Philosophy of the Social Sciences

In investigating their models, economists do not appear to engage much in the activities many philosophers take to be essential to scientific understanding of the world, activities such as testing hypotheses and establishing laws. How, then, can economic models explain anything about the real world? Borrowing from William Dray, an explanation of what something really is, as opposed to an explanation of why something happens, is the subsumption of the explanandum under a suitable concept. One way economic models explain real-world phenomena is by providing explanations-what of such phenomena. In this way, economic models can afford explanations of the world without necessarily involving the activities philosophers take to be integral to scientific understanding of the world, for explanations-what do not necessarily involve the activities in question.

Some authors (Schumpeter, Sorokin) consider classes as communities or groupings of families. Others consider them as conditions, positions, or roles assumed in society. Such theoretical uncertainty is followed by a similarly uncertain empirical classification. This confusion probably exists because classes are not ostensible objects but concepts, that is, culturally and mutually constructed cognitive schemas. In order to see classes, scientists have to agree about the culturally framed discourse to use. This has not yet happened. This seems to be the main cause of the endless conflict in the debate on social stratification. This article documents that "class," before becoming a scientific construct, was a "folk category." From ordinary language, "class" reached the social sciences, passing through the natural sciences.

When defining science as a problem-solving activity, philosophers of science have mainly focussed on "the context of discovery," the process of finding creative solutions to problems; and "the context of justification," the process of evaluating new theories. This article takes a step backward and proposes ways to find problems with a creative potential: (1) Seek areas of theoretical controversy—respect all the facts and set out to find a new theory that can encompass the contradictions; (2) move beyond the realm of research proper—take an interest in phenomena that do not fit into any established theory or frame of reference; (3) give a break to discovery by chance—be attentive and welcoming to unexpected results; (4) look for exceptions—treat them as first-class facts instead of ignoring them or trying to explain them away.

I should say at the outset that I actually like this book a lot, but I am not sure how comfortable I am with liking it. It is the sort of innovative, exciting, exasperating, infuriating, and provocative book that's good even when it's bad, because it sets everyone to talking and arguing about all kinds of things. Initially, I will give a brief gloss (if such a thing makes sense in reference to a piece of Steve Fuller's writing) of the main points of the book and of its virtues. Then I would like to single out two issues for brief discussion: Fuller's conception of rhetoric and in what sense he is still a philosopher, in both his case studies and curriculum, despite advertising to the contrary.

Although Wes Shrum advertised my critics as representing quite distinct points of view, they nevertheless managed to converge on a set of concerns that revolve around the meanings of "rhetoric," "politics," and "multiculturalism" in the project of social epistemology. Either the critics were not chosen correctly or the book under discussion is quite obviously flawed! Rather than make that Hobson's choice, I will address my critics' concerns in a way that I hope will prove illuminating to other normatively oriented theorists in the social sciences who want to take the challenge of postmodernism seriously but who also realize that postmodernism may soon become the orthodoxy, rather than the challenger, in cultural politics.