Turning an idea into reality: Creating the European Institute of Peace

Abstract

This article explains the creation of the European Institute of Peace (EIP) in May 2014. Combining constructivist insights on policy ideas with a framing approach, it proposes a conceptual framework to analyse the dynamics of interaction between state and non-state actors (NSAs) with regard to formulating new policies and creating new institutions. Focusing on the role of frame entrepreneurs, framing strategies and frame resonance, it argues that the creation of the EIP was a result of framing undertaken by an advocacy coalition in which Sweden and Finland, together with specialized NGOs and individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), played the role of frame entrepreneurs. This advocacy coalition managed to convince a number of European states there was a certain gap in the EU’s mediation capacities and that a new institution independent of the EU was needed to address it. The limited degree of frame resonance among the majority of EU member states and their reluctance to join the institute explain why the EIP initiative struggled to receive broad political support.

Keywords

EU foreign policy EU mediation framing policy ideas

Introduction

Europe must rise to the formidable challenges of our time, threatening peace, freedom and sustainable development both at global level and in its immediate neighbourhood. The European Institute of Peace is an ambitious way to advance European capacities and augment the diplomatic toolkit of the EU and beyond (European Voice, 11 May 2014).

These lines conclude an open letter written by the foreign ministers of nine European countries that welcomes the creation of the European Institute of Peace (EIP) on 11 May 2014.¹ The EIP was founded as a non-profit, public interest foundation and is intended to serve as ‘a flexible and external tool in support of Europe’s peace efforts, complementing the set of instruments at the EU’s disposal in mediation and dialogue’ (European Institute of Peace, 2014: 1). In other words, the EIP was established as an independent institution outside the EU’s foreign and security policy framework by nine states serving as founding members, but designed to work in close cooperation with EU institutions and member states in the field of peace mediation and preventive diplomacy.

The idea of creating a European peace institute had been floating around for many years in the international policy and think tank community (Krümpelmann and Major, 2013: 2–3). However, it was not until 2010 that this loose idea gained substantial prominence when Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt together with his Finnish colleague, Alexander Stubb, sent a joint non-paper to EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, proposing the creation of the EIP to engage in peacemaking and conflict resolution activities on a global scale (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2010). The establishment of the EIP is an interesting case for European integration scholars and foreign policy analysts to study. In the sphere of foreign and security policy there has been a strong reluctance by EU member states to transfer authority to the supranational level (cf. Thomas, 2009: 340–341). The creation of an independent institution that is tasked with complementing and cooperating with EU institutions and the member states is a remarkable development that calls for a theory-informed explanation. Moreover, the fact that the creation of the EIP only received the support of 8 out of 28 EU member states also needs to be explained.

While acknowledging the important role played by Sweden and Finland in establishing the EIP (cf. Balfour, 2015: 2), the article argues that we miss out an important part of the story if we understand the creation of the EIP solely as a successful attempt by states to upload their ‘pet projects’ to the European level. Rather, the article makes the case for understanding this process as being shaped by individual agents representing a multiplicity of actors and institutions – EU member states and the European Parliament (EP), as well as NGOs and think tanks specialized in the field of conflict prevention and mediation. The main argument of the article is that the creation of the EIP was a result of active framing processes by an advocacy coalition in which key individuals representing both EU member states, EU institutions and NGOs played the role of frame entrepreneurs, shaping different phases of the framing cycle. Framing denotes the construction of meaning through the generation of frames that provide a specific interpretation of a certain problem. While state representatives and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were instrumental in arguing for the need to create the EIP (diagnostic framing), in mobilizing support for the initiative (motivational framing), NGOs and scientific experts actively shaped the debate about its design and mandate (prognostic framing). This framing process, however, did not fully resonate with a number of EU member states and the European External Action Service (EEAS), challenged the rationale of establishing the EIP.

Through the in-depth analysis of an empirical case that has not yet been sufficiently studied, the article makes a contribution to three distinct literatures in the fields of European integration studies and international relations. First, it adds another interesting case study to the literature on the influence of ideas on policy formulation and implementation, both in the fields of foreign policy analysis and European integration research (cf. Björkdahl, 2007, 2013; Lucarelli and Manners, 2006). By thoroughly tracing the four-year-long consultation process that led to the creation of the EIP, the article makes a contribution to our understanding of why certain ideas ‘take off’ (Björkdahl, 2007: 173).

