectiveness of advocacy. I argue that we can resolve this issue by focusing on the degree of human rights monitoring in a country. Doing so allows researchers to recognize those under the scrutiny of advocates, and hence those that could have been deterred even if they were never shamed. Once we do this analytical refocus it is easy to see the positive effect of human rights advocacy. Human rights monitoring reduces abuse, and it does so in most countries.

How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate territorial disputes? We argue that inconclusive findings in previous studies stem from inadequate consideration of the interaction between challenger state religiosity and the domestic constituencies actually invested in religiously salient territorial claims. To address this gap, this article differentiates between secular regimes, which provide minimal support to their state’s dominant religion and religious regimes, which strongly support their dominant religion. It also considers narrowly salient coreligionist populations, which appeal almost exclusively to religious audiences, versus broadly salient contested sacred sites, which appeal to much broader constituencies. We argue that the interaction between these two factors produces very different patterns of interstate conflict behavior. Secular regimes avoid escalation over narrowly salient religious claims because they do not depend upon religious constituents for support. However, they lack the necessary religious legitimacy to manage outbidding challenges that frequently arise over more broadly salient claims. Religious regimes, by contrast, enjoy high domestic religious legitimacy, enabling more peaceful engagement with broadly salient religious claims. Yet their political dependence upon religious constituencies incentivizes conflict when disputes involve narrowly salient religious claims. We test these propositions utilizing original data on the religious salience of interstate territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era, from 1990 to 2010. Analyses, using both dichotomous and continuous measures of regime religiosity, confirm these inferences and contribute to highly nuanced understandings of how state-religion policy and religious salience interact to influence patterns of interstate violence.

Does increasing Internet access and use challenge authoritarian elections? I argue that Internet access provides both opposition supporters and government authorities with new means to shape electoral conduct. Opposition supporters can use the Internet to report on electoral malpractice and mobilize for support. At the same time government authorities can use the Internet to monitor antiregime sentiment prior to the elections and disrupt Internet access to selectively repress regime opponents during the elections. Studying Uganda’s 2016 presidential elections, evidence from election monitoring and survey data suggests that electoral violence is significantly higher in opposition strongholds with greater Internet access prior to the Internet disruption and is targeted specifically at voters. Insights from qualitative interviews with politicians, journalists and activists underline that the disruption of Internet access indeed hindered opposition supporters to effectively challenge electoral malpractice. Overall, the results stress the important role that Internet access can play for opposition actors in authoritarian elections. At the same time, they highlight their susceptibility to manipulation by government authorities.

Communal violence is a major source of insecurity within and across borders, sparking significant displacement flows and disturbing livelihoods. While conflict literature has shed light onto its causes, the existing research has paid little systematic attention to the spatial dynamics of communal violence. We distinguish between spillover of violence and spillover of predictors. Spillover of violence is defined as conflict incidences occurring as a direct response to communal violence in a nearby location. Spillover of predictors describes instances of communal violence that occur due to nearby conflict-inducing factors. We clarify theoretical pathways for both spillover processes, focusing on drought exposure affecting not locally but in nearby areas. Applying spatial models, we test the expectations regarding nearby violence breeding violence and nearby drought increasing violence with data on incidences of communal violence for sub-Saharan Africa (1990–2014). Our results demonstrate that communal violence explains nearby communal violence through different spillover processes. We also find evidence for an increase in violence due to exposure from neighborhood droughts as well as other conflict-inducing factors.

Civil conflicts typically end with negotiated settlements, but many settlements fail, often during the implementation stage when average citizens have increasing influence. Citizens sometimes evaluate peace agreements by voting on referendums or the negotiating leaders, and, almost always, they decide whether to cooperate. Yet, despite their role, we do not know much about how citizens form attitudes toward peace agreements. In this article, we assess how citizens form attitudes toward settlements, specifically the policy provisions that emerge from them, which are central in shaping the post-conflict context. These are complex policy changes, involving deeply factionalized actors, and the citizens evaluating them are often focused on rebuilding their lives. We therefore theorize that citizens use stark cues from political elites with whom they have affinity to form their attitudes. We test our theory using survey experiments in Colombia. We find that citizens rely on political elites’ cues to decide their stance on the settlement’s provisions. These cues appear to supply easily-accessible information that respondents use over other information. In contrast to work positing that peace agreements are exceptional and weary citizens are stabilizing forces, our results suggest that even these decisions are politics as usual, where divisions among political elites drive the outcome.

This article introduces the Rebel Foreign Fighter Dataset (RFFD) which can be used to expand research on civil war and foreign fighters (FFs). First, it largely expands the previously reported data on the number of FFs that have and continue to be involved in conflicts across the globe. Second, this database disaggregates FFs into the various rebel groups they inhabit as opposed to simply categorizing them as residing within a rebel movement. Third, low, high and best estimates of FFs within rebel groups have been provided as well as providing a novel FF ordinal coding mechanism. These additions allow for more accurate conclusions to be drawn on the effects of FFs on specific groups as well as on the conflict in which they reside. Using the RFFD, the link between FF inclusion and civilian sexual violence discussed in Doctor’s study will be re-examined. The new findings show that FF numbers below 1,000 do not have a significant impact on moderate levels of civilian victimization perpetrated by a rebel group and FF numbers below 100 do not have a significant impact on high levels of civilian victimization.