Abstract
Three profound shifts are coming to a head in the twenty-first century: shifts in the global order, shifts in the US–China relationship, and shifts in Chinese behaviour. These shifts are compelling Canada to reframe its relations with China. First, at the global level, the changing balance of power is leading us toward an era of polycentric global governance. Second, there is deepening antagonism in US–China relations. Third, China’s international posture has become more assertive. Canada has yet to adjust, but it is well placed to develop a global worldview in sync with twenty-first century realities. The Canada–China relationship needs to be transformed into an adaptive, modular, and strategic relationship, in our dealings with China at the global level, in triangulating our relationships with the US and China, and within the confines of our bilateral relationship. This paper tackles each area in turn.
Since the middle of the twentieth century, Canada has operated under the twin advantages of an international balance of power dominated by our neighbour and closest partner, as well as a global order in large part constituted of values and principles close to our own, in which we have exerted a sizable influence. In the twenty-first century, however, three profound shifts are coming to a head: shifts in the balance of power and global order, shifts in the US–China relationship, and shifts in Chinese behaviour. These shifts are compelling Canada to reframe its approach to foreign policy more generally, and in particular its relations with China. 1
First, at the global level, the rise of China and other emerging economies is changing the configurations of power underpinning much of the global order. The absence of any one dominant power across all areas of global affairs means that we are entering an era of polycentric global governance, where imperfectly delineated areas of the global order respond to their own sets of dynamics and are home to distinct interest coalitions. Second, the end of the Obama presidency brought with it a hardening of positions toward China in the United States, of which President Trump’s approach to China is but an expression. There is deepening antagonism in US–China relations across partisan lines, even if a variety of outcomes remain possible. Third, China’s posture has become more assertive internationally, and it is set to play a determining, albeit variable, role in almost all global issues—sometimes aligned with Canadian interests, sometimes not.
Canada has yet to adjust to these changing geopolitical realities, but it is well placed to develop an innovative and sophisticated global worldview in sync with twenty-first century realities. As a result of these deep transformations, and in order to develop an adaptive, modular, yet strategic approach to China, Canadian foreign policy needs to go beyond customary binary normative assessments at these three levels: beyond a diagnosis of the global order as liberal or illiberal; beyond a conception of international partnerships as like-minded or non-like-minded; and beyond binary evaluations of Chinese behaviour as good or bad.
Shifts in the global order
The global balance of power is shifting, and the US-led global order is being contested. We are in a period of transition to a post-hegemonic, polycentric world. In this scenario, different, not neatly delineated areas of the global order—in terms of geographies, stakeholders, and issue-areas—will increasingly respond to their own sets of multilevel dynamics. China (and other dominant powers) will play a wide range of roles across global issues, at times obstructionist or disruptive, at times innovating or asking for reform, and at times supportive of existing institutions.
The dominant narrative in North America is that China is threatening the Global Liberal Order (commonly conceptualised as consisting of international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Trade Organisation [WTO], open markets, and liberal values such as sovereignty and democracy). Woven from a US perspective, this narrative at times conflates normative and power considerations, global public goods, and American interests.
Seen from the rest of the world, the narrative is more nuanced. A variety of scholars, both within and outside the US, have argued that American debates about the preservation of the Global Liberal Order too often exclude global power relations. 2 Others have pointed to the existence of a variety of global orders, rather than one. 3 If we accept that the shifting balance of power will lead to change in global institutions, a more nuanced assessment of existing global institutions and their histories and embedded power relations is a necessary step in going beyond all-or-nothing perspectives on reforming global institutions.
There is a divergence of diagnostics on the key challenges facing the global order and on the ways forward—notably, but not exclusively, between developing and developed countries. Responding to this discomfort, Joseph Nye recently suggested that it would be “wise to discard the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘American’ and refer instead to the prospects of an ‘open international and rules-based international order.’” 4
At the global level, many have argued that President Trump has irremediably damaged multilateralism. The US president has indeed damaged global trust in American support for multilateral endeavours, but multilateralism may well survive the Trump presidency. In the end, there could be one silver lining to the current US president’s disruptive behaviour: it has at once created momentum for the overdue reform of international institutions, and put China in a position where it may be more willing to compromise on certain key issues.
Implications for Canada–China relations
The current dominant narrative depicting China as a threat to the global order creates a hunkering-down mentality, and is not conducive to seeing the global order’s limitations and need for reform, or to engaging system outsiders in a constructive way.
