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Predicting Quality of Well-being Scores from the SF-36
Dennis G. Fryback, William F. Lawrence, Patricia A. Martin , [...]
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Abstract
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This paper examines how values should be assigned to health states when policy decisions must be made about who should receive treatment. The paper demonstrates that, if priority were to be assigned to those people who would benefit most from treatment, standard health-state utilities might fail to identify resource allocations that would maximize total health-related well-being in society. A new measurement instru ment is proposed that is based on the direct comparison of the well-being achieved by different people in various health states and thus captures such community priori ties. A sample of 72 health administration students used the instrument to evaluate speech and mobility dysfunctions as they afflicted hypothetical people who differed by gender, family status, and occupational type. This preliminary analysis indicates that the instrument is feasible to use, and that the valuations of respondents did, for some health conditions, significantly depend on the type of person afflicted. Key words: util ities ; interpersonal comparisons; ethics; health policy; extended-sympathy instrument.
Pliskin, Shepard, and Weinstein identified three preference conditions that ensure that quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) represent preferences over gambles over chronic health profiles. This paper presents an experimental test of the descriptive validity of two of these preference assumptions: utility independence and constant proportional tradeoff. Eighty students at the Stockholm School of Economics and 92 students at Erasmus University Rotterdam participated in the experiment. The results of the ex periment support the descriptive validity of constant proportional tradeoff: both within groups and between groups constant proportional tradeoff could not be rejected. The results are less supportive of the descriptive validity of utility independence. Within- groups utility independence was rejected. Between-groups utility independence could not be rejected, but this may have been due to a lack of statistical power. Analysis of the individual responses revealed that without adjustment for imprecision of preference, 39 respondents (22.8%) satisfied constant proportional tradeoff. Twenty-three respon dents (13.4%) satisfied utility independence without adjustment for imprecision of pref erence. However, because of the relative unfamiliarity of the respondents with both the health states to be evaluated and the methods of health-state-utility measurement, it is likely that the respondents' preferences were imprecise. Adjusted for imprecision of preference, the upper estimates of the proportions of respondents who satisfied constant proportional tradeoff and utility independence, respectively, were 90.1% (155 respondents) and 75.6% (130 respondents). Pliskin et al. further derived that if an individual's preferences satisfy both constant proportional tradeoff and utility indepen dence, then these preferences can be represented by a more general, risk-adjusted QALY model. Without adjustment for imprecision of preference, ten respondents (5.8%) satisfied both constant proportional tradeoff and utility independence. Adjusted for imprecision of preference, the upper estimate of the proportion of respondents who satisfied both constant proportional tradeoff and utility independence was 68.6% (118 respondents). The results of this study indicate that constant proportional tradeoff holds approximately. The evidence is much weaker for utility independence, however. This has important implications for the use of QALY-type measures in medical decision making.
Scaling instruments for the measurement of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) incor porate either a personal or an impersonal perspective on the benefits of a health intervention and either do or do not incorporate considerations of equity. This paper sets out three hypotheses concerning perspective and equity: 1) that more equally distributed benefits will be preferred to less equally distributed benefits; 2) that the preference value elicited for a health benefit will be greater when the respondent to a QALY questionnaire is a potential beneficiary; and 3) that, by comparison with personal preferences, individuals will be more concerned with the quantity than the quality of life in other people. These hypotheses were tested using two existing instruments and two other instruments that were created for this study. Results gave no support to the third hypothesis; some support to the first hypothesis, and strong support for the sec ond hypothesis. It is concluded that perspective can significantly alter the values in corporated in a QALY instrument. The policy implications of the results are twofold. First, they give some support to the view that distributional consequences of health programs are of importance to the population and that they should be included in the evaluation of any health program. Second, they indicate that an evaluation should consider whether the health-state values to be obtained should incorporate an imper sonal perspective reflecting the purely "social" judgment of a health planner or a per spective reflecting self-interest.
The authors conducted a study exploring whether preferences for sequences of events can be approximated by preferences for component discrete states. Visual-analog- scale (VAS) and standard-gamble (SG) scores for a subset of the possible sequences of events (path states) and component temporary and chronic outcomes (discrete states) that can follow prenatal diagnostic decisions were elicited from 121 pregnant women facing a choice between chorionic villus sampling and amniocentesis. For in dividuals, preference scores for path states could not be predicted easily from discrete- state scores. Mean path-state VAS scores, however, were predicted reasonably ac curately by multiple regression models (R2 = 0.85 and 0.82 for two different anchoring schemes), with most measured scores lying within the 95% confidence intervals of the derived scores. It is concluded that, for individual patient decision making, preferences for path states should be elicited. When mean preference values for a population are sought, however, it may be reasonable to derive regression weights from a subset of respondents and then to apply those weights to preferences for discrete states elicited from a larger group.
This study illustrates the use of consensus theory to assess the diagnostic perform ances of raters and to estimate case diagnoses in the absence of a criterion or "gold" standard. A description is provided of how consensus theory "pools" information pro vided by raters, estimating rater competencies and differentially weighting their re sponses. Although the model assumes that raters respond without bias (i.e., sensitivity = specificity), a Monte Carlo simulation with 1,200 data sets shows that model esti mates appear to be robust even with bias. The model is illustrated on a set of elbow radiographs, and consensus-model estimates are compared with those obtained from follow-up data. Results indicate that with high rater competencies, the model retrieves accurate estimates of competency and case diagnoses even when raters' responses are biased.
