International Journal of Mass Emergencies & Disasters

In this article we very briefly review the history of sociobehavioral disaster research in Japan which is mostly a poet 1970 undertaking. Examples of recent major studies are given. While the work has been relatively limited so far, the future appears promising.

This paper examines the operations of mass media in disasters, the content of messages in disaster reporting, and the distortion in reporting warnings and disasters, based on empirical studies in several communities in Japan.

In the warning stage, we found that the broadcast media are the primary source of information in most cases. However, the warnings often did not reach a complete range of audience, nor could it induce an adaptive response among these recipients.

As for the mass media operation during and after the disasters, we found that the difficulties in mobilizing resources, uncertainties in reliable news sources, and malfuntioning communication channels were the main obstacles in reporting damages.

The main characteristics of the content of mass media reporting in disasters are described. Six types of information are found in the disaster reporting of the broadcast media: Information on (1) advice or directions, (2) disaster agent, (3) safety message, (4) damage, (5) countermeasures, and (6) restoration. The results of the content analysis of the broadcast of two stations on the day of the Nihonkai-Chuubu Earthquake shows that personal messages and damages information were the most heavily broadcast. This did not always match the information needs of the residents.

The media in Japan tend to exaggerate damages in disasters, leading to the distorted perception of hazards. They also tend not to report sufficiently the news people want to get. The reasons for these inaccurate reportings are: (1) journalist's attitude to news editing and reporting, and (2) distorted images or myths among journalists. The content of newspaper reporting of a false warning was analyzed as a case study.

Major earthquakes were predicted on both sides of the Pacific in Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan, and the state of California, the United States, at roughly the same time. These predictions differ from those made previously in that (1) the location, scale, and likelihood in a given timeframe have been specified; (2) the predictions for both regions have been taken seriously by the governments; and (3) there has been an unprecedented increase in earthquake concern among the area's residents.

In the present study, the American and Japanese reactions to these earthquake predictions are compared in terms of earthquake policy and the impact on residents’ lifestyles.

Conclusins are that (1) there is a major difference in the time, money, and energy spent on earthquake policy, Shizuoka being far better prepared than California; (2) Tokai earthquake policy is premised on the assumption of short-term predictability, but California policy is not; and (3) Shizuoka residents are ahead of Californians in earthquake preparedness, but public earthquake awareness is growing steadily in California, and should be considerably enhanced in the near future.

Three simulation models with different areas of application are developed in this report to predict the risk posed by the rapid return to their homes of people around terminal stations immediately after earthquake warnings issued in daytime. These are also useful tools to evaluate the effectiveness of measures to mitigate the risk. The applications of these models to several terminal stations and train lines with many passengers were carried out and the results indicate the following:

1. Around 30–40 percent of the people around terminal stations should walk home.

2. Those who intend to take trains should go to terminal stations three or four hours ahead of the time they might otherwise need.

3. Strong traffic control at passages and wicket gates should be undertaken by police officers and station staff as soon as possible.

4. It is very important to make an “earthquake diagram” and to keep it as available as possible.

5. Public officers involved in the planning for the prevention of disasters should build “information bases” at terminal stations to announce various types of information to waiting passengers after earthquake warnings have been issued.

6. Finally, public officers and managers of businesses around terminal stations should inform people for whom they are responsible, about the circumstances anticipated and the measures mentioned above.

To have a national methodology for pre-earthquake planning, a model for predicting the post-earthquake behavior of city lifeline systems was developed. We discussed three factors in the model: structural damage, functional damage, and the restoration process after the earthquake. The restoration process is basically described by a differential equation applicable to a service area represented by a census mesh, and is applied to the lifelines (i.e., supply systems of gas, electric power, and water) of Sendai city in Japan. The model, in addition, indicates the lifeline network properties, and serviceability indices are defined in order to assess the functional damage of each system. In the case of the 1978 Off-myagi earthquake, a computer simulation of the restoration process was carried out by using step by step calculations and the Monte Carlo method. The simulated results, using indices as a function of time, were well in agreement with actual results, which indicates that the model is capable of predicting the restoration process. Through further simulations which varied the restoration strategies of the Emergency Headquarters, we show that the recovery of the gas system is sensitively affected by the strategy used. However, the electric power and the water systems were more influenced by the network properties rather than the strategies used. Our approach can provide useful information in undertaking pre-earthquake countermeasures for city lifeline systems.

We first discuss psychological response and coping behavior in disaster situations. We confirm earlier findings that people have a tendency to interpret the signs of danger within their daily context and to underestimate the possibility of a disaster. It is suggested that the repetitive and consistent information would help to induce adaptive responses. The typical coping patterns found were: (1) information gathering behavior, (2) activities closely related to one's family, (3) preventive or protective behaviors, and (4) self protection by moving. We found the following six psychological determinants of coping behavior: (1) recognizing the seriousness of the situation, (2) knowing appropriate behavior for the situation faced, (3) expecting the projected coping response to be feasible, (4) perceiving the cost and reward of acting, (5) feeling of imminence of danger and, (6) the state of emotion of those involved.

In the last part of the article we examine evacuation behavior in particular, based on our surveys in four communities in Japan. The central factors which determine evacuation decisions were: (1) direct perception of threat, (2) exposure to the evacuation advice, (3) factors relating to family, (4) community preparedness, and (5) ’ demographic charactersties. We distinguish three basic phases in the evacuation process, that is, the timing of evacuation, the choice of transportation, and the sheltering activity. Threat conditions, exposure to evacuation advice, and one's location were found to relate to the timing of evacuation. Most people evacuated by car. No consistent pattern was found in the choice of shelters.

This research studied human behavior in the great Sakata Fire. The fire, fanned by a violent wind at the time, burned continuously in the center of the city for about 12 hours. Although it rained that night, the fire was massive and spread extensively.

The research focus was on: (1) the recognition of the fire: about what time was it noted, how the fire was reported, and what were the early forecasts about it; (2) the behavior of people seeking refuge: the period of preparation for refuge, the state of the fire at the time, what people thought of doing and how; (3) information: the means used to obtain information about the fire, and rumor behavior; and (4) social disorganization: whether or not there was panic and looting behavior, details about it, and reasons why it occurred.

The fire spread at a speed of about 100 m/h, which was rather slow in spite of the strong wind. This condition is considered as the reason for the relatively smooth evacuation of people, the lack of any great panic, and the few deaths and injuries.

This paper deals with how occupants respond and why they are exposed to casualty risk in an earthquake. It is based upon field data obtained by means of questionnaire and interview in recent large earthquakes in Japan. Major results obtained are: (1) the most significant factor which governs their responses is seismic intensity and (2) multiplicity of behavioral patterns at and after an earthquake can be well interpreted by taking account of personal characteristics and surrounding circumstances.