War in History

The writing of medieval military history, at present, is dominated by a romantic emphasis on ‘chivarly’ and ‘knightly’ individualism. This parti pris fundamentally distorts the history of medieval warfare and undermines a proper understanding of medieval society by making it seem intrinsically alien to both Roman and early modern military culture. In this study of a siege, which dominated warfare during the Middle Ages, the material realities have been emphasized, e.g., administration and logistics, as contrasted to literary propaganda and religious propaganda, in an effort to stimulate discussion regarding the ineluctable facts that undergird war throughout history.

Studies of the history of chemical warfare ignore the chemical dimension of the campaigns in the Middle East during the First World War. They miss the fact that the British first considered using gas in the region during the Gallipoli campaign in 1915. At that time, the political and military leadership in London, as well as senior commanders of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), were alarmed by the possibility of Turkish chemical attacks and repeatedly debated whether they should pre-empt this move by initiating the use of gas. This raised ethical, moral and prestige considerations, related to the British reputation in the Middle East. Eventually, gas cylinders were shipped to the MEF but never used. The British waited another year and a half before attacking the Turks with chemical munitions in Palestine.

After the First World War and the signing of the treaty of Versailles, the German army was forced to rethink its guidelines and restructure its forces. Generaloberst (Colonel-General) Hans von Seeckt had a special role in the development of the Reichswehr in the Weimar Republic. His influence was of such importance that he has been called the ‘creator of the Reichswehr’. As an answer to Germany’s changed geopolitical and military situation after the First World War, Seeckt developed the structure of the Neuzeitliches Heer or ‘modern army’, which distinguished itself fundamentally from the prevailing military doctrine in the German army. His vision of this modern army was of special importance to him and became the core of his innovative thinking, even if the restrictions of the Versailles treaty made sure it remained only a vision. This army would be characterized by a small number of soldiers, who would be well trained and equipped. This would enable the army to conduct a highly mobile war, which Seeckt saw as the key to success in future conflicts. This article examines Seeckt’s model and the implications this would have had on a future war.