Philosophy & Social Criticism

This special double issue of Philosophy and Social Criticism focuses on the sources of pluralism. The introduction will summarize and present the contents of this issue in 4 sections: (1) on the origins of pluralism (Richard Bernstein, Ulrich Preuß, Rajeev Bhargava, Ramin Jahanbegloo); (2) on the development of pluralism (Alessandro Ferrara, Julian Baggini, Paolo Costa, Maurizio Ferraris); (3) pluralism in Turkey (Murat Borovalı and Cemil Boyraz, Markus Dressler, İlay Romain Örs and Ömer Turan, Cengiz Aktar); (4) and pluralism within Islam (Khaled Abou El Fadl, Syafiq Hasyim, Saskia Schäfer, Volker Kaul).

The expression ‘cultural pluralism’ was popularized by Horace Kallen, a student of William James. I explore the meaning of pluralism in the context of the American pragmatic tradition with emphasis on the meaning of pluralism for William James. Kallen sought to characterize cultural pluralism in contrast with the idea of America as a ‘melting-pot’. I also examine the contributions of Randolph Bourne and the African-American philosopher Alain Locke to the discussion of cultural pluralism. I conclude by indicating that the idea of a democratic society that respects and is enriched by differences is highly relevant to contemporary discussions of cultural pluralism in a global context.

This article builds upon the distinction between pluralism and plurality, the latter in the sense of variety or diversity. Plurality is an empirical fact, such as the biological diversity of the human species. In contrast, pluralism is a normatively underpinned social pattern according to which the diversity of interests, opinions, values, ideas, etc., of individuals and groups is recognized as a constitutive element of a political order. Pluralism can materialize only if a political order is not based upon the claim of one undisputable truth. An embryonic form of pluralism through law emerged in ancient Greece with the institution of courts in which the parties to a legal dispute could argue over what the law said and hence officially present divergent meanings of justice. For the modern development the separation of law and justice was a major step towards pluralism insofar as the authority of the polity and the binding force of the law were no longer based upon the contention of one exclusive truth – auctoritas, non veritas facit legem. This Hobbesian principle banned religious, moral, philosophical and political discourses to the pre-political domain of privacy and secrecy from which pluralism could not result. Referring to the distinction between regulative and constitutive norms I submit that only the latter, not the former, can function as sources of pluralism.

India is one of the most culturally, philosophically and religiously diverse countries in the world. The roots, not only of these diversities but also of morally appropriate responses to them, i.e. to pluralism, go very deep. This presentation substantiates this claim by looking at the relevant edicts of Emperor Asoka who reigned in India in the 3^rd century BCE. Asoka not only advises people with deeply divergent worldviews to live together face to face but also suggests what the basis for this coexistence could be. He claims that resources exist in all traditions to exercise self-restraints. These self-restraints are of two kinds: self-related and other-related. Everyone should exercise both these self-restraints, particularly in speech. This ‘control of tongue’ is crucial for morally legitimate and principled coexistence. In the article, I try to explicate the meaning of these edicts and flesh out this argument by providing a vivid, quasi-phenomenological account of what public life in Asokan times was like.

This article argues that Mohandas K. Gandhi and Isaiah Berlin remain the two main thinkers of pluralism in the 20^th century. Though the two never met and despite their essential differences, the two political thinkers can be read as complementary in order to hold on to the idea of a common human horizon. As such, Gandhi’s transformative conception of pluralism, exemplified by his universal method of transforming liberal citizenship into a civic friendship, offers definitely a way to enlarge the Berlinian concept of value pluralism as an alternative of moral monism. Consequently, the reading of Gandhi could complete Isaiah Berlin’s idea of value pluralism by adding an effective exercise of plurality through his antagonism to monism as a tradition of thought that does not possess the resources to change and the potential for the moral and spiritual growth of humanity. As a result, this article suggests that it is worth trying to strike a balance between the Gandhian and Berlinian concepts of pluralism in order to be able to differentiate pluralism and relativism and to search for a core of shared or universal values which allows us to reach an agreement on at least some moral issues in today’s world.

