OMEGA - Journal of Death and Dying

Throughout recorded history, a series of seemingly unrelated ideas have been consistently intertwined: suicide, euthanasia, infanticide, eugenics, genocide and, most recently, the practice termed physician-assisted suicide. From Plato and Hippocrates to a pair of twentieth-century American physicians named Haiselden and Kevorkian, an examination of history shows these disparate notions always involve two troublesome questions: Which lives are not worth living? And who will decide? The same examination of history teaches that separating the worthy from the not worthy is a very dangerous proposition, especially for those whose lives are deemed marginal.

Jack Kevorkian criticizes the Hippocratic tradition in Greek medicine, which bans the physician from giving his patient a lethal medication. He sees this prohibition as potentially bringing harm to a suffering patient and not reflective of the larger Greek society which was tolerant and even approving of suicide. However, Kevorkian's advocacy of doctor-assisted suicide can be seen as the polarity of doctor abandonment of the suffering patient rather than as an antidote to it. Both positions involve an outcome of physician removal from the suffering patient, which can be contrasted with Maimonides' command to the physician to watch over the life and death of his patients.

The present study concentrates on the attitudes of high school students toward active doctor-assisted suicide as described in hypothetical doctor-patient scenarios, orthogonally manipulating doctor's reaction to patient's wishes to end his/her life (whether discussed, accepted or encouraged), presence of patient's physical pain, presence of patient's emotional pain, and the gender of the hypothetical patient. Doctor-assisted suicides thoroughly discussed with the patient are judged to be more moral, acceptable, and “legal” than assisted suicides that are simply accepted by the doctor or actively encouraged by him. Significantly, this is not a distinction that is relevant in the eyes of the law. Further, the presence of both physical and emotional pain on the part of the patient make the patient death more acceptable in the eyes of high school students. This latter effect is striking, given the result of the Wooddell and Kaplan (1999–2000) study showing that patient depression tends to weaken acceptability of death. Finally, respondents, both male and female, tend to view deaths of patients of the opposite gender as more acceptable than patients of the same gender.

Ninety-six students were presented with eighteen different vignettes describing different types of active and passive observed suicide, assisted suicide, and euthanasia. Attitudes regarding the morality and desired legality of each situation were measured. Results indicate that the interaction between the doctor and the patient, and, to a lesser extent, the active or passive nature of the agent of death, were more important than the actual actions of the doctor in allowing or causing death to occur.

Michigan public opinion on Doctor Assisted Suicide (DAS) was assessed in January 1997 (N = 603). Asked if they would consider DAS for themselves, two-thirds would if being kept alive by a machine or were experiencing chronic pain; one-half would if they experienced a loss in mobility or independence, became a burden to others, or were diagnosed with a terminal disease; and one-third would if they were incontinent or going to a nursing home. A series of demographic and attitudinal comparisons were made for support for the concept of DAS and as a hypothetical consideration for oneself. The highest support for the concept of DAS was found among the following: men eighteen to twenty-four years old, some college education, $35–60,000/year income, Caucasian, Democrat, liberal, Protestant, and frequent church attendee. The highest self-consideration of DAS was found among the following: men, fifty to fifty-five years old, post-graduate education, $35–60,000/year income, Caucasian, Democrat, liberal, Protestant, and infrequent church attendee.

Pharmacists are in a critical position when pharmaceutical agents are prescribed for the purpose of physician-assisted suicide and/or euthanasia and they may need to decide whether dispensing a lethal dose of a medication is ethically and morally acceptable for a patient. In many cases, pharmacists may not even be aware that prescriptions are intended for physician-assisted suicide and/or euthanasia. Pharmacists have a special responsibility to protect patients who are contemplating end-of-life decisions such as physician- assisted suicide and euthanasia. Pharmaceutical care (“Responsible provision of drug therapy for the purpose of achieving definite outcomes that improve a patient's quality of life … ”) requires that the pharmacist not only understands the medications but also the individual patient and the complexities of their lives and suffering. Only in this way can pharmacists provide safe and effective use of medications for the patients they serve.

