The EU as an international security actor after Lisbon: Finally a green light for a holistic approach?

Abstract

This article argues that a holistic approach is important when studying the European Union’s (EU) role as an international security actor, but at the same time it identifies problems in adopting such a comprehensive research agenda. The holistic approach entails that the research must include ‘new’ security problems, such as climate change, but also relevant policies and instruments outside the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, owing to conceptual, legal and political obstacles, this has been difficult to achieve; as a consequence, existing research on the EU as an international security actor tends to narrow down the focus to just one framework: the CSDP and its operations. This may lead to a distorted image, because the EU’s role in international security surpasses any single policy framework. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it sets the framework for the comprehensive research agenda concerning the EU as an international security actor. Second, it identifies key obstacles that are making this holistic approach methodologically and conceptually difficult. In this context, the Lisbon Treaty, formally abandoning the pillar structure of the EU, provides an opportunity to mitigate at least some of these roadblocks.

Keywords

Climate security Common Security and Defence Policy European Union holistic approach international security actor piracy Somalia

Introduction

‘The relative decline of questions of “high politics”, the rise of economic diplomacy and a wider definition of pre-requisites for security all enhance the international significance of the Union’. (Whitman, 1998: 234)

Two recent instances of the European Union’s (EU) international security policy indicate the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach when assessing the EU as an international security actor. On the one hand, an explicit conceptualization of climate change as a security challenge reinforces the ‘human security’ approach often present in EU’s official documents and narratives. It provides a compelling case for scholars to include ‘new’ security problems when analysing EU security policy. On the other hand, the EU’s response to maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia serves as a confirmation that security instruments in the policy apparatus of the EU are located within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but also outside this policy framework; they include, for example, a range of financial instruments that enable security problems to be addressed over the medium and long term, such as the Instrument for Stability and European Development Fund.

There is a growing body of scholarship that incorporates this broadened approach to studying EU security policy, moving beyond traditional security problems and the CSDP.¹ For example, Cottey (2007: 192–216), Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 249–52) and Hintermeier (2008: 666–667) include more traditional security threats within their empirical analysis, but also examine the EU’s role in addressing ‘new’ security challenges, such as climate change and HIV/AIDS, more in line with contemporary Security Studies literature (Buzan et al., 1998; Collins, 2007; Williams, 2008). There is also a significant body of scholarship on European civilian crisis management, which approaches security in a holistic manner (e.g. Boin and Ekengren, 2009; Boin et al., 2008). This article builds on this scholarship by addressing some of the challenges identified in this literature (notably, the lack of coherence in EU action). It also broadens the geographical scope of this literature, in order to demonstrate the EU’s security role beyond its neighbourhood and particularly the Balkans (Møller, 2005).

Furthermore, scholars increasingly take into account non-CSDP, security-focused instruments and policies of the EU. Notably, Kirchner (2006: 962–963) argues that states have lost monopoly on providing security and have emerged as one type of participant in a cooperative system. In this cooperative system, according to Marsh and Mackenstein (2005: 15), the European Community emerged as an international security actor, by contributing to the Western European zone of peace and by establishing a dense network of economic and humanitarian agreements with the rest of the world. Ekengren (2011), through referring to the concept of societal security² in the EU and linking security with disaster response,³ argues that CSDP missions in Congo and Guinea-Bissau have emphasized the need in the EU to rethink the demarcation lines between policy areas such as trade, aid, diplomacy and civilian and military crisis management capabilities. However, the author also identifies some challenges to this integrated approach (Ekengren, 2010: 108–110; please see also Britz, 2011). Regelsberger (2007) further points to the process of ‘fusion’ of the EU’s intergovernmental security cooperation, including through the processes of ‘socialization’ or ‘Brusselization’.

Undoubtedly, there is more to the EU’s international security profile than the relatively recent CSDP framework and capacities. Indeed, the EU’s security policy is multidimensional, seemingly well equipped to tackle contemporary security challenges in a comprehensive manner. However, if the EU is actively broadening its view of security and utilizing a wide range of measures in responding to contemporary security problems, why is it so difficult to take a systematic account of all these measures? The scholarship adopting such an all-encompassing stance is still in the minority, with the prevailing approach reflecting the post-Maastricht division into economic and international security policies, until recently embedded in the first and second pillars of the EU (Knodt and Princen, 2003: 2–3).

This article argues that there are significant stumbling blocks preventing a more systematic, comprehensive analysis. The two case studies examined in this article exemplify these problems. First, the case of the EU and climate security points to the conceptual difficulties in delimiting security from non-security policies, as well as to the real differences in threat perceptions across the EU. Second, the case of the EU and Somali piracy raises the question about an overarching strategic vision behind the range of the EU’s short and long-term security measures; it also points out an interrelated problem of utilizing all those measures in a consistent manner (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 211–212). The Lisbon Treaty addresses some of these challenges, but will its reforms lead to a more holistic approach to studying the role of the EU as an international security actor?

The challenge of vertical coherence: ‘New’ security problems

The European Security Strategy (ESS) – a document drafted by former High Representative Javier Solana and approved by the European Council in 2003 – provides for a broad understanding of security (Council, 2003). It identifies more traditional security threats, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but also points to global warming and poverty as the possible causes of conflict (Biscop, 2008: 8–13). These non-traditional or ‘new’ security issues have been further elevated in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS in 2008 (Council, 2008f.). In this document, energy security and climate change are identified as global challenges and key threats, alongside the proliferation of WMDs, organized crime and terrorism (Council, 2008f.: 3–6).

The EU’s broad approach to international security reflects the widening (new security threats) and deepening (new referent objects of security) of the international security agenda (Williams, 2008: 7–9). Problems previously overshadowed by a nuclear rivalry between major powers and labelled as ‘low politics’ have become recognized for their impact on the security of millions beyond the Western world (Annan, 2005). This process has been facilitated by the shift away from an exclusive focus on ‘present’ existential threats towards a more probabilistic approach, focusing on diffuse risks (McInnes, 2008: 276). Thus, Security Studies experts are not dismissing more traditional security threats, but they also incorporate the analysis of the nexus between security and health (Elbe, 2007; McInnes, 2008), poverty (Thomas, 2008) and climate change (Barnett, 2003; Dalby, 2009; De Wilde, 2008).⁴

In its official narrative, the EU often subscribes to the concept of human security (European Commission, 2010: 6; Council, 2008f.: 10; European Council, 2006), institutionalized in the United Nation’s (UN) Human Development Report from 1994 (United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 1994: 22–46). Human Security entails moving beyond territorial defence and national interests to include universal concerns such as unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and human rights violations (UNDP, 1994: 22).

