Studies in Christian Ethics

Should a Christian ethic endorse an individual’s right against torture? If so, how should its reasoning take into account considerations of common security? To answer these questions, this article first compares the early Christian ‘just war’ tradition’s pre-liberal reasoning about the ethics of harming with that of the liberal philosopher, David Rodin. It then deploys the fruits of this comparison—especially the contingency of a right against harm (partly upon social obligation), and the distinction between natural moral rights and positive legal ones—in an examination of what makes torture wrong and when. Dissenting from the views of Jeremy Waldron and Jean Porter, the article concludes that a positive legal right against torture and aggressive interrogation should be granted—even though morally right cases of the latter might occur.

Surveillance is sometimes spoken of as a God’s eye view of the world. This idea is explored in relation to the ‘objective gaze’ of disengaged reason in the Enlightenment and its technologically-reinforced modes in the twenty-first century. The rise of the eye-centred viewpoint is coincident with the ‘great disembedding’ of individuals from the social. This in turn also prompted the self-disciplines of modernity, which are now key aspects of the power-base of modern institutions. A crucial moment in this shift was Bentham’s panopticon proposal, in which the knowledge regime of secularism started to shape social imaginaries in relation to surveillance. While secular omniscience was sought through the surveillance gaze, and explored later in the work of Foucault, Debord and others, the eye-centred view is not without critics. We draw upon some biblical resources, notably, the story of Hagar, that query the centrality of ‘objective vision’. Instead, an ethic of care is proposed, based in part on a fresh understanding of the ‘eye of God’. It is argued that the implications of the care ethic go far deeper than current appeals to privacy, data protection, civil liberties or human rights.

This article offers a theological ethics of surveillance in its form as social sorting. The skill of (in)visibility is deployed as an analytical device to critique the saliency of privacy rights-talk, given the focus of surveillance having shifted from a panoptic gaze to actionable intelligence. The claim is made that an ideology of normativity and the political categories of ‘evil’ and ‘risky’ persons can be addressed by the notions of relational knowledge (Muers), the resurrection of the non-person (Swinton) and the power of the future (Moltmann). Three biblical vignettes illustrate (in)visibility and offer imaginative responses.

The nature and scope of government surveillance have intensified debates about liberty and security in a post-9/11 world. Critics of the just war tradition argue it is not able to constructively address these new challenges. Defenders often simply re-affirm its various criteria in making retrospective judgments or clarifying principles. By contrast, this article argues that our political moment—marked by the arbitrary exercise of power, the prospect of permanent war, and the rapid speed of global politics—reinforces the need to frame just war thinking within a constructive account of statecraft and practical reasoning. In particular, I highlight moral (rather than simply legal) dimensions of authority and intention which reveal a fundamental question about what we want from the just war tradition in relation to democratic social criticism and the possibility of political morality.

This article inquires into what the gospel of peace might mean for Christian theological engagement with international law and sets a provisional agenda for peace ethics in an age of global risks. Two warnings are sounded with respect to the language of ‘peace ethics’ and ‘the rule of law’. Three priorities are identified: (i) thinking with and about the global poor in ways that do not render ‘the other’ somehow different from myself; (ii) retrieval of the twin ideas of ‘naturalness’ and distributive justice in natural law reasoning as they bear upon international law and the use of force; (iii) how to conceive of international common good by considering ‘peace through law’ as a potentially subversive endeavour when employed in the service of the global poor.

Stoddart writes that the God of Christian faith ‘knew [surveillance’s] gaze [and] suffered its harsh consequences’. That was especially so during the last week of Jesus’ life, when the religious/political leaders engaged him in tension-filled exchanges. Employing Stoddart’s concept of ‘(in)visibility’, I propose a new way of reading the controversy about Roman tax which, taking up insights in Myers’s ‘political’ commentary, shows connections between this text and those immediately preceding it. Jesus makes central in the engagement about tax the same issue as is already at stake: identity and recognition. His ‘amazing’ response makes clear what the leaders are not seeing.