Abstract
Matten and Moon studied cross-national variations in corporate social responsibility (CSR) forms using an explicit-implicit framework. This article proposes a development and refinement of the explicit-implicit framework to account for, first, intranational variations of CSR, and, second, the role of individual managers in the actual process of developing CSR constructs within a given country. The specific national, institutional context, such as Norway, within which managers construct personal meaning for CSR, is ambiguous and possesses both different and potentially conflicting institutional logics of the role and responsibility of business in a given society. The author suggests that explicit and implicit models of CSR differ in two key respects. One difference concerns whether corporate or collective responsibility mechanisms should be used to address social issues. The other difference concerns whether the scope of issues to which the corporate entity is expected to attend should be broad or narrow. The author proposes four institutional models of CSR that combine the explicit-implicit distinction with these two differences: Explicit Expansionist CSR, Implicit Contractive CSR, Implicit Expansionist CSR, and Explicit Contractive CSR. Focus group interviews with Norwegian managers empirically illuminate these models and the micro-level individual construction of variable meanings for CSR within a national, institutional context.
The current institutional analysis of corporate social responsibility (CSR) constitutes a strong case for arguing that forms of CSR differ across national contexts (e.g., Gjølberg, 2009; Levy & Newell, 2000; Maignan & Ralston, 2002). Less effort has been devoted yet to inquiry into equally important intranational variations in forms of CSR and to accounting for why such intranational variations occur (see Berthoin, Antal, & Sobczak, 2007). Taking the explicit-implicit CSR framework (Matten & Moon, 2005, 2008) as a point of departure, this study argues that the explicit-implicit distinction is a dual notion that involves multiple and possibly contesting forms of CSR not only between countries but also within a given national, institutional context. Institutions may provide support for different forms of CSR. “Institutional context” refers to the broad set of political, economic, and social institutions within which organizations and individuals are embedded and that affect their behavior (e.g., Campbell, Hollingsworth, & Lindberg, 1991; Fligstein, 1990, 2001; Roe, 1991, 1994). Institutional context encompasses not only formal institutional arrangements such as (primarily state) regulatory agencies and policies but also the taken-for-granted societal norms and values embedded within formal institutional arrangements (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008) as well as norms and values operating in the wider society.
Building on the national business system (NBS) approach (e.g., Whitley, 1992, 1999, 2002), Matten and Moon (2005, 2008) argued that national differences in CSR can be understood and accounted for with reference to the historically grown institutional frameworks of countries. According to Matten and Moon (2005, 2008), differences in such frameworks are vital to a comparative understanding of CSR. Varieties of historically grown institutional frameworks range from liberal market economy to coordinated market economy (Hall & Soskice, 2001). While a liberal market economy can be described in terms of national institutions encouraging individualism and policies providing discretion, a coordinated market economy can be described in terms of national institutions encouraging collectivism and policies providing obligations (Matten & Moon, 2005, 2008). The key argument is that national institutionalized contexts characterized by the liberal market economy will, in general, leave clear incentives and opportunities for business to take an explicit responsibility for social issues; that is, “corporate policies that assume and articulate responsibility for some societal interests” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409).
Explicit CSR normally consists of voluntary programs and efforts—and their associated corporate features like structure, strategies, and communication—perceived as being part of the responsibility of the organization. The reason is that the corporation assumes primary responsibility and the government assumes secondary responsibility for CSR. National institutional contexts characterized by the coordinated market, on the other hand, will leave fewer incentives and opportunities for business to assume a direct, explicit responsibility for social issues. The reason is that the government assumes primary responsibility and the corporation assumes secondary responsibility for CSR. Companies’ responsibility for social issues has been implicit, referring to “a corporation’s role within the wider formal and informal institutions for society’s interests and concerns” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409).
Implicit CSR normally consists of collective institutionalized values, norms, and rules (often mandatory and customary) for appropriate and nonappropriate business conduct. The regulation of labor markets and the role of trade unions and industry associations within coordinated market economies can serve as an example (Matten & Moon, 2005): A particular area of explicit CSR policies is the role of employees and the position of labor as a production factor. Many of the firm-based policies, which are described as (explicit) CSR within a liberal market economy, are redundant in a coordinated market economy as it is mandatory and/or customary for corporations to fulfill such measures. The responsibility is implicit rather than explicit. Consequently, it is not part of what corporations explicitly state as their responsibility. Rather, it is part of what corporations do as an implicit aspect of doing business within a national context characterized by a coordinated market economy.
Two observations inform the conceptual development and the empirical illumination of the refined explicit-implicit framework in this article. The first observation is that the current institutional analysis of CSR—due to its cross-national comparative orientation—relies on a one-dimensional and overdeterministic account of institutional theory. The institutional CSR literature only to a limited degree takes into consideration how to account for heterogeneity versus homogeneity, contestation versus consensus, and variations in CSR practices within an institutional context. Furthermore, the idea of a unified and constant institutional context informing a specific form of CSR within that context in effect eliminates a key requirement in much of the CSR literature—that of managerial discretion, referring to what is left to individual judgment and choice in the realm of management (e.g., Ackerman, 1975; Carroll, 1979). Consequently, the current institutional analysis of CSR and the explicit-implicit framework also not only downplays how actors adapt to their institutional context but also often plays an active role in shaping those contexts (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire & Hardy, 2006; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Levy, 2008; Lounsbury, 2008).
The second observation is that it is not really clear what comprises the institutionally informed models of explicit and implicit CSR. While explicit CSR is defined in terms of some corporate-level properties, implicit CSR is defined more in terms of some institutional properties—that is, what are the institutional conditions that inform implicit forms of CSR, rather than what it is. Explicit CSR is associated with what an organization does: for example, sustainability reporting, the design of formal management systems for CSR, membership in CSR organizations and networks, and the like. However, the corresponding corporate-level properties of implicit CSR are not as clearly stated. Rather, implicit CSR refers to a corporation’s role within the “institutions for society’s interests and concerns” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409). This formulation is exactly the same that could be used to characterize explicit CSR given an institutional approach emphasizing the support institutions provide for different forms of CSR.
The overall aim of this article is to suggest a further development and refinement of the explicit-implicit CSR framework. First, the refined framework proposed here seeks to take into account recent developments within institutional theory that explain how a national institutional context can embed multiple ideas about forms of business responsibility for society, which, in turn, can enable managerial discretion and thus multiple forms of CSR. Second, the refined framework proposed here seeks to identify what explicit and implicit forms of CSR comprise—that is, its corporate level properties or underlying dimensions. As such, the article seeks to complement the cross-national comparative analysis of CSR that highlights differences in CSR forms between different national contexts, with a perspective on intranational differences and contestation. The key point is that national, institutional contexts embody more conflicts of ideas about forms of business responsibility for society than what the current institutional analysis of CSR hitherto has emphasized, and consequently, more options for managers in constructing variable meaning and advancing different forms of CSR than what has been accounted for yet.