Yet, McDonald (2002) argues that international actors do not rationally ‘choose’ any given approach to international security. Instead, ‘issues such as history, culture and identity shape what is rational, appropriate and possible’ (McDonald, 2002: 286). Consequently, ‘human security’ frames the positions of actors for which it is relevant, instead of actors purposefully adhering to ‘human security’ as the ‘right’ security narrative for them. If the EU’s international identity is pacific, principled, consensus-based, networked-based, open and contra-Westphalian (Manners and Whitman, 2003: 398–399), then ‘human security’ appears to fit well.

In particular, human security underpins the EU’s commitment to link security objectives with development policy. The security-development nexus is an overarching theme of the ESS, but also of the European Consensus on Development – the key statement on guidelines for the EU’s development policy (European Council, 2006). The Consensus notes that ‘Insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achieving the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals]’ and, as a consequence, ‘Security and development are important and complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries’ (European Council, 2006: 7).

Furthermore, in a rather contested manner, security objectives were included within the 2005 Amended Cotonou Partnership Agreement, updating the original treaty between the European Community and 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Although the original goal of poverty reduction was retained, the 2005 document commits ACP states to a set of security objectives, including: (a) the prevention of mercenary activities, (b) the subscription by all parties to the International Criminal Court; (c) the combat of terrorism and (d) the countering of the proliferation of WMDs (Hadfield, 2007: 57–63). The 2010 revision of the Cotonou Agreement adds the pursuit of ‘human security’ as one of the key objectives, including a much stronger focus on combating HIV/AIDS and addressing climate change as the main threat to MDGs (European Commission, 2010: 16–18).

Regardless of the extent to which it is the EU which rationally chooses its approach to international security, or it is ‘chosen’ based on the EU’s particular history, identity and culture, the broad, human-focused approach to security has important consequences for research. On the one hand, it is important to incorporate this broader security agenda when studying the EU as an international security actor. On the other hand, at least two problems arise with the EU’s ‘human security’ approach; these include: (a) delimiting security from non-security problems, and (b) the challenge of vertical consistency (between Member States and the EU). The following section demonstrates these problems on the example of the case study concerning the EU’s policy on climate security.

The EU and climate security

The correlation between the environment and security was already recognized to some extent in the 1970s and 1980s (Brown, 1977; Buzan, 1983; Falk, 1971; Ullman, 1983; Westing, 1989; World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987), but this and other non-traditional security problems were of marginal interest in the Cold War context. Environmental security gained more prominence in the 1990s, when the discussion mainly evolved around the impact of environmental change on conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999). In recent years, following the publication of a number of influential scientific reports (German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), 2007; Haldén, 2007; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007; Stern, 2007), the discussion on environmental security has increasingly become focused on the security impacts of climate change (Trombetta, 2009: 138).

As a consequence, climate security was integrated into the security agenda of major international organizations. In 2007, the topic was discussed by the UN Security Council at the initiative of the UK; the discussion enjoyed strong support of Pacific island states and the EU, but some major powers (the US, China, Pakistan) were sceptical whether this was an appropriate forum for this talk. In the same year, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), on a Spanish initiative, adopted the Madrid Declaration on Environmental Security. NATO has been redefining its approach to security already throughout the 1990s. In 2008, the NATO Security Science Forum on Environmental Security organized a major conference followed by the inclusion of climate change in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept.

In this context, the EU has emerged as the world’s leading ‘norm entrepreneur’, promoting the idea of linking climate change with security, and thus adopting appropriate policies at the EU and global levels (Zwolski and Kaunert, 2011).⁵ The dominating approach in the EU to climate security is that of climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’, putting a particular strain on states and regions that are already fragile and vulnerable to conflict. The EU adopts a broad view of climate change posing humanitarian (human security) risks, but also bearing political and security consequences directly affecting the EU (High Representative and Commission, 2008: 2). This EU position on climate security was defined in the high-profile Joint Report of the European Commission and the High Representative on ‘Climate Change and International Security’ (High Representative and Commission, 2008) requested by Member States in 2007.

In this document, approved by the European Council in 2008 (Council, 2008a: 14), the EU explores the consequences of climate change for international security and stability, identifying threats such as conflicts over resources, economic damage and risk to coastal cities, loss of territory and border disputes and environmentally induced migration. The report also recommends that the EU becomes an international leader in addressing climate security by developing appropriate capacities internally and promoting climate security agenda in its bilateral and multilateral relations. Findings of this report were incorporated into the Report on the Implementation of the ESS (Council, 2008f.: 5–6).

Furthermore, the approval of the Joint Report by the EU prompted the Commission and Council Secretariat to establish an informal Steering Group on Climate Change and International Security with the purpose of further developing climate security agenda at the EU and global levels (Zwolski and Kaunert, 2011: 32–37). All the Member States were invited to participate in this informal setting, but only a few decided to join the group, including Germany, the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Slovenia.

At the end of 2009, the following achievements of the Steering Group were identified (Council, 2009: 4–8): (a) Promoting the climate security agenda at the UN, including the EU’s involvement in preparing a UN Secretary General’s report on climate security, at the request of the UN General Assembly (United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 2009: 2); (b) initiating and promoting dialogue with third parties, including raising the issue of climate security with more than 40 countries; (c) anchoring the climate security agenda in the EU, including the identification of climate change as one of the global challenges and key threats in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS; and (d) initiating capacity building within the EU and externally, including climate security training for EU staff and improving EU early warning capacities.

