‘We must take our allies’ views into account’: Pierre Trudeau and the turn back to NATO in the mid-1970s

It is a staple of many analyses of Cold War defence policy that Pierre Trudeau came to be a stronger supporter of Canada’s military and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the mid-1970s. Early on, he was a skeptic of the alliance, and angered allies by cutting the strength of Canada’s troops in Europe by half in 1969 after a lengthy review of foreign and defence policy. From 1968 to 1974, he kept the military on a tight budget: personnel levels dropped to a Cold War nadir of 78,000 and equipment was nearing obsolescence. But in 1975 the government announced a plan to increase funding and re-equip the armed forces. From 1976 to 1984, the defence budget more than doubled from CAD$3.14 to $8.77 billion, and the military received new aircraft, armoured vehicles, and ships. Trudeau’s new appreciation for NATO was symbolized by the purchase of 128 Leopard 1 tanks for Canada’s troops in Europe in 1976, and this support was confirmed in later episodes, such as the decision to allow cruise missile testing in Canada.

Many authors have ascribed this increased funding and support of NATO to the influence of Helmut Schmidt, chancellor of West Germany from 1974 to 1982. He and Trudeau were close friends, and Schmidt visited Trudeau’s tomb in a 2011 trip to Canada. ¹ They first met in 1975 while Trudeau was trying to build support for a trade link between Canada and Europe, the “Third Option.” The story goes that the Europeans, particularly Schmidt, told Trudeau that if Canada wanted trade with Europe, it would have to help defend Europe. NATO allies were still angry over the reductions in 1969 and wanted a tangible demonstration of support for the alliance, such as new tanks for Canadian troops in Europe. The implicit, or explicit, suggestion was “no tanks, no trade.”

One account notes that Schmidt lectured Trudeau on the need for Canada to improve its defences, particularly with new tanks for Canadian troops in Europe, and that “Helmut Schmidt personally advised Trudeau to ‘pull up Canada’s military socks’ if the country wished to discuss any increase in trade deals.” ² R.B. Byers put it more delicately, stating that Schmidt, the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and the NATO secretary general, Joseph Luns, criticized Canada’s military contributions and advised that the desired contractual link with Western Europe was based on an improvement in Canada’s military performance. ³ J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, in Pirouette, stated that it was a combined operation by Chief of the Defence Staff General Jacques Dextraze, Deputy Defence Minister Sylvain Cloutier, and the chancellor. Schmidt gave Trudeau a lesson in European security, the prime minister was eager to please the Germans, and so he agreed to the purchase of the tanks. ⁴ Trudeau and his foreign policy adviser, Ivan Head, ducked the matter of tanks and increased support for NATO in their 1995 foreign policy memoir, The Canadian Way, but Roy Rempel in his analysis of post Second World War Canadian–West German relations, Counterweights, was adamant that the Germans linked trade and defence policy. ⁵ In Alliance and Illusion, Robert Bothwell made a passing reference to the purchase of the tank, and in a footnote cited a Canadian diplomat who noted that the tanks and the Third Option were linked. ⁶

The accounts vary slightly, but they all affirm that Trudeau reluctantly went along with the purchase of tanks, and by extension, stronger support for NATO, to facilitate Canada’s trade objectives and ensure good relationships with allies. Although Schmidt was the central reason for this change, the story of “no tanks, no trade” simplifies the complex evolution of Trudeau’s approach to NATO into a neat and tidy narrative. This paper uses the defence policy debate over Canadian tanks in Europe to examine why Trudeau came to support the alliance and Canada’s military after his skepticism in 1968. It is true that the economic objectives of securing trade links with Europe played a part in the decision to re-arm, but there was more. Trudeau, after discussions with Schmidt in 1975 and a broader exposure to NATO, recognized the importance of the alliance’s conventional forces, especially Canada’s modest contributions, in maintaining the balance of power in Europe and the solidarity of the alliance. Second, Schmidt was accommodating, not browbeating, and his support for Canada convinced Trudeau that the alliance was not a relic of 1950s internationalism, but could serve Canadian interests. There were other reasons for increased defence spending—namely, the efforts by officials in the Department of National Defence to inform Cabinet of the effects of inflation on the budget, but this article does not have the space to explore them here.

