Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights

In the past decade or so, vulnerability has become a fairly prominent concept in human rights law. It has evolved from being an underlying notion to an explicit concept. This column takes stock of vulnerability's relationship to, and possible influence on human rights law, assessing the concept's potential and pitfalls. It focuses on the not altogether unrelated issues of migrants’ social rights and on the role of human rights in environmental protection. The discussion commences with a reflection on the potential of vulnerability to re-interrogate those aspects of the human rights paradigm that relate to environmental protection. The next section focuses on the potential of vulnerability to enhance migrants’ social rights within human rights law. Subsequently, it focuses on the pitfalls and the difficulties of the vulnerability concept. It concludes by offering an outlook for the future of the concept.

While UN treaty bodies have sought to address forms of oppression resulting from the intersection of gender, race and/or disability through their practice, they rarely recognise the experience of groups at the intersection of other social categories. This article uses the lens of intersectionality to analyse the practice of UN treaty bodies in relation to the intersection of minority and refugee status. We argue that while minority-refugees have fled persecution connected to their minority status, UN treaty bodies have failed to appreciate the impact of their location at the intersection of persons belonging to minorities and refugees in host States on their right to preserve their cultural identity. By failing to address the distinct experience of minority-refugees, UN treaty bodies risk participating in their oppression. Further, we reveal that current practice not only has potentially negative consequences for minority-refugees – as both individuals and groups – and for the host society but may even undermine the ability of IHRL to achieve its overarching objectives.

Undercover police operations have emerged from the shadows and into the spotlight in the United Kingdom as a result of a public inquiry into undercover policing and the enactment of the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act. The inquiry has revealed troubling details about the ways intelligence and police services have wielded their powers to infiltrate and undermine political groups and social movements over the course of five decades. The problem is not exclusive to the United Kingdom, but is seen the world over. Yet despite the widescale nature of the problem, the legality of agents provocateurs – undercover officers who infiltrate social and political movements to manipulate their messaging, instigate violent tactics and undermine public perception – has received scant attention in legal scholarship or the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This article capitalises on the current spotlight to suggest that agents provocateurs can and should be conceived of as (potential) violations of the right to freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights. A purposive approach is required to ensure protection for not only the means of expression – the exchange of information and ideas – but also the ends – vibrant democratic discourse and meaningful public debate.