On top of promoting the climate security agenda, the EU remains the most ambitious actor in multilateral negotiations on climate change within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Kilian and Elgström, 2010; Parker and Karlsson, 2010; Wurzel and Connelly, 2010). Although the EU did not succeed in convincing parties to adopt Kyoto-like, legally binding obligations at the 2009 UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen, it set for itself some ambitious goals, including the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2020. Furthermore, it pledged around one-third of the sum committed by parties for adaptation to climate change in developing countries between 2010 and 2012 (World Resources Institute, 2011).

Incorporating ‘new’ security problems in the research agenda

This analysis indicates the importance of including ‘new’ security problems, such as climate change, when evaluating the EU as an international security actor. However, at least two problems arise immediately: one rather obvious, the other slightly more concealed. An obvious challenge concerns the boundaries of ‘security’ in the EU’s international policy. One of Solana’s former advisors rightly points out that: ‘It is in the DNA of our organisation to define security problems broadly.’⁶ Yet, this presents the challenge of delimiting security from non-security policies of the Union. If climate change, AIDS and poverty are included within the EU’s security agenda, which specific policy actions can be assessed in the context of the EU’s role as a security actor, and which fall merely under environmental, health and development policies?

This seemingly trivial choice bears considerable consequences for the analysis, because the extent to which the EU can be considered a security actor depends largely on the definition of security (Kirchner, 2006: 952; Rieker, 2009: 704). Thus, Biscop (2008: 12) argues that the ESS should have been named a foreign policy strategy and that the label ‘security’ must be reserved for issues posing an effective threat of violence. This critique echoes the more general dilemma concerning human security: ‘How to delimit the concept, and how to judge which insecurities to honour when conflicting concerns are at stake’ (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 204).

The European Consensus on Development exemplifies this dilemma, emphasizing the correlation between development and security and the necessity for the EU to pursue both values in its external policy. At the same time, the document fails to specify which objectives will be given priority when values conflict with each other. For example, the EU wants to give priority to local ownership (a popular Euro catch-phrase), but at the same time to press authoritarian regimes for democracy (Youngs, 2008: 421).

This dilemma also points to another subtle distinction in the EU’s approach to security, between the strand relating to instability, conflict and insecurity in developing countries (which are the most vulnerable to ‘new’ security problems) and the EU’s own security concerns. While both understandings of security are amply addressed in the ESS and other strategic documents, the second strand remains contested and raises questions about the EU’s real intentions in Africa and elsewhere (Youngs, 2008: 422).

The less obvious challenge to incorporating ‘new’ security problems within the research agenda concerns vertical consistency (between national and EU policies) (Nuttall, 2005: 106). A high level of vertical consistency entails that Member States comply with the policies agreed upon at the EU level. The case of climate security has demonstrated that all Member States have, in principle, approved the move towards developing the security dimension of climate change in EU policy. Elsewhere, the author elaborates on this topic (Zwolski and Kaunert, 2011).

Yet, this principled acceptance of the climate security narrative by all Member States at the EU level does not preclude significant differences at national levels. If the international identity of the EU is pacific, principled, consensus-based, networked-based, open and contra-Westphalian (Manners and Whitman, 2003: 398–399), the identities of Member States vary considerably. These identities, forming particular security cultures, are shaped by the factors such as: (a) internal cultural cohesion; (b) interactions with neighbours; (c) defeat and occupation; (d) threat perception; (e) past martial or imperial ambitions and traditions; (f) impermeability and durability of national borders (Howorth, 2007: 178).

Consequently, countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) attribute relatively less importance to ‘new’ security challenges due to their distinctive historical experiences and their ongoing insecurities concerning Russia’s foreign policy intentions. In the case of Poland, this traditional view is reinforced by the dominance of right-wing political parties and the influence of nationalistic media outlets (Zwolski, 2009a). As a result, for the most part, CEE countries do not play an active role in the Steering Group on Climate Change and International Security. This is how one CEE state representative explains this absence: ‘The EU, under “climate security” label, does not do anything new. Thus, it does not really matter whether my country is part of the Steering Group, because we basically do the same things.’⁷

It is not only CEE countries that often differ in their perceptions of ‘new’ security problems from older EU Member States. Following the approval of the Joint Report on Climate Change and International Security by the European Council in March 2008, the Council Secretariat drafted the follow-up report with some more specific recommendations (Council, 2008b). It was thus expected in the Council Secretariat that it would be the December 2008 European Council discussing these recommendations. Instead, the French Presidency did not find room for this agenda item, submitting it instead to the December 2008 Agriculture and Fisheries Council, which merely acknowledged the document (Council, 2008e: 49).

These two roadblocks to incorporating ‘new’ security problems within the research on the EU as an international security actor must be acknowledged, but cannot prevent a more holistic research agenda. The challenge to vertical consistency in EU security policy, together with the conceptual problems associated with the post-Cold War understanding and delimiting security, will not disappear in the foreseeable future. At the same time, narrowing down the analysis to the security policies undertaken by the EU exclusively within the CSDP framework runs the risk of distorting the complex image of the EU as an international security provider (Sebesta, 2009: 590).

The problem of institutional/horizontal coherence: Moving beyond the CSDP

International security policy of the EU has traditionally been associated almost exclusively with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), rebranded into the CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty. The establishment of the ESDP and the deployment of first EU missions attracted scholarly attention, contributing to the fact that the analysis of various aspects of the ESDP constitutes the bulk of scholarly work on the EU’s international security policy (e.g. Deighton, 2002; Duke, 2000; Howorth, 2007; Menon, 2009).⁸

There is a good reason for this; the speed at which the ESDP has acquired its shape and the number of operations deployed up to date are remarkable and can be surprising even if missions are relatively modest (Toje, 2011: 51). When evaluating the first five years of the ESDP, Solana pointed to the paradox that while it remains difficult for Member States to cooperate on security and defence, the cooperation in these areas advanced rapidly since 1999 (Solana, 2004: 5).