Canada needs to adjust to a twenty-first century state of affairs and learn quickly how to operate and wield maximum influence in this newly configured global arena. For this, one must go beyond binary analyses of the global order as liberal or illiberal and recognize that frustrations concerning the status quo globally come from a wide variety of backgrounds. A return to a pre-2008 Global Financial Crisis US-led global order is no longer feasible, and cannot be a workable goal.
A more productive way to approach challenges in global governance would be to conceptualize the global order into three components toward which Canada can develop distinct engagement approaches. First, there are components of the global order that need reform. Canada can be honest and open-minded about this, and work with emerging economies including China on reforming existing international organizations. We are better placed than the US to engage on this front. For instance, we can agree with developing countries that the tradition of US-nominated World Bank presidents and EU-nominated IMF presidents may need to give way to a more inclusive model.
Second, there are components of the global order that are in Canada’s interest to preserve and that Canada can choose to continue to defend. Against the backdrop of the rise of various challenges to sociopolitical principles of democracy, individual rights, and freedoms and inclusivity—in the form of the rise of populism, authoritarian models of governance, rising sentiments of exclusion, and democratic setbacks—it can be the legitimate aspiration of Canadian foreign policy to advocate for the advancement of these principles, at the same time as working to strengthen their foundation at home. Here, Canada can be insistent, while being attuned to the difference between arguments based on self-interest and those based on “the common good.”
Third, there are components of the global order that need to be created. Here, Canada can be innovative and contribute to deliberations on the future of global governance (e.g. governance of the Internet, data, 5 artificial intelligence, 5G, fresh water resources management, migration, refugee education, 6 the Arctic, et cetera).
In each of these categories, there will be some instances where Canada can work with China, and other instances where Canada can build different coalitions. Canadian foreign policy has to be nimbler; it must accept that there is no permanent coalition of “like-mindeds” across all issue-areas, and it must work outside of comfortable arenas, at different levels of government and with civil society. At the global level, different issue-areas will require different kinds of partnerships. Canada can be aligned with most Chinese stakeholders in the fight against climate change, aligned with some Chinese stakeholders on the reform of the WTO and the defence of multilateralism, and not aligned with many Chinese stakeholders on the governance of the Internet.
This means that Canada must transform its approach to China into an adaptive, modular relationship, one that modifies character and tone across different issue-areas, but which rests on a strategic vision. This does not mean a transactional, or ad hoc, foreign policy. It is strategic and deeply principled to work closely with China on climate change. Deciding to work on climate change is the primary decision, as it were, and the need to work with China follows from it. Working to revitalize multilateralism is also a primary policy choice, and can lead to Canadian policy partly aligning with the US and partly aligning with China, in different ways. Temporarily bypassing American (or Chinese) partners (such as in 2018–2019 meetings on WTO reform), 7 should only be done when absolutely necessary, and with the aim of bringing both in at a later stage (as should be the case for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership [CPTPP]).
Canadian convening capacity, soft power, and partnership networks should be harnessed toward the reform of international organizations and toward engaging with China to elicit support for these reforms, while at the same time encouraging necessary compromises. If momentum is preserved, enough progress can be made to prepare the ground for Chinese- and American-supported reforms to be pushed through when the right conditions are present.
Shifts in US–China relations
Across the developed world, most notably in the US, we have seen a serious hardening of views toward China based on an emerging consensus that the longstanding engagement policy, predicated on the gradual liberalization of the Chinese polity, economy, and society, has failed. This is accompanied by a return to economic nationalism.
Of note, Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, former senior Obama administration advisors, 8 argue: “[T]he record is increasingly clear that Washington once again put too much faith in its power to shape China’s trajectory. All sides of the policy debate erred: free traders and financiers who foresaw inevitable and increasing openness in China, integrationists who argued that Beijing’s ambitions would be tamed by greater interaction with the international community, and hawks who believed that China’s power would be abated by perpetual American primacy.” 9 See Alastair Iain Johnston for a powerful rebuttal. 10
As a result of this shift, mainstream positions on US–China have narrowed and shifted significantly, and now range from “smart competition” at the engagement end, 11 to discussions of “containment” and “conflict,” which have become commonplace. Phrases such as “strategic rivalry” and “decoupling” have become middle of the road.
The current president may exhibit idiosyncratic behaviour: the administration irritates and challenges traditional allies, and fosters uncertainty (making China less likely to agree to structural compromises). Its means are poorly selected (tariffs) and its endgame is uncertain, but the current US administration’s approach to China is buoyed by deep bipartisan support. We have passed a threshold: no matter the outcome of the next US presidential elections, the future has been qualitatively altered. A measure of decoupling is currently taking place, but what remains to be seen is the shape and breadth of decoupling tendencies. Yet, the future is not predetermined, and a variety of scenarios remain possible at this point. A key risk lies in self-fulfilling prophecies.