Second, the article speaks to the literature on EU foreign policy-making, particularly to studies on the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in European foreign policy (Bicchi, 2007; Joachim and Dembinski, 2011). Recently, a number of studies have made advances in relation to theorizing agenda-setting and framing in EU foreign policy and the role of NGOs in these processes (Dijkstra, 2012; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2013; Voltolini, 2016). This article illustrates that the concept of collective framing provides a fruitful avenue for further theorizing on the conditions under which framing processes occur and are successful. In addition, it somewhat shifts the attention away from the macro- to the micro-level, focusing particularly on the role of individuals acting as frame entrepreneurs.

Third, there is an emergent academic literature on the EU as a peace mediator (Bergmann and Niemann, 2015; Brandenburg, 2017; Davis, 2014; Girke, 2015). The majority of these studies focus on the conduct of EU mediation activities and analyse the management and effectiveness of EU mediation efforts. However, less attention has been devoted to the evolving institutional architecture for EU mediation (but, see Brandenburg, 2017). A case study on the EIP thus contributes to our understanding of the EU’s resources and institutional capacities for undertaking mediation and mediation support activities.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, it develops a conceptual framework that builds on the framing approach and incorporates insights of the literature concerning the impact of ideas on foreign policy-making. Second, it briefly outlines the design of the EIP and the institutional and policy context in which it is situated. Third, it applies this framework to the case of the EIP and empirically investigates the processes that led to the establishment of the EIP, drawing on the method of process tracing. The data basis for the empirical analysis consists of policy documents, nine semi-structured interviews with policy-makers and mediation practitioners involved in different phases of the process², and secondary literature. Finally, the conclusion discusses the utility of the conceptual framework, but also points to its limits in explaining member states’ motives for not joining the EIP, an aspect that is better explained by a rationalist perspective. Finally, refining the conditions of frame resonance and exploring the value added by the EIP’s activities are identified as potential future research avenues.

Policy ideas and framing – a conceptual framework

This section presents the conceptual framework for investigating how the idea to create the EIP turned into reality, and aims to explain the processes and mechanisms that led to this outcome. The framework builds on a middle ground, constructivist perspective on European foreign policy (EFP) cooperation that opens up a space for analysing the constitutive role of ideas in policy construction (Björkdahl, 2007: 171). In principle, constructivist accounts have focused on a variety of different analytical tools for understanding EFP, including ideas, values, roles, rules and identities (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 326). In line with the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ social constructivist approaches to EFP, the conceptual framework of this study leans more towards the ‘thin’ version of social constructivism (cf. Smith, 1999: 685). According to Aydin-Düzgit (2015: 137–138), the latter implies

an explanatory theory closer to rationalism that can debate with rationalism due to its similar ontological assumption of the existence of a social reality ‘outside’ discourse, where identities, norms, values, ideas and discourses can shape states’ interests and hence influence their actions.

It is this ontological position that distinguishes the constructivist approach adopted by this study from thicker poststructuralist and discursive approaches to EFP that conceptualize social reality as constructed through discourse (Aydin-Düzgit, 2015: 138).³ Rooted in what has been termed a ‘common-sense constructivist position’ (Björkdahl, 2007: 171; cf. Pettmann, 2000) the conceptual framework for analysing the creation of the EIP rests upon two constructivist premises that serve as main building blocks: (1) the centrality of ideas in policy construction; and (2) the role of political elites in framing and institutionalizing these ideas. A key contribution to the study of policy ideas has been made by Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 3), who define ideas as beliefs held by actors, differentiating between world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. As Björkdahl (2007: 171) puts it, ‘at the most fundamental level, ideas define the universe of possibilities for action’. In other words, ideas may represent beliefs about why a certain course of action or initiative is needed, which implies a belief about the cause-and-effect relationship between the action or initiative and the presumed outcome. As outlined in detail later, the initial proposal to create the EIP also rested upon a certain causal belief that such an institution would have a positive effect on the mediation capacities of the EU and its member states.

To influence and shape policy processes, ideas need actors to bring them into the public domain and draw attention to them (Princen, 2011: 929). This study builds on the social constructivist assumption that social reality can be shaped and framed by all kinds of actors, including international organizations, NGOs, social movements and epistemic communities (Adler, 1997: 343). Consequently, social constructivism does not limit its analytical focus to state actors. Rather, it puts a strong emphasis on the role played by NSAs and their interaction with state representatives in framing and institutionalizing policy ideas (cf. Voltolini, 2016: 1503). Framing is here understood as the key mechanism through which ideas gain widespread attention, are promoted and potentially modified, and then finally turned into concrete initiatives to institutionalize them (Björkdahl, 2007: 173–174).