Canada had originally sent squadrons of aircraft and a brigade of 6,000 troops with sixty tanks to Europe in 1951. These troops, garrisoned a short distance from the Iron Curtain, bolstered Western Europe’s defences when it was still rebuilding from the war, making Canada an important military power in the alliance. But Canada’s importance diminished as the Europeans rebuilt their economies and militaries in the 1950s, and there was significant domestic criticism of NATO’s reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and Canada’s role in that strategy. Despite Lester B. Pearson’s questioning of NATO’s and Canada’s military commitments in the 1960s, there were no significant alterations to the brigade. The status quo, however, would not last under Pierre Trudeau.

The new prime minister had spoken of the need for a review of Canada’s foreign and defence policies during the election campaign in April 1968 and, after his win, instructed National Defence and External Affairs to review policy. Trudeau thought that the alliance offered few benefits for Canada and was a relic of the 1950s. It did not make sense that Canada maintained the same commitments even though Europe had fully recovered from the war. It also did not make sense that some of Canada’s best troops were not at home and could not contribute directly to the defence of Canada. In a press conference in May 1968, which disquieted both allies and External Affairs, he stated that Europe had recovered from the war and no longer needed “Canadian military ‘might’ to defend itself.” Canada’s armed forces should focus on North American defence. ⁷

Even worse, Canada’s contributions to NATO won little concrete influence with allies, especially the Europeans. Although External Affairs was adamant that Canada had influence in Europe, there were no particularly close economic or cultural relationships between the continent and Canada. To the contrary, the protectionist European Economic Community built trade walls that effectively blocked many Canadian exports, particularly agricultural products. Albert Edgar Ritchie was correct when he stated that Canada’s “affection for Europe was unrequited.” ⁸ Canada also paid the costs of stationing its troops and their families in Europe and received no money or trade preferences to offset the drain on the balance of payments. This was in contrast to the United States and United Kingdom, which threatened Germany with significant troop reductions in the 1960s if the Germans did not offset their costs. Trudeau and his foreign policy adviser, Ivan Head, later stated that the costs of keeping Canada’s forces in Europe were $120 million per year, and that “This ‘influence’ could be jeopardized… were Canada to withdraw from, or substantially diminish, its NATO role. Not surprisingly, this argument failed to impress many ministers.” ⁹

Trudeau also had grave doubts about the alliance’s strategy, Flexible Response. Since 1945, the Soviet Union had maintained sizable forces in East Germany and large reserves of troops ready to march to the Iron Curtain if war broke out. The military wisdom in the 1950s was that without massive Western rearmament, Soviet tanks would be on the shores of the English Channel within a fortnight. But NATO powers were unwilling to spend to match the Soviet Army’s strength and, in the 1950s, relied on a “tripwire” strategy, along with tactical nuclear weapons and the American strategic arsenal, to offset their numerical inferiority. This was a dangerous expedient that offered two stark choices—all-out nuclear war or surrender. NATO began moving away from the tripwire strategy in the late 1950s, and the Kennedy administration’s strategy, Flexible Response, was supposed to offer a variety of options ranging from conventional engagements to selected nuclear strikes to all-out war. The key to this strategy in Central Europe was the strengthening of NATO’s conventional forces deployed on the Iron Curtain so they could hold the line in the face of a Soviet invasion. Again, no powers were willing to pay: NATO’s strength actually diminished in the 1960s, and the United States and Britain cut troop numbers dramatically. ¹⁰ Trudeau realized the West was still faced with the problem of all-out nuclear war or surrender, and asked some senior officers, “What is the point of having large conventional forces if they are going to lose the conventional battle anyway? The alternatives seem to be not to use atomic weapons and write-off Europe to the Russians, or use atomic weapons and write-off the world.” ¹¹