This deepening concern is finding some echo in Canada following the Meng Wanzhou affair. US government pressures on Canadian China policy began with the inclusion of section 32.10 in the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), and continue now over the question of Huawei in 5G. 12 A key question for Canadian foreign policy going forward will be how to carve out room for manoeuvre, given the triangular nature of the US–China–Canada relationship.
Implications for Canada–China relations
Given deepening US–China antagonism, there is a danger that Canada will be siphoned into a higher-level, sharp conflict of hearts and minds against China, which would not serve Canadian interests. Parallels with the Cold War are not helpful, given the deep entanglement of US and Chinese economies, finance, and people. But considering the shifting geopolitical environment and the disintegration of China engagement rationales south of the border, the foundations of a sustainable China policy have to be reassessed for Canada.
Engagement rationales need not be predicated on a likeability heuristic or on rapid socioeconomic and political liberalization. They have routinely exaggerated developed countries’ capacity to influence Chinese domestic politics, and underestimated the extent to which China has contributed to, as well as been profoundly shaped by, globalization. A China policy can be interest based as well as aspirational, and need not depend on China becoming a liberal democracy, even as it seeks to empower progressive forces in China.
Nuance, precision, and clarity have become ever more important, given the narrower room for manoeuvre resulting from the deepening China–US rivalry. Gone are the days when one could talk loosely of engaging or disengaging from China. There is now a prerogative to explain when, in which areas, how, and why.
Canada managed to negotiate room for manoeuvre in times of non-alignment with US preferences in the past. Canadian policymakers should draw from these experiences and work to actively create and utilize space for Canadian foreign policy independence on China, wherever possible. Room for manoeuvre can be created by fragmenting sensitive decisions into smaller, more manageable parts, fostering a nuanced discussion on China with the Canadian public; as well as by working with American and other stakeholders on certain difficulties with China (such as on commercial espionage or market access); and working with Chinese and other stakeholders on certain difficulties with the US (such as on climate change or multilateralism).
On 5G and beyond, the negative and positive security implications of profound technological decoupling need to be carefully weighed. 13 Careful, fragmented, interest-based, and periodically reviewed Canadian policy responses to this rapidly evolving environment need to be crafted. In other words, we need multiple policy decisions over time, not one. New technologies are forcing us to reinterpret notions of the Canadian interest and how to protect Canadian institutions, from the security of communications all the way to freedom of speech on social media. The room for manoeuvre and breadth of access for Huawei and other foreign firms need to be carefully assessed and reassessed on an ongoing basis. Implications for Canadian participation in the Five Eyes network (US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) need to be considered. Core areas of telecommunications infrastructure and Canadian government contracts are already off-limits to Huawei as per current regulations, but the particularity of 5G technologies require rethinking those. On the other hand, profound decoupling and the creation of bifurcated telecommunications spheres would also increase security vulnerabilities. As senior Google executives recently argued, tens of millions of Huawei phone users outside of China, including in the US, would become more vulnerable in a decoupled world. 14 The very dynamics associated with decoupling, such as the deep hostility and reduced interdependence it fosters, run the risk of fuelling a security dilemma worsening both sides’ security. Managed entanglement or managed zones of independence and interdependence (joint research in some field but not others for instance) may be the best way to foster enhanced security, and may offer Canadians more levers and options going ahead.
It is important to note is that there is often no consensus within China on many issues critical to Canadian interests, such as IP protection. As Canada accomplished in the lead-up to USMCA negotiations by engaging with a variety of US partners, there is a need for a granular understanding of where Chinese partners are located on issues of interest to us. Canada ought to leverage promising relationships and open the door for non-traditional partnerships. On IP, for example, we need a sophisticated understanding of which Chinese companies, stakeholders, or interest groups are aligned with Canadian views, and how to more deeply engage with them.
Shifts in Chinese behaviour
Within the span of a couple of decades, China went from an almost complete outsider to the second most dominant economy in the world, the main manufacturer of most goods, the largest consumer of commodities, the largest contributor to global GDP growth, the top-two import or export market for 56% of countries in the world (including for the US, the EU, India, Brazil, Japan, Russia, Nigeria, and Canada), the largest emitter of carbon dioxide, the largest consumer of electric vehicles, the largest contributor to reforestation, the country with the second largest military budget, and the second largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget after the US.