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. The next section elaborates on the current institutional analysis of CSR to substantiate a need for an institutional account of intranational as well as cross-national forms of CSR and the role of managerial discretion (i.e., agency) in the formation of different and possibly competing CSR constructs. The subsequent section promulgates a theoretical explanation of how different forms of CSR can develop within a national, institutional context and the role of individuals in the construction of different and possibly contesting forms of CSR. The next section asks what the different, institutionally informed forms of explicit and implicit CSR might look like—that is, what are the corporate-level properties or underlying dimensions of explicit and implicit CSR. Based on the answer to this question, four different institutional models of CSR are outlined. The subsequent two sections contain, respectively, the research setting and the methodology of the study. The author argues that the Norwegian institutional context contains two coexisting but very different ideas of the role and responsibility of business in society. The next section empirically illuminates the theoretical arguments and conceptual development of the article through the construction of four discourses of CSR corresponding to the conceptually developed CSR models. The concluding section discusses the implications of the refined explicit-implicit CSR framework and analysis for theory and future research.
The Current Institutional Analysis of CSR
An increasingly large body of literature argues that scholars should pay more attention to how the institutional context influences forms of CSR (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Bűhner, Rasheed, Rosenstein, & Yoshikawa, 1998; Campbell, 2006, 2007; Doh & Guay, 2006; Hoffmann, 1999; Jones, 1999; Matten & Moon, 2005, 2008; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Walsh, Weber, & Margolis, 2003). More specifically, the cross-national literature indicates that there are strong cases for arguing that CSR is institutionally contingent and varies between national, institutional contexts (e.g., the edited collection of CSR developments and progress across Europe by Habisch, Jonker, Wegner, & Schmidpeter, 2005). This insight arguably is of great importance for ethics and CSR perspectives that too often understand “corporate practices, prices, and working conditions [only] as matters of managerial discretion rather than an outcome of production networks as economic, political, and ideological systems” (Levy, 2008, p. 947). At the same time, the current institutional analysis of CSR seems to rely on a too one-dimensional and overdeterministic account of institutional theory. Both theoretically oriented (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007; Matten & Moon, 2005, 2008) and empirically oriented studies (e.g., Chapple & Moon, 2005; Levy & Newell, 2000; Maignan & Ralston, 2002) tend to suggest that a unified institutional context informs homogeneity and consensus around the meaning and practice of CSR within that context. Aguilera et al. stated that, “a cross-national comparison suggests that government actions through promulgating and enforcing laws help to create unique [author’s emphasis] CSR climates that vary across countries . . .” (2007, p. 849). Gjølberg (2009) explained the differences in CSR forms among 20 countries either by the specific unitary political, economic, and social institutions at the national level or by a dominant unitary institutional setup and a common idea about how to organize the business–society interface shared by groups of countries. The CSR scores for the Nordic countries then reflected a common national-level coordinated market economy, informing a more implicit than explicit form of CSR: These countries are characterised by close, cooperative and consensual relations between the state, business, and labour, as well as long-standing traditions for involving civil society in policy-making. The result is a carefully crafted system of roles and responsibilities, duties and rights, in which all parties have vested interests. This consensual interaction has evolved over decades and has fostered a business culture for balancing business interests and societal interests in a more long-term perspective, as well as management style based on consensus-building and participation . . . (Gjølberg, 2009, p. 20)
Due to its cross-national comparative nature, the institutional analysis of CSR does not fully take into account that national, institutional contexts can possess multiple and contesting ideas (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) of the role and responsibility of business in society. As a result, the institutional analysis of CSR does not theorize how institutional theory not only can account for homogeneity and consensus but also for heterogeneity and contestation around the meaning and practice of CSR not only between, but also within, institutional contexts.
In addition, the one-dimensional and overdeterministic account of institutional theory results in something of a paradox. While a key hallmark of CSR arguably is the principle of managerial discretion (e.g., Carroll, 1979; Matten & Moon, 2008; Wood, 1991), the current institutional analysis of CSR envisages managers’ choices and corporate actions as structurally bounded and highly institutionalized. To borrow a phrase, managers’ choices are envisaged as “in some measure beyond the discretion of any individual participant or organization” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 344). By embedding CSR in a societal setting, the institutional analysis of CSR downplays the very essence of the notion of explicit CSR itself—that of managerial discretion or agency. That principle allows “each entity, individual or group some relative freedom to act according to its awareness, capabilities, and best understanding of its situation” (van Marrewijk, 2003, p. 98), within some political, economic, and cultural bounds.
Given the arguments above, the current comparative application of institutional theory to CSR at the cross-national level needs to be complemented with an account based in institutional theory also of intranational heterogeneity and contestation. Such an account must show (a) how a national, institutional context can possess highly different ideas about the appropriate forms of business responsibility for society, and (b) how different ideas within the very same institutional context enable individuals to hold, construct, and promulgate variable meanings of CSR.
An Institutional Account of Heterogeneity and Contestation
Meyer and Rowan emphasized that “institutional environments are often pluralistic, and [that] societies promulgates sharply inconsistent myths” (1977, p. 356). This insight, however, was often overlooked, as early appliance of institutional theory largely emphasized homogeneity and the development of consensus around institutional phenomena (e.g., Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995). More recent analysis (e.g., Lounsbury, 2007) has begun to show how heterogeneity, practice variation, and contestation can occur in the context of a pluralistic institutional environment (e.g., Kraatz & Block, 2008; Zilber, 2008). We see the “renewed” interest in agency and practice variation in the increasingly prominent concepts of “institutional entrepreneurship” (DiMaggio, 1988; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004), “institutional work” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), and “institutional logic” (Friedland & Alford, 1991), all of which have gained in institutional analysis and organization theory.
The notion of “institutional logic” was introduces by Alford and Friedland (1985) to account for the often contradictionary practices and beliefs inherent in the institutions of modern western societies (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). They explained how society-level institutions—such as capitalism, the bureaucratic state, democracy, and the nuclear family—all have a central logic that “shape individual preferences and organizational interests as well as the repertoire of behaviors by which they may attain them” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 232). The notion of “institutional logic” refers to a set of practices and symbolic constructions constituting an institutional order’s organizing principle (Friedland & Alford, 1991). More formally, it can be defined as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804).
The difference between “institutions” and “institutional logics” is that while institutions specify what in some way is taken for granted and/or is important for the members of a culture (and the structural arrangements supporting the cognitive and normative dimensions of institutions), institutional logics indicate what sort of behavior to expect from one another, given a specific institutional order. For example, “capitalism” can be understood as something that is taken for granted and/or is highly valued in western societies. It is also supported by some formal structural arrangements—it is an institution. The institution of “capitalism” embeds a specific logic about what is and what is not appropriate behavior given the institution of capitalism, which is behavior associated with “the accumulation and the commodification of human activity” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 258).
