Abstract
This contribution analyzes from a retrospective and synchronous perspective the often conflicting power relations between the French colonial, the Senegalese post-colonial central states and the decentralized collectivities. Reflecting on the effective autonomy of the local collectivities in the management and running of the competences which are transferred to them through the decentralization laws, the article shows how, on the basis of real cases, the intervention of the central power in local affairs not only questions democracy but also and above all diverts the regionalization policies from their initial objectives.
This article is a reference tool for understanding the history and evolution of decentralization in Senegal. By examining several questions, it supplies evidence on the functioning of decentralized communities, local governance, land management and the system of financial adjustment. It proposes means of decision-making and useful actions for those who are interested in the feasibility of democracy and local development in Senegal.
Keywords
For more than two decades now, the still fashionable concepts of ‘democratization’, ‘good governance’ and ‘decentralization’ have dominated the African political stage, serving as a testing ground by posing as a political conditionality designed to guarantee the success of the institutional reforms rolled out. By now common concepts generously scattered through the vocabulary of the development partners, widely echoed by the public authorities, which have gone on to make them a leitmotif of their intervention policies, they are generally attributed the task of paving the way for the introduction of the rule of law, the reinforcement of civil society, and the promotion of grassroots development through direct participation by the users in the management of public services (Bocke, 1997). The repeated calls for the reconceptualization of the State in favour of empowerment at the local level, the rallying around the paradigm of the institutional economy through de-monopolization, deregulation and privatization (World Bank, 1994) have, for the past few years, marked the anchoring of the free market model in almost all States. It is against this background of the reconsideration of the interventionist development model and the renewal of civil society that the plea for decentralization has largely taken root. Reducing the prerogatives of the central authority and reinforcing the peripheral authority to establish democracy, promote development and accountability are, in short, the guiding principles of the political and administrative reform. This therefore seems to offer local governments a wide-ranging opportunity for expression (Debbasch, 1976: 186).
In Senegal, the decentralization policy is not new, although there does seem to be more interest in its implementation today. It has an endogenous history that is very often overlooked by social science, legal and political researchers when they undertake an analysis of the political and administrative system of the Senegalese State. Its underlying principles of autonomy and delegation were already being experimented in Senegambian socio-political institutions (Baol, Saloum, Waalo, Djoloff, Cayor), which, for geographical, technological and political reasons, had to take recourse to such a policy (Barry, 1988; Diaouné, 2007; Gastelu, 1976). As they developed, these decentralizing practices were presented with a new model, ushered in by the colonial era, with the introduction of communalization in four coastal cities of the country (Johnson, 1971). The decentralization policy spread to the rural areas in 1972 and, with the administrative, territorial and local reform (ATLR) triggered the birth of the rural communities. The regions were created in 1996 with the adoption of Laws 96-06 and 96-07 of 22 March 1996 promulgating the Local Government Code (LGC) and transferring competencies to the local Councils, 528 of which were in place during the last local elections in 2009 (14 regions, 151 communes and 363 rural communities). The historical regionalization introduced to Senegal, a country considered as holding the oldest voting experience in Africa (Le Vine, 2004), is founded on the constitutional principle of the free administration of the local governments that are granted legal personality and financial autonomy.
But has this hankering for the local in Africa, and in Senegal in particular, crowned over the past few years by many institutional changes, led to the weakening of the public authority in local society, or rather, does State intervention reproduce itself under new forms? Have the decentralization policies paved the way for the emergence of real powers within the framework of a participatory territorial governance? Is there a peripheral space of regulation emerging? What concrete shape do relations between the central government and the local government take on a day-to-day basis?
