Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

Two experiments investigated effects of numerical primes on production of simple multiplication facts (e.g. 4 × 8 = ?). In Experiment 1, a correct (32), related (24), unrelated (27), or neutral (##) prime appeared for 200 msec and was followed by a target problem at an ISI of 0, 750, or 1500 msec. Relative to neutral primes, correct primes produced constant RT and accuracy benefits across ISIs, and unrelated primes produced constant RT costs. Related primes produced costs compared to unrelated primes at the 0-msec ISI only. In Experiment 2, eliminating correct-answer primes from the stimulus set eliminated all the false-prime effects except the costs of related primes at the 0-msec ISI. We propose a dual-process account incorporating a familiarity-based name-the-prime strategy that produces benefits and costs insensitive to ISI and an automatic retrieval-priming process that is measurable only at short ISIs.

Two experiments examined the processing of objects with low name agreement. Experiment I compared naming latencies for objects with three different types of name disagreement to those for matched control objects with very high name agreement. Objects with low name agreement due to abbreviations (e.g. phone) were named no more slowly than were control objects. Objects with multiple names (e.g. couch, sofa, settee) and objects often given incorrect names (e.g. spider for ant) took longer to name correctly than did matched controls. These results were confirmed in a second naming experiment using a revised set of high-name-agreement control stimuli. In Experiment 2, subjects carried out an object decision task using the revised stimulus set. Subjects could recognize objects with multiple names as quickly as those with high name agreement. Objects often given incorrect names were recognized by subjects more slowly than were high-agreement matched stimuli. The pattern of data suggests that the delay in naming latency due to the availability of more than one correct name arises after structural recognition. In contrast, the slowed naming of objects often misnamed would seem to originate from difficulties encountered at or before the structural stage of recognition.

The effects of the frequency of a surname in the population and of the distinctiveness of a face on the latency to name famous faces were explored. Distinctive faces were named more quickly than were typical faces. Celebrities with low-frequency surnames were named faster than celebrities with high-frequency surnames, but only if their faces were distinctive. Subsequent experiments showed that the effect of surname frequency could not be attributed to differences in the articulatory onsets of the surnames and was not present in a task that did not require a naming response. Experiments in which surnames were taught to previously unfamiliar faces showed that familiar surnames (e.g. the surnames of celebrities) were produced more rapidly than were unfamiliar surnames. If familiar surnames were taught, no effect of surname frequency was observed. It is concluded that lexical access to peoples’ names is frequency sensitive—surnames shared by few individuals are accessed faster than are high-frequency surnames. However, when learning names to unfamiliar faces, familiar surnames (i.e. the surnames of people already known to the subject) are learned and accessed more quickly than unfamiliar surnames.

Although previous studies have demonstrated that faces of one's own race are recognized more accurately than are faces of other races, the theoretical basis of this effect is not clearly understood at present. The experiment reported in this paper tested the contact hypothesis of the own-race bias in face recognition using a cross-cultural design. Four groups of subjects were tested for their recognition of distinctive and typical own-race and other-race faces: (1) black Africans who had a high degree of contact with white faces, (2) black Africans who had little or no contact with white faces, (3) white Africans who had a high degree of contact with black faces, and (4) white Britons who had little contact with black faces. The results showed that although on the whole subjects recognized own-race faces more accurately and more confidently than they recognized other-race faces, the own-race bias in face recognition was significantly smaller among the high-contact subjects than it was among the low-contact subjects. Also, although high-contact black and white subjects showed significant main effects of distinctiveness in their recognition of faces of both races, low-contact black and white subjects showed significant main effects of distinctiveness only in their recognition of own-race faces. It is argued that these results support the contact hypothesis of the own-race bias in face recognition and Valentine's multidimensional space (MDS) framework of face encoding.

In the standard 2–4–6 induction task, subjects are instructed to discover the rule generating sequences of three numbers by inventing number triples for which they receive immediate feedback. The rule is “ascending numbers”. Performance is greatly aided with Dual Goal (DG) instructions that ask subjects to discover two rules, one that generates “Dax” triples (equivalent to “yes” instances with Single Goal [SG] instructions) and another that generates “Med” triples (equivalent to “no” instances). The present study eliminates two explanations for this effect suggested by Wharton, Cheng, and Wickens (1993). Experiment 1 tested their Information-Quantity hypothesis that the effect results simply from the DG subjects testing more triples prior to proposing a rule. Our DG subjects were more likely to solve the problem and produced more “negative” triples than SG subjects when both groups generated exactly 15 triples. Two further groups received feedback only after generating all 15 triples, and again DG subjects were more likely to solve the problem and to generate more “negative” triples. Experiment 2 tested Wharton et al.'s Goal-Complementarity hypothesis that success under DG instructions hinges on preserving the complementary representation of the two rules. We compared SG instructions with three types of DG instructions that suggested different types of triples (Dax, Med, both Dax and Med, neither Dax nor Med). DG instructions were more effective in promoting successful rule discovery regardless of differences in rule complementarity. Our analysis of the heterogeneity of the examplars generated with DG instructions in both experiments suggest that success on the 2–4–6 task is as much a consequence of the breadth of hypotheses that subjects entertain as it is a consequence of the testing strategy.

