New Perspectives

There is a substantial literature in the tradition of constructivism and sociological new institutionalism that suggests the existence of shared EU norms. Yet, the issue of how EU norms are adopted and/or contested in EU member states remains underexamined. In the paper, we therefore study the public discourse on citizenship in Latvia and examine how the discourse relates to EU norms on citizenship, minority rights and in the broader sense human rights. The analysis takes its empirical starting point in the period after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and focuses on how the issue of statelessness was discussed in the Latvian online media. Looking at how the contested term (‘statelessness’) achieves different meanings in the Latvian discourse, and how the domestic actors try to reformulate the EU norms in question, we aim at a better understanding of the diffusion of norms within the context of a regional organization. The conclusion indicates that apart from the EU human rights norm, there are several different articulations of statelessness (i.e. othering, security and instrumental) that are present in the discourse. This has enabled Latvian governments to stress their commitment to human rights promotion, while simultaneously facing criticism regarding the country’s stateless inhabitants.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a rupture point in European politics of a kind not seen since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The effects on the human, military, energy and environmental security of Central and Eastern Europe have been dramatic, but ideational factors are proving to be as significant as material ones. Conflicting understandings of shared history are shaping the course of the war in Ukraine and its effects on the rest of Europe, underscoring the status of Russia as the other against which European societies construct their identity. As a result, in the rest of Europe as well as in Ukraine itself, Ukrainian identity is now increasingly seen as European, and European identity is understood to include Ukraine. At the same time, a collective focus on this reshaping of identity is muting some of the most urgent questions about the limits of European liberalism and democracy.

Is polarisation a fundamental threat to the open society? Are the divisions that run through societies and separate them into two (or more) more or less hostile groups problems to be solved? Or are they the corollaries of a vibrant democratic system that might legitimately be called an ‘open society’? These are the questions I seek to explore in this contribution to the special issue. My argument unfolds through a reinterpretation of Karl Popper’s conception of open society as a democratic idea, characterised by an appreciation of genuine human plurality and diversity that make ‘critical encounters with the other side’ possible (and desirable); this conception of open society also recognises the progressive potential of social and political conflicts. For that reason, political polarisation cannot be regarded as a lethal threat to open societies. By contrast, ‘belief polarisation’, with its Manichean orientation and anti-political tendencies, is a much more serious threat. It follows that advocates of open society should avoid the temptation to solve the ‘problem’ of political polarisation – they should accept it as the price to be paid for the ‘imperfect ideal’ of open society. However, they should take steps to reduce belief polarisation through the active creation of spaces of critical encounters with the other side.

The overarching aim of the article, then, is to make a contribution to both the literature on open society and polarisation. To that end, I will bring the concept of open society and the phenomenon of polarisation into a relationship of reciprocal elucidation: through the engagement with open society, I will shine some light on polarisation, and through the analysis of polarisation, I will put flesh on the concept of open society.

This text elucidates some of the uses and connotations of the word “sorosoid,” which has recently permeated the public discourse in Bulgaria, used to refer to individuals and organizations affiliated with Soros’ Open Society Foundation. I am particularly interested in the inflection “-oid,” which seeks to echo the word “humanoid.” In other words, my specific concern is with strategies of dehumanization of neoliberals in Bulgaria, whereby the fundamental values of open society in this country are challenged. The paper provides a glimpse of some key ideological attitudes in one of Europe’s post-communist democracies.

The anti-gender movements began in the West but have thus far been most influential and governmentally supported in Hungary, Poland and Russia. Anti-genderism has served multiple functions to entrench what proponents label as traditional values, while promoting specific class and racialised interests in the cloak of rejecting both the communist past and Western European political and social expectations. Why did anti-genderism develop and become pronounced in otherwise different post-communist countries? This article traces the origins of these movements based on news coverage and scholarly sources, arguing that anti-gender movements signal authoritarian trends and thus matter deeply for open, democratic societies. The Hungarian, Polish and Russian cases offer similar but distinct variations in the political trajectory of their respective movements, highlighting the feedback between conservative, expressively patriarchal, and populist forces and their embracing of anti-genderism.