Few research studies have approached the issue of decentralization from the point of view of power dynamics, of their centrality, their permanence in relations between public institutions. Overlooked by the literature, this question, which has a significant influence on localized public policies, puts greater emphasis on the nature and configuration of the interaction and intertwining of the multiple logics (political, electoral) that appear in their strategies. By approaching the political and administrative reforms in Senegal from a diachronic and synchronic perspective, this articles examines, on the basis of an analysis of a few illustrative cases, the implications of public authority intervention on the local democracy of delegation and territorial public management from the municipalization processes that began during the colonial age up until post-alternation Senegal. The data analysed here come from a review of the relevant literature and a qualitative survey conducted among public personalities at the central and local levels.
The issues
The question of autonomy has been the subject of several studies. It is not our intention here to go back over the various meanings of this concept (Marcou, 2008). We set out rather to examine, on the basis of the literature on decentralization in Africa, whether the practices of the players and the institutional framework allocated to local self-government in the various States help reinforce a governmentality at the local level. An examination of past studies first of all brings to light an institutional approach to the concept, where local autonomy is considered, within the context of solutions to the crisis of the State, from a technical and normative point of view (Totté et al., 2003). It is perceived as an optimal framework for good governance within States. According to the international financial institutions, the State in Africa has lost its credibility. For a long time, control over development was carried out from above and provided an opportunity for the elites to dissipate public funds. Several political and economic arguments were therefore put forward to justify decentralization on the continent: the overburdened nature of the State, the absence of accountability and of transparency in public service management. Decentralization was seen as a good way of achieving macroeconomic stability, efficiency and fairness in public service management (World Bank, 2000).
The studies relating to the second perspective raise the question of autonomy from the point of view of the administrative organization of the States (Ben Letaief et al., 2008). Political history teaches us that reforms leading to decentralization were, despite the Franco-British colonial heritage (Tunisia, Nigeria, Egypt, etc.), for a long time feared in the name of national construction (Mback, in de Gaudusson, 2001) or the developmentalist ideology (De Decker, 1967). Across the board, in the ‘liberated’ States of the continent, the creation of the ‘new’ society materialized during the 1960s through the setting up of highly centralized political and administrative structures. The decentralization policies tentatively set in motion in most cases quickly derailed. The authoritarian State hesitated to grant the delegated local bodies real powers of action. Driven by external and internal pressures for democratization (Chole and Ibrahim, 1995), decentralization was seen at the beginning of the 1990s as a promising means of reducing poverty and embracing democracy. In certain countries (Burundi, South Africa, Uganda), it was touted as a good means of resolving socio-political crises (Mback, 2003) and in others as a driving force behind the new development dynamic (Goita, 2005).
Generally speaking, two models of decentralization are often applied in Africa: administrative decentralization, which is the most widespread form, and political decentralization, which grants local governments a sometimes broader autonomy via permissive functions. In South Africa, Demante and Tyminski, for example, explain that local governments have extremely broad competencies, covering the major water and electricity distribution services (Demante and Tyminski, 2008: 7). The first model delegates to the communal local governments (mainly in French-speaking countries) competencies in the fields of basic social services, local development and urban management (Benin, Burkina Faso, etc.). The second model is rolled out in certain federal States (Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia) with sometimes several tiers of local government.
The political and institutional framework briefly described here is a decisive factor that directly impacts deliberative democracy. However, it reduces the logics of appropriation and confrontation of the different players. The third, more dynamic, perspective also raises questions about the multiple interferences of the State and of its spin-offs in local management (Blundo, in de Gaudusson and Médard, 2001; Goïta, 2003; Marie and Idelman, 2010). The argument suggests that the State reproduces itself (Piveteau, 2004), and its significant discretionary competencies often prevent decentralized governments from conducting activities in the local economic interest. The reinforcement of political and administrative control (Blundo, 2001) and the perverse effects of intervention (Gentil and Husson, 1996) are thus elucidated. Certain studies put the focus on the strategies of the players (Laurent and Peemans, in Blundo and Mongbo, 1998), the conflicts arising from positioning and the logics of tapping into resources and external revenues (Beridogo, 1998; Goïta, 2005; Mback, 2001). Identity issues and the confiscation of the rules of the democratic game by the local political elites also raise a great many questions (Dramé, in Blundo and Mongbo, 1998; Wade, 2001).
