Politics

Forty years after its publication, Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions confronts us with a series of questions: Are social revolutions different today compared with 50 years ago, and if yes in what ways and why? What is the state of the study of Revolutions in political science and sociology? More generally, how do we understand and relate to social revolutions in the post-Cold War world? Why do we pay more attention to civil wars now compared with then – and vice versa? If the 40th anniversary of Theda Skocpol’s path-breaking book forces these questions on us, answering them opens up fundamental concerns about how we approach the study of social phenomena and the way we are embedded, as social scientists, into the politics of our world.

Stein Rokkan and Barrington Moore revived comparative historical analysis (CHA) in Europe and the United States, respectively, during the 1960s without, however, elaborating its methodological underpinnings. Theda Skocpol’s State and Social Revolutions as well as her Visions and Methods Historical Sociology filled this gap. In her important essay with Margaret Somers, she identified three distinct strands of CHA that tackled macro-historical question in distinct but ultimately also complimentary ways. In doing so, she established the foundation for subsequent work on CHA methodology. The article elaborates the subsequent elaborations of Skopol and Somer’s CHA typology and the factors contributing to this evolution. It also underscores how many of those innovations were already implicit in Skocpol’s State and Social Revolutions even though she herself did not highlight it in her own methodological writings. Skocpol the empirical scholar thus turns out to have been methodologically more advanced than Skocpol the methodologist.

Forty years on, Theda Skocpol’s account of the French Revolution remains remarkably robust. But how are we to think about political change today? Since Louis XVI walked up to the guillotine, we have been used to thinking of a left/right opposition driving political change, but this was not the only division at the time, nor indeed since: during the Terror, Robespierre was supported by the Montagnards, the deputies who sat on the highest benches of the Assembly, while the opposition was located at the bottom, in the Marais or the Plain. Like during la Terreur, today’s politics, from France to the United States, appears more to oppose a centre to an extreme, and this prism allows us to track Skocpol’s own evolution since 1979, from periphery to centre.

Scholars have mostly investigated the fall of dictatorships during the Arab Uprisings through the lens of contentious politics, uncovering new information about the protest dynamics and how they spread both within countries and throughout the wider region. However, the longer structural vulnerabilities within regimes have received little attention; yet such factors internal to states and their regimes proved paramount to the social revolutions investigated by Theda Skocpol. Focusing on the case of Tunisia, the author shows how the economic downturn and a succession crisis contributed to the decay of the Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime starting in the 2000s. Importantly, they heightened internecine conflicts within the regime and, in particular, within the longtime ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally. It is through this backdrop that the events of the 2010–2011 Tunisian revolution must be understood: far from supporting the regime in times of crisis, members of Ben Ali’s ruling party engaged in contentious activities against him, thus crucially weakening the regime from within.

My first book, in many ways a lonely project at the time, is now part of a steadily growing body of comparative-historical scholarship in the social sciences. Studying socio-political changes of all kinds – including today’s democratic backsliding in the United States and beyond – is best done, as States and Social Revolutions helped to demonstrate, by probing and juxtaposing fully contextualised cases. It still makes sense for scholars to (directly or implicitly) compare historical trajectories, tease out the intersections of social inequalities and struggles over state power, and address the evolving global contexts as in local, regional, or national episodes play out. This way of studying political conflict and change is what I believe endures from States and Social Revolutions, as new generations of scholars go far beyond the arguments of that book born decades ago.

This article investigates Haifa Port’s carceral and mobile geographies by examining how Israel is being re-made, rebranded, and harnessed as ‘safe and secure space’ for the transits of global capital. The article contends with ports as key protagonists of empire, situated in an enduring and ongoing history of colonial routes and route-making that are raced and moving with/through the transits of colonised bodies and commodities. Haifa Port – and Israel itself – are examined as nodes in a matrix of global colonial-capitalist relations, moulded to an essential geographic rationale, in which everything moves and must continue circulating. Yet, in exploring the specific dense and durable materialities of Haifa Port – and the racial logics of the settler colonial state – the article also works to understand that which becomes contained and fixed in particular sites, spaces, bodies, and lives. This also helps point to whom and what sits outside them – vulnerable and threatening to Israel’s participation in global economic circuits and orders.

Imagery associated with the Knights Templar appears in the public discourse and symbolism of many white supremacist and white nationalist groups. The 2011 Norwegian mass murderer cited the Templars in his manifesto, as did the 2019 New Zealand shooter. Templar crosses were on display at the 2017 white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, North Carolina. To understand the security imaginary behind these racialised medievalisms and their contemporary animation within right-wing extremism, this article develops the concept of ‘conspiratorial medievalism’. The Knights Templar imaginary blends a specific, racialised, and romanticised vision of history with the grammar of conspiracy theory. This is characterised by (a) a belief in the racialised decline and victimisation of a ‘righteous’ White Christendom; (b) a sense of threat posed by racialised Others and betrayal by insiders; and (c) an anachronistic view of near-omnipotent individual agency. Significantly, conspiratorial medievalism demonstrates an aspiration to not merely combat ‘undue’ agency of racialised Others, but to reclaim and perform extreme agency themselves. Agency is cast in the idiom of medieval chivalry and framed as the moral obligation of righteous White men. Although Knights Templar imagery may appear superficial, this article finds it is an important justificatory and enabling discourse for racist violence.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has made headlines for its use of mass surveillance technologies against UAE residents, as well as opponents externally. Under the guise of protecting national security, there has been a proliferation of state-led initiatives to monitor public spaces and online activity across the UAE, making the country an important laboratory for advanced surveillance tools. This article takes as a starting point that despite claims to being race-neutral and scientific, surveillance technologies have an embedded racial bias and operate according to context to (re)produce forms of state control and racial social relations. Reviewing the introduction of multiple surveillance technologies, this article traces the rationales used to racially order space and define deviance in the UAE context, emphasising questions of race, migration status and labour, to understand how the state defines, codifies, and regulates an ethno-racial hierarchy.