The prime minister instructed the two bureaucracies of National Defence and External Affairs to plumb all options, including neutrality, and they laboured for months on a review. By March 1969, they produced justifications of the status quo. Although there were some critics of Canada’s foreign and defence policies within External Affairs, ¹² the official position of the committee tasked to write the report, the Special Task Force on Europe, was that Canadian membership in NATO was of vital importance. It meant having influence and an active relationship with some of the largest military and economic powers of Western Europe, which could be a counterweight to American influence, but this came at a price. Canada needed to commit military forces to the alliance that allies took seriously and that were based in Europe. ¹³ This boiled down to the current commitments. National Defence produced the Defence Policy Review, an exhaustive examination of the strategic and political factors of non-alignment and the status quo, as well as Canada’s military options. The Defence Policy Review cautioned against withdrawal from Europe and noted that troops deployed along the Iron Curtain bought the most influence. ¹⁴

The Cabinet Committee on External Affairs and National Defence considered these two reports throughout February and March 1969. The majority concluded that Canada should remain in NATO and make a military contribution based in Europe, although the committee could not come to a consensus on this point. ¹⁵ Trudeau, frustrated by this adherence to the status quo, turned to Ivan Head to challenge the orthodoxy of the bureaucracies. In “Canadian Defence Policy: A Study,” Head argued that Canada’s defence priorities were not in Europe, but they were the defence of the American nuclear deterrent, the reduction of the chances for an occurrence of nuclear war, and fostering economic development and peace. The military had become specialized in alliance roles and was ill suited to discharge such fundamental tasks for the government as aid to the civil power. In terms of Canada’s brigade in Europe, Head argued that Western Europe had more than enough blood and treasure to defend itself, and the alliance did not need a large contribution from Canada. He did not advocate total withdrawal, but a symbolic contribution of 1,500 to 2,000 troops equipped with light vehicles. This would give NATO allies some Canadian hostages in the unlikely case of conflict with the Soviet Union, but they would be compatible with domestic requirements. Trudeau evidently agreed with much of the paper: his copy has many notations and underlined passages that recurred in speeches or statements before and after the writing of the paper. ¹⁶

Head’s paper was distributed to Cabinet, then hastily withdrawn at the protest of the defence minister and NATO supporter Léo Cadieux. Cabinet was divided, but Trudeau was intent on a reduction of the forces in Europe at the least. He stated, “We should be protecting our internal security, defending our three seas, and then considering other possible international commitments. It was not logical or rational to protect that which was not ours.” ¹⁷ Cabinet wrestled over the size and composition of Canada’s NATO contributions in late March and early April before finally agreeing that there would be a “planned and phased reduction” of Canada’s troops in Europe, not a withdrawal. ¹⁸

This did little to mollify Cadieux’s colleagues when he announced the size and composition of the reduced Canadian force in Brussels in May. They reacted with dismay, fearing that Canada’s decision, arrived at without consultation, would provide a bad example during a difficult time for the alliance. ¹⁹ During the 1970s, all member nations were under pressure to reduce defence budgets in favour of social spending, and there were strong currents of anti-war sentiment occasioned by the war in Vietnam. Henry Kissinger, in his White House Years, recalled the debates over “burden-sharing” and European fears of American troop reductions, coupled with American resentment at Europe’s unwillingness to do more. ²⁰ The Germans were particularly worried about the withdrawal of allied forces, given that they were on the central fault-line of the Cold War and had the most to lose from the weakening of NATO.

It took the rest of the summer of 1969 to finalize the timing and details of this reduction with the military and Canada’s allies, but by Labour Day, September 1969, the plans were clear. Canada would reduce the size of its brigade from 6,000 to 3,000 troops and, once the money became available in 1972 or 1973, replace its heavy Centurion tanks with a lighter vehicle that could easily be transported in the air force’s fleet of transport aircraft. The watchword was compatibility—Canada’s troops abroad and its troops at home would use the same equipment, dictated by domestic requirements. Although Canada would continue to contribute to European defence, it would be on its own terms.