Originally developed in the field of social movement studies, framing has gained widespread attention in European integration studies (cf. Princen, 2011), increasingly also in the context of agenda-setting within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) (Bicchi, 2007; Dijkstra, 2012; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2013; Voltolini, 2016). The term ‘frame’ goes back to the writings of Erving Goffman (1974: 21) to whom ‘frames denote schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their lifespace’. As Benford and Snow (2000: 614) put it, ‘frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action’. The process of frame generation is called ‘framing’ which can be described as an active and dynamic process of the construction of meaning. A central role in framing processes is assigned to so-called ‘frame entrepreneurs’, who articulate certain policy ideas and propose frames that provide a specific interpretation of a particular problem and possible solutions to it (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614–615; Voltolini, 2016: 1505).

To establish and diffuse a frame that leads to collective action, frame entrepreneurs engage in three framing tasks that can also be understood as three stages of the framing process: (1) diagnostic framing, which refers to the process of identifying a certain problem; (2) prognostic framing, implying that frame entrepreneurs propose potential solutions to problems and strategies for implementing them; and (3) motivational framing, which refers to the process of motivating adherents to engage in collective action aimed at solving problems (and, potentially, the amelioration of the situation). By pursuing these framing tasks, frame entrepreneurs engage in what sociologists have termed consensus mobilization and action mobilization (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615–618). In other words, through framing, actors seeks to establish consensus on a particular problem and strategies to solve it as well as a consensus on adequate action for implementing these strategies.

Finally, the success of framing processes, i.e. the establishment of a new frame that leads to new policy initiatives, depends on what sociologists have termed frame resonance (Snow and Benford, 1988). Frame resonance refers to the question of whether a particular framing process is perceived as credible and salient. I focus here on two aspects of frame resonance. First, the empirical credibility of the frame refers to the apparent fit of the framing with the perception of the frame addressees. In other words, the question is whether diagnostic and prognostic claims are perceived as valid and actually factual by the individuals or groups at which the framing is targeted (Benford and Snow, 2000: 620). Second, the centrality of a frame depends on how politically salient the targets of mobilization perceive the content of the frame to be, be it an idea or a specific norm. The higher the perceived centrality of a frame, the higher the chances of its target mobilizing for a particular initiative.

The concept of frame resonance promotes bridge-building with alternative explanations of institutional innovation and change, in particular rationalist and institutionalist accounts. The perceived empirical credibility and centrality of a frame are likely to be influenced by actors’ material and/or strategic interests. Although this is seldom spelled out by scholars adopting a framing perspective, in their formulation of the approach, Benford and Snow (2000: 624) acknowledge that framing processes are ‘deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed: Frames are developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose’. In turn, acknowledging the rationality of the frame entrepreneur logically necessitates recognizing the rationality of the mobilization of frame constituents. In other words, processes of mobilization of frame constituents may also be informed by strategic and material interests, in particular when it comes to the institutionalization of policy ideas. Governments’ strategic foreign policy interests may influence how salient and credible they perceive a certain frame to be and this, in turn, influences their support of its institutionalization. On the issue of the centrality of ideas, the framing approach is, therefore, similar to accounts of historical institutionalism that understand institutional change as the ‘product of changes in ideas held by actors’ (Steinmo, 2008: 130).⁴ A key difference between the framing approach and historical institutionalism, however, is that the latter gives supremacy to material factors by presuming that institutional change occurs ‘when powerful actors have the will and ability to change institutions’ (Steinmo, 2008: 131), while the framing approach does not link the concept of framing success to material power, but rather points to the features of the frame and its resonance with ideas and beliefs as a key condition of framing success.

In sum, I have developed a conceptual framework to analyse the dynamics of interaction between state and NSAs with regard to formulating new policies and creating new initiatives and institutions. Having established its key components, the conceptual framework will guide the analysis of the creation of the EIP in 2014. Before doing so, the next section briefly outlines the evolution of the EU’s institutional architecture for mediation and mediation support to illustrate the context in which the debate about creating the EIP emerged.