This research investigated the effect of computer-assisted test interpretation (CATI) on physicians' readings of electrocardiograms (ECGs). The authors used an experimental method based on direct observations of 22 cardiologists, each reading 80 ECGs, for a total of 1,760 (of which 1,745 were used in the study). There were 40 sets of clini cally-matched pairs of ECGs, one with CATI and one without. Reading time was ob served and interpretation accuracy was measured by criterion-referenced aggregate scoring. To control for potential biases, the findings were subjected to multivariate analyses using ordinary least-squares regressions. The impact of CATI on cardiolo gists' readings of ECGs is demonstrably beneficial: the main empirical conclusion of this study is that, compared with conventional interpretation, the use of computer- assisted interpretation of ECGs cuts physician time by an average of 28% and signif icantly improves the concordance of the physician's interpretation with the expert benchmark, without increasing the false-positive rate. Moreover, CATI is the most ac curate and saves the most time when the ECGs have many unambiguous diagnoses. Given that computers alone cannot perform the task of cardiovascular diagnosis, and that cardiologists' ECG interpretations are greatly enhanced by ubiquitous CATI tech nology, it appears that the best approach is one that combines person and machine.
The Markov process is a useful tool for modeling the natural history of disease, which is becoming increasingly important as new diagnostic tests increase the detectability of early-stage disease. The accuracy of a Markov model, however, depends on the accuracy of the estimates for the transition probabilities between different stages of disease. Because these estimates are usually based on "expert opinion" or small cohort studies, they are subject to imprecision and bias. The authors describe an alternative method of estimating transition probabilities from the stage distribution of disease observed at the time of death and age-specific mortality rates from other causes. In addition, they prove that the transition probabilities are unique given certain assumptions about how they change with age. Finally, they illustrate the method using population-based data for prostate cancer.
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis, which yields indices of accuracy such as the area under the curve (AUC), is increasingly being used to evaluate the performances of diagnostic tests that produce results on continuous scales. Both par ametric and nonparametric ROC approaches are available to assess the discriminant capacity of such tests, but there are no clear guidelines as to the merits of each, particularly with non-binormal data. Investigators may worry that when data are non- Gaussian, estimates of diagnostic accuracy based on a binormal model may be dis torted. The authors conducted a Monte Carlo simulation study to compare the bias and sampling variability in the estimates of the AUCs derived from parametric and nonparametric procedures. Each approach was assessed in data sets generated from various configurations of pairs of overlapping distributions; these included the binormal model and non-binormal pairs of distributions where one or both pair members were mixtures of Gaussian (MG) distributions with different degrees of departures from bi- normality. The biases in the estimates of the AUCs were found to be very small for both parametric and nonparametric procedures. The two approaches yielded very close estimates of the AUCs and of the corresponding sampling variability even when data were generated from non-binormal models. Thus, for a wide range of distributions, concern about bias or imprecision of the estimates of the AUC should not be a major factor in choosing between the nonparametric and parametric approaches.
Test-indication curves (TiCs) are tools for determining whether a test is indicated for a given patient. They apply the threshold approach of Pauker and Kassirer in graphic form. These curves are composed of two parts: the raw curve, which plots posttest probability versus pretest probability (given values for specificity and sensitivity); and the final curve, in which three straight lines are added to the raw curve by the clinician to generate a TIC for a given treatment threshold. In the final curve, the complete range of pretest probability is segregated into three zones, corresponding to the three groups described by Pauker and Kassirer: those patients in whom disease is assumed to be present and who are thus best treated empirically; at the other extreme, those who require neither testing nor treatment; and, finally, those in the middle, for whom the test is indicated, since the decision to treat would be based on the test result. Thus the clinician could consult the TIC and determine with certainty whether the test should be employed for a given patient. It also could be modified with ease for a different patient, with a different set of threshold values. TICs provide a complete, visual inter pretation of a test's diagnostic power, in the context of a given treatment threshold. They foster an intuitive comprehension of Pauker and Kassirer's method, and offer the clinician a facile means to prove that a test is indicated in a given setting. By promoting the use of exactly those tests that are indicated, TICs can help spare the patient the cost, burden, and risk of unnecessary testing, and help spare the physician the cost, burden, and risk of interpreting inconclusive test results.
Cost-effectiveness (CE) ratios vary considerably, not only across interventions, but within single interventions. Using a simple decision-tree model of the treat-vs no-treat decision to organize the analysis, four potential errors leading to these within-treatment differences in CE ratios are identified. These errors arise from estimates relating to 1) prior probabilities of disease; 2) treatment efficacies; 3) costs of treatment; and 4) patient preferences. Systematic biases, where present, suggest overuse of medical interventions. For diagnostic tests, two additional potential sources of error are con sidered (using a simple decision tree incorporating both test and treat decisions). These involve 5) sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic test and 6) inappropriate choice of "cutoff" to determine abnormal patients, in part arising from errors in esti mating prior probability of disease.