Trudeau and the rest of Cabinet had less interest in foreign and defence policy after the reviews of 1968 and 1969, but the army was restless. It regarded a tank like the Centurion as a critical part of a modern army, and that capability, once lost, would take years to recover. The army also argued that Canadian troops in Europe required a heavy tank to challenge the Soviet Union’s numerous forces deployed in Central Europe. Trudeau and the defence minister appointed in late 1970, Donald Macdonald, had suspected that the army would drag its feet in retiring the Centurion, so the 1971 Defence White Paper made an explicit point of stating that it would be retired and replaced with a lighter vehicle in the interests of compatibility. ²¹

Allies questioned this decision, especially given the Soviet Union’s conventional buildup in Europe in the 1970s. Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Andrew Goodpaster pressed the government to reverse the decision on tanks. He drew on NATO’s report “Alliance Defence Problems for the 1970s,” which noted the Warsaw Pact’s three to one numerical superiority in tanks, and improving quality. ²² He discussed the replacement of the Centurion with the Canadian liaison officer at NATO, and told him he wanted tanks. ²³ Goodpaster also sent comments to Ottawa asking for a “fresh review” of policy. Chief of the Defence Staff Frederick Sharp responded that “the question of armour capability… is a long standing and irreversible decision of the Canadian government associated with the firm decision that Canadian land forces based in Europe should be compatible with those based in Canada.” ²⁴

The German and US senior political leadership also tested the waters. Helmut Schmidt, West German defence minister from 1969 to 1972, spoke with Donald Macdonald about tanks and made no headway ²⁵ and tried, unsuccessfully, to speak with Trudeau. Despite being rebuffed, Schmidt had a “soft spot in his heart for Canada.” ²⁶ He suggested that West German troops should train there in 1971. This was in part because there was limited space available for large-scale training in Germany, but there were political motives as well. A memo to Mitchell Sharp on the plan noted that “He [Schmidt] wished to help the Canadian public understand Germany’s role in Europe and NATO and to help the German public in turn understand Canada’s approach to foreign policy and defence issues. He was concerned that NATO might become bi-polarized by its stress on European–USA relationships and its primary concern for European security.” ²⁷

German troops began training in Manitoba shortly thereafter, a relationship which continued to the 1990s. Schmidt also directed that the West German Ministry of Defence should consider purchasing more products from Canadian companies to offset Canada’s costs of stationing troops in Europe. ²⁸

James Schlesinger, US secretary of defense from 1973 to 1975, wanted to bolster NATO’s conventional capabilities and increase defence spending across the alliance in the mid-1970s. In a December 1973 meeting with Henry Kissinger, he criticized Canada for “doing nothing” and said he wanted the Canadians to put the full brigade back in NATO. Kissinger replied, “They’ll never do it” but Schlesinger could “take a run at the brigade.” ²⁹ He gently suggested an enhanced contribution the next day, but to little effect. ³⁰

While these discussions continued, the army planned to buy a light British reconnaissance vehicle called the Scorpion to replace the Centurion, and it was close to a contract until General Jacques Dextraze was appointed chief of the defence staff in late 1972. He delayed the Scorpion deal and with the new defence minister, James Richardson, submitted a memorandum to Cabinet in January 1973 that recommended a delay in replacing the Centurion, effectively challenging the White Paper. Donald Macdonald stymied him in Cabinet, but Richardson submitted a similar memorandum a few months later. Trudeau dominated the meeting, intent on making his point absolutely clear. He pointed out that the paper was not in accordance with Defence in the 70s and stated that, “The government had decided on a configuration for its land forces in Europe. It did not intend to change that decision. If the configuration was not acceptable to Canada’s NATO partners or if the Canadian Forces could not play a worthwhile role within that configuration, withdrawal of the forces from Europe would become necessary.” He was willing to delay the replacement of the Centurion tank “as long as the Cabinet Record of Decision re-affirmed in explicit terms the 1971 policy decision and leave no doubt that this decision was not open for re-consideration.” Richardson stated that it was neither his nor the general’s intention to question policy. ³¹

By 1973, the replacement of a few dozen Centurion tanks with a light vehicle had become more than a simple military question that should have been dismissed in a quick Cabinet session. It was one of the central results of the 1968–1969 defence policy review and a tangible assertion of Canadian national interests. It also had become a symbol of the civilian control of defence policy. A common critique of Trudeau was that he had only sporadic interest in defence matters, but his interest in this file was consistent.