The EU’s institutional architecture for mediation and the EIP

The creation of the EIP in May 2014 by its nine founding member states added another innovative institution to the EU’s evolving governance framework for mediation and mediation support. This framework has gradually developed in the past decade. Against the backdrop of increasing EU involvement as mediator in international conflicts (cf. Bergmann and Niemann, 2015: 957, 971–972), the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy issued in 2008 called for an expansion of EU mediation and dialogue capacities (European Union, 2008: 9). Following up on this initiative, during the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU, the Council adopted the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities in November 2009 (Council of the European Union, 2009). The Concept is the first policy document dealing exclusively with mediation as a distinct EU foreign policy instrument and represents the main point of conceptual and policy reference for EU mediation. Apart from acting as a mediator in peace negotiations, the Concept defines supporting, leveraging, promoting and funding of mediation activities as additional roles for EU mediation involvement (Council of the European Union, 2009: 6). Moreover, it identifies five key guiding principles for EU mediation activities: (a) policy coherence; (b) comprehensiveness; (c) careful assessment of risks; (d) complementarity with principles of transitional justice and human rights; and (e) promotion of women’s equal and full participation in mediation processes (Council of the European Union, 2009: 6–9).

To implement the ambitious 2009 Concept, the EU Mediation Support Team (MST) within the EEAS K2 division and comprising five staff members was established and became operational in late 2011 (European External Action Service, 2013; Sherriff and Hauck, 2012: 8–9). In addition, the EP also created an entity tasked with providing expertise on mediation and supporting mediation missions of MEPs. The so-called European Parliamentary Mediation Support Service was established within the EP’s bureaucracy in 2014.

These conceptual and institutional developments in the field of EU mediation are important to understand the overall context in which the debate about the need for creating the EIP was situated. The adoption of the 2009 Concept set in motion a number of initiatives to strengthen the EU’s mediation capacities, primarily aiming to bolster the mediation capacities of the newly created EEAS. At the same time, the Concept provided a ground for reflections both within the EP and among EU member states on how the EU’s role as peace mediator could be further strengthened. It is in this context that the debate which led to the creation of the EIP in 2014 emerged. The next section turns to the empirical analysis, seeking to explain the creation and institutional design of the EIP by drawing on the conceptual framework developed above.

Framing processes and the creation of the EIP

On 11 May 2014, the EIP was established as a non-profit, public interest foundation under Belgian law by its nine founding states, the latter having agreed to fund the EIP for the first three years (Harman, 2014: 1). In terms of its formal organizational structure, the EIP is completely independent of any EU or state-level institution. The EIP has been designed as an operational hub, focusing on the organization of mediation and dialogue between parties in conflict and supports the build-up of capacities in this field (EIP, 2014). According to its director, Martin Griffiths, the EIP is engaged in ‘helping EU policy makers and European governments to identify opportunities for creative diplomacy and we open new ways of dialogue that can make a real difference’ (Griffiths, 2015). As of January 2017, the EIP has 23 staff members, a board of governors headed by President Pekka Haavisto and Vice President Marc Otte and an advisory council composed of a number of academic experts and practitioners in mediation.

It is difficult to determine when and by whom the idea of creating the EIP was first articulated publicly, since it seems this had been floating around within the Brussels policy community for some time (Krümpelmann and Major, 2013: 2–3). Nevertheless, the idea gained increased public attention when Nobel Peace Prize winner and former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari gave a statement in the EP on 1 April 2009 about the EU’s peace mediation capacities. In this statement, Ahtisaari (1 April 2009, quoted in Vucheva, 2009: 1) provided an assessment of the EU’s capacities in the field of mediation and proposed to create the EIP as an instrument to overcome existing shortcomings in the EU’s foreign policy system:

We have to develop professional expertise in mediation and also in mediation support, like the other actors in this field are doing – like the UN at the moment (…) when I look at the US system, they have created the US Institute of Peace endeavours. And I sometimes wonder why we are not yet thinking about the setting up of a European Institute for Peace (…) actually to reflect on our lessons learned – something the EU is not particularly good at at the moment, at least in the foreign policy domain – it is interesting to note that so far we could not come up with one single ‘lessons learned’ paper in terms of mediation or specific peace purposes. A European Institute for Peace could do something like this.

Although Ahtisaari’s statement on the rationale and potential tasks of the EIP was quite vague, it nevertheless provided the impetus for two initiatives to further reflect on this idea. First, the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs requested a study on a possible blueprint for the EIP which was authored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) researcher Gunnilla Herolf and delivered in February 2010. In her study, Herolf (2010) presented an analysis of the potential added value of a peace institute in areas identified as in need of increased capabilities, such as ‘advice, analysis, research, informal negotiation and training for a range of tasks such as mediation’ (2010: 5). Moreover, the author outlined potential organizational models for the EIP, discussing the possibilities for building upon existing bodies, such as the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), and the benefits of creating a new body that had a certain distance from existing EU institutions (2010: 7–9).