The advent of China as a global superpower and shaper of the international rules of the game under which we operate is distinctive for Canadian foreign policy because this kind of influence is being exercised for the first time by an authoritarian entity home to sociopolitical principles very different from our own.
Under Xi Jinping, China has become more assertive internationally (although not across all areas, as discussed in Johnston, 2013 15 ), and has shifted gears on domestic reforms, continuing forward in some areas and reversing course in others. Some areas have continued to improve in China since 2012, including environmental governance, health governance, socioeconomic development, a reduction in the number of crimes punishable by the death penalty, an easing of the one-child policy, economic development, the gradual opening of capital markets, et cetera. Other areas have seen clear reversals, including a reestablishment of party control over various spheres of business and society, a crackdown on political dissent, the Xinjiang camps, the massive surveillance system, corporate espionage, the targeting of human rights lawyers, et cetera.
A lack of familiarity with China and Asia among the general public, government, and business communities in Canada continues to be an issue. It is fair to say that few Canadians understand the depth of the outrage in China that was to follow the arrest of Huawei deputy chairwoman and chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou on 1 December 2018. Gaps in values between Canada and China complicate the relationship. The Meng Wanzhou affair has brought Canada–China relations to their lowest point in decades.
Implications for Canada–China relations
Chinese responses to the Meng Wanzhou affair, including the detention of two Canadian citizens in December 2018, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, as well as the ban on canola, beef, and pork exports, have had a negative impact on favourability toward China among Canadians, but perhaps not as much as some would expect. 16 Favourability stood at 36% in 2017, was down to 22% in early 2019, and is now back up to 29%, according to a poll conducted by UBC professors Paul Evans and Xiaojun Li in October 2019. 17 At the same time, favourability toward the US stood at 52% in 2017, was down to 36% in February 2019, and is back up to 51% in October 2019. On the Meng affair, 74% of Canadians think Canada is caught in the middle of a conflict between the US and China. Interestingly, support for an FTA with China has remained remarkably stable throughout the last year, at 62% (down from 69% in 2017). The survey also finds that in identifying the top priority for the Canadian government in its relations with China, “promoting human rights” still ranked fourth (11%), as it did in 2017, after “expanding trade and investment” (27%), “furthering cooperation on global issues” (24%), and “protecting Canadian values and institutions at home” (15%). On Huawei, 50% of Canadians think Huawei should not be a major provider to Canada’s 5G system, while 43% think Huawei investments in Canadian universities should be encouraged. Some 68% of Canadians think Canada can have good relations with China and the US at the same time. In other words, the Canadian public holds nuanced views.
The combination of China’s importance in world affairs and the complications related to divergences in sociopolitical values means that this will remain one of the most complicated relationships for Canada to navigate going ahead. It also means that Canada should refrain from the temptation to reach for the on/off switch, to escalate and react in one block. Recent fluctuations between “hot” and “cold” approaches to Canada–China relations have resulted in a lack of baseline continuity over the past fifteen years. Official China narratives in Canada have tended to be binary (i.e. “trade versus human rights”), unrefined (i.e. mostly about prosperity or values), and amalgamated (i.e. positive/negative). This is a suboptimal, impractical frame. Canada needs a deeper, more stable rationale for engagement with China. We cannot stop engaging China on climate change issues because we disagree on the governance of the Internet.
This is why Canada needs to evolve toward an adaptive, modular, yet strategic relationship with China. In addition to being nimbler, Canada’s China policy also needs to be spirited (resolute about core interests to maintain or reinforce), targeted (no blanket statements), accurate (reflecting reality on the ground and operating with realistic expectations), forward-looking (firmly set in the twenty-first century), and perceptive (about likely Chinese interpretations).
Downward pressure on general sentiment toward China mitigated by continued majority support for maintaining a working relationship, the presence of deep people-to-people linkages, support for deepening economic engagement, and awareness of China’s importance to the management of most global issues, all increase the need for a more complex official China narrative in Canada.
The multifacetedness of China’s roles and the variety of strategic considerations raised by China have rendered usual binary Canadian responses to Chinese behaviour unproductive. Distinct and predictable policy responses to different types of Chinese behaviours that are not aligned with Canadian interests can be developed. Here are four potential categories:
Problems arise when there is a mismatch between types of Chinese behaviour and levels of Canadian responses. Questions relating to China’s respect for international agreements cannot be dealt with entirely within the confines of the Canada–China bilateral commercial relationship.
Conclusion
For any of the above to be feasible, two developments are necessary: deepening channels of communication, and increasing Asia and China literacy across the board.