Methodology
This contribution examines relations between local governments and central government and their repercussions on local autonomy. It is based on contributions from the fields of the sociology of power, the socio-anthropology of development and strategic analysis as a framework of theoretical analysis. The literature mentioned above describes various analytical approaches to decentralization. It is often presented as a way out of the economic, social and political situation of the countries of the South. This institutional conception suffers from the fact that it is seen through a developmentalist prism. It tends to exalt the issues raised by decentralization without hinging them around the internal dynamics specific to the States. The reference to market virtues and conditionalities in the allocation of aid has been discussed by a number of authors (Piveteau, 2004, 2005; Touré, 2009). Far from shying away from international political injunctions or a prescriptive political-institutional framework, decentralization is in fact factored in to face up to a range of local issues (Olivier de Sardan, 1995). It is a ‘focal space’ (Schelling, 1986) at the crossroads between the players and a socio-political construct that conceals the power struggles. While it therefore comprises a strong symbolic dimension (identification with a reference community), the local governments, as spaces of positions and games (Abdoul and Dahou, 2003), constitute important places for policy production and multi-identity crystallization.
According to Dahrendorf (1959), the exploratory concept of authority strikes us as a promising path to follow. The unequal distribution of authority between institutions and players in fact prompts socio-political conflicts. The authority is based on a legitimacy and on resources that can all be used as means of coercion (economic, political, physical). In reference to the work of Lemieux (2001), we can make a distinction between six types of resources that appear indispensable to take account of in an analysis of the interactions between public institutions: statutory, normative, action, relational, material, informational and sometimes physical resources (social withdrawal). As attributes of the players (Crozier and Friedberg, 1992), these resources (deliberation, customs, laws, competencies, political and economic networks, financial capacity, etc.) make up sources of power and negotiation and power struggles and confrontation. Decentralization would thus be a confrontation between several ‘structures of collective action’ or of ‘systems of organized action’ (Crozier and Friedberg, 1992; Olivier de Sardan, 1995).
To illustrate this hypothesis, the analysis is based on a documentary survey and the examination of a series of semi-directive interviews conducted in 10 local governments in the country. On the basis of the territorial sampling method, 14 territorial administrators (governors, prefects, sub-prefects and heads of the Support Centre for Local Development 1 ) were interviewed. These devolved structures ensure respect for laws and regulations in force on decentralization. They exercise administrative control over local actions. The texts grant the elected officials missions involving planning, allocation and reallocation of land, and management of State-owned property. The elected officials also vote on the budgets and administrative accounts. Numbering 47, they were chosen according to several criteria: either as head of a commission, head of the local executive, vice-president or deputy or for having exercised two mandates. The data gathered were processed and analysed on the basis of content analysis techniques (Miles and Huberman, 2003).
From self-governing communes to communes with special status: a multi-faceted municipalization
If we adopt a historical perspective, the decentralization policy officially took root in Senegal in the nineteenth century with the creation of the country’s first four municipal institutions (Gorée, Saint Louis, Rufisque and Dakar), considered as the cradles of the country’s modern political life. Those stemming from these ‘four self-governing old communes’ had special citizenship and many privileges (military, matrimonial, administrative). From 1879 onwards, they had the right to elect a General Council and to send a member to the French Parliament. The communes with mixed status put in an appearance from 1904 onwards. They were governed by Municipal Councils, half of which were appointed and the other half elected, with mayors who were always appointed. Groundnut crops in certain parts of the country encouraged in part the transformation of other areas into communes between 1911 and 1953 (Mercier, 1959). The entry into force of Law 55-1489 promulgating the municipal reorganization of French West Africa (AOF) and French Central Africa (AEF) in Togo, in Cameroon and in Madagascar on 18 November 1955, was to usher in a new era of communalization in colonial Senegal. It introduced so-called partly self-governing communes (communes de moyen exercice) (Kaolack, Thiès, Louga, Ziguinchor, Diourbel) with an elected Council but whose mayor was an appointed official.