The “institutional logic approach” of institutional analysis promulgates (at least) two key insights relevant for the argument in this article (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008): (a) society as an interinstitutional and multilevel institutional system, and (b) interests, assumptions, and practices as embedded within prevailing institutional logics.
Society as an interinstitutional and multilevel institutional system
Friedland and Alford (1991) explained how society can be thought of as an interinstitutional system. Society-level institutions—such as the capitalist market, bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and religion—all have their own distinct logic about appropriateness and what sort of behavior to expect from one another. Thornton (2004) explained that society also can be thought of as a multilevel institutional system and that institutional logics also consequently develop at levels, such as markets, industries, and organizations. Moreover, research on institutional logics has emphasized how competing and contradictionary logics develop within institutional contexts such as markets and industries (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). In effect, the institutional environment promulgates multiple and contradictionary institutional logics. Therefore individuals and organizations—within the very same institutional context—will be exposed to different expectations about what conditions are problematic and about the practices that represent the appropriate solutions to these problems. Thus, the institutional context makes multiple logics and sources of rationality available to individuals and organizations, which, in turn, open for different interpretations and practice variation within that context (Lounsbury, 2008).
Embedded agency
Within the institutional logic approach of institutional analysis, heterogeneity and practice variation cannot be accounted for as the result of the mere structural-level existence of multiple and competing sources of rationality within that context. Rather, heterogeneity and practice variation are understood because of the interplay between agency and structure (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Interests, identities, values, and assumptions of individuals are embedded within structural-level institutional logics. At the same time, institutional logic shapes mindful behavior by providing individuals (and organizations) with multiple and possibly contradictory ideas about what conditions are problematic and the appropriate solution to these problems. These ideas—and their embedded discourses—are “available to individuals, groups, and organizations to further elaborate, manipulate, and use to their own advantage” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 101). In slightly other words, individuals and organizations do not passively adapt to the logics embedded in their institutional context. Rather, multiple logics provide an opportunity (Lounsbury, 2008) that enables actors to advance competing claims and diverse courses of interpretation and practice.
Drawing on social constructionist assumptions (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) emphasizing translation (Latour, 1986) at the individual level (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) rather than diffusion of institutional phenomena, this study sees institutions as formed and changed as meaning comes to be shared and taken for granted. Actors are not only carriers of institutional meaning (Zilber, 2002) but are also active interpreters, “formulating, conforming to, disobeying, and modifying” (Scott, 1994, p. 60) institutional phenomena in their efforts to make sense out of the world (Weick, 1995). In this respect, actors’ “sense-making,” imagination, and acts of interpretation can be understood as an important form of institutional agency (e.g., Hajer, 1995; Maguire & Hardy, 2006; Munir, 2005; Zilber, 2002, 2006) in which actors play a role in both shaping and being shaped by their institutional context. Building on the theoretical thesis developed above, the comparative oriented institutional CSR analysis—emphasizing cross-national differences in CSR forms—can be complemented with assumptions of intranational heterogeneity in CSR forms.
The Corporate-Level Propertiesof Explicit and Implicit CSR
A weakness with the dual construct of explicit-implicit CSR is that while explicit CSR is defined in terms of some corporate properties (“corporate policies that assume and articulate responsibility for some societal interest . . .” [Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409]), implicit CSR is defined more in terms of some institutional properties (“Implicit CSR normally consists of values, norms, and rules that result in . . . requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues . . .” [Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409]). While the definition of explicit CSR as “corporate policies” has an intuitive validity in the context of established definitions of CSR as involving the “Principle of Self-Determination” (van Marrewijk, 2003) or managerial discretion (Carroll, 1979; Wood, 1991), the definition of the dualistic opposite to explicit CSR falls somewhat short of identifying the notions corporate properties. That means that we simply do not know how to recognize implicit CSR at the corporate level and consequently how to distinguish between explicit and implicit forms of CSR. Although institutional contexts inform different CSR practices, formal institutional arrangements—like, for example, the state—do not “do” CSR. By definition, CSR is performed by corporations, or more precisely, by individuals representing the corporation (Laudal, 2011). As such, we need to identify the corporate-level properties of not only explicit but also implicit CSR.
Building on the argument in the preceding section, the models of the liberal and coordinated market can now be contextualized as two different and conflicting logics of the market, each with different assumptions about the appropriate and nonappropriate solution for organizing the business–society interface. Based on the logics of the models of the liberal and coordinated markets, the explicit and implicit models of CSR differ in two respects: (a) in the basic responsibility mechanisms to address social issues, and (b) in the range or scope of issues to which the corporate entity is expected to attend.
The models of the liberal and coordinated markets differ considerably in how what is valued should be addressed and governed. That is, the logic differs in the level at which to locate agency and how to construct governance structures (Dobbin, 1986). For example, are employees’ pensions a corporate or state responsibility to secure? Is reduction of greenhouse gases secured through mandatory requirements for groups of businesses, or is it subject to voluntary, isolated, corporate initiative? The idea of collective responsibility embedded in the logic of the coordinated market in general prescribes rulemaking and rule following as the appropriate strategy and hence define a role for “obligatory agency” and associated actors in addressing and solving social issues like pensions and emissions. In contrast, the logic of corporate responsibility embedded in the model of the liberal market in general envisages a greater role for isolated corporate initiatives and discretionary agency to address such issues. The difference between “obligatory agency” and “discretionary agency” is that while the former embeds some action required by society, normally for a group of organizations, the latter embeds some action expected or desired by society. As a result, within the model of explicit CSR, the responsibility mechanisms are more corporate than collective in nature: the corporate entity—through voluntary corporate policies and programs—assumes a direct organizational-level responsibility for various social issues, such as employees’ pensions and the reduction of greenhouse gases. Within the model of implicit CSR, on the other hand, the responsibility mechanisms for obtaining what is valued is more collective than corporate in nature. The corporate entity, as a member of the societal institution of business—through values, norms, and rules—assumes an indirect responsibility for various social issues, together with the other major institutions of society. The key difference between corporate- and collective-level responsibility mechanisms is that while the former are situated inside an organization and issued with the authority that managers are granted within formal organizations, the latter are situated outside organizations and issued without the authority that managers are granted within formal organizations (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2004).
