Theory & Psychology

In spite of arguments to the contrary, psychologists, it is shown here, believe statistical significance (SS) signifies that a finding will replicate. The most visible argument that SS is not an index of replicability, one that is based in notions of Bayesian statistical inference, is considered and shown to be flawed. Two different arguments are presented that demonstrate the irrelevance of SS to replicability: (a) SS may not be taken as a sign of the truth of the research hypothesis; and (b) statistical significance tests do not generate verifiable predictions of replication attempts. Direct tests of replicability and effect-size measures of replicability are shown to have comparable problems. A solution to the replicability problem is proposed for atheoretical research that replaces `once-and-for-all' tests of replicability with the requirement that the treatment effect be demonstrable (a) in the individual, (b) on a continuing basis, and (c) in a way that is clearly discernible. The question of the role of significance testing in research is answered by denying a role to such testing.

The role of statistical significance (SS) and replicability in research is discussed with reference to Sohn's (1998) exposition. I agree with Sohn's view that SS has no contribution and it is widely misinterpreted. Two interrelated criteria for evaluating research are mentioned: confidence in the hypothesis and replicability of the effect. Science is conceived as progressing continuously via attempted replications. Each successful repetition enhances our confidence in the hypothesis, as can be shown by Bayesian analysis. This, in turn, increases the chances of future replicability.

Sohn (1998) presents a good argument that neither statistical significance nor effect size is indicative of the replicability of research results. His objection to the Bayesian argument is also succinct. However, his solution of the `replicability belief' issue is problematic, and his verdict that significance tests have no role to play in empirical research is debatable. The strengths and weaknesses of Sohn's argument may be seen by explicating some of his assertions.

Commentators agree with me that statistical significance does not betoken replicability, but not for the reasons I give. Chow (1998) defends the use of significance tests by arguing that they are useful for assessing the role of chance in findings. I dispute this by pointing out that the Type II error rate may be as high as 1 - ct. Falk (1998) defends Bayesian inference, which was impugned by me. She also makes a case for the use of replications for the purpose of testing hypotheses. I complain that the supporters of Bayesian inference have not explained adequately what its purpose or role in science is, and for this reason it is an impediment to understanding in this area. I also dispute Falk's view of the role of replications in that I would require a successful replication to be one that produces an effect that is clearly discernible, meaning the effect is consistently noticeable with the aid of nothing more than descriptive statistics.

This paper explicates the conceptual limits and moral problems brought about by the use of social constructs for deriving a second-order description of an individual psychological process, made by reference to the social constructionist analysis of emotions. The metaphysical and moral naivety of psychologists is argued to be shown in the way they engage in a study of social phenomena without inquiring into the agentic-moral conditions which set the phenomena in place. It is proposed that psychology reform its practice in two directions. First, psychology's respect for truth should be maintained in its unconditional recognition of the first person as the source of meaning and truthfulness in all places at all times. Second, its duty is paradoxically defined as that of performing an act of collective remembrance through recounting the common expressions used in a social collective.

Discourse and Social Psychology by Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell has been an influential text in recent developments in social psychology. This paper examines certain aspects of the book's `linguistic resources'-though it does not use a discourse analytic approach and is neither a review nor a critique. Instead, through fragmentary readings informed by recent feminist writings, the paper raises questions about the `specific reality' (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 2) constructed in and through the text. Particular attention is paid to binary oppositions which are implicated in Potter and Wetherell's textual worlding—reality and representation, inner and outer worlds, nature and culture. The paper attempts not to expose `errors' or offer solutions to controversial issues but to suggest problematics which emerge from this construction of a particular discursive `world'.

This paper responds to the critical points raised by Morgan (1998) about Discourse and Social Psychology. She suggests that the book is organized around basic binaries (inner/outer, representation/reality, nature/culture) which reflect and reproduce logocentricism and thereby phallogocentricism, and she proposes that the phenomenon of silence is one which is simultaneously of particular concern to women and beyond the limits of a discourse approach. The response takes issue with the philosophical idealism and gender essentialism of these arguments, stressing that binaries are made sexist or progressive in the context of specific ideological practices. We disagree with both her identification of binaries in Discourse and Social Psychology and their claimed consequences. The paper ends by outlining some ways in which silence can be approached from conversation analytic and discourse analytic perspectives, and raising some reflexive questions about Morgan's own construction of gender and silence.

In this reply to Wetherell and Potter's (1998) reading of my article (Morgan, 1998) I construct their response as a turn-in-talk. This draws attention to my status as `second turn-taker' and allows me to acknowledge that alongside our continuing disagreement I am indebted to Wetherell and Potter's response for providing me with resources to draw my attention more closely to issues of rhetoric and dialogue.

Every theory of development is normative in using certain criteria to distinguish developmental states or stages, and many make (implicit) evaluative claims in addition. A logic of development is a method for describing, analyzing and comparing the logical relations within and between stages in theories of judgment development, that is, theories distinguishing stages that can be characterized by the use of different sets of criteria in making (evaluative) judgments in the field concerned. It is aimed to facilitate precise stage comparisons, and comparative evaluations, by formularizing their possible relations in terms of the relations between their distinctive sets of judgment criteria. Several types of criteria relations, both of logical implication and of preference, are discussed.

This review essay, in addition to presenting a general overview of the three volumes, interrogates their claims to being contributions to the `new paradigm' in social psychology. Firstly, it is noted that the political dimension of the `crisis' critiques of orthodox experimental social psychology is largely absent from these volumes. This is particularly reflected in the fact that some of post-crisis developments-for example, those drawing on the work of Michel Foucault-do not feature in the version of the `new paradigm' presented here. Moreover, the social constructionist perspective exemplified so well in these volumes is problematized. Drawing on the sociology of the environment, it is suggested that an `even newer new paradigm' is in the process of emerging in which constructionism and realism are held in tension or ambivalence. Some of the implications of this ambivalence for new paradigm social psychology are explored.