This article suggests that the CSDP does not represent the entire image of the EU’s international security role; non-CSDP instruments and policies have to be included into the analysis. In this context, Hintermeier (2008) notes that the EU’s approach to security is based on two liberal institutionalist principles, that is (a) political integration, economic interdependence and multilateral cooperation, which weaken the anarchical system of states, and (b) the principle of democratic peace (Hintermeier, 2008: 667). More specifically, the EU pursues its security objectives through integration and enlargement, promotion of liberal values, promotion of sustainable development, effective multilateralism and strengthening international law. These objectives are pursued by the EU through a variety of economic, political and recently also civilian and military CSDP means (Hintermeier, 2008: 670–673). Among measures that are both economic and political in nature, one of the most important is the range of financial and technical assistance instruments that have traditionally been at the disposal of the European Commission, and recently were partially incorporated within the European External Action Service (EEAS).⁹

The most prominent of these financial instruments is the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which former member of the European Parliament (MEP) Angelica Beer (also EP’s rapporteur on the IfS) defined as an attempt to ‘define the Grey Zone between the Council’s CFSP, ESDP and the Commission’s development policy’, with the potential to ‘encourage active conflict prevention’ (Beer, 2006: 34). This instrument, building on the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), allows the EU to respond rapidly to crisis situations, but also to develop longer-term, capacity-building projects. The regulation for the IfS allocated it the budget of €2.062 for the years 2007–2013 (European Parliament and the Council, 2006: 10) and the Commission proposed an increased budget of €2.5 billion for the IfS in the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 (European Commission, 2011: 46).

The first component of the IfS, defined in article 3 of the regulation, concerns the provisions for assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis, which fulfils the primary aim of the IfS. The second component, regulated by article 4, concerns the provisions for providing assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation. Only about 23% of the overall IfS budget was allocated for ‘article 4’ types of projects, which may be developed in three security areas: (a) threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health; (b) risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents; and (c) pre- and post-crisis capacity building.

Of these areas, non-proliferation was given priority; this enabled the European Commission to continue developing capacity-building non-proliferation programmes, primarily in Russia, further building on its already extensive experience in this area. The European Community started providing Russia with non-proliferation assistance as early as the beginning of the 1990s, first through the programme known as the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), and since 2007 through the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) and the IfS (Anthony, 2004; Höhl et al., 2003; Müller, 2007; Zwolski, 2011a; 2011b).

Similarly, non-CSDP instruments and policies have to be taken into account when investigating the EU’s response to maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. This response consists mainly of the CSDP’s first naval operation EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, but other (medium to long-term) efforts are also important. They are examined in greater detail in the following section, indicating the importance of adopting a holistic approach when assessing the EU as an international security actor.

However, the case of non-proliferation policy, counter-piracy measures and other security policies of the EU also indicate some obstacles hampering a more comprehensive research agenda, such as the problem of institutional and horizontal consistency between different EU institutions and policies. Following the brief empirical examination of the EU’s anti-piracy policy, the subsequent section addresses these obstacles and the efforts that have been undertaken to overcome them.

The EU and Somali piracy

Piracy off the coast of Somalia emerged as a security problem at the beginning of the 1990s, following the collapse of the central government in Mogadishu. While there have been a number of high-profile piratical attacks since then (including the attack on the US-operated cruise liner Seabourn Spirit in 2005), in 2008 the problem expanded and became an ever more urgent security threat (Lehr and Lehmann, 2007; Lennox, 2008; Murphy, 2009: 101–111). Piracy continued to thrive throughout 2009 and 2010, with organized gangs moving further away from the coast of the Horn of Africa (International Chamber of Commerce – Commercial Crime Services (ICC-CCS), 2011).

At the core of the African piracy problem is Somalia, which remains a thoroughly failed state torn by violence on a daily basis (Bruton, 2009; Hesse, 2010; Marchal, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007, 2009). It has no central government with control over the territory of the country, or even Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu. This condition of permanent insecurity contributes to Somalia’s disastrous economic and humanitarian situation, fostering acts of organized crime, including maritime piracy. Furthermore, there is no single state of Somalia to speak of; instead, there are three autonomous regions existing in parallel within the internationally recognized borders of Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland enjoy relatively stronger institutional capacities than the southern part of the country).¹⁰

The EU got involved in countering Somali piracy in response to numerous calls by the UN Security Council (Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851). To this end, it deployed the largest naval mission to the region, EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, which is the EU’s first naval operation (Council, 2008d); thus, it adds a new component to an already broad EU experience of conducting limited-scale, land-based CSDP military and civilian missions. ‘Atalanta’, like all CSDP missions, relies entirely on the voluntary contribution of Member States. It comprises navy ships, surveillance airplanes and independent vessels protection detachments. The mission is commanded from the operational headquarters in Northwood, near London, and from the force headquarters on the ground in Djibouti (Council, 2011b).

Importantly, the CSDP component includes the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), which is a web-based platform enabling ship-owners to register their vessels securely and to update their position. MSCHOA also contains a secure chat-room, which states and non-state actors fighting piracy in the region utilize to communicate on a minute-to-minute basis. Rear Admiral Philip Jones, formerly heading the EU task force, notes that MSCHOA ‘has been one of the unexpected and very significant successes of the operation, where almost all of the shipping companies that transit through the Gulf of Aden register’ (Great Britain House of Lords, 2010: 3).

Yet, experts and policy-makers alike underline that piracy off the coast of Somalia also requires longer-term, non-military efforts if it is to be tackled effectively. Notably, a deputy commander of the EU’s anti-piracy task force Thomas Ernst indicates that: ‘It is arguable how much of a deterrent effect counter-piracy forces are having’ (BBC News, 2010). He notes that the structures on which pirates rely must be targeted, most notably the flow of money to pirate gangs and the impunity of pirate leaders. Moreover, experts point to addressing the economic, political and social problems of the failed state of Somalia (Vego, 2009: 178).