Second, Ahtisaari’s call for creating the EIP was taken up by the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and his Finnish colleague Alexander Stubb, who presented a joint non-paper to EU High Representative Catherine Ashton in September 2010 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2010). In this document, the two foreign ministers proposed the creation of the EIP as an independent organization to conduct conflict resolution activities and complement the EU’s traditional diplomacy approach. According to their vision, this suggested institute should be funded by EU member states and EU institutions, but should also allow non-EU member states to participate.

Thus, the first steps towards turning the idea of the EIP into a manifest project were taken at two different places: the EP, and the Swedish and Finnish foreign ministries. Leading individuals in these institutions – foreign ministers Bildt and Stubb as well as MEPs Franziska Brantner and Alain Lamassoure – played the role of frame entrepreneurs in the subsequent consultation process.⁵ The latter was initiated by the Swedish and Finnish foreign ministries. These tasked the Brussels-based NGO mediatEUr, led by the experienced mediation expert Antje Herrberg, with organizing expert workshops, civil society consultations and high-level policy seminars to create a business model for setting up the EIP.

In addition to designing and facilitating the consultation process, mediatEUr was tasked with providing support to the two ministries through policy advice and analysis, and convening and facilitating the Informal Advisory Council for the European Institute of Peace Process (mediatEUr, 2012: 4). The latter was created in 2011 and comprised a core group of European states, states’ officials NGO representatives and individual MEPs. Together with German MEP Franziska Brantner, it hosted a number of conferences and events to further discuss the potential benefits, costs and added value of the EIP and invited more than 150 stakeholders to join this consultation process (mediatEUr, 2011). Thus, the NGO mediatEUr, mandated by Sweden and Finland, played a leading role in initiating and moderating the consultation process, which was joined by the EP at a later stage.

The consultations of the Informal Advisory Council for the European Institute of Peace Process and the debates within the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs led to the establishment of what I term the ‘EIP frame’. The core features of this frame were as follows:

There are a number of gaps concerning the EU’s mediation capacity and there is a need for added capabilities;

To fill these gaps, a new institution such as the EIP is needed rather than improving existing capacities;

Creating an independent EIP based on special relationship with EU institutions will increase the EU’s mediation capacities (Herolf, 2010: 8–9; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2010: 1).

The EIP frame thus incorporated a number of diagnostic and prognostic elements. In terms of diagnostic framing, a regular argument made by the proponents of the EIP was that the EU lacked the capacity to engage with proscribed armed actors such as rebel groups and terrorist organizations (Brorsen, 2012: 8). As a participant to the consultation process remembers, a key argument that Carl Bildt regularly made ‘was that non-state actors have to be engaged in peace dialogues, but this is something the EU does not have the capacity to do’.⁶

In the joint non-paper, Bildt and Stubb had noted that there might be situations where traditional state diplomacy was less suited to addressing security challenges (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2010: 1). This argument became an important element of diagnostic framing during the consultation process (Krümpelmann and Major, 2013: 4). A study commissioned by the EP and authored by consultant Peter Brorsen identified track 1.5 diplomacy as one of the major gaps in EU mediation capacity and an area where significant capacity-building was needed (Brorsen, 2012: 14). In addition, other diagnostic arguments that were put forward pointed to the lack of both EU capacity for rapid expert deployment for mediation support and a centralized knowledge hub for mediation expertise and training within the EU’s foreign policy structure (Brorsen, 2012: 4–7; Herolf, 2010: 9–10; mediatEUr, 2012: 8). Although there were some nuances in the different assessments of existing EU mediation capacities, the consultative process created a consensus within the advocacy coalition on the need for further improvement of EU mediation capacities in this respect.

