Perception

Representing motion in a picture is a challenge to artists, scientists, and all other imagemakers. Moreover, it presents a problem that will not go away with electronic and digital media, because often the pedagogical purpose of the representation of motion is more important than the motion itself. All satisfactory solutions evoke motion—for example, dynamic balance (or broken symmetry), stroboscopic sequences, affine shear (or forward lean), and photographic blur—but they also typically sacrifice the accuracy of the motion represented, a solution often unsuitable for science. Vector representations superimposed on static images allow for accuracy, but are not applicable to all situations. Workable solutions are almost certainly case specific and subject to continual evolution through exploration by imagemakers.

Human subjects misjudge the position of a target that is flashed during a pursuit eye movement. Their judgments are biased in the direction in which the eyes are moving. We investigated whether this bias can be reduced by making the appearance of the flash more predictable. In the normal condition, subjects pursued a moving target that flashed somewhere along its trajectory. After the presentation, they indicated where they had seen the flash. The mislocalisations in this condition were compared to mislocalisations in conditions in which the subjects were given information about when or where the flash would come. This information consisted of giving two warning flashes spaced at equal intervals before the target flash, of giving two warning beeps spaced at equal intervals before the target flash, or of showing the same stimulus twice. Showing the same stimulus twice significantly reduced the mislocalisation. The other conditions did not. We interpret this as indicating that it is not predictability as such that influences the performance, but the fact that the target appears at a spatially cued position. This was supported by a second experiment, in which we examined whether subjects make smaller mis-judgments when they have to determine the distance between a target flashed during pursuit and a reference seen previously, than when they have to determine the distance between the flashed target and a reference seen afterwards. This was indeed the case, presumably because the reference provided a spatial cue for the flash when it was presented first. We conclude that a spatial cue reduces the mislocalisation of targets that are flashed during pursuit eye movements. The cue does not have to be exactly at the same position as the flash.

In soccer games, an attacking player is said to be in an offside position if he or she is closer to the opponents' goal line than both the ball and the second-to-last defender. It is an offence for the attacker to be in an offside position and in active play at the moment a fellow team member plays the ball. Assistant referees often make mistakes when judging an offside offence, probably because of optical errors arising from the viewing angle adopted by them (Oudejans, Verheijen, Bakker, Gerrits, Steinbrückner, Beek, 2000 Nature 404 33). Looking more closely at Oudejans et al's data, we show evidence that the flash-lag effect may contribute significantly to these mistakes. Participation of the flash-lag effect in assistant referees' misjudgments would take this perceptual phenomenon from laboratory setups to a real-life situation for the first time.

Retinal images of three-dimensional scenes often contain regions that are spatially blurred by different amounts, owing to depth variation in the scene and depth-of-focus limitations in the eye. Variations in blur between regions in the retinal image therefore offer a cue to their relative physical depths. In the first experiment we investigated apparent depth ordering in images containing two regions of random texture separated by a vertical sinusoidal border. The texture was sharp on one side of the border, and blurred on the other side. In some presentations the border itself was also blurred. Results showed that blur variation alone is sufficient to determine the apparent depth ordering. A subsequent series of experiments measured blur-discrimination thresholds with stimuli similar to those used in the depth-ordering experiment. Weber fractions for blur discrimination ranged from 0.28 to 0.56. It is concluded that the utility of blur variation as a depth cue is constrained by the relatively mediocre ability of observers to discriminate different levels of blur. Blur is best viewed as a relatively coarse, qualitative depth cue.

The importance of ‘configural’ processing for face recognition is now well established, but it remains unclear precisely what it entails. Through four experiments we attempted to clarify the nature of configural processing by investigating the effects of various affine transformations on the recognition of familiar faces. Experiment 1 showed that recognition was markedly impaired by inversion of faces, somewhat impaired by shearing or horizontally stretching them, but unaffected by vertical stretching of faces to twice their normal height. In experiment 2 we investigated vertical and horizontal stretching in more detail, and found no effects of either transformation.

Two further experiments were performed to determine whether participants were recognising stretched faces by using configural information. Experiment 3 showed that nonglobal vertical stretching of faces (stretching either the top or the bottom half while leaving the remainder undistorted) impaired recognition, implying that configural information from the stretched part of the face was influencing the process of recognition — ie that configural processing involves global facial properties. In experiment 4 we examined the effects of Gaussian blurring on recognition of undistorted and vertically stretched faces. Faces remained recognisable even when they were both stretched and blurred, implying that participants were basing their judgments on configural information from these stimuli, rather than resorting to some strategy based on local featural details. The tolerance of spatial distortions in human face recognition suggests that the configural information used as a basis for face recognition is unlikely to involve information about the absolute position of facial features relative to each other, at least not in any simple way

There is a significant delay between the time when light hits the retina and the time of the consequent percept. It has been hypothesized that the visual system attempts to correct for this latency by generating a percept representative of the way the world probably is at the time the percept is elicited, rather than a percept of the recent past. Here we show that such a ‘perceiving the present’ hypothesis explains a number of classical geometrical illusions: the Hering, Orbison, Müller-Lyer, Double Judd, Poggendorff, Corner, and Upside-down-T illusions. Each stimulus is perceived as it would project in the next moment were the observer moving through the scene the stimulus probably represents. We also examine one general class of predictions made by the hypothesis, and report psychophysical experiments confirming the predictions.

We examined the effect of visual experience on the haptic Müller-Lyer illusion. Subjects made size estimates of raised lines by using a sliding haptic ruler. Independent groups of blindfolded-sighted, late-blind, congenitally blind, and low-vision subjects judged the sizes of wings-in and wings-out stimuli, plain lines, and lines with short vertical ends. An illusion was found, since the wings-in stimuli were judged as shorter than the wings-out patterns and all of the other stimuli. Subjects generally underestimated the lengths of lines. In a second experiment we found a nonsignificant difference between length judgments of raised lines as opposed to smooth wooden dowels. The strength of the haptic illusion depends upon the angles of the wings, with a much stronger illusion for more acute angles. The effect of visual status was nonsignificant, suggesting that spatial distortion in the haptic Müller-Lyer illusion does not depend upon visual imagery or visual experience.