International Migration Review

This article argues that an “invisibility bargain” constrains migrants’ identities and political participation, demanding their economic contributions plus political and social invisibility in exchange for tolerance of their presence in the host country. In response, migrants negotiate their visible identity differences, minimize social distance from the host population, and build informal coalitions with non-state brokers to avoid citizen backlash against overt political activism. Examining Colombian forced migrants in Ecuador, the article challenges state-centric governance approaches, underscoring migrant agency in negotiating identity to influence social hierarchies, coexistence, and human security. Its findings advance the broader understanding of migration in the Global South.

This article argues that an “invisibility bargain” constrains migrants’ identities and political participation, demanding their economic contributions plus political and social invisibility in exchange for tolerance of their presence in the host country. In response, migrants negotiate their visible identity differences, minimize social distance from the host population, and build informal coalitions with non-state brokers to avoid citizen backlash against overt political activism. Examining Colombian forced migrants in Ecuador, the article challenges state-centric governance approaches, underscoring migrant agency in negotiating identity to influence social hierarchies, coexistence, and human security. Its findings advance the broader understanding of migration in the Global South.

While immigrants may value their ethnic identities, the symbolic boundaries in many European nations are drawn in an exclusive manner, presenting ethnic identification as incompatible with host national belonging. Combining boundary drawing and contact theory, this article examines whether — in a context of exclusive boundary drawing — contact can lead to more inclusive boundary perceptions and foster identity compatibility. The analysis employs survey and interview data from Denmark, which is taken as a case of exclusive boundary drawing. Demonstrating both positive effects and the limits of contact in such a context, the article offers a critical assessment of contact's potential and contributes to nuancing our understanding of macro and micro conditions of immigrant identity.

While immigrants may value their ethnic identities, the symbolic boundaries in many European nations are drawn in an exclusive manner, presenting ethnic identification as incompatible with host national belonging. Combining boundary drawing and contact theory, this article examines whether — in a context of exclusive boundary drawing — contact can lead to more inclusive boundary perceptions and foster identity compatibility. The analysis employs survey and interview data from Denmark, which is taken as a case of exclusive boundary drawing. Demonstrating both positive effects and the limits of contact in such a context, the article offers a critical assessment of contact's potential and contributes to nuancing our understanding of macro and micro conditions of immigrant identity.

Now is the time for social scientists to focus an analytical lens on the new third generation to see what their experiences reveal about post‐1965 assimilation. This paper is a first step. We compare the household characteristics of post‐1965, second‐generation Latino and Asian children in 1980 to a “new third generation” in 2010. Today's new third generation is growing up in households headed by parents who have higher socioeconomic attainment; that are more likely to be headed by intermarried parents; that are less likely to contain extended family; and that, when living with intermarried parents, are more likely to have children identified with a Hispanic or Asian label compared to second‐generation children growing in 1980. We use these findings to inform a larger research agenda for studying the new third generation.

Now is the time for social scientists to focus an analytical lens on the new third generation to see what their experiences reveal about post‐1965 assimilation. This paper is a first step. We compare the household characteristics of post‐1965, second‐generation Latino and Asian children in 1980 to a “new third generation” in 2010. Today's new third generation is growing up in households headed by parents who have higher socioeconomic attainment; that are more likely to be headed by intermarried parents; that are less likely to contain extended family; and that, when living with intermarried parents, are more likely to have children identified with a Hispanic or Asian label compared to second‐generation children growing in 1980. We use these findings to inform a larger research agenda for studying the new third generation.

Recent research theorizes a widening sociopolitical gap between undocumented and documented immigrants — but also between citizens and noncitizens generally — with implications for mobility. How might legal inequality influence educational outcomes? Largely due to data constraints, much existing research is unable to distinguish between legal statuses. Yet, legal status may help explain inconsistent findings of “immigrant advantage” among Latinos. Using survey data from Latino young adults in California, I explore how legal status impacts high school completion, post‐secondary enrollment, and labor market expectations. I find evidence of undocumented disadvantage and citizenship advantage in completion and enrollment, but no differences in expectations. Findings suggest that scholars should pay closer attention to the role of legal background in shaping mobility.

