Studies in Christian Ethics

The work of Dan Brock and Helga Kuhse is typical of the current stream of thought rejecting the validity of sanctity of life appeals to instill objective inviolable worth in human life regardless of the quality of life of the patient. The context of a person’s life is supremely important. In their systems life can have high value, yet the value of life can be outweighed by the force of other disvalues. The notion of quality of life has increasingly come to signify the measurement of the worth of a person’s life itself. Having a life equals personal life. Any objectivity to life resides in ‘personal’, ‘biographical’, or ‘creative’ life, not mere biological life. Personal life represents the minimal threshold for any objective worth.

In responding to this challenge, John Finnis has argued extensively that life is an intrinsic good - a basic human good. Following from our grasp of human life as a basic incommensurable good, it cannot be practically reasonable both to affirm that (a) ‘human life is a basic human good’, and (b) that ‘human life qua human life can be intentionally acted against to its destruction’. Yet, if the good of human life can be considered self-evident, the self-evidence of the basic human good qua good does not mean that dialectical reasoning cannot be engaged in to indirectly support the practical reasonableness of respecting the good of human life in the deliberative choices that persons make concerning their actions. It is to the use of such dialectical reasoning, supportive of the status of human life as such a basic human good, that the article is primarily concerned to draw out and articulate.

The image of God in the Bible is a projection of the normal human, raised to the highest degree. This excludes the human body which is different. Knowledge itself is based in bodily experience, and a starting place for a theology of disability may be found in the phenomenology of different bodies. When philosophers and theologians use the image of the face of God, this hegemony of the average is particularly noticeable. Blind people are only one of a number of human experiences without the face, and if the theological tradition is to be redeemed from the dominance of exclusion, the image of God must be poly-anthropomorphic rather than uniform.

The question of responsibility to future generations is a distinctively modern ethical problem, which exposes the limits of many modern ethical frameworks. I argue for the theological importance of this ‘limit’, and of the question of responsibility to future generations, drawing on the ultimate/penultimate conceptuality of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Ethics. Responsibility to future generations calls for detailed attention to a given situation, in the light of its openness to a future not within our control; and action for the sake of future generations requires a suspension of one’s own judgement on that action. Christian ethics can take responsibility to future generations seriously while (and indeed through) maintaining a critique of attempts to orient action towards an innerworldly future utopia.

As the signs of the highest expectations of the world’s economy come crashing down around us and the dust settles on a sorrowing humanity led foolishly towards war as its only and immediate prospect, ethical thinking is called upon to hold open the way for us to find the truth by which we are to live, and to do so with intellectual acuity and pastoral sensitivity. What might this way be? This paper is written as a preliminary exploration of the question of this way, and of the truth to which ethics is ordered, and it is written to enquire about the way that is being drawn out by a global ethics.

Christian thought on the resolution of conflicts rests on a strong predisposition against violence and a determination to discourage outbreaks of violence, limit the means used, and bring the conflict to as speedy an end as possible. Less attention has been given to the psychological and social roots of violence, the moments of transition from violence to diplomacy and reconciliation, and alternative ways of conflict resolution. These three areas are explored with special reference to the use of sanctions, the WCC’s Programme to Overcome Violence, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, Gandhian Satyagraha, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Such measures should be judged against the same criteria as are used in relation to violence and war.

This article explores Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s writings on truth telling with reference to the problem of medical error in the US, the UK, and other developed nations, with particular attention to physicians’ resistance to disclosing their own mistakes to injured patients and their families. The brief essay ‘What Is Meant by “Telling the Truth”?’ and its historical context — Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment and interrogation in 1943 — is proposed as a text for medical ethicists and others seeking to overcome the barrier of the ‘hidden curriculum’ within the culture of medicine, which encourages medical students and physicians to conceal their errors and to fear disclosure.