Two experiments investigated inferences based on suppositions. In Experiment 1, the subjects decided whether suppositions about individuals’ veracity were consistent with their assertions—for example, whether the supposition “Ann is telling the truth and Beth is telling a lie”, is consistent with the premises: “Ann asserts: I am telling the truth and Beth is telling the truth. Beth asserts: Ann is telling the truth”. It showed that these inferences are more difficult than ones based on factual premises: “Ann asserts: I live in Dublin and Beth lives in Dublin”. There was no difference between problems about truthtellers and liars, who always told the truth or always lied, and normals, who sometimes told the truth and sometimes lied. In Experiment 2, the subjects made inferences about factual matters set in three contexts: a truth-inducing context in which friends confided their personality characteristics, a lie-inducing context in which business rivals advertised their products, and a neutral context in which computers printed their program characteristics. Given the supposition that the individuals were lying, it was more difficult to make inferences in a truth-inducing context than in the other two contexts. We discuss the implications of our results for everyday reasoning from suppositions, and for theories of reasoning based on models or inference rules.

It was hypothesized that the perceived irrelevance of the proposition “Some X are not Y” is a factor contributing to the difficulty of nearly all the determinate syllogisms classed as multiple model by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991), according to mental models theory. Experiment 1 supported this hypothesis by showing that subjects frequently correctly evaluate valid “Some … not” conclusions but rarely produce them, even when they have evaluated them elsewhere. Explanations of these findings based on the use of superficial strategies were ruled out. Experiment 2 further supported the hypothesis by showing that performance increased across the no-conclusion, multiple-choice, and evaluation task formats, and that this effect generalized to problems containing the quantifier “only”. However, the initial hypothesis was rejected in light of Experiment 3, which found no difference between multiple-choice and no-conclusion formats when the number of allowable conclusions was controlled for. Nevertheless, superior performance remained in the evaluation format, and it is suggested that offered conclusions may be used as a goal for the reasoning process. This interpretation is supported by the finding (Experiments 1 and 3) that subjects appear to search only for alternative conclusions that maintain the subject-predicate structure of the offered conclusion.

Subjects were given a prediction task in which they had to learn that one cue, P (positive), was followed by the outcome, and a compound of P and another cue, N (negative), was not followed by the outcome. Next, N was tested in compound with a transfer cue, T, which had signalled the outcome but had never been compounded with N. Experiment 1 confirmed an important assumption of the Rescorla–Wagner model (Wagner & Rescorla, 1972) that negation of T should depend on the specific P cue compound with N being positively contingent. Experiments 2 and 3 confirmed the model's prediction that no decrement in negative transfer should be observed following postlearning devaluation of P. Unfortunately, the model did not anticipate that a large proportion of devaluation trials relative to learning trials would attenuate negative transfer (Experiment 4), nor did it predict that negative transfer would occur when P was neutral during the learning stage and was only later made positive (Experiment 3). The results can be accommodated by the Rescorla–Wagner model if one assumes that absent cues have their associative strengths altered.

This paper reports the case of an aphasic patient, EE, with a problem in word retrieval. He is consistently unable to produce specific lexical items, which tend to be items of low rated familiarity. His retrieval of these words is not aided by the provision of phonemic cues or extra time for word retrieval. His errors consist primarily of failures to respond, and the provision of semantic information without any attempt at the target. It is argued that this pattern of performance is consistent with the loss of specific lexical items from a phonological lexicon for speech production.

EE is shown to have no impairment in auditory recognition and comprehension of the lexical items that are unavailable for naming. This dissociation is problematic for theories that propose a single phonological lexicon for both word recognition and production, but is easily accounted for by separate input and output lexicons.

In tasks where subjects are required to tap in synchrony to a sequence of evenly spaced uniform auditory stimuli (a metronome), tap onsets typically tend to anticipate the metronome's stimulus onsets. We investigated this phenomenon, called “negative asynchrony”, as a function of (1) the duration of the stimuli (1 or 2, 50, 100, and 300 msec), (2) the rise time of the stimuli (0%, 40%, and 80% of stimulus duration), and (3) the interstimulus onset interval duration (500, 700, and 900 msec). The results from three experiments with 28 different subjects showed a significant reduction of the negative asynchrony with longer stimulus durations, and the reduction was not significantly affected by the tempo of the stimulus sequence. Also, a prolongation of the rise time of the stimuli caused an analogous reduction of the negative asynchrony. Findings were taken to suggest that subjects use the perceptual centre rather than physical onset of stimulus as the cue with which to synchronize