The year 1974 would lay the foundations for a change. The Yom Kippur War in October 1973 triggered a worldwide economic slowdown that finally ended the postwar economic boom, but inflation remained high. “Stagflation” devastated the defence budget and threatened the military with massive personnel reductions. So began the Defence Structure Review, an intensive analysis of the armed force’s tasks and capabilities. Canadian diplomats would also begin serious attempts to implement the “Third Option.” In the wake of American efforts to reduce the drain on its balance of payments and resolve other economic problems in 1971, Canadian economists and diplomats became even more worried about dependence on the US. In a special issue of External Affairs’ in-house publication International Perspectives the foreign minister, Mitchell Sharp, laid out the options. Canada could continue in the present relationship, move to closer integration with the US, or pursue a policy to reduce Canada’s dependence on the US. This third option did not mean anti-Americanism, but diversification. ³² Western Europe was an obvious candidate, and the support of its most dynamic economy, West Germany, would be central to these efforts. Luckily, Helmut Schmidt was the chancellor.

Trudeau and Schmidt first met in March 1975, while Trudeau was trying to build support for Canada’s contractual link with the European Economic Community. A briefing note for the prime minister highlighted Schmidt’s interest in Canada and the importance that West Germany placed on defence cooperation. ³³ They quickly became friends and External Affairs noted with some satisfaction that the prime minister had a very successful visit. In a two-hour discussion, Trudeau affirmed Canada’s commitment to the alliance, which pleased Schmidt. The chancellor was also happy that his efforts to improve the bilateral defence relationship between the two countries in the early 1970s were effective. Trudeau explained that he saw the “sought-after contractual link with EC (European Community) as complementary to our membership in NATO.” ³⁴ The German records describe this statement in similar terms, and say that Trudeau recognized that the economic field and the military commitment in Europe were complementary. ³⁵ The two leaders also discussed Canada’s NATO contribution. In The Canadian Way, Trudeau and Head recounted that Schmidt made the following point:

“A German farmer is not able to detect the identity of NATO aircraft flying overhead as their contrails stream behind them. Besides, he knows that those airplanes can flee westward as quickly as they can fly eastward. He recognizes the maple leaf on tanks and infantry vehicles, however, and knows that there is no escape for them in the event of war. These units are reassuring and important, whether or not there is a persuasive military role for them.” This kind of straight talk, intellectually and politically credible, was wholly attractive to Trudeau.

They later noted that Schmidt was fearful that allied forces would leave Germany, which would be of profound psychological significance. ³⁶ Canadian troops on the Iron Curtain with tanks demonstrated the alliance’s solidarity and cohesion in a way that perhaps more valuable naval, air, or light ground forces could not match.

A few weeks later, in April 1975, Cabinet discussed the Defence Structure Review. One item on the agenda was the equipment of Canada’s forces in Europe. The memorandum argued strongly that the policy to field light tanks in Europe was flawed and that a tank like the Centurion was still needed. ³⁷ The discussion of this memo in Cabinet was vague, but Trudeau affirmed that one of the crucial elements in the report was linking Canada’s force contribution in Europe to social, political, and economic developments on the continent. This was a thinly veiled reference to the Third Option, as well as to ongoing negotiations to reduce tensions in Europe, particularly the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Trudeau was keenly interested in the type of war that might arise in Central Europe, and the role that Canada might play in it. ³⁸

The prime minister travelled again to Europe in May 1975 for a NATO heads of government meeting in Brussels. Trudeau was delighted by the summit and suggested more frequent meetings for NATO leaders, which surprised Canada’s allies who were accustomed to his lack of enthusiasm. During a meeting of NATO’s Defence Planning Committee, James Richardson spoke about Canada’s defence review. James Schlesinger pointedly stated that NATO could not suffer any reductions, especially of Canadian tanks, and it would be a mistake to eliminate them. ³⁹ A week later on the 30 May, Trudeau told US president Gerald Ford that Schlesinger “took us on” at the meeting and assured the president that Canada would stay in Europe. ⁴⁰ Trudeau was still unconvinced about keeping tanks, however.

