See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 14,776.
29.
Prior to issuing the final rule, the California Department of Health Services will conduct a 45-day comment period on the proposed regulation in the spring of 2002. See MahoneyL.GilroyT., “California: California Rulemaking Would Set Nurse-to-Patient Ratios in Hospitals,”BNA Health Law Reporter, 11 (2002): 145.
30.
Nurse-to-patient ratios explicitly mandate the number of patients cared for by a nurse at any one time. While ratio requirements are absolute, requests for waivers may be granted to rural general acute care hospitals. A.B. 394, 1999–2000 Sess. (Cal. 1999).
31.
Department Proposed ratio.
32.
Emergency rooms1:4.
33.
Medical-surgical1:6.
34.
Oncology1:5.
35.
Pediatrics1:4.
36.
Labor and delivery1:2.
37.
Post anesthesia1:2.
38.
ICU/CCU/neonatal intensive care1:2.
39.
Step-down units1:4.
40.
See California Nurses Association, New Era for Hospital Staffing: The Ratios are Here!!, available at <http://www.calnurse.org/cna/12202> (last visited May 1, 2002).
41.
See A.B. 394, 1999–2000Sess. (Cal. 1999).
42.
See TiemanJ., “Counting Down: California Lawmakers Face Staffing Ratio Deadline,”Modern Healthcare, December 24, 2001, at 10.
43.
See MahoneyGilroy, supra note 1, at 145.
44.
See PereraA.MorainD., “Davis Pledges $60 Million to Train Nurses,”Los Angeles Times, January 24, 2002, at B–11.
45.
See MahoneyGilroy, supra note 1, at 145. DHS must adopt the regulations in accordance with licensing and certification regulations in §§ 70053.2, 70215, and 70217 of Title 22 and $ 1443.5 of Title 16 of the California Code of Regulations. A.B. 394, 1999–2000 Sess. (Cal. 1999).
46.
See TiemanJ., “Absolute Minimum: California Announces Its Decision on Nurse-Staffing Ratios, and Other States Watch and Wait for the Ripples to Come Their Way,”Modern Healthcare, Jan. 28, 2002, at 8.
47.
See California Nurses Association, supra note 2.
48.
See MahoneyGilroy, supra note 1, at 145.
49.
See Tieman, supra note 8, at 8.
50.
See Id.
51.
See MahoneyGilroy, supra note 1, at 145.
52.
See Tieman, supra note 8, at 8.
53.
See TiemanJ., “But Does It Work? Measuring Effect of Staffing Ratios Could Be Tough,”Modern Healthcare, March 4, 2002, at 10.
TiemanJ., “Paying the Piper: California Hospitals Brace for Mandatory Compliance Costs,”Modern Healthcare, August 6, 2001, at 19.
57.
See California Nurses Association, Frequently Asked Questions About California's New Ratios Law, available at <http://www.calnurse.org/cna/12202/faq2402.html> (last visited May 1, 2002).
58.
See Tieman, supra note 15, at 10.
59.
See, e.g., California Nurses Association, Attend a CE Class in Your Area: Class #A “Staffing Ratios: Implementation and Enforcement,” available at <http://www.calnurse.org/cna/pdf/ratce2002.pdf> (last visited May 1, 2002).
60.
See Tieman, supra note 15, at 10.
61.
See Tieman, supra note 8, at 8;
62.
SchiffL., “Staffing Ratios Proposed in California — But Still Not Final,”RN, 65 (2002): 14.
63.
Tieman, supra note 17, at 19.
64.
See Tieman, supra note 15, at 10.
65.
See Id.
66.
See Id.
67.
N.X. v. Cabrini Medical Center, 97 N.Y.2d 247 (N.Y. 2002).
68.
See Id.
69.
See N.X. v. Cabrini Medical Ctr., 719 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
70.
See Id. at 61–62.
71.
See Cabrini, 97 N.Y.2d at 250.
72.
See Id.
73.
See Cabrini, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
74.
Id. at 62.
75.
See Id.
76.
See Cabrini, 97 N.Y.2d at 250.
77.
See Cabrini, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 62–63.
78.
N.X. withdrew the charge of negligent hiring, however. See Id.
79.
See Id. at 63–64.
80.
Id. at 65.
81.
Id.
82.
See Id. at 70.
83.
See Id. at 71–72.
84.
See Id. at 71.
85.
Id. at 75.
86.
See Id. at 76.
87.
See Cabrini, 97 N.Y.2d at 251.
88.
See Id. at 252.
89.
See Id. at 249.
90.
See Id. at 252.
91.
See Id. at 251.
92.
See Id.
93.
Judith M. v. Sisters of Charity Hospital, 93 N.Y.2d 932 (1999).
One such example is as follows: “In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances of which the supplier knew or had reason to know, such as … the supplier made a misleading statement of opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely to the consumer's detriment.” Kan. Stat. Ann. $ 50–627(b)(6) (2000). The Supreme Court of Kansas found that there was nothing misleading about Dr. Levine's conduct, however.
118.
See Stovall, 38 P.3d at 714.
119.
Kan. Stat. Ann. $50–623 (2001).
