Abstract
Nancey Murphy (Fuller Theological Seminary) is a Christian philosopher best known for her “nonreductive physicalist” account of human nature, put forth in numerous publications. In A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, Murphy restates this position, but she does so as part of a much broader project. Here her intention is to offer a text that deals with the traditional questions of “faith and reason.” She does this in a way that situates such questions firmly within the Christian tradition (as opposed to a generalized “philosophy of religion” approach) and takes into account the particular developments of late modernity. Murphy provides an expansive and interesting survey of the Western philosophical tradition in the process.
The book consists of two parts. Part I, “A Brief History of Reason,” surveys various ways that reason has been conceived in ancient, medieval, modern, and late modern contexts. In this section, Murphy sketches the situated and contextual nature of what counts as “reason,” even while she argues that “the fact of historical change in knowledge does not entail that there is no knowledge at all” (6). She focuses on issues like early Christian appropriations of Greek thought, Aquinas’ synthesis of the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions, Descartes’ epistemological revolution, and post-foundationalist approaches to reason in the twentieth century. One of the unique features of this survey is the way that Murphy highlights how particular metaphysical frameworks condition our understandings of reason.
Part II, “Crises in Modern Christianity,” explores the intellectual crises presented to the Christian tradition by modernity, as well as the ways that the tradition has succeed or failed at answering these questions. These include challenges like shifting theories of knowledge, the critical study of scripture, religious plurality, the problem of special divine action, the problem of evil and suffering, and various challenges to Christianity from the sciences. Murphy states that “in a sense, the whole of this text is an attempt to provide the best account that can be offered…of the rationality of the Western Tradition” (182).
Murphy relies heavily on Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of “large-scale traditions” of human reasoning. According to her reading of MacIntyre, “Traditions develop by means of successive attempts to interpret and apply their authoritative texts in a new context” (87). She sees MacIntyre’s account as the best understanding of human reason available. It takes into account the situated nature of human reason that Murphy highlights throughout the book and provides a basis for the Christian tradition to learn from and to respond to the objections of competing traditions. Murphy’s reading of MacIntyre is the heart of the book. It helps to make sense of how the various traditions of rationality discussed in Part I function. Part II is largely an exercise in testing MacIntyre’s account by examining how the Christian tradition has adapted and responded to the intellectual crises of modernity. Murphy displays an excellent grasp of MacIntyre’s corpus and the development of his thought over time.
One of the more interesting features of the book is the extent to which Murphy engages with the philosophy of science. In fact, she spends so much time discussing scientific models of knowledge that I would be tempted to say the book would function just as well as a text in a course on Christianity and science as one on Christianity and philosophy. And I suspect that this recommendation would be in keeping with Murphy’s overall goal. For example, Murphy makes much of Imre Lakatos’ understanding of “progressive scientific research programs” which must “evaluate how the program has changed over time in the face of intellectual difficulties” (75). She likens this to MacIntyre’s account of “large-scale traditions” and she wants to apply a similar account of rationality—a narrative account that carries with it a story of successes, failures, and developments in a tradition—to theological reflection. The proposal, use, and eventual dismissal of a scientific theory or paradigm is a model for her understanding of how religious traditions function. In fact, Murphy casts disciplines like religion, philosophy, and science as distinct traditions rather than separate fields. To this end, she constructs a new hierarchy of sciences with theology at the top – a revised version of theology as “queen of the sciences.” She moves effectively between theology, philosophy, and science, taking a holistic approach to these disciplines—or traditions—and dispensing with many of the artificial barriers that often separate them.
One helpful aspect of Murphy’s book is the occasionally personal nature of her writing. She inserts autobiographical vignettes that give context for the development of her specific research interests at the intersection of philosophy of science and theology. Through explaining how these interests developed during her graduate work, Murphy helps to reinforce the situated and traditioned nature of rationality. Other helpful components are the graphs that are included throughout the book to illustrate various interactions between intellectual traditions. The book could serve well as a text in an undergraduate or graduate class on the philosophy of religion for theology or seminary students.
I will note two concerns about this otherwise excellent book. One concerns form and the other substance. First, while Murphy’s section and chapter summaries are helpful and clearly map out her project, the amount of time that she spends rehearsing and retracing previous chapters becomes tedious. The repetition is clearly intentional and pedagogically motivated, but it bogs down the text at points. Second, her rejection of dualist accounts of human nature in favor of a “nonreductive physicalist” account is ultimately unconvincing. Murphy’s discussion of the topic is enlightening, and she effectively presents the concerns—biblical, philosophical, and scientific—that motivate the nonreductive physicalist position. However, I do not think that she provides a sufficient response to Christian concerns about physicalist accounts of human nature. To address these concerns fully, she would have done well to interact with contemporary Christian Platonists like John Milbank, Paul Tyson, and others who provide nuanced and sympathetic readings of Christianity’s appropriation of platonic metaphysics.