Theory & Psychology

In this article we reconsider the relation between time and agency that is at the heart of the current distinction between online and offline cognition. Mainstream psychology starts out with an abstract notion of time, in which only the current moment is real. Therefore persisting representations are necessary for agents to make their way across time. We take Gibson and Heidegger to offer a different account of the relation between time and agency. Their theories suggest that, by taking agents in their world as coordinated motion, the need for representations disappears. We extend this picture of human involvement by showing how this can account for the concept of time by retaining its relational, situated structure. Finally, we return to the distinction between on- and offline cognition and show that offline cognition need not be considered a different type of cognition, but only a different mode of coordinating: offline cognition in such a view is not a return to the internal manipulation of content; rather, it is a contentless, unstable mode of coordinating to the world in which the relational constitution of agency falters.

Discussions of psychological measurement are largely disconnected from issues of measurement in the natural sciences. We show that there are interesting parallels and connections between the two, by focusing on a real and detailed example (temperature) from the history of science. More specifically, our novel approach is to study the issue of validity based on the history of measurement in physics, which will lead to three concrete points that are relevant for the validity debate in psychology. First of all, studying the causal mechanisms underlying the measurements can be crucial for evaluating whether the measurements are valid. Secondly, psychologists would benefit from focusing more on the robustness of measurements. Finally, we argue that it is possible to make good science based on (relatively) bad measurements, and that the explanatory success of science can contribute to justifying the validity of measurements.

A perceptual phenomenon called apparent motion has been described as a paradox that challenges the notions of causality and temporal order. While the illusion has generated a passionate and often highly technical debate about the relationship between subjective experience and its objective description, no accounts so far have examined the possibility that the source of the paradox lies not in the mysterious workings of the brain but in the inadequacy of the reductionist explanation. Here, I suggest that the paradox is created by the deep estrangement between subjective and objective perspectives which has created two separate and conflicted worldviews. The illusion itself reflects a veridical perceptual experience, while its analytical explanation fails because it lacks the very qualities it is trying to account for. Although the proposed solution is controversial, it offers a simple and potentially far-reaching explanation for a long-standing problem in psychology and consciousness research.

The purpose of this article is to introduce Manuel DeLanda’s “assemblage theory” to psychology. Based on a select review of this theory, we argue that DeLanda’s work may allow for new ways of approaching unresolved problems in psychological inquiry, such as the realism–constructivism impasse, and disputes regarding linear and non-linear models of causality. DeLanda’s systematic treatment of the assemblage, using terms familiar to social scientists and analytic philosophers alike, offers a host of novel concepts and methods for the analysis of social, biological, and/or political systems, while also indicating how this analysis may be deployed in innovative social science inquiry. A number of psychologists have recently begun to explore the concept of assemblage. We add to these efforts in the present paper by assessing how DeLanda’s assemblage theory may open up a new “image of the psychological” to guide research and practice.

Questions pertaining to “empirically supported treatments” (ESTs) frequently address concerns about “measurement” and “evidence,” but rarely frame the conversation in terms of differences in the linguistic possibilities represented in each treatment orientation and how the availability and marketing of therapeutic languages are parsed out along class lines. Moving the conversation “beyond ESTs,” the author addresses how language positions persons into a particular relationship with their experience—a way of understanding their suffering and identity—and the significance of understanding therapeutic orientations as representing an epistemological pluralism rather than existing merely on an evaluative axis related to evidence and effectiveness. Next, the intersection between language, experience, and class access to treatment orientations and discourses is considered. It is argued that the emphasis on evidence-based modalities and symptom-reduction models impacts the experiential possibilities of persons in important and often disguised ways and this has a particular bearing on persons with fewer economic resources who have access to a narrow range of therapeutic and epistemological possibilities. Linguistic options are circumscribed and pre-decided. Lastly, the author illustrates the segregations and hierarchies of therapeutic approaches available at different class designations and the marketing of evidence-based epistemologies through the cultural allure and capital of “science.” The author concludes with expressed concerns regarding present epistemological narrowness in the mental health delivery system and proposes that additional dimensions be explored in the “evidence-based” discussions.

In order to legitimate itself as a science, psychology has faced the ongoing problem of establishing its proper method of investigation. In this context, debates on introspection have emerged that have remained intense since the 18th century. However, contemporary debates and historical investigations on this topic have not done justice to the richness and diversity of positions, leading to oversimplifications and hasty generalizations, as if the terms “introspection” and “introspectionism” referred to one and same thing. The central goal of this article is to offer an analysis of William James’s position on the introspective method within the intellectual context of his time, covering the period from his early writings until the publication, in 1890, of The Principles of Psychology. Our results indicate that James used two different types of introspection. We conclude by discussing divergences in the secondary literature and the implications of our study for historical and theoretical debates in psychology.

While dominant approaches to stress and coping focus on individual responses, field studies show that strategies of adaptation to difficult and harmful work conditions are partly collective. The notion of collective coping takes interactions and group behavior into greater account than the concepts of social support. The collective forms of coping are parts of the mediation between potential stressors due to work organization and health trouble. This analysis approaches stress as a social construction and contributes to a better understanding of the meaning of stress in different occupational groups. Examples from industrial workers and police officers (based on c.120 interviews) illustrate the different configurations of collective resistance and show how its weakening may explain, among different causes, the rise of stress complaints within these groups.