While the models of the liberal and coordinated market evidently differ in how they address and govern what is valued, the logics of the liberal and coordinated market models share some basic assumptions about what is valued, having similar commitments to democracy, capitalism, and welfare (Matten & Moon, 2008). This similarity has, however, different implications concerning the scope of issues the corporate entity is expected to attend within the liberal and coordinated market model. Within the logic of the liberal market, incentives and opportunities are left to the corporate entity in assuming a direct responsibility for contributing to obtain what is valued: democracy, capitalism, and welfare. Consequently, explicit CSR is potentially associated with a broad scope of social issues. For example, Vogel (1992, p. 42) showed how businesses have played a significant role in the development of U.S. cities and communities and, therefore, have been assigned “substantial responsibility for the moral and physical character of the communities in which they have invested.” It becomes legitimate for the corporate entity—more or less decoupled from other societal actors—to expound the needs of society and to develop strategies and measures that can contribute to realizing what is valued, that is, the corporate interpretation of democracy, capitalism, and welfare.
Within the model of the coordinated market, on the other hand, the corporate entity has far less discretion in expounding the needs of society and in developing strategies that will contribute to realizing those needs; such acts are more the result of collective institutional-level efforts. As a result, the corporate entity—within the model of implicit CSR—will potentially address a narrower scope of social issues. For example, due to the role of the state in Europe in providing social welfare (Clough, 1960; Grahl & Teague, 1997), social responsibility has been defined very narrowly and has been constrained mainly to offering good working conditions (Weaver, 2001). Byrkjeflot (2001) notes that for the coordinated market economies of Scandinavia, there has been little tradition for (or acceptance of) businesses and managers themselves establishing a vision for society beyond the core economic activity of the firm. Within the coordinated marked, the corporate entity simply do not enjoy the same degree of status as a model for organizing societal affairs (e.g., Byrkjeflot, 2001; Røvik, 1998) as it does within the model of the liberal market.
To summarize the argument so far, the logic of the liberal market will, in general, inform CSR-forms in which the corporate entity assumes organizational-level responsibility for a potentially broad range of social issues, for example, issues associated with “the moral and physical character of the communities in which they have invested.” The logic of the coordinated market will, in general, inform CSR-forms in which the corporate entity enters into collective-level responsibility mechanisms, in which it assumes a role in the administration and managing of a relatively narrow range of social issues, for example emissions and health and safety at the workplace. For these issues, collective-level actors, for example, the state, industry associations, and tripartite structures, have the prime responsibility.
However, other combinations are possible (see Table 1). Given the ambiguity of national institutionalized contexts (Morgan, 2007; Scott, 1994), possessing both different and possibly conflicting institutional logics of the market, there exist an institutional foundation (Lounsbury, 2008) for actors to advance competing claims of the appropriate form of CSR. Combining the dimensions of the responsibility mechanisms (corporate vs. collective) with the appropriate scope of issues to address and manage (broad vs. narrow) gives the following possible institutional models of CSR.
Four Distinct CSR Models Derived From the Explicit-Implicit CSR Framework in Relationship to Responsibility Mechanism and Scope of CSR Issues.
Research Setting: Institutional Contradictions of the Norwegian Institutionalized Setting
The empirical section of the article coming below further illuminates and illustrates the institutional informed CSR models suggested in the preceding section through the construction of four CSR discourses corresponding to the proposed models. This construction is based on how a group of Norwegian managers interpret and construct variable meaning for CSR in the context of different ideas about the appropriate role and responsibility of business in society. First, however, this section substantiates the claim that the institutional context of Norway does not fit the uniformity assumption of the CSR cross-national literature through embedding different and contesting logics of the market and embedded ideas about forms of business responsibility for society.
Building on existing literature on political-economic institutions within the Norwegian institutional context (e.g., Byrkjeflot, 2001; Dølvik, 2007; Engelstad, 1999; Gooderham, Norhaug, & Ringdal, 1999; Gustavsen, Hofmaier, Philips, & Wikman, 1996; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Løken & Barbosa, 2008; Østerrud, Engelstad, & Selle, 2003; Reve, 1994; Sejersted, 1993, 2001; Willums, 2005), two coexistent, but basically different and conflicting, market logics can be identified. Each logics holds somewhat different notions about the level at which to locate agency and responsibility mechanisms for social issues and, consequently, with different notions about the legitimacy of the enterprise as an interpreter of what is valued in society and the scope of issues to which companies should attend.
The institutional logic that was dominant within Norwegian society up to the 1980s (e.g., Byrkjeflot, 2001; Østerrud et al., 2003) emphasized the role and responsibility of business in society within a coordinated market (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Together with the other Scandinavian countries, Norway is often characterized as the typical example of a coordinated market economy (e.g., Hall & Soskice, 2001). Social issues, such as work life issues and environmental protection, have mainly been addressed through collective responsibility mechanisms at the industry and/or national levels (e.g., Sørensen & Wathne, 2007). As a result, companies have mainly addressed a rather narrow range of social issues. Broader social issues—such as social benefits to workers and their families and different welfare services—have not been a corporate-level responsibility, but rather a task for the government to secure. In sum, within the logic of the coordinated market model, the role and responsibility of business in society can be characterized through the following key words (Matten & Moon, 2008): collectivism, obligatory agency, solidarity, partnership governance, interlocking actors, and policies providing obligations.
Since the 1980s, the logic of the coordinated market has been challenged by another institutional logic (e.g., Byrkjeflot, 2001; Østerrud et al., 2003), that of the role and responsibility of business in society within the liberal market (Hall & Soskice, 2001). There has been a marked evolution in Norwegian views. The role of the Norwegian state vis-à-vis the market is very different today than it was 20 years ago. While the state was earlier seen as the stronger party vis-à-vis the market and business, there has been a change in power relations so that business often is understood as the stronger party vis-à-vis the state (e.g., Østerrud et al., 2003). The governing of the market has changed from, exactly, governing the market, to securing the effective functioning of the market (Byrkjeflot, 2001). Within the rebalanced Norwegian institutional framework, different groups in society and business constituencies, to a wider extent than previously, expect the social institutions of businesses and companies to assume direct organizational-level responsibility for various social issues not only in their primary and secondary areas of operations but also beyond. Norwegian companies, for example, are expected to play a larger role than before in offering welfare services (Hole & Osmundsen, 2006) like pensions and health care. In 2009, the Norwegian government produced a white paper on CSR in which they encourage companies to assume a more extensive—and corporate level—responsibility for a broad range of social issues.