The administrative architecture of independent Senegal was marked by the extension of the self-governing communes (Law of 1 February 1960) in reference to the French law of 1884 and the emergence of the communes with special status. The idea was to establish ‘a development administration’ to offset the disadvantages of the sub-administration and bring the administration closer to the citizens (Gautron, 1971). This renewal was also linked to the population’s demand to participate in the management of their land and the adaptation of the administrative organization to meet the specific characteristics of Senegalese society. The regions, the circles and the districts were the newly created tiers of devolution. Law 64-02 of 19 January 1964 introduced for the first time a special municipal system derogating from common law. Law 66-64 of 30 June 1966 promulgated the Communal Administration Code. It was designed to govern the creation, organization and control of the communal authorities and guarantee the autonomy of the communes under common law and those with special status. Supported by his deputies, the mayor was the one in charge of preparing and executing the deliberations of the Council.
A local administrative organization weakened by the weight of interventionism
Any local power is determined by the legal system in which it exists. The rules of law that make up its matrix thus determine the direction taken by the principles of its operation and delineates at the end of the day its borders and its prerogatives. In the French conception of the administrative system, centralization, a policy in which all the important decisions are the responsibility of the central government, has remained a sacrosanct principle (Debbasch, 1976). Whether under the 1st and 2nd Empire or the 3rd Republic that established the communal regime in 1884 (Law of 5 April), all the important decisions of an economic, social and cultural nature were under the jurisdiction of the central authority although, by delegation, decentralized local bodies and elected officials took on certain decision-making powers. The decentralized governments and their elected staff were subject to the legality and opportunity checks of the supervisory authorities. This tendency towards the concentration of power at the central level was to be further accentuated within the framework of the government of the colonies, where the attempts at decentralization had very mixed results. It suffices to examine the status conferred on the respective communes (self-governing mixed, indigenous, partly self-governing communes) to realize the semantic and legal uncertainty surrounding the colonial municipal system. The many prevarications and delaying tactics of the French government have been underscored by several analysts who have looked into the scope and actual meaning of the municipalization policy in the colonies (Diouf, 1999; Johnson, 1971). In actual fact, the colonial communal system was aimed more towards association and assimilation. The administrative organization of colonial Senegal took the form of the division of the country into 12 circles and 140 cantons at the head of which were administrators entrusted with the exercise of the authority of the State. In this technostructure that confiscated the political power from the indigenous people, the governor had control over all of the circumscriptions (circle, subdivision, canton). He was the depository of the powers of the Republic. At a lower rung in the ladder, territorial administrative organization was entrusted to the commanders of the circle and heads of subdivision. The commander of a circle held the title of administrator-mayor that headed a municipal commission that was either appointed (first degree), elected by restricted suffrage (second degree) or by universal suffrage (third degree). The municipalities were under the control of the French in Rufisque and Dakar and of the métis or mixed race in Saint-Louis and Gorée (Diouf, 1999).
The administrative organization of independent Senegal was quite similar to the French administrative tradition. In this march towards modernization, the centralist orientation was to be the cornerstone of the public authority. The presidential nature of the regime and the greater concentration of powers around the executive offered a fertile breeding ground for the limitation of local autonomy and to what President Léopold Sédar Senghor was to describe as ‘Pontius Pilate behaviour’. To build the political, social, administrative and economic foundations of the nation, the central authority was to quickly withdraw the authority over water and electricity entrusted to date to the municipalities. As defined by Article 135 of Law 72-63 relating to the administrative reform, territorial public management came under the authority of the State. It set up and divided up the public services and supplied locally the frameworks necessary for public action. Via the municipal administrator, under the authority of the Prime Minister and the Minister in charge, the central authority exercised all of the attributions entrusted to the mayor. The municipality was stripped of any power of initiative (administration of the town, execution of the deliberations, appointment of the municipal employees) and was closer to a decentralized administration. Its deliberations on the investment, budget, taxes and duty programmes could only be executed after having been approved by the authority in charge which, within the framework of the communal code, had the power of cancellation or substitution. It is within this framework that the governors, essential lynchpins of the territorial administration (Gautron, 1971), were placed until 1990 in the centre of the management of the communes and regions. The unbridled politicization of the administration, the bureaucratic tendencies of the administration and the hegemonism of the Socialist regime (Hesseling, 1985) had the effect of perpetuating the State’s patrimonialist system. It is therefore hardly surprising that the communes were between the decades 1960 and 1970 at the centre of scandals on the mismanagement of public resources (Diop and Diouf, 1992).
