War in History

Urban elites across early modern Europe practised a variety of playful activities that extolled martial virtues. In Siena under the Medici grand dukes, nobles played at war for an urban audience, and celebrated those among them who had experienced the real thing. Tuscan cities staged mock-combat games of mazzoscudo, organized jousts and assembled cavalcades of mounted honour-guards whose regalia evoked chivalric themes. These festivities contrasted ever more strikingly with a Counter-Reformation of decency, while the aristocracy demilitarized culturally, as well as professionally. If warlike cultures practised more warlike sports, Italian states and society as a whole demilitarized in the course of the late seventeenth century, and these pageants waned in consequence.

All armies must feed to exist and move to engage the enemy, so logistical operations are crucial to warfare. Logistical provision for the Madras army was so restricted in its wars between 1746 and 1783 that it dominated strategy rather than served it. This was due to the enemy’s light cavalry being so superior that it could invariably cut British communications. But the enemy was unable to defeat the British in pitched battles or take their fortresses. So the East India Company survived to become dominant in India by keeping the Madras field army ‘in being’, supported by its invulnerable Bengal supply base and usual command of coastal waters.

This article examines the role of Indian soldiers and camp followers during the siege of Kut-al-Amara, from December 1915 to April 1916. Historians have traditionally attributed the demise of the British garrison at Kut to the suspect decisions of its commander, Charles Townshend, and his superiors. This article argues that the conduct of the Indians attached to Towns-hend’s force contributed significantly to its defeat. It also demonstrates that many of the difficulties faced by the Kut garrison were a product of the delicate relationship between Indians and the British command structure of the Indian Army during the First World War.

The historiography to date on Major-General J.F.C. Fuller has created the impression that his career as a military theorist gradually petered out in the latter half of the 1930s, and that after the Second World War the former enfant terrible devoted himself to the writing of military history. This article argues that such an interpretation is open to question, showing the extent to which he continued to write and reflect as both military theorist and commentator in the post- 1945 period. While his views on the new strategic situation, the Cold War, nuclear weapons and the redefinition of military concepts appeared in too many diverse places to enjoy the same influence as his interwar theories, their existence and remarkable coherence demand that his achievements as a theorist be re-evaluated in the light of this hitherto ignored body of work.