In this context, the EU stresses the comprehensive nature of its counter-piracy efforts, going beyond an immediate military operation off the Horn of Africa (Council, 2011a, b; see also Council, 2008f.). These efforts are grouped into political engagement, support for security and economic assistance. Politically, the EU supports the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) – the only Somali authority recognized by the international community. In the sphere of security, the EU supports politically and financially the peace-keeping operation in Somalia called AMISOM, deployed by the African Union to protect the TFG against ongoing attacks of Islamist insurgents and warlords (Council, 2011b). The EU’s African Peace Facility, another security-oriented non-CSDP instrument, has been utilized to support AMISOM. Furthermore, in 2010, the EU launched its own training mission for Somali soldiers in Uganda, called EUTM Somalia (Council, 2010).

Finally, the EU remains the biggest donor of development assistance to Somalia. This includes contributions of the European Commission and Member States. The main instrument utilized by the EU to provide development assistance to Somalia is the European Development Fund; through this instrument, the Commission has committed €215 million for Somalia for the years 2008–13 (European Union, 2008). In addition to this assistance, the Commission has also contributed €45 million of humanitarian aid in 2009 and €35 million in 2010 (Council, 2011a).

In the context of this wide range of activities, the EU emphasizes that it is ‘building up a comprehensive engagement in Somalia, with a view to responding to the priority needs of the Somali people and stabilising Somalia’ (Council, 2011a: 1). Indeed, the EU’s set of instruments deployed directly against piracy, and addressing the root causes of the broader range of insecurities in Somalia, is significant. Through its naval task-force and the popularity of MSCHOA, the EU emerged as a leader in regional counter-piracy measures. Furthermore, being the largest contributor of development aid, the EU is also leading longer-term efforts to restore peace and security in Somalia.

Nonetheless, the effectiveness of international counter-piracy measures, including these of the EU, remains questionable. In the first quarter of 2011, $65 million was paid in ransoms compared to $39 million in the same period in 2009, with pirates ‘becoming significantly more prevalent, lucrative and violent’ (Willis Group Holdings, 2011). Moreover, two important questions about the EU’s security actorness arise. First, to what extent is the EU presenting a strategic, comprehensive security approach rather than purely a policy-sector specific reactive set of measures? And second, to what extent are EU’s policies and institutions consistent (horizontal and institutional consistency)?

Incorporating non-CSDP policies within the research agenda

Just as it is vital to include ‘new’ security problems within the analysis of the EU as an international security actor, it is also important to move beyond the CSDP framework to explore the broader range of security instruments that the EU has at its disposal. The empirical evidence suggests that, indeed, the EU has been widely utilizing different forms of political and economic measures when addressing even the more traditional international security problems, such as the threat of the WMD proliferation and maritime piracy. Yet, a number of interconnected obstacles prevent a more systematic inclusion of this wide range of measures within the analysis of the EU’s performance in international security. The first concerns the question of the EU’s grand strategy and the extent to which these diverging instruments are deployed purposefully, reflecting clearly defined and codified strategic objectives of the EU.

Biscop (2009) argues that the ESS and the Report on the Implementation of the ESS provide only a partial strategy. These documents set guidelines for the EU’s international conduct, underlining preventive, holistic and multilateral character of the EU’s action, but they do not explain what exactly the EU should do. This lack of clearly specified objectives and priorities, according to Biscop, is particularly problematic in the wake of Lisbon Treaty institutional reforms, NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the growing political role of BRIC countries (Biscop, 2009: 3). Howorth (2010) seconds these concerns, arguing that ‘the EU should adopt a more calculated strategic approach and begin at long last to think in terms of “large goals”’ (Howorth, 2010: 464). Only then, Howorth argues, can the EU make the best use of the wide range of crisis management instruments that it has at its disposal.

The above analysis has demonstrated that the EU is able to draw on a vast array of resources when addressing organized crime, such as maritime piracy. However, even though the EU presents its political and economic efforts in Somalia as part of its ‘comprehensive approach’, listing them together with EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, these longer-term measures do not serve explicitly the purpose of countering piracy. Instead, they are largely part of the EU’s pre-programmed development policies in Somalia, as well as its multilateral policy aiming to strengthen the TFG. The ‘grand strategy’ or ‘strategic vision’, in this case, could contribute to a clearer identification of a set of relevant policies that the EU deploys in specific security situations. This would prevent the impression of randomness in international security policy of the EU.

The second obstacle hindering a more systematic inclusion of non-CSDP instruments and policies within the analysis of the EU as an international security actor concerns the traditional problem of institutional and horizontal inconsistency – the challenge closely related to the one discussed above. In Nuttall’s (2005) categorization, horizontal consistency entails that different EU policies are aligned and support each other. Institutional consistency, on the other hand, has traditionally concerned the degree to which the Council and the Commission have been coordinating their policies and supporting each other’s actions. The Lisbon Treaty introduces important changes in this respect, discussed further in this section.

The problem of assuring inter-pillar consistency in the international security policy of the EU has attracted significant scholarly attention, and rightly so (Dijkstra, 2009; Missiroli, 2001, 2010; Tietje, 1997; Van Elsuwege, 2010; Zwolski, 2011a). The growing profile of the European Commission in international relations, particularly through its Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex), coincided with the international role of the Council, including its Secretariat. Notably, the Council Secretariat has been steadily growing in quantitative (number of officials) and qualitative (number of policies) terms (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 101), thus increasing the risk of overlapping competences between the first and second pillars of the EU.

The Lisbon Treaty addressed this very problem, opening up the opportunity for a more holistic approach to researching the international security policy of the EU. On the personal level, it merged the post of the High Representative with that of the Vice-President of the European Commission in order to ‘ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action’ (Council, 2008c: 35). On the bureaucratic level, the Lisbon Treaty provided for the establishment of the EEAS, which brings together DG Relex and the part of the Council Secretariat responsible for foreign and security policy. The EEAS, which also includes Member States representatives, assists the High Representative.

These and other reforms provide an opportunity for a more consistent international security policy of the EU, but they also create a new set of challenges. On the personal level, the new permanent President of the European Council is entrusted with ensuring ‘the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy’ (Council, 2008c: 30). Depending on personalities, the perception of interests and the interpretation of the EU law, this can lead to tensions with the High Representative. On the bureaucratic level, the EEAS consists of three different bodies with different institutional cultures. It will become fully effective only when old institutional loyalties are replaced with the new ethos (Whitman, 2011: 12).