This article aims at exploring one specific facet of pluralism: How can we conceive of a variety of democratic cultures that are not just local adaptations of one basic western-centric understanding of the democratic ethos? Drawing on Islamic, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian sources, a convergence among diverse democratic cultures is cursorily highlighted on such elements as the priority of the common good, the acceptance of pluralism, the desirability of collegial deliberation, the equality of citizens, and the value of individuality. Then two important points of dissonance are analysed in greater detail – (1) the idea of the priority of rights over duties and (2) the role of political conflict within a democratic polity – and shown not to be correlative with a divide between western and non-western contexts. Finally a typology of 4 kinds of democratic cultures is outlined.

Although political pluralism can have an ethical justification, it does not need one. Political pluralism can be justified on the basis of an epistemological argument about what we can claim to know, one which has a normative conclusion about how strongly we ought to believe. This is important because for pluralism to command wide assent, it needs something other than an ethical justification, since many simply will not accept that justification. Thus understood, we can see that current threats to pluralism come not just from authoritarian movements but from populism, which has already infected mainstream politics.

In broad terms, realism, relativism and pluralism can be regarded as the theoretical articulations of the following insights. Realism embodies the sense that what is at stake in our beliefs is something serious, i.e. that there is a fact of the matter, independent from our desire, which is going to decide whether what we believe in is true or not. Relativism, on the other hand, incorporates the realization that our cognitive take on the world is always perspectival, that there is no way to overcome the blind spot which enables the knower to have a world in view at all. Pluralism, finally, draws on the intuition that every human being and every human community cannot fully understand, let alone save themselves, without the help of others’ sense-making efforts. Against the background of Charles Taylor’s philosophy, the core of truth of the above insights will be discussed and arranged to develop an active view of toleration that not only urges us to put up with others, but encourages us to rely on the benefit of coming to terms with different outlooks and ways of life.

In this article I defend two theses. The first is that the centrality of recording in the social world is manifested through the production of documents, a phenomenon which has been present since the earliest phases of society and which has undergone an exponential growth through the technological developments of the last decades (computers, tablets, smartphones). The second is that the centrality of documents leads to a view of normativity according to which human beings are primarily passive receptors of rules manifested through documents. We are not intentional producers of values. The latter, as I shall suggest in my conclusion, should be viewed as being ‘socially dependent’ rather than ‘socially constructed’.

As a result of its failure to embrace the increasingly visible social and political diversity in the country, Kemalism, the founding ideology of modern Turkey, is currently facing its severest legitimacy crisis. Through interviews with representatives of leading voluntary Kemalist associations, this article inquires whether there are attempts to reinterpret the doctrine in order to offer an alternative, credible vision in harmony with the existing social, political and economic realities of Turkey.

The religious identity of Turkey’s Alevis, with the origins of their traditions, and in particular their relation to Islam, are the focus of a debate current in Turkey as well as in those western European countries with strong Turkish migrant populations. This debate began in the late 1980s, with the public coming-out of the Alevi community, when the Alevis set out on a manifest campaign to be recognized as a distinct cultural and/or religious tradition. Against the backdrop of this debate, this article discusses the impact of Turkish politics of doxa on the possibilities of Alevi representation in Turkey. It gives particular attention to the implication of secularism and nationalism in the knowledge regime that subscribes heterodoxy to the Alevis – an ascription that secures their principal integratability in the Turkish nation, while at the same time preparing the ground for otherizing them from the Sunni majority perspective.