That same day, Schmidt took another opportunity to talk to Trudeau. He said he was concerned that the Defence Structure Review would lead to withdrawal of Canada’s tanks. The diplomatic cable noted that “He [Schmidt] wanted to point out that it was military view and his own view that tanks were essential for an effective Canadian presence in Germany.” Trudeau responded that Canada could not do everything and needed to establish priorities. The review was not intended to reduce the military contribution, but to make the most effective use of limited resources. Of course, Canada would consider strategic imperatives, military requirements, and the views of allies. Schmidt repeated that to have an effective presence in Europe Canada needed tanks. Trudeau asked what he thought of light mobile troop carriers to which Schmidt responded that they would be useless against Soviet forces and would not have the same psychological weight as tanks. He proposed that representatives from West Germany and Canada meet to study the problem of Canadian forces in Europe. Trudeau agreed to this proposal and announced it in a press conference at the end of the summit. ⁴¹ Gordon Crean, Canadian ambassador to West Germany, referred to the discussion as “intimate.” ⁴² Later on the 30th, Trudeau delivered a speech in which he reassured allies that Canada was committed to collective security and the alliance, and that it would “maintain a NATO force level which is accepted by our allies as being adequate in size and effective in character.” ⁴³ This was not stirring rhetoric, but allies were surprised and heartened by this formulation, and repeatedly referenced it in discussions over the summer.

German and American military staffs consulted with the Canadians, and they both pressed Canada to keep tanks. The message sent home was that “In last analysis any option that involved retention of tanks by Canadian forces in Europe would be acceptable to Germans.” ⁴⁴ The German defence minister, Georg Leber, also visited Canada and told Foreign Minister Allan MacEachen, James Richardson, and Trudeau that Canada should retain properly equipped troops in Germany. This was code for tanks, but the Canadians were cagey and did not make a commitment. ⁴⁵ In mid-July, Crean paid a farewell call to Schmidt. When the chancellor inquired if Donald Macdonald was still opposed to tanks, Crean surmised that Schmidt was trying to ferret out the source of opposition to new tanks. In a message sent directly to Trudeau, Crean concluded that “I summed up by saying that I was satisfied that if [the] Prime Minister was convinced that Canadian forces in Europe should remain with a mixed configuration, including a tank element which Mr. Leber had pleaded for, then those forces would indeed remain in that form.” ⁴⁶

The culminating meeting was between Schmidt and Trudeau in late July, in Helsinki. Trudeau was attending the signing ceremony of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and he and Schmidt met for breakfast on 31 July at the German embassy. Trudeau began by thanking Schmidt for supporting Canada’s attempts to forge trade links with the European Economic Community, to which Schmidt replied, “We have to.” The chancellor quickly asked how the Defence Structure Review was progressing. Trudeau reviewed the consultations and stated that he expected a resolution by September, but he did not want to pre-judge a decision on tanks. He stated that, “because our allies considered them so important he thought we would probably keep them. It did not make much sense in terms of Canada’s overall defence posture but we must take our allies’ views into account.”

Trudeau also said that, “he wished he could find answers to the questions about the sort of war we should expect. Would it be quick? Perhaps there were no answers.” He asked for Schmidt’s appraisal, but “he could in any case assure the Chancellor that his point about the importance of tanks in Central Europe had been taken aboard.” Schmidt and Trudeau discussed the different scenarios and responses, and the prime minister questioned Schmidt on the use of tactical nuclear weapons and the efficacy of conventional forces. The chancellor emphasized that he would never allow the use of nuclear weapons in Germany, but they were useful because the Soviets thought that NATO would use them. Schmidt summed up his thinking “in a nutshell”: “We needed nuclear weapons to deter the Russians from aggression or adventure but we needed conventional forces to actually stop the enemy if he tried to advance.” This seemed to satisfy Trudeau, who stated “that Canadian participation in NATO was predicated on what our allies wanted us to do. Our choice regarding the structure of our forces would therefore be essentially political, tailored to accommodate within our budget the most efficient forces and equipment required to do the job.” Schmidt stressed the “psycho-political element” of Canada’s participation in the alliance and of NATO itself: “In the Chancellor’s view the Canadian presence in Europe was primarily of political importance and the effectiveness of NATO was primarily political rather than military.” In the German records of the discussion, Schmidt highlighted that, without Canadian troops on the continent, Canada could not have been in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Trudeau stated that this was a strong argument for Canada’s participation in NATO. Schmidt also said that, “they [the West Germans] welcomed the Canadian presence in Lahr because they wanted to show the Russians and others that the NATO forces in Germany were not all German or American.”