From a desire to transform the countryside to the aborted communalization of the rural space
By the early 1960s, rural Senegal was the first centre of choice for many development policies (De Decker, 1967). The need to extract itself from the lethargy of underdevelopment was to spark the construction of a programme to transform rural societies. The ideology of African socialism, inspired by the theories of ‘Negritude’ and a critique of Marxian theory, was to mobilize the national elites and the masses to serve as a framework to enshrine this desire for change. This was mainly done by scrapping a series of bottlenecks that existed in the rural peripheries associated with the rise of conservatism, the parochialism of village society, social inequality and the obsolescence of the trading economy. Starting from the idea of reorganizing the grassroots to take better account of their aspirations, extensive empirical studies were conducted throughout the country under the leadership of Father Louis Joseph Lebret. Based on an overall picture that diagnosed the economic, social and cultural life of the country, a schedule was developed, based on three steps:
the first starting with the creation of a coordination unit within several villages; the creation of development units that would later give way to rural communities, new spaces of solidarity in charge of promoting the dynamics of nation-building; then, lastly, a gradual construction of rural communes after internal consultation between local populations within the framework of the free regrouping of rural communities.
This idea of communalization was generally hinged around a philosophy of grassroots development that set out to change the Senegalese countryside into emerging economic centres. 2 This political option could not take full effect for political reasons related to the political crisis of December 1962, during which Mamadou Dia was removed from office and detained for usurping power. The centralization and concentration of power increased with the 1963 constitution and its subsequent revision in 1967. Circular 32 was replaced, after nearly a decade of administrative vacuum (disorder of the rural management, lethargy of agricultural extension services), by Circular 37. The State authority was undermined from within by its intelligentsia, more concerned about financial and tribal issues.
Administrative, territorial and local reform: between change and continuity
The desire of the Senegalese administrative authorities to introduce local democracy to the countryside took concrete shape in 1972 with the entry into force of Law 72-25 of 19 April on the ATLR that would integrate the non-communalized rural areas into the decentralization process. Article 1 of Law 72-02 of 1 February 1972 on Territorial Administration provides that the newly created rural community is a local government, a public law entity, with financial autonomy. It consists of a number of villages belonging to the same area, united by a solidarity arising from their situation as neighbours, with common interests together capable of finding the resources necessary for their development. The originality of this reform lies in the fact that the rural community itself manages the problems of its development and remains the closest institutional entity that can have a ‘better’ understanding of people’s needs.
Focusing on the logic of grassroots accountability, the ATLR marks, in the opinion of many observers, the first real phase of decentralization initiated in Senegal, in particular via the different revisions that it updated: bridging the gap between areas left by the colonial administration, correcting imbalances, distributing income. The region of Thiès was selected as a test area for the reform in June 1972 (Decree 72.664 of 7 June 1972). It was gradually followed by Sine Saloum in 1974, Diourbel in 1976, Louga in 1976, Casamance in 1978, the River region in 1980 and Eastern Senegal in 1982, where the ATLR was duly applied.