From 2012 onwards, Sweden, under the lead of Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, increasingly joined forces with the EP to advertise the creation of the EIP as a solution to the EU’s problems in terms of mediation capacity and to propose a specific institutional design for the EIP that built upon formal independence (prognostic framing). The most active MEPs involved in prognostic framing were the German MEP Franziska Brantner, the Green Party’s coordinator on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and French MEP Alain Lamassoure, chair of the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) (Krümpelmann and Major, 2013: 3). In a joint open letter published in a number of European media outlets, Bildt, together with Brantner and Lamassoure, advocated for the creation of the EIP as a platform for conflict mediation, informal diplomacy and exchange of mediation experience. The authors argued that the EIP ‘should work in close contact with EU institutions and their foreign policy leaders, but be formally independent’ (Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 December 2012, translation from German original). In addition, they emphasized that the EIP’s added value would be to act ‘more flexibly, innovatively and independently than traditional EU Diplomacy’, thus providing a possible solution to the lack of track 1.5 capacities (Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 December 2012). In a similar way, a study authored by United States Institute of Peace (USIP) researcher Jonas Claes (2013: 2) argued that the EIP could add flexibility to the EU’s mediation approach and noted that, ‘advocates particularly value the potential of this innovative peacebuilding entity to engage with proscribed armed groups, while maintaining the required legitimacy through close association with the EU’.

A central prognostic element was the advocacy for creating the EIP as a formally independent institution that enjoyed some sort of special relationship with EU institutions. As a Swedish official confirmed, it was a key interest of the Swedish foreign ministry that the EIP was created as an independent institution, but would be enabled to act in close coordination with and as demanded by EU institutions and EU member states.⁷ Closely related to the debate on the independence of the EIP was the idea that the institute should be enabled to engage in informal mediation missions in its own right and deploy mediation experts to acute crisis situations within a short space of time. Through the establishment of an expert roster, the names on which could be quickly deployed, the EIP was envisaged as complementing the EU’s capacity for rapid reaction and engaging with proscribed actors with whom EU institutions may have experienced difficulties in interacting themselves (Brorsen, 2012: 14; Poot et al., 2013: 36–37).

Moreover, a major point of debate within the advocacy coalition was the proposal for the EIP to be engaged in mediation training activities. However, there was no consensus on the exact degree of involvement in this (Brorsen, 2012: 4; Herrberg, 2012: 59–61; Krümpelmann and Major, 2013: 4). As there was no coherent vision of how strong the training role played by the EIP should be, the decision regarding this also depended on how the frame would resonate with EU institutions and EU member states that had already built training capacities (see below).

Finally, the motivational framing phase was less visible to the public. Attempts to mobilize support for the EIP within the EU and its member states were mostly undertaken behind closed doors and in an informal way. While the EP played a decisive role in shaping the process of prognostic framing, the frame entrepreneurship of Carl Bildt and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was decisive when it came to motivating other states to join the project and become founding members of the EIP.⁸ As one interview partner remembers, ‘Carl Bildt and his team went from capital to capital, asking the national foreign ministries “what do you think about the initiative, would you support it?”’.⁹ In 2013, the Swedish government decided to move forward with the creation of the proposed institute and to form a core group of states willing to establish the EIP within one year. Sweden, Finland, Poland, Hungary, Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg formed this core group and were joined by Spain and Italy in the spring of 2014. The active lobbying of Foreign Minister Carl Bildt was vital to convince a number of his European colleagues to support the initiative and to join the endeavour of creating the EIP.¹⁰

In sum, the consultation and advocacy process leading to the establishment of the EIP can be conceptualized as a framing process in which individuals representing both EU member states and the EP acted as frame entrepreneurs. In particular, Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and, to a lesser extent, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, together with MEPs Franziska Brantner and Alain Lamassoure, served as main advocates of the project, establishing a frame that called for the creation of the EIP and specifying why it was needed and how it could be designed. A central role in this framing process was also played by the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs that tasked several NGOs and researchers with conducting scientific analyses on the potential costs and benefits of establishing the EIP (Brorsen, 2012: 1; Herolf, 2010: ii; Poot et al., 2013: 7). In contributing these analyses to the consultation process and being closely involved in the discussions of the advocacy coalition, NSAs such as mediatEUr, SIPRI, USIP and the consulting group COWI A/S considerably influenced the prognostic framing phase through their expert knowledge. In particular, mediatEUr played a prominent role in facilitating and steering the consultation process and the discussions about the business model of the EIP. In the final motivational framing phase, Sweden was the main driver behind forming the core group of nine states that finally took the decision to establish the EIP in May 2014.

Analysing the different framing elements alone, however, is not sufficient to explain the creation of the EIP. Rather, we have to investigate how the framing resonated with EU institutions and EU member states and what consequences this had for the success of the EIP frame and the establishment of the EIP.

