Rationality and Society

Both structural and cultural arguments suggest that extensive relationship-building behaviors are a precursor to the onset of sexual intercourse. This research develops and tests a game-theoretic signaling framework, which suggests that the association between courtship behaviors and the onset of sexual intercourse should reflect selection effects. To test this framework empirically, this research utilized the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (1994–1996) and estimated probit and recursive bivariate probit models of sexual intercourse. The results showed support for the signaling framework. Extensive use of courtship behaviors was associated with sexual intercourse, but this association reflected the effects of selectivity. However, extensive courtship was more associated with sexual intercourse when adolescents did not know one another well prior to the start of their romantic relationships. These findings suggest that selectivity associated with signaling theory can complement models of cultural influence and structural effects.

Web studies explored citizens’ concepts of their duty as voters and their choices concerning actual policies. Some people see a moral duty to support their group (their nation) regardless of harmful effects on outsiders. One study supports the hypothesis that this duty avoids betrayal of the nation, which they see as granting the right to vote for the purpose of advancing national interest. Some also see a duty to defend their self-interest through voting; many think this is a rational way to pursue their interests. Another justification is, “If [the voter] does not look out for her own interests, nobody else will.” I hypothesize a norm of responsibility for self-defense, part of the “culture of honor” (Cohen and Nisbett, 1994) in all of us. Yet politics is by design an inefficient way to pursue self-interest, although it is efficient for advancing the good of all.

This paper explores the effects of collective identity on protest behavior by applying an extended version of the theory of collective action. Hypotheses are derived about the following questions that are rarely addressed in the literature: Are there situations in which collective identity diminishes protest? The standard assumption is that collective identity increases protest behavior. Does collective identity have indirect effects – via the determinants of protest – on protest behavior? Are there feedback effects of protest participation on collective identity? The hypotheses that address these questions are tested with a three-wave panel study. Three findings are of particular interest: (1) the overall direct additive effects of identity on protest behavior are statistically not significant. (2) Evidence is provided that in solidary groups identity does not raise but reduce protest. (3) The major effects of identity are indirect: identity influences the determinants of protest.

The paper expounds a non-cooperative game that can be interpreted as a model of the system of kula that was described by Bronislaw Malinowski in his Argonauts of the Western Pacific. The game of kula is an infinite-horizon game with an arbitrary, but fixed, number n of players. It generates pure norms of direct reciprocity, pure norms of indirect reciprocity, and mixed norms whereby a player who deviates is punished both by the individual who has been harmed and by a third party.