Theory & Psychology

Six positions are described on the question of whether psychological concepts can and should be defined. Anger is defined as follows: `P in C at t is angry at Q' = df 'P in C at t believes that at least one person whom P in C at t cares for has, intentionally or through neglect, been treated without respect by Q, and P has not forgiven Q.' The definition belongs to the system of psychologic (PL), in which the other concepts in the definition are also defined. The definition of anger is evaluated through the plausibility of its implications, and the plausibility of the explanations of apparent contrary cases. Three explanations are presented to account for cases which appear not to fit the definition. These are: stronger other concerns; the personification of non-persons and depersonification of persons; and a variation in the subjective standards of what constitutes respect and disrespect, both between persons and between situations (degree of frustration). The ultimate test of the definition lies in its general utility as part of the system of PL.

Contemporary cognitive psychologists share methodological solipsism (MS) as a general research strategy. MS postulates that a complete explanatory level dealing exclusively with processes within an organism is the domain of psychology. The paper undertakes a critical review of MS. By reanalysing the debate between proponents of MS (cf. Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981) and proponents of ecological realism (cf. Gibson, 1966, 1979), it will be shown that MS is theoretically unsound. As a second step, problems concerning the concept of transduction and invariance detection, using movement perception as a concrete example, are discussed. Existing findings do not support the principle of MS. The third step consists in discussing the status of MS in the theory of problemsolving developed by Newell and Simon (1972). The next section of the paper is devoted to the development of a model that fulfils the conditions stipulated by the critique of the principles of MS. The last part presents a summary of the differences of the developed model in relation to MS.

Gibson's theorizing about perception represents a potent case against cognitivist constructions of that capacity. Primarily it is seen to apply in contexts not dependent upon language. Gibson's own position on language is argued to contain some unexamined characteristics which could create contradictions for his ecological (hence evolutionary) theorizing about perception. Subsequent attempts, by Verbrugge and by Reed, to come to grips with the issue of language within an ecological framework are argued against. The model proposed by Buhler of language as Iorganon', or tool, is seen as best fitting the Gibsonian approach. Furthermore, the account of language's evolutionary emergence developed by Davidson and Noble is argued as congenial to Gibson's treatment of perception.

The functional theory of psychogenic illness proposes that the human capacity for psychological states to cause physical illness evolved during the Paleolithic as an adaptive mechanism for ensuring mutually interdependent behaviour under conditions when mutual interdependence was essential for survival. This integrative theory is consistent with existing data from several disciplines, including archaeology, anthropology, ecology and health psychology, and leads to two sorts of empirical consequence for health psychology. First, the theory acts as a heuristic for suggesting the most predictive psychological units for use in health psychology: the current weak or inconsistent results may be the consequence of using an inappropriate psychological unit, namely behavioural aggregation. Secondly, the theory provides predictions about how psychological variables should interact with type of disease, age and sex.

Much research demonstrates that people's choices do not conform to utility theory, a model of rational decision-making (Baron, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1988). Researchers have begun to question the normative status of utility theory in light of the many empirical violations of the theory. We argue that consistency with a formal model is not an appropriate standard for evaluating the quality of decisions. Rather, we propose that accuracy is a more useful standard. We define an accurate decision as one in which there is a one-to-one correspondence between the factors that affect a decision and those that affect experience. Based on our definition, we address the question of whether violations of normative models such as expected value theory and expected utility theory reflect inaccurate decisions. We argue that some violations of normative models do lead to inaccurate decisions. However, many violations may arise because the normative models prohibit factors from affecting decisions that do in fact affect the experience of the outcomes of decisions.