A number of assumptions underlying the debate over physician-assisted suicide (PAS) deserve closer scrutiny. It is often implicitly assumed that decisions as to the competency of the patient to request PAS can be accurately made, and that the treating physician's values and intrapsychic conflicts can be successfully separated from the decision to accede to or reject the patient's request. This article argues that in such an emotionally-laden decision, such factors may play a significant role, and that even were PAS to gain widespread acceptance, ignoring them may lead to errors in classifying patients either as appropriate or inappropriate for PAS.

This article examines biomedical and psychosocial data on the first forty-seven cases of physician-assisted suicides (PAS) of Kevorkian as collected by means of both a physical autopsy and a preliminary psychological autopsy. The following patterns emerge: 1) The physical condition of these PAS patients was not typical of the conditions that lead to death in the United States. 2) Consistent with the above findings, our pilot data indicate that only 31.1 percent of these patients were terminal. While 73.9 percent were described as reporting pain, only 42.6 percent were revealed at autopsy to have a specific anatomical basis for their pain. However 36 percent were described as depressed, 66 percent as having some disability, and perhaps of key importance, 90 percent expressed a fear of dependency. Most important, our pilot data suggest the possibility of large gender differences, since 3) 68.1 percent of these forty-seven PAS's are women and only 31.9 percent are men. This represents the reverse of the gender pattern for completed suicides in the United States in 1995, resembling instead the approximate pattern for unsuccessful suicide attempts. 4) Approximately 75 percent of both men and women in the above sample were described as reporting pain. Men were almost twice as likely to have had an anatomical basis for the pain and three times as likely to be terminal. Our pilot data indicate PAS women are more likely to be described as depressed and twice as likely to have had a history of previous unsuccessful suicide attempts. 5) Kevorkian's patients were older than the typical unaided suicides in America. Reported pain decreases with age as does depression; however anatomical basis for pain increases slightly with age, and no age effect emerges for terminality. 6) Approximately two-thirds of these physician-assisted suicides were at middle SES levels. History of disability was the biggest risk factor for the low SES patients and fear of dependency for the high SES patients.

This study examines the seventy-five suicide cases Dr. Jack Kevorkian acknowledged assisting during the period between 1990 and 1997. Although these cases represent a range of regional and occupational backgrounds, a significant majority are women. Most of these individuals had a disabling, chronic, nonterminal-stage illness. In five female cases, the medical examiner found no evidence of disease whatsoever. About half of the women were between the ages of forty-one and sixty, and another third were older adults. In contrast, men were almost as likely to be middle-aged as to be older adults. Men's conditions were somewhat less likely than women's to be chronic and nonterminal-stage. The main reasons for the hastened death mentioned by both the person and their significant others were having disabilities, being in pain, and fear of being a burden. The predominance of women among Kevorkian's assisted suicides contrasts with national trends in suicide mortality, where men are a clear majority. It is possible that individuals whose death was hastened by Kevorkian are not representative of physician-assisted suicide cases around the country, because of Kevorkian's unique approach. Alternatively, the preponderance of women among Kevorkian's assisted suicides may represent a real phenomenon. One possibility is that, in the United States, assisted suicide is particularly acceptable for women. Individual, interpersonal, social, economic, and cultural factors encouraging assisted suicide in women are examined.

