War in History

A wide variety of eighteenth-century authors made comparisons to soldiering and slavery in newspapers, pamphlets and books. The analogy tended to be applied to highlight the lack of personal autonomy and inadequate wages of army service, as well as its harsh punishment and lifetime enlistment periods. While some commentators championed soldiers’ rights to better treatment, many had other agendas in mind. It was particularly prominent in anti-abolitionist propaganda, for example. Regardless of their intentions, civilians’ soldier-as-slave rhetoric took a toll on the actual men in uniform. The few rank-and-file writers to acknowledge it suggest that the metaphor shamed and humiliated them.

The changes in the conduct of military operations during the wars of the French Revolution were the basis for the theory of lines of operation formulated by Jomini in his Traité de grande tactique. The notion of lines of operation gained a new meaning that paved the way for the conceptualisation of the operational art and the transition from tactical debate to strategic thinking. Jomini's contribution to the development of strategic thought is considered from the dual perspective of the break with the military writers of the 18th century and the judgments made on the Traité by Napoleon and Clausewitz.

This paper examines the dramatic events which involved Ravenna and its historical pinewood from 1916, during the First World War. In that terrible year, the centre of the monumental city was for the first time targeted by Austrian bombs, which also threw civilian life into disorder. The emergency also affected Ravenna's ancient pinewood – a unique piece of natural heritage, rich with history – whose survival was threatened because of the decisions and military priorities of the Italian Supreme Command. These events must be seen in the completely new context of the operation to safeguard the Italian artistic and monumental heritage conducted by the state, with the support of the army.

The Gulf, a little-studied theatre of the Second World War, grew in importance to the area's leading power, Britain, as well as the Allies, as war progressed. All three Axis powers at one time or another tested Britain's ability to discharge its defence obligations, which included the protection of tiny Arab shaikhdoms and guarding nearby waters. With Britain's strategic imperatives lying elsewhere, British officials on the spot received scant resources to enact a scheme of defence for the Gulf and instead largely relied on makeshift measures. This article provides the first account of Britain's ad hoc defence arrangements in the region, and, in doing so, offers a window into the organisational, manpower and materiel attention major powers with overseas possessions give peripheral theatres.