Schmidt asked if there was any opposition to maintaining Canadian tanks in Germany, but did not press Trudeau. The prime minister stated that there was no question of reducing the presence in Germany, and that he did not think Canada would change its composition in view of the German and American opinion on the matter. He added that the NATO contribution was good politics in Canada and “made the Canadian military feel they were performing a useful role.” Schmidt concluded by stating that if Canada ever felt it had to reduce its tanks, it must do so under the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions formula; otherwise it would be seen as a unilateral move. The German notes record that he particularly underlined the letters M (mutual) and B (balanced). They then discussed other topics, such as nuclear non-proliferation, and Trudeau extended an open invitation for Schmidt to visit Canada, which occurred in 1976. ⁴⁷

In September, Schlesinger went to Ottawa to once again make the case for tanks and increased Canadian defence spending. His emphasis on the military necessity of tanks had less traction than Schmidt’s emphasis on their political value. ⁴⁸ By the winter, the final decision on tanks was nearing, and Ivan Head, an ardent opponent of tanks, came around to Schmidt’s position. In November, he analyzed the progress of the Defence Structure Review and justified keeping tanks. He noted that the Western Europeans valued Canadian tanks and that Canada’s contribution to European defence was political resolve, not actual military weight. Canada did not need to alter its preference for the compatibility of its army units, but could agree with allies that tanks were the proper expression of that political resolve. The plan to replace the Centurion with a light tank made military sense for Canada, but allies had not accepted it. Head noted that, “In the result, a political decision is now required: whether to accept the views of those allies that the presence on German soil of Canadian tanks represents important evidence of the cohesiveness of the alliance—the political ‘resolve’—to be seen by German peasants and Warsaw Pact observers alike.” ⁴⁹ Donald Macdonald, now the finance minister, opposed the tank purchase, but Cabinet approved the purchase of new tanks in November, and the next year, Canada signed a contract to buy 128 Leopard 1 Main Battle Tanks from the German company Krauss-Maffei.

Schmidt visited Canada just after Cabinet approved the purchase of the tanks. At a dinner, Trudeau asked Schmidt if he was concerned about the USSR’s growing military power. Schmidt thought that Europe was stable and there would be no trouble. The notes of their supper conversation record that, “To this, the Prime Minister asked, half jokingly, why if such were the case the Chancellor had attached so much importance to Canada’s re-equipping its forces in Europe with the new tanks. The Chancellor replied that the important thing was for NATO to maintain the balance of power in Europe. As long as it did so, the situation there would remain stabilized.” ⁵⁰

Schmidt’s efforts were the major reason why Trudeau changed his mind, but some other prominent figures have claimed credit. Schlesinger pressed the Canadians to keep tanks in a characteristically blunt and heavy-handed fashion, but Trudeau was noticeably cool toward his entreaties. Tanks were also a low priority for most Americans—a far more important bilateral concern was the purchase of the Long Range Patrol Aircraft. ⁵¹ General Dextraze pressed Trudeau to buy new tanks, and he made it clear to every soldier and bureaucrat in National Defence that a new tank was a priority, but he could not have convinced Trudeau to buy tanks on his own. Cabinet and the prime minister had rejected his attempts in 1973, and the army had little bargaining power.

Economic motives were a reason for the turn back to NATO, but they were not the only one. One of the central reasons was Trudeau’s acceptance of the alliance’s role in maintaining the balance of power between East and West. Thomas Axworthy, a policy advisor to Trudeau from 1975 to 1981, and then principal secretary until 1984, and also a friend of Schmidt, shed some light on this evolution. He commented that Schmidt’s emphasis on NATO’s role in balancing relations between East and West likely had traction given Trudeau’s dislike for monopolies of power or ideas and desire for effective balances and countervails. ⁵²

In 1975, Trudeau was unsure of how the West should respond to the growing military might of the USSR. Schmidt emphasized that a balance of power, both nuclear and conventional, would prevent war, and other Canadian officials used similar reasoning. ⁵³ The six-year debate over the equipment of Canada’s troops in Europe served as an education in international relations for Trudeau. He came into office skeptical of NATO and convinced that it had distorted Canadian defence policy, but came to see NATO’s role in maintaining stability in Europe and the political importance of Canadian troops. This does not mean that Trudeau accepted NATO’s strategy of Flexible Response wholesale, and it is likely that he remained skeptical of its military plans. But it was an effective political strategy that held the alliance together and reduced the possibility that any distortions in the military balance might prompt a reckless mistake. Canada’s contribution was small, but it reinforced alliance cohesion and solidarity.