Frame resonance and framing success

From early on, the EIP project was met with huge scepticism from the High Representative and the EEAS, a number of individual EU member states and parts of the European NGO community. The two bodies that were the most sceptical about the EIP were the High Representative and the EEAS. In a phase where the EEAS was just being established and developing its own capacities in the field of mediation, the EIP was seen as a potential competitor, undermining the EEAS’ competencies (Krümpelmann and Major, 2013: 6). The interview evidence suggests that the High Representative, and EEAS officials resisted the project due to severe doubts about the added value of the EIP and, thus, decided not to engage with the advocacy coalition about its creation.¹¹

Because the High Representative and the EEAS were highly sceptical about the diagnostic and prognostic elements of the EIP frame, this made it more difficult for the advocates of the project to sell the idea to potential supporters and prolonged the consultation process.¹²

Moreover, several EU member states were sceptical about the EIP. In particular, German and Dutch officials argued that it was far too early to say that the EU’s mediation capacities were insufficient given that the EEAS had just been created (cf. mediatEUr, 2012: 10). In other words, there was a fear that if they backed the EIP, then this would be at the expense of support for the EEAS (Krümpelmann and Major, 2013: 6). This perception ran against the diagnosis of a capacity gap in EU mediation and the proposal of a new institution as the only viable way to address this.¹³ In addition, the German government’s reluctance to become a member state of the EIP was also the result of German NGOs and think tanks being highly sceptical about the project, fearing that the EIP would become a main competitor for project funds and, thus, advocating against it (cf. mediatEUr, 2012: 10).¹⁴ Moreover, for some member states, the EIP project did not seem to be politically salient enough to justify the creation of another costly institution in times of financial crisis. As Krümpelmann and Major (2013: 6) note in their assessment of the proposals for an EIP in 2013,

advocates of the EIP like Franziska Brantner and Carl Bildt are eager to emphasize that a small and focused EIP would be financially beneficial in the long-run as it could help to avoid the consequential costs of armed conflicts. While several studies seem to support this view, it might not be enough to convince a broad range of European states to contribute.

As an interview partner closely involved in the process mentioned, ‘especially the UK was against creating a new European-tied body, arguing that at the end of the financial crisis, this would be really bad timing’.¹⁵

Finally, different institutional cultures concerning the cooperation with NSAs may have also influenced the degree of frame resonance on part of the member states. While Sweden and Finland, and Switzerland too as a non-EU member state, have gained a lot of experience in cooperation with NSAs in the field of conflict prevention and resolution, states with huge enormous diplomatic apparatuses such as France and the UK revealed considerable scepticism towards the idea of tasking small independent institutions with important missions of informal diplomacy.¹⁶

In sum, the conclusions we can draw from the combined analysis of framing processes and frame resonance to explain the creation and institutional design of the EIP are twofold. First, the analysis has demonstrated that there was a strong belief on the side of the most prominent advocates of the EIP that a new institution was needed to address the lack of EU capacity in the field of mediation and informal diplomacy. Additionally, at the core of the EIP frame was the belief that this new body needed to be institutionally independent of existing EU bodies to be able to engage with proscribed armed groups in situations where the EU was not able or willing to become involved (Brorsen, 2012: 14; Poot et al., 2013: 36–37). As the main actor involved in motivational framing, Sweden managed to convince a core group of European states to support this idea and, as a result, the EIP was jointly created in 2014.

Second, the analysis also illustrates that EU institutions, such as the High Representative and the EEAS, as well as individual member states, challenged the empirical credibility and salience of the EIP frame. As demonstrated above, there were serious doubts concerning the diagnosis that the EU lacked capacity in mediation and these were combined with concerns about the prognosis that an independent institution would be needed to fill this gap. The limited degree of frame resonance is key to understanding why 20 out of 28 EU member states decided not to join the EIP as founding members. The empirical results indicate the importance of member states’ material and strategic interests in understanding the limited degree of frame resonance. Due to financial concerns about the costs of setting up the EIP as well as concerns about competition with national NGOs in the field and/or their own diplomatic services, member states refrained from supporting the initiative. The evidence thus tentatively points to the limits of the framing approach in understanding the lack of support by EU member states in the final phase of the framing process – the institutionalization of the policy idea.¹⁷

In addition, the limited degree of frame resonance helps us to understand why there was no agreement among EU member states on how to define the relationship between the EIP and the EEAS. While the EIP founding members were keen to stress that the institute was to serve as a complementary partner to the EU, High Representative Catherine Ashton and EEAS staff members working in the field of mediation showed no real interest in engaging with the EIP advocates to discuss how an institutionalized working relationship between the EIP and the EEAS could be designed.¹⁸