At the level of the firm, there are several signs that explicit CSR is growing in strength. About 50 Norwegian companies are currently members of the Global Compact (UN Global Compact, 2011). Gjølberg (2009) has found that Nordic companies rank at the very top of international CSR indexes, such as the Dow Jones Sustainability index, indicating that these companies have established organizational-level, voluntary CSR strategies and systems to implement those strategies and have published reports on their economic, social, and environmental performance. In sum, the logic of the liberal market, evidently coexisting with the logic of the coordinated market within the Norwegian institutional framework, can be characterized through the following key words (Matten & Moon, 2008): individualism, discretionary agency, liberalism, network governance, isolated actors, and policies providing discretion. The evident growth in strength of the logic of the liberal market within the Norwegian institutional political-economic context means that while the “dominant logic assumption” might have worked for Norway earlier, it is now reasonable to believe that the Norwegian context embodies conflict of ideas about forms of business responsibility for society. Consequently, it is also reasonable to believe that the Norwegian institutional context embodies options for managers in constructing variable meaning and advance different forms of CSR.
Method
The epistemological orientation of this study is that of social constructivism. As explained by Scott (1995, p. xv), while a social realist position assumes that reality is given and “out there” to be discovered, a social constructivist position, in contrast, assumes that reality is constructed by the human mind interacting in a cultural setting. A social constructivist and cultural frame of references thus brings attention to interpretative processes of reality construction by individuals and organization, and the ideational aspects of institutional phenomena, that is, how individuals interpret, construct, and understand a phenomenon within a particular cultural and historical context (Zilber, 2002, 2008). The conceptual development of the preceding sections suggests the possible existence of different institutional models of CSR within a national institutional context: Explicit Expansionist CSR, Implicit Contractive CSR, Implicit Expansionist CSR, and Explicit Contractive CSR (cf. Table 1). The objective of the empirical analysis is to illuminate and illustrate the ideational aspects of the proposed models. The key question is how individuals interpret, understand, and construct personal meaning for CSR within a national institutional context characterized by different and conflicting logics of the market. Based on the individual’s interpretation and understanding of CSR, the author empirically illuminates and illustrates the ideational aspects of the institutional models of CSR through the construction of four CSR discourses corresponding to the respective conceptually developed models. In short, that means that the author places the structure (the conceptual developed CSR models) on to the text (empirical data) rather than finding them there (Czarniawska, 2004).
Method
The focus group interview (Morgan, 1996) was chosen as the preferred data gathering method to analyze managers’ perceptions of CSR within the context of different institutional logics constituting a possible institutional foundation (Lounsbury, 2008) for heterogeneity and multiple discourses of CSR. As stated by Morgan (1988, p. 25), focus groups “are useful when it comes to investigating what participants think, but they excel at uncovering why participants think as they do.” In general, a focus group examines how ideas develop and operate within a given cultural context (Kitzinger, 1994).
In contrast to data generated through other methods, for example, individual interviews and surveys, the data elicited in focus group discussion is interpersonal and negotiated, allowing different and differing views to be presented and challenged (Kitzinger, 1994). Thus, the main purpose of focus group interviews is to access group norms and understandings of a subject (Bloor, Frankland, Thomas, & Robson, 2002). In this study, the purpose is to learn the group’s understanding of CSR, and, more specifically, the basic responsibility mechanisms and issues inherent in the concept. As such, the unit of the analysis becomes the group (Brandt, 1996). The results are a shared understanding of the participants’ views. Although it is possible to use focus groups to analyze individual-level data (Guldvik, 2002), the unit of analysis remains the group (Crabtree, Yanoshik, Miller, & O’Connor, 1993) rather than the individual.
Focus group interviews are especially suitable to reveal data about subjects and issues where there exist strong norms of what is and is not appropriate (Guldvik, 2002). The subject of CSR is an obvious example of such an area (Dobers & Springett, 2010), being considered as “appraisive” or valued (Moon, Crane, & Matten, 2005). The advantage of focus groups is that the method encourages the participants (respondents) to contest the meaning of a subject and challenge each other’s viewpoints, thereby uncovering meaning beyond what initially is valued and considered as appraisive.
Data Collection: Groups, Participants, Questions, and Procedures
The focus groups consisted of managers with varied experience and knowledge of CSR, including representatives from the Norwegian textile industry, the oil and gas business (both operating companies and suppliers), the energy sector, food and nourishment industry, agriculture, and hotel and service companies. Given the homogeneity of the respondents constituting the focus groups—they belong to the profession of managers—five focus groups were considered a sufficient number to reach saturation. Several industries were selected because studies have shown that industry affiliation may systematically influence perceptions of CSR (Ibrahim, Angelidis, & Howard, 2006). A total of 32 managers were assigned to five groups. Each group was interviewed twice. The first interview was used to uncover the respondents’ understanding of CSR. During the second interview, the groups were asked to verify and further discuss the preliminary analysis of the first round of interviews. Notes were taken during the sessions and the interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.
Analysis and Interpretation
The study’s modes of scientific inference and thought operations can be characterized as abduction (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 1997). An abductive mode of analysis refers to the interpretation and recontexutalization of a phenomenon within a conceptual framework or a set of ideas (Danermark et al., 1997). In this study, the phenomenon of interest is that of CSR. As earlier explained, the current institutional analysis of CSR often suggests that a unified national context informs homogeneity and consensus around the meaning and practice of CSR within that context. The conceptual development of this article suggest that a national institutional context can embody conflicts of ides about forms of business responsibility for society and, in consequence, options for managers in promulgating variable meaning for CSR. The empirical analysis illuminates the conceptually developed models of CSR through illustrating exactly how individuals (managers) construct multiple and variable meaning for and advance different form of CSR within the context of conflicting logics of the market.
In general, this study is based on qualitative coding, which can be defined as “(. . .) the process by which segments of data are identified as relating to, or being an example of, a more general idea, instance, theme or category” (Lewins & Silver, 2007, p. 81). Analysis of the interview transcripts, after verbatim transcription, occurred in two phases. In the first phase of analysis, researchers engaged in open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In this phase, we were looking for sensitizing concepts (van den Hoonaard, 1997) from the literature—e.g., “voluntary,” “legal compliance,” “human rights,” “local community,” and “working conditions”—that characterize different dimensions of the concept of CSR, itself an example of a sensitizing concept (Jonker, 2005). In the second phase of analysis, the data was coded more systematically into four categories outlined from the theoretical construct of explicit-implicit CSR and, as such, constituted an example of theoretical coding (Lewins & Silver, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this way, the theoretical construct of explicit-implicit CSR—differentiated on the basis of the level of responsibility mechanism and the scope of issues to address at the corporate level—was used as competing codes, each code representing a “particular system of beliefs, values, and images of the ideal” (Philipsen, 1987, p. 249).