The balance of power, however, did not absolve NATO of the responsibility to reduce tensions with the Eastern Bloc. In 1967, in Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel’s “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance,” the alliance made détente, along with continued deterrence, the two pillars of NATO. Trudeau evidently was unaware of or ignored this commitment in the late 1960s, but there were a number of important initiatives in the 1970s. The alliance led the efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union through the ill-fated Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks and the more successful Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Axworthy commented that this also likely made the alliance much more appealing to Trudeau in 1975. ⁵⁴ A speech at a NATO summit in Washington in May 1978 illustrates the development of the prime minister’s views. He stated that “The Soviets’ assurance of complete security cannot be bought at the cost of our incapacity to protect ourselves… In seeking to improve the reality of our security we must maintain the balance of deterrent strength. But our security problem will not be solved simply by the reactive policy of trying to match the military capacity of the potential adversary. We must also pursue with vigour, at every opportunity and along every avenue open to us, the goals of a meaningful policy of détente and of a genuine reduction in our mutual capacity to wage war.” ⁵⁵

The second reason for the turn back to NATO was Schmidt’s accommodating approach. There is the persistent rumour that he lectured Trudeau and told him bluntly in one of their 1975 meetings, “no tanks, no trade.” There is no reference to any such pressure in the Canadian or German archival record, but it is not surprising that such an exchange would have been omitted from official dispatches. The most authoritative statement comes from John Halstead, Canada’s ambassador to West Germany from 1975 to 1980, and present at many of Schmidt and Trudeau’s meetings. He stated definitively that there were no bald-faced statements by European leaders linking the Third Option to Canada’s contributions to NATO, but that it was an “unstated assumption in the background.” ⁵⁶

Halstead was certainly right, but his statement obscures Schmidt’s accommodating and generous approach. His appeal for tanks was based on attempts to foster ties with Canada from his time as German defence minister in the early 1970s, when he arranged for German troops to train in Canada and directed the German Ministry of Defence to consider buying more materiel from Canadian companies. He was conciliatory when military relations between Canada and its allies were at their lowest ebb in the Cold War, and he supported Canada’s efforts to implement the Third Option in the summer of 1975, well before the government’s final decision on tanks. Schmidt’s support, combined with American pressure, was also essential to Canada’s inclusion in the “Group of Six” in 1976 against the opposition of French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.

The defence of Western Europe during the Cold War was a worthwhile goal no doubt, but Schmidt took concrete steps to show that NATO could indeed be the entry to Western Europe that many Canadians hoped it would be. The chancellor wanted Canadian tanks in Europe, but was willing to offer considerable West German support for Canada’s initiatives in return. External Affairs could point to no such efforts in 1968 or 1969, and it is no surprise that Trudeau and other Cabinet members were unsatisfied by their justification of NATO. In the mid-1970s, Schmidt showed Trudeau that the alliance could effectively serve Canadian interests, and that it was worth it to be part of the NATO club. If the club dues were tanks, then so be it.

Trudeau’s record on the defence file has been unfairly criticized. John English, in his 2009 biography of Trudeau, Just Watch Me, included a short rejoinder to the critics of Trudeau’s defence policy, ⁵⁷ and some studies have highlighted Trudeau’s increases in defence spending, ⁵⁸ but the perception remains that the entire Trudeau era was a “long dark night of the spirit.” ⁵⁹ Trudeau was right to question Canada’s relationship with NATO, especially its European members, and his doubts about NATO’s strategy were well founded. However, he overestimated Canada’s freedom for change in a rigid strategic context, and underestimated the political value of Canada’s contributions. Once he realized these constraints, he tried to turn them to Canada’s advantage and began the wholesale re-equipment of the Canadian military. At the core of this change was an acceptance of the political value of Canada’s contribution to the balance of power and Schmidt’s successful efforts in bringing Canada back into the NATO fold.