The underdeveloped strategic vision, together with the difficult task of ensuring consistency in the EU’s external action, has been to a large extent preventing a comprehensive approach to studying the EU’s international security policy. The Lisbon Treaty has initiated reforms which may bring consistency in a longer term, eventually forcing the EU to formulate a more explicit strategic objectives and goals.

However, regardless of the pace of the progress in these areas, this article argues that it is important to incorporate the analysis of all the relevant policies and instruments when assessing the EU’s role in international security. Some of them, for example the development and political assistance in Somalia, may not be directed at the security threat in question (such as maritime piracy). Nonetheless, they may still be contributing to addressing the problem indirectly and in a longer term.

Conclusion

This article has put forward two propositions. First, it has indicated the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach to studying the role of the EU in international security. In the author’s view, the case studies concerning the role of the EU in climate security policy and in countering Somali piracy amply demonstrate this necessity. Traditional security threats and the CSDP are rightly at the core of the research agenda; yet, problems such as climate and health security, together with the range of EU’s capacity-building financial instruments, must be incorporated in order to obtain a more accurate image of the EU as an international security actor.

Second, this article has also identified a set of roadblocks preventing such a holistic approach, or making it conceptually and methodologically a difficult exercise. These include: (a) the difficulty in delimiting security from non-security policies of the EU due to the contested nature of the security concept; (b) different perceptions of security among Member States, even if there is an agreement on security strategies at the EU level; (c) the lack of an overarching ‘grand strategy’ or a ‘strategic vision’, which would help to make better use of the diversity of security instruments at the EU’s disposal; and (d) a connected challenge of assuring consistency in developing and conducting the EU’s international security policy.

Although the security concept will remain contested, the move towards widening and deepening its understanding is fairly well established in Security Studies and in the practice of many states and non-state actors. The security consequences of climate change and pandemic diseases have been acknowledged by the UN Security Council, which further fosters the focus on non-state referent objects, such as societies and individuals. The EU subscribes to this broader view of security (including the concern with human security) and this must be taken into account when studying the EU’s role in security policy.

Similarly, the diverging perceptions of security problems and differing accents in national security strategies will remain part of the security landscape in the EU in the foreseeable future. However important these differences are, they did not prevent Member States from approving strategic documents at the EU level, which institutionalize the broadened approach to security, acknowledging the relevance of ‘new’ security problems. Some of the most important among these are the Joint Report on ‘Climate Change and International Security’, the EES and the Report on the Implementation of the EES.

A more assertive strategic vision for the EU is in order, not least to supplement the institutional reforms instigated by the Lisbon Treaty and to make better use of the diversity of resources in the EU’s security apparatus. Yet, as Toje (2011) convincingly argues, the lack of ‘big thinking’ in the EU can be better understood if the Union is conceptualized as a small power. This approach can indeed serve as ‘the best path to making peace with the inconsistencies associated with the presence, capabilities and patterns of behaviour that characterize the European Union’ (Toje, 2011: 57).

Finally, the abandonment of the pillar structure in the Lisbon Treaty and institutional reforms concerning the EU’s foreign and security policy create conditions for improved consistency in the EU’s external action. Furthermore, these reforms offer an opportunity for further research concerning all three types of consistency: between Member States and the EU, between different EU policies and between different EU institutions.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their excellent feedback, as well as the Editors for their helpful comments. I also thank Dr Christian Kaunert and Dr Sarah Leonard. Findings of this article are partially based on research interviews funded through the generous scholarship of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies. I am also grateful to Regent’s College London for a generous financial contribution.

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

References

Annan

(2005) ‘In larger freedom’: Decision time at the UN. Foreign Affairs 84(3): 63–74.

Anthony

(2004) Reducing Threats at the Source: a European Perspective on Cooperative Threat Reduction. SIPRI Research Report no. 19. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barnett

(2003) Security and climate change. Global Environmental Change 13(1): 7–17.

BBC News (2010) EU force: Somali pirates cannot be stopped by force. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11947331 (accessed on 11 May 2011).

Beer

(2006) Conference on greening foreign and security policy: The role of Europe. Final Report, 6–7 December. Brussels: European Parliament. Available at: http://www.envirosecurity.org/ges/conference/report.pdf (accessed on 16 March 2010).

Biscop

(2008) The European security strategy in context: A comprehensive trend. In: Biscop

Andersson

(eds) The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe. London: Routledge, pp. 5–20.

Biscop

(2009) The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A Call for an EU Grand Strategy. Egmont Paper 33. Gent: Academia Press.

Boin

Ekengren

(2009) Preparing for the world risk society: Towards a new security paradigm for the European Union. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 17(4): 285–294.

Boin

Ekengren

Rhinard

(2008) Security in Transition: Towards a New Paradigm for the European Union. Number B41. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College.

10.

Bretherton

Vogler

(2006) The European Union as a Global Actor. London: Routledge.

11.

Britz

(2011) The EU’s view on security sector reform. In: Ekengren

Simons

(eds) The Politics of Security Sector Reform. Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 81–92.

12.

Brown

(1977) Worldwatch Paper 14: Redefining National Security. Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute.

13.

Bruton

(2009) In the quicksands of Somalia. Foreign Affairs 88(6): 79–94.

14.

Buzan

(1983) People, States and Fear. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.

15.

Buzan

Hansen

(2009) The Evolution of International Security Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

16.

Buzan

Wæver

De Wilde

(1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

17.

Collins

(ed.) (2007) Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

18.

Cottey

(2007) Security in the New Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

19.

Council (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. Report no. 15895/03, 8 December 2003. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

20.

Council (2008a) Brussels European Council 13/14 March 2008: Presidency Conclusions. Report no. 7652/1/08, 20 May 2008. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

21.

Council (2008b) Climate Change and Security: Recommendations of the High Representative on Follow-up to the High Representative and Commission Report on Climate Change and International Security. Report no. 16994/1/08, 12 December 2008. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

22.

Council (2008c) Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Report no. 6655/08, 15 April 2008. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

23.