Based on the theoretical coding of the focus group interviews, the author then could construct four different discourses of CSR corresponding to and illustrating the conceptually developed institutional CSR models; (a) “the discourse of explicit expansionist CSR,” (b) “the discourse of implicit contractive CSR,” (c) “the discourse of implicit expansionist CSR,” and (d) “the discourse of explicit contractive CSR.” This mode of scientific inference means that the narratives and discourses are products of the analysis and thus not something “preexisting” that is uncovered via coding. Rather than being “discovered” within some world of objective reality, the discourses are constructions constituted by statements illuminating and illustrating different combinations of level of responsibility mechanism (corporate vs. collective) and scope of issues to attend to (broad vs. narrow). To be clear, the empirical analysis does not represent a “test” of the refined explicit-implicit framework in terms of indicating the actual existence of the four narratives and discourses of CSR. Consequently, the empirical analysis does indicate neither the relative strength nor position of the respective discourses. Furthermore, the narratives did not inductively follow from the empirical analysis, which, in turn, opened for theoretically reasoning and a refinement of the explicit-implicit framework. What the empirical analysis does, however, is that it indicates how managers—within a national institutional context characterized by different logics of the markets—promulgate variable meaning and advance different forms of CSR. On that basis, the author constructs narratives and discourses of CSR corresponding to, illuminating, and illustrating the conceptually developed institutional models of CSR.
A consequence of the abductive line of reasoning followed in this study is of course that there are no fixed or definitive criteria by which it is possible to assess or judge the validity of this study’s interpretations and conclusions (Danermark et al., 1997). The “results” of the study do not necessarily follow from the premises, but rather constitutes a plausible interpretation or construction of a phenomenon, in this case that of “CSR.” Abductive inference is a matter of interpreting a phenomenon in terms of some theoretical frame of reference, but the social constructed outcome does not constitute the only “true” interpretation or construction, but rather—given the theoretical frame of reference—constitutes a possible and meaningful interpretation or construction given the phenomenon of interest. As such, there is considerable amount of subjectivity, creativity, and imagination involved in the conceptual development and analysis empirically illuminating the four institutional models of CSR.
Narratives of InstitutionalInterpretation of CSR
The data revealed plausible existence of multiple narratives about the appropriate meaning of CSR (see Table 2). Each narrative is constituted by a somewhat different set of storylines or statements from which four different CSR discourses could be constructed.
Categorization of Managers’ Statements About the Role of Business in Society.
Oljeindustriens Landsforening [The Norwegian Oil Industry Association]. OLF, The Norwegian Oil Industry Association, is a professional body and employers’ association for oil and supplier companies engaged in the field of exploration and production of oil and gas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. OLF is a member of the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry [NHO].
Narrative 1 can be labeled “the discourse of explicit expansionist CSR.” This discourse consists of the following key storylines: (a) the notion of the corporate entity as possessing an identified organizational-level responsibility for addressing some social issues, and (b) the notion that the corporate entity has a responsibility to address a broad scope of issues on the societal arena. Within this form of CSR, the discussions in the focus groups embedded interpretations of CSR in which the corporate entity was seen as a legitimate actor in both expounding the needs of society and developing corporate strategies and mechanisms for addressing those needs. The corporate entity and the social institution of business were portrayed as a credible and efficient supplement to government or collective-level initiatives for addressing societal issues. The following statement well illustrates the discourse of explicit, expansionist CSR: You know, the point of departure was to start an alternative-thinking company that can sniff around in what everyone else takes for granted, and challenge political authorities on (social) issues . . . (. . .) Today we cooperate extensively with women’s shelters in Norway. It is part of our close community focus. Women’s shelters in Norway have never received state subsidies. Granting money for women’s shelters is voluntary for local governments. When the local government cuts costs, they obviously cut back on services that aren’t imposed by law [such as funding for women’s shelters]. Over a period of three weeks, our shops collected signatures [in support of our local women’s shelters]. We invited television companies and all the big newspapers to our presentation of the signing of the document by Bondevik [the Norwegian prime minister at the time]. He didn’t come, but his secretary came . . . In the subsequent revised national budget, crisis centres got 4.5 million kroner . . .
The discourse of explicit expansionist CSR thus embedded statements in which the logic of the coordinated market was questioned and challenged and where the corporate entity was interpreted, in part, as a social and political, and not only economic, actor in society.
Narrative 2 can be labeled “the discourse of implicit contractive CSR.” This discourse consists of the following key storylines: (a) the notion of collective-level responsibility for social issues, and (b) the notion of a narrow scope of social issues for the corporate entity to address within the framework of collective-level responsibility mechanisms. Within this form of CSR, the discussions in the focus groups embedded interpretations of CSR in which the notion was understood and adapted to what can be called the traditional role and responsibility of business within Norwegian society. The corporate entity was thus seen neither as an appropriate object for identification nor as a model for organizing societal affairs. Rather, CSR was related to the core economic objectives of the firm within a capitalist society, (a) capital accumulation and profitability and (b) legal compliance. The following two statements well exemplifies the narrative of implicit contractive CSR: Don’t we have a responsibility to be even more profitable so that the state gets more tax revenues and, in those terms, there will be more to distribute [back to society]? Isn’t that what our social responsibility is: taking as a basis what we have at our disposal . . . ? If you read all labour legislation regulations regarding employees, you’ll see that companies have a great responsibility towards their employees. (. . .) So there’s this core element of social responsibility that is already imposed by law.
In sum, the discourse of implicit contractive CSR embedded statements in which the logic of the liberal market was questioned, and, in which—in line with the logic of the coordinated market—the corporate entity was seen as largely an economic, and not social and political, actor in society.
The two narratives presented above, respectively, come close to the pure types of the role and responsibility of business in society embedded in the models of the liberal and coordinated markets. The liberal market model emphasizes primary CSR and minimal government action. The coordinated market model emphasizes state dominance and secondary CSR. The two other discourses of CSR discussed below combine elements of both logics towards hybrid forms of the concept.
Narrative 3 can be labeled “the discourse of implicit expansionist CSR.” This discourse consists of the following key storylines: (a) the notion of collective-level responsibility for societal issues, and (b) the notion of a broad range of social issues for the corporate entity to address within the framework of some collective-level responsibility mechanisms. Within this form of CSR, the discussions in the focus groups embedded interpretations of CSR in which the appropriate responsibility mechanisms for addressing social issues were collective, rather than corporate, in nature. There is, however, a very important difference between the discourse of implicit contractive CSR and the discourse of implicit expansionist CSR. The former discourse only envisages a role for the corporate entity in complying with existing—mostly national—legal and collective-level frameworks regulating a relatively narrow range of social issues (e.g., health and safety at the work place). The latter discourse envisages a role for the corporate entity in complying with collective-level frameworks—national as well as international—that address a broader range of social issues (e.g., issues of community development and human rights). The following two statements are illustrative: But I think it will happen sooner or later: we will get a set of international regulations that regulate transparency and openness about how bonuses that companies pay in order to get a permit are spent. I’m most likely speaking to the detriment of my own company when I say that, but I would welcome it, the sooner the better. There will always be certain people who don’t do it [demonstrate transparency on their own initiative]. So I personally would welcome international regulations or something similar. . . . I think that both public debate and initiative [regarding social responsibility] can come from the UN, EU, international labour and employer organisations, and NGOs. For instance, the EU can set regulations that we must take into consideration . . .