Taken together, the empirical findings demonstrate the utility of a framing approach to explain the creation of the EIP. The findings point to the important roles played by individual state representatives, MEPs, and NGOs and think tanks in influencing and shaping the consultations on the rationale and design of the EIP. The analysis of framing activities using the three framing tasks (diagnosis, prognosis, motivation) also helps in understanding the dynamics of the process of establishing the EIP between 2010 and 2014. At the same time, the findings on the limited frame resonance among EU member states due to diverging strategic interests indicate the limits of the framing approach for explaining decisions in the final framing stage, i.e. the institutionalization of the policy idea.

Conclusions

This article set out to explain the creation and institutional design of the EIP. The empirical analysis demonstrates that the creation of the EIP can be plausibly understood as the result of an active framing process initiated by an advocacy coalition in which Sweden and Finland together with specialized NGOs and MEPs acted as frame entrepreneurs. This advocacy coalition managed to convince a number of European states that there was a certain gap in the EU’s mediation capacities and a new institution independent of the EU was needed to address this. In addition, the EIP’s design as an independent foundation can be explained by the strong belief of the frame entrepreneurs that only an institution without any formal links to the EU would be able to engage in mediation with proscribed armed groups and be perceived as a legitimate and credible actor. This finding, therefore, underlines the potential of the framing approach for explaining policy change in the field of EU external policy more broadly (cf. Bicchi, 2007). The creation of similar institutions in different EU external policy domains, such as the European Endowment for Democracy or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, may constitute interesting cases to compare with the establishment of the EIP in future research.¹⁹

At the same time, the limited degree of frame resonance explains the small number of EU member states that have committed to being member states of the EIP and funding it. It also explains why the nature of the working relationship between the EIP and the EEAS was not further specified formally when the institute was created in May 2014. The investigation of the underlying causes of limited frame resonance suggests that material and strategic interests have been key drivers of member states’ reluctance to join the EIP. While this finding points to the limits of the framing approach, it calls for refining the approach rather than discarding it. In contrast to what historical institutionalism would expect, for example, the idea of the EIP became institutionalized despite the lack of support from powerful EU member states such as France, Germany and the UK. Nevertheless, I argue that there is continuing scope for further refinement of the concept of frame resonance and the conditions that are conducive/obstructive to framing success.

In addition, the empirical analysis demonstrates that framing processes may involve a variety of states and NSAs, influencing different stages of the framing cycle. Thus, this study reiterates Voltolini’s (2016: 1504) call to ‘complicate the process’ and focus on the interaction between member states, EU institutions, and NSAs such as NGOs and think tanks to comprehensively understand the emergence and codification of frames that lead to new policy initiatives. This article’s findings on the frame entrepreneurship of individual MEPs, and NGOs such as mediatEUr, underscore the need to explore further the role of NSAs in the field of EU foreign and security policy, challenging the traditional view that such policy remains the sole concern of EU member states.

Finally, future research on the EIP may explore to what extent its creation has made a difference to the EU’s peace mediation activities. Three years after its establishment, the EIP will enter a critical phase in which it has to prove its added value and effectiveness in order to maintain and possibly extend the support of its member states.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive comments on earlier drafts. Parts of the author’s research related to this article that were undertaken at the University of Mainz were facilitated by a grant from the German Foundation for Peace Research whose support is gratefully acknowledged. In addition, I would like to thank the participants of the panel discussion about ‘The role of actors in policy processes and institutional change’ at the UACES 46th Annual Conference in London in 2016, particularly the discussant Borja Garcia, for helpful comments and suggestions. Finally, I am indebted to all interview partners for sharing their views and insights with me.

Funding

Parts of this article are related to a research project at the University of Mainz on ‘A Peacemaker in the Making? A Study on the European Union’s Effectiveness as an Actor in International Mediation’ funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF).

Notes

Author biography

Julian Bergmann is a post-doctoral researcher at the German Development Institute (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)). His main research interests are EU foreign and security policy, EU development policy and international mediation. Recent publications include ‘From neo-functional peace to a logic of spillover in EU external policy’ (2017) and Mediating international conflicts: The European Union as an effective peacemaker? (2015) (both Journal of Common Market Studies, with Arne Niemann) and ‘Reputation, credibility and manipulative negotiation style – Attributes of successful peacemakers?’ (Zeitschrift für Friedens-und Konfliktforschung (2014 in German).

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