Council (2008d) Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008 on the Launch of a European Union Military Operation to Contribute to the Deterrence, Prevention and Repression of Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery off the Somali Coast (Atlanta), L 330 (OJEU). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

24.

Council (2008e) Press Release: 2917th Meeting of the Council Agriculture and Fisheries, Brussels. Report no. 16916/1/08 REV 1 (Presse 361), 18–19 December 2008. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

25.

Council (2008f) Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World. Report no. S407/08, 11 December 2008. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

26.

Council (2009) Joint Progress Report and Follow-up Recommendations on Climate Change and International Security (CCIS) to the Council. Report no. 166645/09, 25 November 2009. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

27.

Council (2010) Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP of 31 March 2010 on the Launch of a European Union Military Mission to Contribute to the Training of Somali Security Forces, L 87 (OJEU). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

28.

Council (2011a) EU Engagement in Somalia. Report no. EU/Somalia 12. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

29.

Council (2011b) EU Naval Operation Against Piracy. Report no. EUNAVFOR/31. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

30.

Dalby

(2009) Security and Environmental Change. Cambridge: Polity Press.

31.

Deighton

(2002) The European security and defence policy. Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4): 719–741.

32.

De Wilde

(2008) Environmental security deconstructed. In: Brauch

Mesjasz

Grin

. (eds) Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century. Berlin: Springer, pp. 595–602.

33.

Dijkstra

(2009) Commission versus Council Secretariat: An analysis of bureaucratic rivalry in European Foreign Policy. European Foreign Affairs Review 14(3): 431–450.

34.

Duke

(2000) The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

35.

Ekengren

(2010) The challenge of a broadening security agenda for EU security sector reform. In: Ekengren

Simons

(eds) The Politics of Security Sector Reform. Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 101–126.

36.

Elbe

(2007) Health and security. In: Collins

(ed.) Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 413–427.

37.

European Commission (2010) Second revision of the Cotonou Agreement – Consolidated Agreed Texts. 1–19 March 2010. Brussels: European Commission.

38.

European Commission (2011) A Budget for Europe 2020 – Part II: Policy Fiches. COM(2011) 500 final, 29 June 2011. Brussels: European Commission.

39.

European Council (2006) The European consensus on development. Official Journal of the European Union C46: 1–19.

40.

European Parliament and the Council (2006) Regulation (EC) no 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability. Official Journal of the European Union L 327: 1–11.

41.

European Union (2008) Somalia joint strategy paper for the period 2008–2013. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_so_csp10_en.pdf (accessed on 13 August 2010).

42.

Falk

(1971) This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival. New York: Random House.

43.

German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) (2007) Climate Change as a Security Risk. London: Earthscan.

44.

Germond

(2010) From frontier to boundary and back again: The European Union’s maritime margins. European Foreign Affairs Review 15(1): 39–55.

45.

Great Britain House of Lords (2010) Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta. HL Paper 103: 12th Report of Session 2009–10. London: Stationery Office.

46.

Hadfield

(2007) Janus advances? An analysis of EC development policy and the 2005 amended Cotonou partnership agreement. European Foreign Affairs Review 12(1): 39–66.

47.

Haldén

(2007) The Geopolitics of Climate Change. Stockholm: FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency.

48.

Hayes-Renshaw

Wallace

(2006) The Council of Ministers. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

49.

Hesse

(2010) Introduction: The myth of ‘Somalia’. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 28(3): 247–259.

50.

High Representative and Commission (2008) Climate Change and International Security. Report no. S113/08, 14 March 2008. Brussels: High Representative for the CFSP and the European Commission.

51.

Hintermeier

(2008) Reconceptualization of External Security in the European Union, in Brauch

. (eds) Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, pp. 659–76. Berlin: Springer.

52.

Höhl

Müller

Schaper

. (2003) EU Cooperative Threat Reduction Activities in Russia. Chaillot Papers no. 61. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.

53.

Homer-Dixon

(1999) Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

54.

Howorth

(2007) Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

55.

Howorth

(2010) The EU as a global actor: Grand strategy for a global grand bargain? Journal of Common Market Studies 48(3): 455–474.

56.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) The Fourth Assessment Report. Geneva: IPCC.

57.

International Chamber of Commerce – Commercial Crime Services (ICC-CCS) (2011) Hostage-taking at sea rises to record levels, says IMB. Available at: http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/429-hostage-taking-at-sea-rises-to-record-levels-says-imb (accessed on 31 January 2011).

58.

Kaunert

(2007) Without the power of purse or sword: The European arrest warrant and the role of the Commission. Journal of European Integration 29(4): 387–404.

59.

Kaunert

(2009) Liberty versus security? EU asylum policy and the European Commission. Journal of Contemporary European Research 5(2): 148–170.

60.

Kaunert

(2010) European Internal Security: Towards Supranational Governance? Manchester: Manchester University Press.

61.

Keukeleire

MacNaughtan

(2008) The Foreign Policy of the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

62.

Kilian

Elgström

(2010) Still a green leader? The European Union’s role in international climate negotiations. Cooperation and Conflict 45(3): 255–273.

63.

Kirchner

(2006) The challenge of European Union security governance. Journal of Common Market Studies 44(5): 947–968.

64.

Knodt

Princen

(2003) Introduction: Puzzles and prospects in theorizing EU’s external relations. In: Knodt

Princen

(eds) Understanding the European Union’s External Relations. London: Routledge, pp. 1–16.

65.

Kronsell

Bäckstrand

Kahn

. (eds) (2010) Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy. Camberley: Edwar Elgar.

66.

Lehr

Lehmann

(2007) Somalia – pirates’ new paradise. In: Lehr

(ed.) Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism. London: Routledge, pp. 1–22.

67.

Lennox

(2008) Contemporary Piracy Off the Horn of Africa. Calgary, Canada: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.

68.

Leonard

(2010) EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitization through practices. European Security 19(3): 231–254.

69.

McDonald

(2002) Human security and the construction of security. Global Society 16(3): 277–295.

70.

McInnes

(2008) Health. In: Williams

(ed.) Security Studies: An Introduction. London: Routledge, pp. 274–288.

71.

