The Price of Alliance: The Politics and Procurement of Leopard Tanks for Canada’s NATO Brigade by Frank Maas

Reviewed by: Susan Colbourn (susan.colbourn@yale.edu), Yale University, New Haven, United States of America

In 1970, Pierre Trudeau announced plans to halve Canada’s brigade in Western Europe and to replace the aging Centurion tanks with new light vehicles. The 1971 Defence White Paper reaffirmed the decision to move toward a light vehicle, one which Trudeau continued to support despite pushback from the Canadian Forces. By 1976, however, the Trudeau government had agreed to purchase 128 Leopard 1 tanks from the Federal Republic of Germany. Why did the Trudeau government’s position change? What made Pierre Trudeau change his mind?

Frank Maas’ The Price of Alliance: The Politics and Procurement of Leopard Tanks for Canada’s NATO Brigade explores these questions, making a valuable and much-needed contribution to the literature on Canadian foreign and defence policy during the Trudeau years. Little recent work has tackled these issues. Maas rightly points to Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein’s Pirouette (1990) and Roy Rempel’s Counterweights (1996) as the last authoritative studies, but over two decades have passed since their publication. ²

Maas illustrates how and why the Trudeau government ultimately agreed to purchase the Leopard, arguing that Canada’s allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “became the most important group determining the character and composition of Canada’s ground forces in Europe” (5). In particular, Maas points to the role of West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt in influencing Trudeau’s thinking. Schmidt emphasized the symbolic importance of Canadian tanks: they were a tangible sign of the country’s commitment to the defence of Europe. Light vehicles, Schmidt argued, “would be useless against Soviet tanks and would not have the same psychological weight as tanks” (95). Moreover, the presence of Canadian troops on the continent made it possible for Canada to participate in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. Schmidt invoked the latter to dissuade Trudeau from unilateral cuts; any reduction of Canadian tanks should be done under the auspices of MBFR or risk upsetting the balance of power in Europe. Here, particularly given the arguments made by many Western Europeans in the early 1990s, some greater detail from Maas about the links between Canada’s contributions and those of the United States would be of interest.

The Price of Alliance revisits conventional wisdom about the decision to procure the Leopard tanks, particularly the notion of a direct “no tanks, no trade” connection between the Leopard acquisition and the contractual link between Canada and the European Economic Community (EEC). Maas comes to a more nuanced conclusion, noting that there is no explicit link between trade and tanks found in the archival record. The relationship between the two, Maas concludes, was implicit.

Canada’s NATO allies, particularly the West Germans, were not the only ones who favoured the tank over a light vehicle. As Maas clearly demonstrates, there was a long-simmering debate within the Canadian government over whether to keep tanks stationed in Europe. Maas identifies a division between what he terms “civilian traditionalists” and “civilian revisionists.” The former group was made up of cabinet ministers who supported NATO and, by extension, a continued tank presence on the European continent. These traditionalists included prime minister Lester Pearson, Pearson’s foreign minister Paul Martin Senior, and members of the Trudeau cabinet, including secretary of state for external affairs Mitchell Sharp and minister of national defence Léo Cadieux. So long as the traditionalists held power during the Pearson government, there were few direct challenges to the Canadian tank commitment in Europe. With Trudeau’s election in 1968, the revisionists’ position improved substantially.

These revisionists, including Trudeau himself, held views at odds with Canada’s allies in NATO, the Department of External Affairs, and the traditionalists. The Canadian Forces, too, tended to favour a continued tank presence in Europe, seeing the brigade as “a critical step in the professional development of its soldiers” (3). Within the Department of National Defence, however, Maas draws attention to the role played by individuals. General Jean Victor Allard, who served as chief of the defence staff between 1966 and 1969, lobbied for the army to adopt a lighter posture—one without tanks. After becoming chief of the defence staff in 1972, General Jacques Dextraze pushed to keep the tanks. Dextraze cancelled trainings on the Scorpion—the most likely replacement for the Centurion—and actively worked to overturn earlier policy decisions.

Maas considers the Leopard acquisition from a variety of angles, linking the politics of procurement to larger questions about Canada’s defence priorities, the country’s relations with its transatlantic partners, budgetary limitations, and civil–military issues. The Price of Alliance presents a much more nuanced and detailed picture of the Leopard acquisition as a result, one made all the richer thanks to Maas’ own personal familiarity with the industry itself (Maas’ parents owned and operated a company painting parts for armoured vehicles.)

Throughout, Maas situates the Canadian story within the broader international landscape. He rightly points to the influence of changing strategic thinking within NATO and the impact of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. He alludes to the importance of ongoing East–West negotiations, such as the MBFR talks, though the overall climate of détente receives minimal focus. Given that Canadian debates over a continued tank presence in Europe coincided with some of the greatest improvements in the Cold War climate, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw, one wonders how these improvements shaped (or not) Canadian thinking on the future of the brigade.

The Price of Alliance is well-researched and accessible, illustrating how both domestic and international factors shaped Canadian debates over the country’s tank presence in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s. It is a welcome addition to the literature and is sure to be the go-to source on this issue.