This article is based on an ethnographic investigation of the Gezi Park events in 2013. Starting from the much acknowledged characteristics of Gezi as being its cultural and political pluralism and its commitment to non-violence, in this article we are engaging with two interlinked questions: How has the plurality of participants and orientations been possible to attain, and how could this pluralism be contained without any major conflict at Gezi? We propose to provide an answer by focusing on the manners of everyday life at Gezi Park during the time of dissidence, which we conceptualize as ‘manner of contention’. It was the manner of contention that characterized the specific ways in which contentious politics took place at Gezi and prevented the formation of clashes among the plurality of contenders. The ethnographic research delineates at least 4 components of manner of contention in the case of Gezi: an ethos of collective work; a spirit of exchange and gift-giving; politeness; and non-violence.

The article examines the resources and the shortcomings of pluralism in today’s Turkey in light of the spring 2013 Gezi protests in İstanbul’s Taksim district. The protests have had ecological and civic as well as political implications and were a turning point in the country’s political life.

There is a serious problem with arguing that God intended to lock the epistemology of the 7^th century into the immutable text of the Qur’an, and then intended to hold Muslims hostage to this epistemological framework for all ages to come. Among other things, this would limit the dynamism and effectiveness of Divine text because the Qur’an would be for ever locked within a knowledge paradigm that is very difficult to retrieve or re-create. The author argues for the recognition of three critical categories in Islamic theology: haqq, hikma and ma‘arifa. While haqq connotes the objective and constant truth, it is not reachable without hikma. Hikma is the balance [mizan] of truths in every historical moment with all of its contingencies. Ma‘arifa is the epistemology or the way to searching the objective and constant truth as well as the search for the hikma appropriate for each stage in human consciousness. The author contends that it is contrary to the very nature of a merciful and compassionate God to leave Muslims with a Revelation that is not fully equipped to deal with the altered states of consciousness and perceptions that are inevitable in every stage of human development.

This article highlights the role of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, the Council of Indonesian Ulama) in making anti-pluralism discourse and practice which are evident in its fatwa on belief (Arabic: ‘aqīda). It begins with the explanation of MUI which in the first three decades of its establishment was a fatwa body that supported pluralism, but since the downfall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, has changed its position from supporter to detractor of pluralism. This article argues that the institutionalization of anti- pluralism discourse through the MUI fatwa creates complexity especially because Indonesia contains the idea of pluralism (respecting cultural and religious diversity) in its constitution. The situation becomes more complex when the state and also Muslim organizations strengthen the position of MUI in monopolizing fatwa-making on ‘aqīda issues. The monopolization of fatwa on Islamic belief issues creates such a negative impact for religious freedom in Indonesia due to its fundamental characteristics that allow only a single judgment for the Muslim communities in understanding and interpreting their Islamic belief. Finally this article concludes the importance of Indonesia for protecting pluralism for maintaining the diversity of cultures and religions in this country.

Commentators have mainly viewed the Ahmadiyya debate in Indonesia either as a controversy over heterodoxy or as an episode raising questions about the human rights of ‘religious minorities’. Instead, I suggest viewing these debates as a field of normative questions of secularism in which the claims of religious are renegotiated in response to the fragmentation of religious and political authority brought on by a diversification of the use of media and a loss of trust in the Indonesian post-Suharto democracy, and between normative questions of secularism.

The article analyses the motivations of fundamentalists. Typically, fundamentalism is considered to have its origin in determinate cultural or religious systems of beliefs and norms. In this regard, it is possible to distinguish between metaphysical accounts and moral accounts of fundamentalism. The first state that fundamentalism makes claims concerning the reality of cultures and religions. The second hold fundamentalism to be of practical, not of theoretical, nature. This article argues, on the contrary, that fundamentalism does not have its source in religion or culture. Fundamentalists are not motivated by cultural or religious beliefs and reasons. Their intolerance is, in contrast, caused and driven by purely emotional reactions. What makes a fundamentalist is the emotional non-distinction between the intentions and actions of others and the proper behavior in matters of culture and religion. A fundamentalist has equally strong and intense emotional reactions when it comes to others’ integrity as with regard to his or her own piety.