Recent research theorizes a widening sociopolitical gap between undocumented and documented immigrants — but also between citizens and noncitizens generally — with implications for mobility. How might legal inequality influence educational outcomes? Largely due to data constraints, much existing research is unable to distinguish between legal statuses. Yet, legal status may help explain inconsistent findings of “immigrant advantage” among Latinos. Using survey data from Latino young adults in California, I explore how legal status impacts high school completion, post‐secondary enrollment, and labor market expectations. I find evidence of undocumented disadvantage and citizenship advantage in completion and enrollment, but no differences in expectations. Findings suggest that scholars should pay closer attention to the role of legal background in shaping mobility.

This study examines theories of Muslim minority integration as these apply to republican France and multicultural Canada, using data on psychological distress as a key measure. Based on the 2001–2002 Canadian Community Health Survey and the 2008 French Enquête sur la Santé et la Protection Sociale, we find Muslim minorities experience higher levels of psychological distress than non-Muslims, not only in France but also in Canada. The Muslim difference is unrelated to religious attachment and rather is partly explained by high rates of unemployment or labor market inactivity.

In 2014, Thailand experienced the mass exodus of 220,000 Cambodian migrant workers, an event precipitated by a military coup and rumors of an impending migrant crackdown. This movement was reportedly the largest in South‐East Asia since the 1970s. Yet while the mass returns were outwardly articulated as a “crisis” moment, migrants largely understood the exodus as a more extreme version of the everyday. The most significant features of the exodus—financial loss, indebtedness, involuntary immobility, and fear of violence and deportation—have been and continue to be regular features of the Cambodian–Thai migration system. In light of these findings, I suggest that taking migration disruptions seriously requires (1) decentering the language and logic of “crisis” and (2) considering what migration disruptions reveal about ordinary times.

In 2014, Thailand experienced the mass exodus of 220,000 Cambodian migrant workers, an event precipitated by a military coup and rumors of an impending migrant crackdown. This movement was reportedly the largest in South‐East Asia since the 1970s. Yet while the mass returns were outwardly articulated as a “crisis” moment, migrants largely understood the exodus as a more extreme version of the everyday. The most significant features of the exodus—financial loss, indebtedness, involuntary immobility, and fear of violence and deportation—have been and continue to be regular features of the Cambodian–Thai migration system. In light of these findings, I suggest that taking migration disruptions seriously requires (1) decentering the language and logic of “crisis” and (2) considering what migration disruptions reveal about ordinary times.

Courts are influential actors during the implementation of immigration policies in liberal democracies. The “liberal paradox” thesis stipulates that courts are driven by logics that hamper restrictionist immigration policies. This study contributes to this theory by exploring the norm construction of impartiality among judicial workers in Swedish migration courts when deciding asylum appeals. Its findings contradict the liberal paradox assumption that courts act according to inner logics that benefit immigrants’ rights. At Sweden’s migration courts, judicial workers show impartiality by using a skeptical approach to asylum applicants and do so to distance themselves from the political discourse of generosity that has dominated Swedish political debate for decades. The broader implications of these findings are that immigration policy theories can benefit from qualitative research exploring informal norm constructions in courts, as such work can offer new insights about the role of courts in the implementation of immigration policies.

Drawing on postdeportation surveys (N = 1,109) with Mexican migrants, we examine the impact of immigration enforcement programs and various social factors on repeat migration intentions. Our multivariate analyses suggest immigrants with strong personal ties to the United States have higher relative odds of intending to cross the border again, even when controlling modes of removal from the United States. Our findings highlight the inevitable failure of immigration policy and enforcement programs when placed against the powerful pull of family and home. These findings shed greater insight on the complex nature of unauthorized migration in an era of increased securitization and deportation.

The purpose of this study was to determine the differences between natives and immigrants in regard to transition probabilities among health states in self-rated health (SRH), depression, and activities of daily living for middle-aged and older adults in Europe. The Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement allows us to investigate how successfully the immigrants have aged from 2004 to 2011 compared to natives, according to country of origin and age at migration. We showed that some groups, such as Eastern European immigrants, have higher probabilities of health deterioration in terms of SRH. Moreover, those immigrants who arrived in the host country during adulthood experienced relatively fast health decline.

Using household surveys for 25 countries over a 12-year period, this paper investigates why the elderly are more averse to open immigration policies than their younger peers. We find that the negative correlation between age and pro-immigration attitudes is mostly explained by a cohort or generational change. In fact, once we control for year of birth, the correlation between age and pro-immigration attitudes is either positive or zero in most of the countries of our sample. Under certain assumptions, our estimates suggest that aging societies will tend to become less averse to open immigration regimes over time.