From the Canadian government’s perspective, the tone of Canada’s China policy, which can be modulated across issue-areas and across time, should be divorced from the structure of the China relationship (official channels of communication), which should remain in place and continue to deepen, despite changes in government. Working to restore and bolster official channels and support Track 1.5 and Track II channels, including across academic, business, arts, and people-to-people networks, is key.
China and Asia experts are important, but literacy levels need to be raised more broadly. Mobility of human resources across the Pacific needs to increase. How to develop deeper Asia/China literacy? In the absence of additional resources, a shift in existing resources is necessary—in proportion to the shifts in the drivers of Canadian interests globally. 18 There are long-term and short-term horizons to keep in mind. Over the long term, there is a need to concentrate on education to foster the right sets of skills for the next generation. Over the short term, however, the creation of spaces for learning and sharing across silos, continuous skill-building, increased mobility, and constructive dialogues on Asia/China should be supported.
Deep changes in the balance of power are disturbing the foundations upon which Canada has built foreign policy narratives and engagement practices since the end of the Second World War. Canada is well placed to seize the moment and develop a foreign policy well adapted to the twenty-first century, an era of polycentric global governance. Adjusting our approach to China by developing an adaptive, modular, and strategic rationale for engagement will be one of the major challenges of Canadian foreign policy in the coming years.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: An earlier version of this publication was produced for, and funded by, Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada.
1
See Jeremy Paltiel, “Facing China: Canada between fear and hope,” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 73, no. 3 (2018): 343–363; Gregory T. Chin, “An uncomfortable truth: Canada’s wary ambivalence to Chinese corporate takeovers,” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 73, no. 3 (2018): 399–428; Yves Tiberghien, “The Canada-China crisis is a game of chess, and Ottawa needs to stop playing it with checker pieces,” The Globe and Mail, 24 May 2019, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-canada-china-crisis-is-a-game-of-chess-and-ottawa-needs-to-stop/ (accessed 4 November 2019); Kim Richard Nossal, “The North Atlantic anchor: Canada and the Pacific Century,” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 73, no. 3 (2018): 364–378; and Paul Evans, “Canada is caught in the middle of a China-U.S. tech war,” The Globe and Mail, 10 December 2018, 
(accessed 4 November 2019).
2
See Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014) and Graham Allison, “The myth of the liberal order: From historical accident to conventional wisdom,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 4 (2018): 124–133.
3
Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States and Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Alastair Iain Johnston, “How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 7–48.
4
5
6
7
See Charles Akande, “Ministers brainstorm WTO reform in Ottawa,” Geneva Watch, 18, no. 26 (2018), http://chep-poic.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/EN_Geneva_Watch_October_29_2018.pdf (accessed 4 November 2019); and Sofia Balino, “As members debate WTO reform, what lies ahead for 2019?” International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2019, (accessed 4 November 2019).
8
Respectively, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2009 to 2013, and Deputy National Security Advisor to US Vice President Joe Biden from 2015 to 2017.
9
Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China reckoning: How Beijing defied American expectations,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2 (2018): 60–71.
10
Alastair Iain Johnston, “The failures of the ‘failure of engagement’ with China,” The Washington Quarterly 42, no 2 (2019): 99–114.
11
12
13
Evans, “Canada is caught in the middle of a China-U.S. tech war.”
14
15
Johnston, “How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness?”
16
At the time of writing, beef and pork exports to China had resumed after five months of suspension.
17
Paul Evans and Xiaojun Li, “Third national survey on Canadian public attitudes on China and Canada–China relations,” University of British Columbia, 2019, https://sppga.ubc.ca/news/october-2019-national-survey-results-and-findings-on-canadian-public-attitudes-on-china-and-canada-china-relations/; Paul Evans and Xiaojun Li, “The Meng factor in Canadian views on China,” University of British Columbia, 2019, https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2019/03/Introduction-to-Public-Opinion-Survey-13March2019.pdf (accessed 4 November 2019); Paul Evans and Xiaojun Li, “Canadian public attitudes on China & Canada–China relations,” University of British Columbia, 2019, (accessed 4 November 2019).
18
Nossal, “The North Atlantic anchor.”
Author Biography
Pascale Massot is an Assistant Professor in the School of Political Studies, a faculty affiliate of the Institute for Science, Society and Policy and a member of the coordinating committee of the International Political Economy Network, at the University of Ottawa. From December 2015 to July 2017 she was on leave from the university, serving as Senior Policy Advisor to the Minister of International Trade and Policy Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, covering the Asia-Pacific region.