120.
See Stovall, 38 P.3d at 712.
121.
See Id.
122.
Id.
123.
See Id.
124.
See id. at 714.
125.
quoting Willman v. Ewen, 634 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Kan. 1981).
J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 596 (2001).
133.
35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (1994 ed. and Supp. V).
134.
7 U.S.C. $ 2321 et seq.
135.
J.E.M. AG Supply, 122 S. Ct. at 606.
136.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1813 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
137.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
138.
J.E.M. AG Supply, 122 S. Ct. at 606.
139.
35 U.S.C. $ 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement therefor, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
140.
See J.E.M. AG Supply, 122 S. Ct. at 597.
141.
See Id.
142.
See Id.
143.
See Id.
144.
In re Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (1985).
145.
See J.E.M. AG Supply, 122 S. Ct. at 594.
146.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447U.S.303 (1980).
147.
J.E.M AG Supply, 122 S. Ct. at 598.
148.
Id. “As Congress recognized, ‘the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.’”
149.
Id. (quoting
150.
Chakrabarty, 447U.S. at 313).
151.
See id. “As in Chakrabarty, we decline to narrow the reach of $ 101 where Congress has given us no indication that it intends this result.”
152.
Id. at 606.
153.
See Id. at 599.
154.
Id. at 602.
155.
Id. at 603.
156.
Id. at 606.
157.
“Stare decisis, however, prevents us from any longer regarding as an open question — as ambiguous — whether ‘composition of matter’ includes living things.”
158.
Id. (citing
159.
Chakrabarty, 447U.S. at 312–13).
160.
Id. at 607.
161.
See Id. at 608.
162.
See O'ConnorK.W., “Patenting Animals and Other Living Things,”Southern California Law Review, 65 (1991): 597–621, at 620 (arguing that intellectual property rights do not extend to the patenting of human beings because the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars such ownership interest).
163.
See HechtE.J., “Beyond Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: The Controversy over Transgenic Animal Patents Continues,”The American University Law Review, 41 (1992): 1023–74 (discussing transgenic animal patents from an agricultural perspective).
164.
See Id. at 1040.
165.
See Id. at 1041.
166.
See Id. at 1042.
167.
See O'Connor, supra note 25, at 607 (stating the PTO decision in 1987 that it would grant utility patents for “non-naturally occurring nonhuman, multicellular living organisms, including animals”).
168.
United States ex rel. Quirk v. Madonna Towers, Inc., 278 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 2002).
169.
31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729–3733 (2002).
170.
See Quirk, 278 F.3d at 766.
171.
31 U.S.C.A. $ 3729 (2002) (Notes of Decisions, Section I, Part 4).
172.
Damages are calculated as treble damages and civil penalties of $5,000 to $10,000 per false claim. 31 U.S.C.A. $ 3729(a) (2002). The qui tam plaintiff can receive up to 30 percent of the government's recovery. See MeyerJ.A.AnthonyS.E., Reducing Health Care Fraud: An Assessment of the Impact of the False Claims Act (Washington, D.C.: New Directions for Policy for Taxpayers Against Fraud, 2001): at 9, available at <http://www.taf.org/publications/PDF/reducing.pdf>.
173.
Quirk, 278 F.3d at 767 (citing Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 248 F.3d 781, 803 (8th Cir. 2001)).
174.
See Id. at 766–67.
175.
Id. at 767 (citing 42 U.S.C. $ 1395y(a)(2)).
176.
Id.
177.
See Id. at 769.
178.
Id. at 767 (citing 31 U.S.C. $ 3729(b)).
179.
Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. $ 3729(b)).
180.
See id. at 768 (citing 31 U.S.C. $ 3729(b)(1)).
181.
Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. $ 3729(b)(3)).
182.
Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. $ 3729(b)(2)).
183.
See MeyerAnthony, supra note 5, at 12.
184.
See id. at 10, 17.
185.
See 31 U.S.C. $ 3729(b). The 1986 amendments to the FCA “clarified the definition of ‘knowingly’ (the Act's requisite level of intent for liability).” Meyer and Anthony, supra note 5, at 10.
186.
, M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 764 N.E.2d. 1 (Ill. 2001).
42 C.F.R. $ 2.31(a)(1) (2000) (implementing $ 543 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 290dd-2 (1994)).
191.
M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 3 (omissions of text in original).
192.
See Id. at 3.
193.
See M.A.K., 736 N.E.2d at 131.
194.
See Id. at 132.
195.
See Id. at 130.
196.
20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. $ 301/1-5 (West1994).
197.
See M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 4–5 (citing 42 U.S.C. $ 290dd-2 (1994)).
198.
See id. at 5 (citing 42 U.S.C. $ 290dd-2(g) (1994)).
199.
42 C.F.R. $ 2.31(a)(1) (2000) (“A written consent to a disclosure under these regulations must include: (1) The specific name or general designation of the program or person permitted to make the disclosure.”).
200.
See M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 6 (citing Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 52 Fed. Reg. 21,796, 21,799 (June 9, 1987)).
201.
M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 6.
202.
See Id. at 6–7.
203.
See Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 52 Fed. Reg. at 21,799.