This report presents an update of the Kevorkian-Reding physician-assisted (or physician-aided) deaths to include the ninety-three publicly acknowledged cases as of November 25, 1998. These deaths are divided into ten distinct time phases. The following trends emerge. Over two-thirds of the decedents are women, the ratio of females to males varying widely with phase. The proportion of women seems to be highest when Kevorkian is free to act as he wants and lowest when he seems to be acting under legal or political restraints. Based on autopsy results, only 29.0 percent of the cases are terminal, this percentage being higher among men (37.9%) than among women (25.4%). However, 66.7% of the decedents were disabled, no significant difference emerging between men and women. Further, five out of the six decedents showing no apparent anatomical sign of disease at autopsy were women. Over 80 percent of the physician-assisted deaths are cremated, approximately twice as high a proportion as that emerging for suicides in Michigan and four times as high as cremations occurring with regard to overall deaths. Finally, death by carbon monoxide decreases dramatically with time phase while the use of the contraption dubbed the “suicide machine” increases, suggesting an increasing routinization over time. Finally, during the ninth and tenth phases, Kevorkian's aims and his own suicidality emerge more clearly, involving 1) harvesting of organs and 2) threat of starving himself in prison if he is convicted. Phase 10 can be seen as an escalation from assisted-death¹ to overt euthanasia, repeating the same need for a demonstration (Thomas Youk) that was first exhibited in Phase 1 (Janet Adkins).

A qualitative case study was conducted to explore the clinical decision making processes that underpinned the practice of euthanasia under the Rights of the Terminally Ill (ROTI) Act. The key informant for this research was Philip Nitschke, the general practitioner responsible for the legal cases of euthanasia. His information was supported by extensive document analysis based on the public texts created by patients in the form of letters and documentaries. Further collaborating sources were those texts generated by the media, rights groups, politicians, the coroner's court, and the literature on euthanasia and assisted suicide. A key study finding was that the ROTI legislation did not adequately provide for the specific medical situation in the Northern Territory, Australia. The medical roles, as proscribed by the legislation, carried many inherent assumptions about the health care context and the availability of appropriately qualified medical staff committed to providing euthanasia. These assumptions translated into difficulties in establishing clinical practices for the provision of euthanasia. A further finding concerned the motivations of those who requested euthanasia. This article addresses the medical roles and the motivations of those seeking euthanasia.

Euphemisms are place-holders for important concepts. They may disguise a practice which one might abhor if it were given another name. In Nazi Germany during World War II, euphemisms were used to desensitize physicians and society to the horrors of a program of euthanasia. This article examines some of the euphemisms used by the Nazi physicians to redefine medicalized killing, compares the Nazi language games with those of contemporary proponents of medicalized killing, and concludes that the consistent application of euphemisms for medicalized killing significantly weakens arguments against assisted killing.

We should watch the way we talk. Human society can be described as a long conversation about what matters. In this conversation, the language we use to describe our social practices not only reveals our attitudes and virtues, it shapes them (Winslow, 1994, p. 1).

In this short article, the authors describe their attempt to do suicide-prevention with a patient that ultimately died as the result of a physician-assisted suicide. Autopsy revealed no sign of physical disease but the patient's letters indicate a preoccupation with independence as the definition of life, and conviction that people who lose independence are no longer alive.

I am not stressed, oppressed, or depressed. I don't have Alzheimer's and am not terminally ill, but I am 82 years old and I want to die.

Our personal reflections on the Michigan versus Kevorkian trial highlight the following issues: 1) the switch from physician-assisted suicide to euthanasia, 2) the television showing of the death, 3) the dropping of the prosecution of the charge of physician-assisted suicide, 4) Kevorkian serving as his own defense attorney, trying to argue that ALS was a secondary cause of Thomas Youk's death, 5) Kevorkian's attempt to employ a logical syllogism to demonstrate that euthanasia need not be murder, 6) Kevorkian's initial reference to the civil rights tradition but sudden change to the medical analogy of Nazi medicine: a final solution, 7) the insistence of Kevorkian on “all or nothing” sentencing, 8) the irony of Kevorkian being finally convicted by a prosector who was elected on a platform of not prosecuting Kevorkian, 9) Kevorkian hiring a lawyer after the verdict is in, and 10) Kevorkian's threat to starve himself to death if sent to prison.