National Institute Economic Review

I argue that the offsetting effect of public pension contributions on household retirement saving depends on how closely the public pension programme imitates a private retirement saving plan (i.e. the ‘actuarial’ content of the public pension programme)–the closer the design of the programme to a private retirement saving plan, the higher the offset. I estimate the determinants of household saving rates in a cross–country panel, augmenting standard measures of public pension programme generosity and cost by indicators that proxy the actuarial component of the programme. These indicators affect saving rates as predicted.

This study examines the saving and insurance behaviour of 386 Boston University (BU) employees who volunteered to receive financial planning based on ESPlanner (Economic Security Planner)–a detailed life-cycle financial planning model developed by Economic Security Planning, Inc. Because the employees received their own financial plan, they had a strong incentive to provide full and accurate financial information. Hence, the data appear to be of particularly high quality for studying saving and life insurance decisions.

ESPlanner recommends annual levels of consumption, saving, and life insurance holdings that smooth a household's living standard through time subject to the household not exceeding its self-ascribed borrowing limit. The programme treats housing and special expenditures as ‘off-the-top’, adjusts for economies in shared living and the relative costs of raising children, makes highly detailed tax and Social Security benefit calculations, and permits users who don't want a stable living standard to specify how they'd like their living standards to change through time.

Our findings are striking. First, the correlation between ESPlanner's saving and insurance prescriptions and the actual decisions being made by BU employees is very weak in the case of saving and essentially zero in the case of life insurance. Many employees are spending far more and saving far less than they should, while others are under-spending and oversaving. The same holds for life insurance. The degree of under-insurance seems particularly acute. Almost 13 per cent of those BU spouses who are secondary earners would experience a 40 per cent or greater drop in their living standards were their spouses to pass away in the near future. Another 13 per cent would experience a 20 to 40 per cent drop. Second, planning shortcomings are as common among high-income professors with significant financial knowledge as they are among low-income staff with limited financial knowledge. Third, two thirds of BU employees are not in a position to smooth their living standards without exceeding their debt limits.

We set out a framework for measuring the adequacy of saving in the United Kingdom by assessing the absolute level of savings based on individual preferences of different ages. We examine this relationship between age and savings using data from the Expenditure and Food Survey 2004–5. We show that, while the level of national saving is about 8.4 percentage points of net national income lower than is required if one assumes that each cohort pays its own way, wealth holdings are considerably higher than are required on the same basis. Looking at household, rather than national saving, the current pattern of benefits on public sector pensions removes the need to save for old age. While perhaps £4000m of household wealth holding can be accounted for by bequest and other transfer motives, our results suggest excess wealth holding of around £1600m in 2004.

We generalise the standard joy-of-giving bequest motive by including inter vivos gifts. Within a life-cycle framework, we analyse the implications of the choice of different discount factors for the utility of gifts and bequests. For a linear utility of giving, we characterise the gift and bequest pattern of a liquidity constrained individual over the life-cycle. We find that discounting at the interest rate is very convenient as the linear utility parameter can be interpreted as a summary measure for the strength of the motive of giving, net of all gift and bequest timing issues over the life-cycle.