In sum, the discourse of implicit expansionist CSR is, in some respects, the discourse of using politics and national and global governance mechanisms to address the typical issues of explicit expansionist CSR, such as human rights abuses, child labor, long working hours, and unhealthy working conditions. Whereas the discourse of explicit expansionist CSR embeds storylines and interpretation of CSR in which the corporate entity develops mechanisms to address such issues, the discourse of implicit expansionist CSR embeds the very same broad scope of issues but finds the appropriate solution in politics rather than in business.
Narrative 4 can be labeled “the discourse of explicit contractive CSR.” This discourse consists of the following key storylines: (a) the notion of corporate-level responsibility mechanisms, and (b) the notion that the corporate entity should address a narrow more than a broad, scope of social issues through its corporate-level responsibility strategies and mechanisms. Within this form of CSR, the focus groups’ discussions embedded interpretations of CSR in which the notion was defined in terms of an identified corporate-level responsibility for social issues. As such, and as with the discourse of explicit expansionist CSR, the corporate actor—more or less decoupled from other societal actors—was perceived as a legitimate actor to expound societal problems and to develop strategies and mechanisms to address those problems.
However, in contrast to the discourse of explicit, expansionist CSR, the key feature of the storylines that constitute the explicit contractionist CSR discourse was the idea that CSR most appropriately must be understood in relation to the nature of the core economic activity of the individual firm or industry. As stated by two respondents, “Social responsibility must be defined in terms of an individual company’s business activity.” “An oil company has a responsibility to protect the environment, but no responsibility to contribute when natural disasters occur [famines, for instance].” An identified aspect of this position was a certain unease and reluctance about the expectation that companies should assume a broad role in society, an unease and reluctance well illustrated by the following statement: . . . because it’s obvious that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, and now we’ve got a whole lot of stuff that gets presented as corporate social responsibility. As a chief executive, I no longer manage a company; I manage society! I’m a little scared that it might get a bit overwhelming [and too many things get defined as corporate social responsibility].
A variant of this argument was that the scope of the issues that companies should address must be defined in terms of what issues the firm has any possibility to influence: “Social responsibility has got to do with attitudes and [needs to be understood] in terms of what the company is able to influence.” Embedded in this position were statements in which the managers did not deny the idea of companies assuming an expansionist role in society from a specific ideal viewpoint. At the same time, they expressed a more contractive and functional position on the background of companies’—constituting first of all an economic institution in society—limited ability to address efficiently a number of social problems: I hang corporate social responsibility on 3 pegs: one is profitability or value generation. The second is environmental responsibility. The third is social responsibility. However, the last two items must be weighed up against profitability/value generation. That’s where you’ve got the biggest opportunity to influence things. Companies can’t assume responsibility for situations that they are unable to influence.
In sum, the discourse of explicit contractive CSR is constructed from statements that indicate that the managers use and elaborate on both the logic of the liberal and coordinated market when promulgating personal meaning for CSR. In line with the logic of the liberal market, the corporate entity is clearly interpreted as an autonomous actor in society with the right and authority vis-à-vis other societal actors to assume responsibility for social issues. At the same time, and in the line with the logic of the coordinated market, there is a considerable amount of functionalism embedded in this position. Given the corporate entity as primarily an economic actor in society, the scope of issues to which it attends must be coupled to its core economic activity and/or to what the corporate entity has an ability to influence.
Taken together, the discussions in the focus groups evidently embedded four very different forms of CSR. Based on the four narratives of CSR, the explicit-implicit CSR nexus can be more formally expressed in the following institutional models:
Explicit expansionist CSR
Responsibility mechanisms in which the corporate entity—with the authority that managers are granted within the framework of a formal organization—assumes a responsibility for a broad range of issues beyond the core economic operation or mission of the firm. Examples can include companies’ charitable giving and voluntary support for society and local community development, the building of recreation facilities for employees and their families, support for schools and hospitals, and sponsoring of art and sporting events.
Implicit contractive CSR
Responsibility mechanisms initiated by collective-level actors, and where the collective-level actor functions as the prime responsibility bearer, but where corporate entities affiliated with the responsibility program become involved in the administration of a narrow, more than a broad, range of issues close to the core economic functioning of the corporate entity. Examples may include corporate internal administration of issues of health and safety, working conditions, emission reduction, and so forth.
Implicit expansionist CSR
Responsibility mechanisms initiated by the state or other collective-level actors, and where the collective-level actor functions as the prime responsibility bearer, but where corporate entities affiliated with the responsibility program or project become involved in the administration of a broad range of social issues. Examples may include the field of voluntary standards setting—like the Forest Stewardship Council—in which industry associations, companies, and nongovernmental organizations assume responsibility for policy making and enactment of a broad range of issues within a specific field (Gulbrandsen, 2008).
Explicit contractive CSR
Responsibility mechanisms initiated by the corporate actor—with the authority that managers are granted within the framework of a formal organization—in which the corporate entity assumes a responsibility for a narrow, more than broad, range of social issues—that is, for some issues close to the core economic functioning of the organization. Examples may include philanthropic activities close to the company’s mission, for example, when a telecommunications company is teaching computer networks administration to students of the local community, or different bottom-of-the-pyramid strategies.
Discussion and Conclusion
Current cross-national comparative institutional analysis of CSR suggests that CSR forms differ across national contexts (e.g., Blasco & Zølner, 2010; Gjølberg, 2009; Matten & Moon, 2005, 2008). This study refines and complements this view by indicating that there is some variety and heterogeneity within a national context in CSR forms in the context of different and competing institutional logics of the market. By adding a level of analysis, the study represents a move toward a multilevel understanding of CSR variations across contexts (see also Aguilera et al., 2007). Through identifying the notions of CSR underlying dimensions and developing a thesis on acts of interpretation as an form of institutional agency, the refined framework opens for multiple and hybrid forms of CSR (Boxenbaum, 2006) within a national context. The empirical analysis illuminates and illustrates the micro-level individual discursive and ideational construction (e.g., Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008; Powell & Colyvas, 2008) of meaning for CSR.
Within the discourse of explicit expansionist CSR, actors question the logic of the role and responsibility in society within the coordinated market in which agency is located in politics and political institutions. Rather, the discourse of expansionist CSR invokes the logic of the liberal market to promulgate the corporate entity as a legitimate societal actor that appropriately should develop strategies and corporate level responsibility mechanisms to address a broad range of social issues.
