Philosophy & Social Criticism

This article examines the permissibility of teaching evolution in the public schools of a religiously diverse society. Science is committed to methodological naturalism, which is a limited epistemological position that is silent on issues of religious importance. The article argues that it is possible to teach evolution under the assumptions of methodological naturalism without violating the principle, of secular rationale or the neutrality principle which apply to religion in a pluralistic democracy. However, neither creationism nor Intelligent Design qualify for inclusion in a science curriculum. The article ends with a discussion of philosophical and pedagogical approaches that an instructor should employ when teaching evolutionary theory.

We discuss whether religious reasons may be appealed to in justification and political debate in a polity whose laws must be justified to those subject to them in terms of reasons that are accessible to one and all. We argue that, properly understood, a commitment to public justification provides no grounds for the exclusion of religious reasons from politics. We trace the view that religious reasons are excluded from public reason to three basic errors: (1) the error of supposing that public justification must be based on shared reasons; (2) the error of supposing that in public justification the same constraints apply to reasons to impose coercion and reasons to resist coercion; and (3) the error of supposing that generating publicly justified laws must occur through public deliberations in which all aim at such laws.

This article examines recent theories of democratic citizenship as well as the institutional separation of religion and politics in light of shortcomings with the traditional secularization thesis. Due to the fact that juridical norms and forms of consciousness develop at a more rapid pace than religious ones, received accounts of both democratic equality and toleration need to be reconceptualized. Questions concerning the legitimacy and neutrality of religious reasoning in democratic politics, as pursued in the work of Rawls and Habermas, also need to be informed by further reflection on the confessional context and other empirical features of post-secular societies. Comparing the politics of same-sex marriage in Canada and Italy helps to illustrate this point.

This article evaluates two opposing approaches to the Western transition from a monotheistic and metaphysically grounded religious dispensation to secularized modern political theory. Where some philosophers emphasize the independence of modern political ideals, others argue that these ideals cannot remain theoretically coherent or practically effective once they are separated from the religious sources that have given rise to them. The theory of communicative action can bring together the insights of both independency and dependency theorists, thereby accounting for the public-political significance of redemptive criticism and other important forms of religious discourse. Yet given that religious groups are no longer embedded within the nation state, an additional and pressing contemporary challenge is to develop an adequate constitutional framework for global society.

The question whether in a liberal democracy religion may serve as a basis of law-making should be desaggregated into two distinct questions. First, is religion a morally legitimate basis of law-making in a liberal democracy? Second, is religion a constitutionally legitimate basis of law-making in the United States? My focus in this article is on the second question, which, as a question about constitutional legitimacy, should not be confused with the first question, which is about moral legitimacy. Like other liberal democracies, the United States is committed to the right to freedom of religious practice. Unlike most other liberal democracies, however, the United States is also committed to the non-etablishment of religion. According to the constitutional law of the United States, law-makers and other government officials may neither prohibit the `free exercise' of religion nor `establish' religion. Does the non-establishment norm ban religion as a basis of law-making? More precisely, should the non-establishment norm be understood to ban laws for which the only discernible rationale — or, at least, the only discernible rationale other than an implausible secular rationale — is religious?

In this article I analyze Rawls' and Habermas' accounts of the role of religion in political deliberations in the public sphere. After pointing at some difficulties involved in the unequal distribution of deliberative rights and duties among religious and secular citizens that follow from their proposals, I argue for a way to structure political deliberation in the public sphere that imposes the same deliberative obligations on all democratic citizens, whether religious or secular. These obligations derive from the ideal of mutual accountability that is supposed to guide political deliberation in a deliberative democracy. The main advantage of this proposal is that it recognizes the right of all democratic citizens to adopt their own cognitive stance (whether religious or secular) in political deliberation in the public sphere without giving up on the democratic obligation to provide reasons acceptable to everyone to justify coercive policies with which all citizens must comply.

The Doctrine of Religious Restraint is the claim that citizens and officials in a liberal democracy should not support coercive laws that they know to require a religious rationale. The most prominent argument for the Doctine of Religious Restraint appeals to the claim that we ought to treat each person as having basic worth: citizens and officials ought to obey the Doctrine of Religious Restraint because doing so is required in order for them to respect their compatriots as persons who have equal moral standing. But this argument is not persuasive: citizens and officials who support coercive laws that they know require some religious justification need not thereby disrespect their compatriots. The article focuses throughout on the figure of an `Agapic Pacifist' who has sectarian religious reasons to oppose government's use of lethal military force.

In this article, I consider the extent to which heteronomous people can be positive contributors to political deliberation. I examine the normative potential of heteronomous people as participants in public debate, and address the overall effects that inclusion of heteronomous people can provide for group deliberations. I subsequently consider empirical findings that bear upon the case I develop, and conclude that liberals ought to reconsider the importance of heteronomous people in healthy liberal democracy. This philosophical recognition lays groundwork for a more morally and politically compelling version of liberalism, one that outstrips comprehensive schemes that vaunt personal autonomy as liberalism's primary normative commitment.

A recent essay by Jürgen Habermas revisits political liberalism and takes up the question of the extent to which democratic citizens and officials should rely on their religious convictions in publicly deliberating about and deciding political issues. With his institutional translation proviso, a proposed alternative to Rawls' idea of public reason, Habermas hopes to dodge familiar (and often overstated) criticisms that liberal requirements of citizenship are unfair or disproportionately burdensome to religious believers. I argue that, due in part to its sharp contrast between the obligations attributed to political officials and those attributed to ordinary citizens, Habermas' position is beset by additional, quite considerable difficulties. I conclude that Habermas' account of religion in the public sphere does not present a genuine alternative to the leading liberal theory of citizenship and public reasoning.