Theory & Psychology

In this paper, we provide a brief survey of the history of the concepts of emotion and emotion regulation and compare two of the leading scales of emotion regulation—the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) and the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS). Our purpose is to determine where there might be room for improved conceptual clarity in the study of emotion regulation research today. We conclude by suggesting that the conceptual difficulties within and between these scales are symptomatic of a deeper problem in psychological research, that of reductionism, and suggest a nonreductive read of the concepts in question.

Persisting post-concussion symptoms (PPCS) refers to a heterogenous cluster of difficulties experienced by a significant proportion of individuals following mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI). Innovative developments by Kenzie et al. suggest that PPCS may be understood as a complex dynamical system, with persisting symptoms being maintained by interacting factors across the brain, experience, and social environment. This paper offers a conceptual and theoretical evaluation of Kenzie et al.’s model, based on a broad set of appraisal criteria drawn from the philosophy of science. Kenzie et al.’s model is found to have several strengths. Areas for improvement highlighted include recognising the role of bodily factors outside the brain, improving the specificity and perceived importance of psychological and contextual factors, and managing the complexity of the model. Four suggestions are then made for continued development of a complex systems approach to PPCS. These include drawing on an enactive understanding of human functioning, utilising the notion of a “scientific phenomenon” to improve specificity, making riskier psycho-social hypotheses, and developing component models targeted at clinical phenomena.

The “standard definition” of creativity holds that a creative idea is one that is novel and useful. This judgement is customarily based on an external frame of reference as it is passed by people who are receiving the idea (the recipient). The internal frame of reference of the person who has generated the idea (the creator) is usually ignored. I make two cases in this paper. First, that employing external frames of reference in assessing creative products has been erroneously applied to understand the creative mind. Second, that any definition of creativity needs to be one that can be reasonably applied whether following an internal frame of reference of the creative experience or an external frame of reference of the creative product. With these aims in mind, I propose the following amendment to the definition of creativity: a creative idea is one that is both novel and satisfying.

In recent decades, several ecologically inclined authors have adopted the Gestalt idea of demand characters. Yet, James Gibson, the founder of the ecological approach, although being inspired by Koffka, was critical of many of his ideas, including the contention that the environment calls for certain actions. This article examines why Gibson was so reluctant to accept this concept of demand characters. To that end, the relationship between Gibson’s ecological approach and Gestalt psychology is scrutinized. After an exploration of the parallels between the frameworks of Gibson and Koffka, Gibson’s critique of Koffka’s masterpiece Principles of Gestalt Psychology is evaluated. It is argued that although Gibson’s claim about the mind–world dualism in which Koffka’s perspective is rooted is arguably valid, neither Gibson nor some of his recent devotees take Koffka’s insights into the qualities of experience sufficiently seriously in their theorizing.

Rapid changes in technology have contributed to making globalization a reality, in spite of it being criticized for imposing Western cultural values on the world. Globalization embeds a neoliberal ideology where productivity, competition, and profit prevail. This paper posits that neoliberalism has enabled the persistence and further spread of coloniality in the field of psychology, both as a research enterprise and practice. The production of psychological research, the diagnosis of psychological disorders, and the prescription of Western therapeutic packages all follow the neoliberal profit-making paradigm which commodifies the field of psychology. The underrepresentation of Global South research is discussed, as well as the over-emphasis on individuality in the conceptualization of well-being and success. The call for a decolonial perspective is underlined, advocating a perspective from within, as opposed to a perspective from above, that critically and selectively integrates indigenous knowledge and practices with what is relevant from the West.

We critically examine the concept of moral outrage within the context of contemporary psychological and moral theory. The prevailing assumption that moral outrage should be a form of disinterested anger—where the individual is uninvolved—presents significant challenges for understanding its moral character. We propose a socioconstructionist approach to moral emotions, arguing that outrage is not inherently disinterested but rather deeply embedded in social norms. By examining moral anger and outrage through this lens, we show that outrage, though often seen as subjective or selfish, can still serve prosocial functions and uphold moral standards. We discuss how norms shape the expression of moral emotions, suggesting that outrage not only responds to norm violations but also plays a role in shaping these norms. We conclude by proposing a more nuanced understanding of moral outrage that integrates personal involvement and normativity to reconcile its subjective nature with its social and moral significance. This approach provides a framework for more robust empirical studies and a deeper understanding of the relationship between emotions, morality, and social norms.

This paper posits the existence of two forms of disavowal: cynical and fetishistic. It explores how cynical disavowal involves maintaining a manipulative distance by obscuring the gap between belief and action, allowing the cynic to disavow their investment in an unattainable object and their knowledge of the Other’s lack. In contrast, fetishistic disavowal acknowledges both the objective reality of things and their subjective appearance to the fetishist. Unlike cynicism, fetishism does not rely on obscuring the gap between belief and action; instead, it recognizes and embraces both aspects. In doing so, this paper highlights significant differences between the manipulative distance of the cynic and the self-awareness of the fetishist. It acknowledges the role of cynicism in maintaining the limits and prohibitions within ideology and authority, through examples of banality, while also emphasizing the unique qualities of fetishistic disavowal.