Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law

The CJEU is perceived to be a rather faceless court due to the principle of collegiality that is supposed to suppress individuality in its inner workings. This paper argues that this is not necessarily true in all cases and discusses instances wherein individual faces of the CJEU's members become discernible, in particular in their roles as President and Vice-President, respectively, the judge-rapporteur, Advocates General, single judges at the General Court, during public oral hearings, as litigants themselves, and of course in their academic publications. It also shows that judicial visibility can, in itself, certainly be construed to support the legitimacy of a court, but that it can, at the same time, also undermine its functioning, especially when judges are, as appointees, dependent on the will of their home Member State and others in the Council. Overall, it will be demonstrated that there are various situations in which individual CJEU members may emerge from an otherwise anonymous bench and play important judicial roles as individuals, thus rebutting the long-standing presumption that the CJEU is a faceless court.

This article critically discusses the interface between EU climate and energy law. It argues that legal scholarship should explore and expose the interrelationships between these legal disciplines through shared understanding and evaluation of both the disparities and synergies found. It maps the origins of EU climate and energy law to demonstrate how they have evolved side by side, guided by separate legal rationales and distinct legislative developments yet sharing partially overlapping objectives and instruments. By comparing EU climate and energy law as legal disciplines, the article identifies dynamic and static attributes that characterize the interface between EU climate and energy law. These attributes, combined with the evolution of EU climate and energy law, are key elements in facilitating disciplinary convergence. As an outcome of the analysis, the article calls for critical legal scholarship that acknowledges the climate and energy law interface, allowing disciplinary convergence to develop between them.

There is currently no empirical evidence on whether or not the use of childlike sex dolls would prevent or encourage sexual abuse of children. Yet, more and more countries prohibit or contemplate prohibiting these objects, and the EU Commission also announced it would consider this issue in the context of the fight against child sexual abuse. This article describes and compares the laws and policies of five countries in which childlike sex dolls are currently banned: Australia, Germany, Denmark, Norway and the UK. These countries have adopted different approaches to dealing with the newly emerging phenomenon of childlike sex dolls: While in Australia, Germany and Denmark dedicated laws prohibiting these dolls are introduced, in Norway and the UK existing laws are applied to these objects. By juxtaposing and critically assessing the different approaches to prohibiting childlike sex dolls, the article aims to inspire and guide other countries that also contemplate legislative action in this context.

The ruling of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice in Case C-118/20 JY v. Wiener Landesregierung EU:C:2022:34 follows the judgments in Rottmann and Tjebbes. These cases concern the relationship between EU law and national citizenship. In particular, they deal with the compatibility of national authorities’ decisions on loss of nationality with the proportionality principle. The JY v. Wiener Landesregierung case highlights the contradictory nature of nationality law, which cannot be fully understood from a purely domestic perspective and yet remains within the sphere of Member States’ competences. Overall, the decision of the CJEU in JY v. Wiener Landesregierung leaves a bittersweet taste in EU lawyers’ mouths. On the one hand, the Court appears to implicitly make clear its aversion for certain national practices. In doing so, it ensures, in the case in question, a higher degree of protection of EU law-derived rights. On the other hand, the ruling does not adequately ensure sufficient safeguards for similar future cases. Finally, the Court seems to have missed a significant opportunity provided by the principle of mutual trust.