Theory & Psychology

This paper argues that positing a Theory of Mind and mindreading abilities in particular is necessary in order to be able to account for the development and possible impairments of communication in normally developing children and individuals with autism. To account for the different impairments that people diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) exhibit, what is needed is a refinement of the levels or degrees of mind-reading abilities that are usually posited in the literature. Instead of the two-tiered system of first-and second-order mind-reading abilities, there is a need to propose several other layers of meta-representation to account for the comprehension of different communicative events, such as metaphors, under-and overstatements, direct and indirect speech acts, lies, deceits, humour, jokes, irony and sarcasm. This paper assumes a relevancetheoretic perspective to explain deficits in communicative abilities in individuals with ASD. It suggests that the pragmatic impairments specific to autism can be accounted for by the role of context retrieval in the comprehension and production process, especially those related to knowledge about the speaker.

We are puzzled by Szilvia Papp's response to the recent Special Issue of Theory & Psychology devoted to critiques of and alternatives to Theory of Mind. Although Papp is a linguist with a special interest not only in Theory of Mind but also in ‘Relevance Theory’, we can find no reference in her response to the critical issues raised in the Special Issue, nor any defence of the dualist metaphysics behind Theory of Mind. Instead, she presents us with a further demonstration that if one starts from dualistic premises, then one does indeed end up with something along the lines of Theory of Mind with its resort to ‘mind-reading’.

This paper responds to Szilvia Papp's paper ‘A Relevance-Theoretic Account of the Development and Deficits of Theory of Mind in Normally Developing Children and Individuals with Autism’. This response argues that positing mind-reading abilities, in the form of a Theory of Mind, is necessary to account for autistic behavior only if one subscribes a priori to theoretical reductions of mental predicates (such as understanding) to cognitive and linguistic processes. This, in the author's opinion, is an unnecessary theoretical appropriation of concepts the meaning of which has not been logically distinguished from their common-sense use. Ordinary observable behavior (autistic or otherwise) is described in language that does not imply, and from which one can not unproblematically infer, theoretical propositions of a neurobehavioral kind. This response therefore argues that the refinement to Theory of Mind proposed by Szilvia Papp, into first-and second-order mind-reading abilities, does not, in fact, address this critique.

A weakness of contemporary ‘forensic’ models of memory is their reliance on the belief that ‘a chain of successive memories’ creates a sense of continuity and stability in the self. This literal presentation of memory forecloses an attending to its practical use (in specific contexts and moments in time) and the subsequent ambivalences individuals experience when trying to make sense of past episodes of child sexual abuse. Drawing variously on Haaken, Campbell and Bergson, we use these approaches to call for a reworking of memory by inviting an engagement with its relational, practical and collective qualities. This paper examines these reworkings of the concept of memory and explores issues of social space, the localized contexts of remembering and the manner through which memories transform understandings of agency and action, with specific attention to how the past and present intertwine in regard to managing adult survivor identities.

This paper concerns Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) philosophy of science and, in particular, the picture of scientific development suggested by his theory of genetic epistemology. The aims of the paper are threefold: (1) to examine genetic epistemology as a theory concerning the growth of knowledge both in the individual and in science; (2) to explicate Piaget's view of ‘scientific progress’, which is grounded in his theory of equilibration; and (3) to juxtapose Piaget's notion of progress with Thomas Kuhn's (1922–1996). Issues of scientific continuity, scientific realism and scientific rationality are discussed. It is argued that Piaget's view highlights weaknesses in Kuhn's ‘discontinuous’ picture of scientific change.

This paper argues for and demonstrates a language-based treatment of probability. The study was motivated by an observation that there is ambiguity in the use of probabilistic terminology in risk communication in genetic counselling. In particular, it was found that terms such as ‘risk’ and ‘probability’ were founded upon different ontological constructs. Most philosophical approaches to probability do not adequately explain this phenomenon. In spite of much variation in theoretical views on probability, one common element is that probability is viewed as an ‘object’ about which knowledge can be obtained. In contrast, a discursive approach to probability offers a way to understand risk communication (and probabilistic discourse more generally) that involves a focus on the function of probability statements in language. In this paper Toulmin's view of probability is used as a foundation for a discursive analysis of probability. Such an analysis is illustrated in transcripts from genetic counselling sessions.

A psychological understanding of interpersonal processes in terms of complementarity is not new. It is enough to mention Buber (the title of our paper refers to an expression of his), as well as Bateson and his definitions of double description, binocular vision and complementary and symmetric relations. We would like to clarify the nature of complementarity, and to point out the presence of this framework in some philosophical and scientific discourses about the person. Moreover, we think that the adoption of a framework of complementarity becomes a metaphysical necessity within what we have called ‘hermeneutic constructivism’, and that other constructivisms fail to acknowledge it, thereby losing much of their metatheoretical, revolutionary potential. We will document the possibility of adopting a framework of complementarity with respect to different pairs of poles, which specify as many phenomenal domains: (1) the relation between any entity and its environment; (2) the relation between modes of description; (3) the relation between the person and the world; and (4) the relation between people. In the final part of the paper we outline some implications of a consideration of complementarity for the psychotherapy process.

This is a short response to a particular point made by our colleagues Wes Sharrock and Jeff Coulter in their otherwise convincing and devastating critique of the ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) avatar of cognitivism. We think they may have misunderstood what we once said about the use of ‘mental predicates’ and wish to clarify the point in question.

We reject the claim advanced by McHoul and Rapley that our remarks implied any ironic attitude toward ‘lay usage’. We do not think that elucidating the grammar of use involves any sort of irony and argue that such a charge is based upon the misconception (interestingly shared by many cognitivist thinkers) that ordinary use is a function of lay users’ beliefs.

Psychologists use the term ‘idiographic’ to refer to the characteristics of unique individuals and ‘nomothetic’ to refer to universal characteristics. It is widely accepted that Gordon Allport borrowed those terms from the German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband and introduced the idiographic/nomothetic distinction to American psychology. However, in this paper we argue that the terms were made a part of American psychological discourse at least as early as 1898 by Hugo Münsterberg, two generations before Allport, and were incorporated by William Stern, who had a strong influence on Allport. Recognizing Münsterberg's and Stern's contribution assists in a more secure interpretation of Allport's understanding of the importance of a balance between idiographic and nomothetic approaches.