Recent scholarship on war and policing has begun to theorize the two in more intimate relation with each other, especially through connections to racialized violence and governance. Drawing on this body of work, and the concept of martial politics specifically, I examine how logics of war operate within domestic spaces and reproduce racialized conceptualizations of threat. I focus on a confrontation between the MOVE organization and the city of Philadelphia in 1985, which led to police firing 10,000 rounds of ammunition into a house where MOVE members and their children were living, and to the extensive use of military-grade explosives, culminating in the police dropping a bomb from a helicopter onto the house. The bomb ignited a fire that killed six adult MOVE members and five children, and destroyed 61 houses. I examine the decision of the city to bomb MOVE and consider the role that conceptions of war and threat played in shaping the event. This case shows not just the migration of military techniques into domestic spheres (and a long history of this in the United States), but more significantly, it reveals how violence and war-making have always been a foundation of liberal governance.

Recent interventions in critical security studies have argued that the field has struggled to account for the racialised/racist foundations of security politics. This article engages with the US Black Panther Party (BPP), arguing that the Party did important work to show how security politics is dependent on racial violence. The idea that we can theorise global politics through struggle (`struggle as method’) is becoming popular within disciplinary International Relations (IR), but has longer lineages in Black radical thought. The BPP were important advocates of struggle as method, with tactics and strategies intentionally designed with a pedagogical purpose; through Panther actions (including community self-defence and survival programmes), and the state’s response to these, the mechanisms of capitalist white supremacy were laid bare. The article therefore acknowledges BPP action as a series of theoretical interventions, which demonstrated how the terms of US/white security are rooted in and dependent on anti-Blackness. It also shows how Panther tactics prefigured alternative, radical, anti-statist approaches to security, these conceptualised as `survival pending revolution’. The article closes by arguing that scholarship on critical security studies - especially as related to the racialised politics of security - should do more to work with and acknowledge its indebtedness to struggle as method.

This article explores how different anti-establishment parties (AEPs) can themselves strategically enact an image of both distinctiveness and ‘normality’ behind their political offer. For this purpose, we directly measure and map diverse anti-establishment normalisation strategies by analysing 142 social media campaigns of radical right, left, and ‘centrist’ AEPs and their conventional competitors during 23 elections in Europe during 2010–2019. We find that while AEPs presented themselves as fundamentally distinct from ‘politics as usual’, they simultaneously attempted to normalise their contestation supply across and within two dimensions: mainstreaming and streamlining. Using regression analysis, we further find that the degree to which AEPs rhetorically normalised their supply was positively and significantly associated with their broader electoral appeal ceteris paribus, controlling for substantive issue positions, parliamentary experience and position in government. Concurrently, the effects of particular normalisation strategies and their specific calibration varied for the radical right and left. The findings deepen our comparative understanding of diverse anti-establishment strategies used in party competition.

Electoral volatility and clientelism were traditionally analysed through the lenses of clientelistic behaviour by political actors. However, we know very little about the importance of volatility for the formation of attitudes towards clientelism within the electorate. This article addresses that gap by analysing the extent to which volatile voters are more likely to accept electoral clientelism as a political practice. We bring evidence from Romania, which is a crucial case due to its extensive use of clientelism in elections over time and high electoral volatility. The analysis uses individual-level data from a survey conducted on a national representative sample of 4316 respondents in 2021. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, the findings illustrate that loyal voters accept clientelism easier, which holds when controlling for variables such as targeting awareness, political interest, income, or education. These results have important implications for the study of elections and voting behaviour.

This article seeks to contribute to the electoral and party politics debate in three main ways. The first is the claim that parachuting politicians into districts in which they have no prior connections is not a nomination practice that is the exclusive preserve of plurality electoral systems, nor does it necessarily engender the critical reaction of carpetbagging in the United States or ‘captain’s picks’ in Australia. Second, the practice of parachutage is tied to the personalisation literature but, in contrast to this literature, the article views [parachute] personalisation and party as complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory. Parachute personalisation serves party-based representative democracy rather than attenuates it. Third, the article questions the undue focus in the personal vote literature on a candidate’s personal-vote-seeking attributes. Rather, in concentrating on the transferability of the parachute vote as an electoral resource, the generic term ‘personal vote’ is viewed as comprising a mélange of party-vote-earning attributes – inter alia name-recognition and reputational status as a party office-holder – and personal-vote-earning attributes – name-recognition from outside party politics (sport, music, etc.). The central question addressed runs: When and why in an intraparty preference voting system – Finland is the focus – is parachute personalisation practised and with what result?