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In this article, I critically discuss the philosophy and psychology of science that are put forward by psychologists involved in the reform debates centered on the so-called “replication crisis” of the 2010s. Following the historian of psychology Laurence Smith, I describe the psychologists’ conception of the science system and individual psychology of the scientist as an “indigenous epistemology.” By first describing the indigenous epistemology of the reform movement, my aim is to constructively criticize it by making explicit how psychologists psychologize scientific psychology, and pointing to where such psychologizing needs more conceptual work, especially when it uses the work of philosophers of science. In their writing, the reformers tentatively subscribe to various positions on ways of knowing and functioning of the science system which exhibit fundamental inconsistencies. I suggest some ways for improving and deepening the discussion of epistemological positions that are taken in the replication crisis debates.

26:T40b,

It is a notion often taken for granted in contemporary Western everyday life that there is an intimate connection between empathy and moral action. Yet, in recent years, this connection has come under scrutiny. In this article, we first ask the question, “What is empathy?” A brief survey of the psychological and philosophical approaches to the notion of empathy shows that it remains a highly contested concept. The field has a propensity to discuss empathy within the frame of sameness. We instead argue that, in order to grasp empathy, it is necessary to foreground otherness. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, we further argue that, when encountering the stranger, moral action requires both visiting the other—as distinct from empathic knowledge—and thinking in order to judge what is right. Ultimately, moral dilemmas are solved, not by having or demanding empathy, but by addressing the issues at hand in joint action.

27:T605,