Manners

Whitman

(2003) The ‘difference engine’: Constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 10(3): 380–404.

72.

Marchal

(2007) Warlordism and terrorism: How to obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of Somalia. International Affairs 83(6): 1091–1106.

73.

Marsh

Mackenstein

(2005) The International Relations of the European Union. London: Pearson Longman.

74.

Martin

Kaldor

(eds) (2010) The European Union and Human Security: External Interventions and Missions. Abingdon: Routledge.

75.

Menkhaus

(2007) The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts. African Affairs 106(424): 357–390.

76.

Menkhaus

(2009) Somalia: They created a desert and called it peace(building). Review of African Political Economy 36(120): 223–233.

77.

Menon

(2009) Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten. International Affairs 85(2): 227–246.

78.

Missiroli

(2001) European security policy: The challenge of coherence. European Foreign Affairs Review 6(2): 177–196.

79.

Missiroli

(2010) The new EU ‘foreign policy’ system after Lisbon: A work in progress. European Foreign Affairs Review 15(4): 427–452.

80.

Møller

(2005) The EU as a Security Actor: ‘Security by Being’ and ‘Security by Doing’. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

81.

Müller

(2007) Europe and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In: Foradori

Rosa

Scartezzini

(eds) Managing Multilevel Foreign Policy. Plymouth: Lexington Books, pp. 181–200.

82.

Murphy

(2009) Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. London: Hurst & Company.

83.

Nugent

Rhinard

(2011) The European Commission and the European Union’s external relations after the Lisbon Treaty. Paper presented at the 12th biennial conference of the European Union Studies Association, 3–5 March 2011, pp. 1–29. Boston, MA.

84.

Nuttall

(2005) Coherence and consistency. In: Hill

Smith

(eds) International Relations and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 91–112.

85.

Parker

Karlsson

(2010) Climate change and the European Union’s leadership moment: An inconvenient truth? Journal of Common Market Studies 48(4): 923–943.

86.

Regelsberger

(2007) The EU as an actor in foreign and security policy: Some key features of CFSP in an historical perspective. CFSP Forum 5(4): 1–8.

87.

Rieker

(2009) The EU – a capable security actor? Developing administrative capabilities. Journal of European Integration 31(6): 703–719.

88.

Schreurs

Tiberghien

(2007) Multi-level reinforcement: Explaining European Union leadership in climate change mitigation. Global Environmental Politics 7(4): 19–46.

89.

Sebesta

(2009) To be or ought to be: That is the question of European security. European Foreign Affairs Review 14(4): 565–590.

90.

Solana

(2004) Preface. In: Gnesotto

(ed.) EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004). Paris: Institute for European Studies, pp. 5–10.

91.

Stern

(2007) The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

92.

Thomas

(2008) Poverty. In: Williams

(ed.) Security Studies: An Introduction. London: Routledge, pp. 244–259.

93.

Tietje

(1997) The concept of coherence in the treaty on European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. European Foreign Affairs Review 2(2): 211–233.

94.

Toje

(2011) The European Union as a small power. Journal of Common Market Studies 49(1): 43–60.

95.

Trombetta

(2009) Environmental security and climate change: Analysing the discourse. In: Harris

(ed.) The Politics of Climate Change: Environmental Dynamics in International Affairs. New York: Routledge, pp. 129–146.

96.

Ullman

(1983) Redefining security. International Security 8(1): 129–153.

97.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (1994) Human Development Report 1994. New York: Oxford University Press.

98.

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2009) Sixty-Third Session, Agenda Item 107. Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit. Report no. A/63/L.8/Rev.1, 18 May 2009, pp. 1–33. New York: United Nations General Assembly.

99.

Van Elsuwege

(2010) EU external action after the collapse of the pillar structure: In search of a new balance between delimitation and consistency. Common Market Law Review 47(4): 987–1019.

100.

Vego

(2009) Counter-piracy: An operational perspective. Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet 3: 169–180.

101.

Vogler

(2005) The European contribution to global environmental governance. International Affairs 81(4): 835–850.

102.

Wæver

Buzan

Kelstrup

. (eds) (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. London: Pinter.

103.

Westing

(1989) The environmental component of comprehensive security. Security Dialogue 20(2): 129–134.

104.

Whitman

(1998) From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

105.

Whitman

(2011) The rise of the European external action service: Putting the strategy into EU diplomacy? Available at: http://www.euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/8l_whitman.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2011).

106.

Williams

(2008) Security studies: An introduction. In: Williams

(ed.) Security Studies: An Introduction. London: Routledge, pp. 1–12.

107.

Willis Group Holdings (2011) News release: Special contingency risks and MUSC host seminar on the changing dynamics of Somali piracy, 6 May 2011. Available at: http://www.willis.com/Media_Room/Press_Releases_%28Browse_All%29/2011/20110506_SCR_MUSC_Piracy_Seminar (accessed on 13 May 2011).

108.

World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (1987) Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

109.

World Resources Institute (2011) Summary of developed country fast-start climate finance pledges. Available at: http://pdf.wri.org/climate_finance_pledges_2011-11-18.pdf (accessed on 17 December 2011).

110.

Wurzel

Connelly

(eds) (2010) The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics. London: Routledge.

111.

Youngs

(2008) Fusing security and development: Just another Euro-platitude? European Integration 30(3): 419–437.

112.

Zwolski

(2009a) Euthanasia, gay marriage and sovereignty: The Polish ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Journal of Contemporary European Research 5(3): 489–497.

113.

Zwolski

(2009b) The European Union as a security actor: Moving beyond the second pillar. Journal of Contemporary European Research 5(1): 82–96.

114.

Zwolski

(2011a) The external dimension of the EU’s non-proliferation policy: Overcoming inter-institutional competition. European Foreign Affairs Review 16(3): 325–340.

115.

Zwolski

(2011b) Unrecognized and unwelcome? The role of the EU in preventing the proliferation of CBRN weapons, materials and knowledge. Perspectives on European Politics and Society 12(4): 477–492.

116.

Zwolski

Kaunert

(2011) The EU and climate security: A case of successful norm entrepreneurship? European Security 20(1): 21–43.