The opposite picture is presented within the discourse of implicit contractionist CSR. Actors evidently question the logic of the role and responsibility of business in society within the liberal market. Instead, they invoke the logic of the coordinated market to promulgate an interpretation of CSR in which agency is located at the collective-level, where, as a result, the corporate entity assumes a role in managing a narrow, rather than broad, scope of social issues.
The discourses of explicit contractionist and implicit expansionist CSR can be seen as hybrid forms of CSR in which actors combine different institutional logics in the attribution of meaning to and interpretation of CSR. Within the discourse of explicit contractionist CSR, actors invoke the logic of the liberal market to promulgate an interpretation of corporate, rather than collective-level, responsibility mechanisms. At the same time, the discourse questions the institutional feature of the liberal market that the corporate entity appropriately should assume responsibility for and address a broad range of social issues through corporate responsibility strategies.
Within the discourse of implicit expansionist CSR, actors invoke the logic of the coordinated market to locate the responsibility mechanisms for social issues within political institutions and other, collective-level actors. At the same time—and contrary to the discourse of implicit contractionist CSR—the discourse identifies a role for the corporate entity to address a broad range of social issues, but within the framework of collective responsibility mechanisms.
What this study indicates is that multiple logics and institutional contradictions enable managers (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Hardy & Maguire, 2008) to attribute meaning to CSR in multiple ways. The actors become interpreters challenging, questioning, and combining the features of different institutional logics as they promulgate multiple translations of a convention like CSR. The institutional analysis of this article thus highlights the discursive and interpretative struggles (Zilber, 2002) that occur in the context of the development of CSR forms within a national institutional context. Furthermore, the analysis provide insight into the conflicts of interests, power battles, and politics that evidently take place within the rebalancing of corporations’ relationships with societal institutions (e.g., Banarjee, 2008; Crane, Matten, & Moon, 2008; Hanlon, 2008; Levy, 2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Vogel, 2005). This reality does not mean that all positioning is the result of an active process of taking up or denying positions. Staying consistent with the initial impetus of institutional theory (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977) of a more institutional or collective (e.g., Lounsbury, 2007) than strategic (e.g., Oliver, 1991) notion of rationality, there is considerable power in structured ways of seeing. As explained by Hajer (1995, pp. 56-57), these are often based on reification, that is, their arbitrary character remains hidden. Consequently, people do not necessarily recognize them as moments of positioning but simply assume that this is “the way one talks” on this sort of occasion.
The theoretical argument and empirical illumination promulgated in this article have important implications. On the descriptive level, the argument suggested in this article offers a better understanding of the specific institutional underpinnings that inform different forms of CSR. These brings attention to (a) an institutional account of heterogeneity and contestation versus one of homogeneity and consensus, around the development of forms CSR within a given national institutionalized context, and (b) the role of individuals and agency in constructing personal meaning for CSR and promulgating multiple discourses and models of CSR. Different forms of CSR can be understood as originating in human agency, but in a context of institutional logics and structures that both enable and constrain their agency (e.g., Giddens, 1984; Hajer, 1995; Zilber, 2002). This insight is important for institutional CSR perspectives that often downplay one of the key ideas of CSR, the principle of managerial discretion and the relative freedom of managers to act according to its own (institutionally embedded) interpretation of a situation.
Furthermore, the thesis of this article offers a better understanding of what comprise explicit and implicit manifestations of CSR, that is, their underlying dimensions. Two of the models—explicit expansionist CSR and implicit contractive CSR—more or less correspond to the meaning given to, respectively, explicit and implicit CSR by Matten and Moon (2005, 2008). The two other, and hybrid, models—explicit contractive CSR and implicit expansionist CSR—have parallels respectively in “strategic” CSR (e.g., Porter & Kramer, 2006) and transformative and deliberative notions of CSR (e.g., Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). The advantage of the refined explicit-implicit distinction and the proposed terminology is that it suggests a coherent framework clarifying each model underlying dimensions (level of basic responsibility mechanism and scope of issues to attend to at the corporate level; cf. Table 1). Furthermore, in contrast to some of postpositivist CSR research (e.g., Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), the advantage of the refined explicit-implicit framework is that it indicates how forms of CSR can be related to national-level institutional logics of the market and the broader meaningful environment.
The conceptually developed models and constructed discourses of CSR are also inherently normative and thus have important normative implications. The two hybrid models of CSR hint at alternative and somewhat unexplored routes for actors to follow than what can be envisaged trough the lenses of the dominating model of explicit CSR (Shamir, 2004a, 2004b) or traditional nonexplicit corporate roles within what Matten and Moon (2008, p. 409) refer to as the “wider formal and informal institutions for society’s interests and concerns.” CSR is thus not only about—as in the explicit expansionist model—developing corporate level responsibility mechanisms for a potential broad range of social issues based on a corporate interpretation of what is valued in society. Nor is it only about—as in the implicit contractionist model—assuming a role in managing a narrow range of social issues within the framework of some collective responsibility mechanisms. It is also about contributing to developing and/or assuming a role within collective responsibility mechanisms that aim to address the complex set of issues companies currently are expected to attend. The CSR configurations suggested in this article may help societal actors to more clearly understand and envision the different (institutional embedded) alternatives available to the responsible company. Neither explicit expansionist nor implicit contractive manifestations of CSR are given or inevitable. Rather, hybrid manifestations will occur, as actors invoke the logics of both the liberal and the coordinated markets, confirming, contesting, or combining those logics’ key assumptions about the role and responsibility of business in society.
The development of CSR forms is not “end point,” but a fluid, dynamic, and an ongoing process (DiMaggio, 1988), in which the development of meaning plays a crucial role (Zilber, 2008). This article has suggested possible institutional models of CSR and empirically illuminated and illustrated these models through constructing discourses of CSR corresponding to the respective models based on managers’ interpretations of CSR within a national institutional context. Future research should reveal the eventual actual existence and mix of these models within national contexts. Especially welcome would be research that closely investigates how meaning and ideational aspects influence the more material and practical/structural aspects of the institutionalization of CSR (e.g., Kraatz & Block, 2008). Also welcomed would be research that closely investigates the political role of companies (e.g., Matten, 2009; Nèron & Normann, 2008; Vogel, 2009) in promulgating different models of CSR and the way in which organizations can affect the institutional logics that enable institutionally given agency and different forms of CSR in the first place.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Duane Windsor, Ben Wempe, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and support in developing the article. A special thanks to Oluf Langhelle at the University of Stavanger for enhancing the quality of the arguments and for his support throughout the project and the writing of the article. The ideas of this article were first presented at the sixth annual colloquium of the European Academy of Business in Society (EABIS), Barcelona, September, 2007. The author is grateful for the helpful comments he received during this conference.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
The article was accepted during the editorship of Duane Windsor.