Theory & Psychology

Modem understandings of the terms `idiographic' and `nomothetic' have diverged considerably from the meanings originally assigned to those terms by their inventor, the German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915). Much of this is attributable to the ascendance and eventual hegemony of aggregate statistical thinking within scientific psychology generally and personality psychology in particular. Based on an examination of the relevant portions of Windelband's original 1894 text, the present article seeks to clarify the misunderstandings which have resulted from this development. One objective of this contribution is to provide a more accurate historical perspective on the long-running nomothetic vs idiographic controversy. A second objective is to provide a much needed critical perspective on certain knowledge claims currently issuing from some quarters of mainstream trait psychology.

What follows is a critical review of Windelband's methodological distinction between nomothetic and idiographic thought as based on Lamiell's translation of Windelband's (1894/1998) `History and Natural Science'. This is followed by a critique of Lamiell's (1998) interpretation of the distinction and its implications for his proposed nomothetic psychology of personality. In the course of evaluating this proposal, Windelband's distinction is placed within the broader context of the neo-Kantian understanding of science, history and philosophy, and briefly contrasted with Dilthey's epistemological distinction between the human and natural sciences which takes psychology, and our understanding of individual persons, as belonging to the human, which is to say, historical sciences.

This paper extracts key themes from Heidegger's philosophy and critically applies them to issues of relevance to psychology. A case is made that Heidegger's arguments concerning ontology before the subject/object distinction, his discussion of enframing, his concern with the understanding of being, and his distinction between modes of being are all important for a rethinking of psychological practice. Heidegger's contributions to phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism are discussed and clarified in terms of distinctions between truth and correctness, the ontological and the ontic, and Being and beings. The conclusion points psychology towards a `deep reflexivity'.

Within psychology, psychosocial theories proposed to explain depression are assumed to have general applicability and, therefore, to account for depression in women. Although the body is implicated in both the expression and aetiology of depression, psychosocial models do not address the female body. Moreover, in development of psychosocial theories the meaning of depressive experiences from women's standpoint has been ignored. These and other lacunae are attributed to uncritical pursuit of research on depression within a positivist-realist paradigm and a taken-for-granted stance with respect to the reductionistic biological form of medical model. Drawing on recent theorizing from a feminist and social constructionist perspective, in concert with attempts to reconcile socio-linguistic with material-embodied dimensions of human existence, directions for developing a materialist-discursive understanding of depression in women are explored.

The originators of the grounded theory approach to qualitative research now disagree on certain procedural aspects of the methodology, while agreeing on others, and dispute its epistemological implications. In this article it is argued that the rift can be traced to a conflict over the logic of justification of the approach. Strauss and Corbin endorse Dewey's instrumentalism, including its prizing of the experimental method, and introduce a form of hypothetico-deductivism into the grounded theory method. Alternatively, although subscribing tacitly to the experimental method, Glaser does not tie it in with instrumentalism, and insists that grounded theory properly involves only the inductive phase of inquiry. It is argued that both instrumentalism and induction are inadequate as rationales for the grounded theory method. A new logic of justification, termed methodological hermeneutics and derived from Margolis's reconciliation of realism and relativism, has been developed by the author. When applied to the two positions, it leads to the conclusion that Glaser's procedures are the most consistent with the objectives of the method.

This paper attempts to clarify the divisions that have emerged in interpretations of grounded theory following the publication of Strauss and Corbin's Basics of Qualitative Research (1990). In particular I examine our use of the term `experience', our meaning of `hypothesis testing', the integration of macro-conditions into the analysis, and the relation of structure to process. I conclude by quoting from a memo written by Strauss concerning these issues in our own and Glaser's work.

An expression of sadness about Strauss's death is made and a note of appreciation is extended to Dr Corbin for commenting under the circumstances. It is then observed that Dr Corbin has failed to address both the author's deconstruction of the Strauss and Corbin methodology and the aptness of the proposed new logic of justification for it. Within this limitation, the rejoinder is organized around four topics: the use of `experience' as data; the meaning of hypothesis `testing'; the consideration of `macro'-conditions; and the matter of `process' vs `structure'. It is argued in closing that, although directed toward Glaser, Strauss's comment about the nature of science is pertinent in that it revealed that his view failed to take into account an alternative viewpoint that would make the Strauss and Corbin methodology more consistent with the epistemic claims that coherently can be made for it.