Elected for a five-year term, the Rural Council was responsible for the management and development of the national domain lands and the rollout of development projects. Its autonomy was, however, very limited. One of the key aspects justifying this approach was that agents of the State were not sufficiently trained and really prepared for the roles assigned to them. The Rural Councils were thus placed, between 1972 and 1990 under the excessive powers of the sub-prefect in charge, according to Article 84 of Law 72-24, of the preparation and development of the local budget. One could properly speak at this time of a decentralization that was mutilated and perverted from its original objectives as corruption, cronyism, bribery, embezzlement of public funds were to mar the operation and management of the resources of the rural authorities (Diaouné, 2007; Diop and Diouf, 1990). In 1990, a new revision of the legal framework (Law 90-37 of 8 October) transferred budgetary competencies to the Rural Councils and, by further amending the Communal Administration Code (Law 90-35 of 8 October 1990) brought the communes with special status under common law.
Administrative division, dissolution/revocation of the regional, communal and rural assemblies: when politics infiltrate the local level
One of the milestones of the power struggles between central and local government was the dissolution in May 2008 of 10 local authorities. 3 This dissolution took root in 2002 when all local councils were ousted by special delegations, following an amendment of a Liberal member of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) who wanted to oppose the extension of the mandate of the, majority Socialist, locally elected officials, which expired in November 2001. By virtue of Law 2001-11 of 18 December 2001, the Constitutional Council instituted, on a transitional basis, special delegations to manage these local governments until the local elections of May 2002. The adoption of this amendment had provoked a wave of protest among the elected officials concerned. Some had described it as a ‘constitutional coup’ and ‘a blow to democracy’. Twelve members of the opposition had filed an action for annulment before the Constitutional Council. Accused by the opposition of having manipulated the whole affair, President Wade had stressed that the National Assembly was sovereign and free to make amendments to the texts submitted to it.
The recent involvement of the State in the revocation of decentralized bodies raised many other questions about the legitimacy and appropriateness of this decision. These dissolutions, which many considered to put into question the constitutional principle of free administration of local governments, created a climate of suspicion and tension between the various protagonists. These dissolved governments were presented as large fortresses of recalcitrant liberals (with centralized power) but also as strong opposition strongholds. As far as the public authorities were concerned, the idea that the law should give the president of the Republic the discretionary power to dissolve and revoke local councils was generally accepted. On the other hand, the assumption shared by the opposition groups was that the State was the only one entitled to claim for itself the right of dissolution, at its discretion, of certain decentralized governments or to decide according to its current interests, on their political survival.
Whatever credit that might or might not be given to these revocations, these different fracture lines suggest that the decentralization policy, far from being implanted into completely virgin ground, accentuated the areas of tension around the management and control of local institutions and their resources, created a breeding ground for competition (municipalities, rural communities and regions) and generated more confrontation among the players (elected officials, state political parties, citizens, businesses, local figures). The ambivalent attitude of the State, which continued to disempower local governments of the missions assigned to them, prompts us to question its real motives and above all to doubt the proclaimed objective, heavily promoted in official speeches, of local autonomy. Experience seems to prove that the legal and legislative framework that governs the local political field was often tampered with at the mercy of special interests. Three reasons can at most, according to the texts of laws on decentralization, lead to the dissolution of a local government by decree. The first is a situation whereby there is an accumulation of financial imbalances not resolved at the end of successive financial years. The second is a situation of exceptional circumstances due to a context of war or serious calamities. And finally the inoperability of a Council. but its dissolution may be imposed via a general measure. 4
This assumption of politicization of decentralization in Senegal seems to be reinforced by recent administrative divisions. Today, the number of newly established local governments has increased significantly. The reorganization of many rural areas into ‘towns’ leaves open several questions. According to Article 79 of the Local Government Code: ‘Only areas with sufficient development in order to have their own resources necessary to balance their budget may be incorporated as communes. No commune shall be instituted which does not have a population of at least one thousand [1000] inhabitants.’ How in this case is it possible to accurately measure the level of development of a territory to turn it into a town? Law 90-34 of October 1990 imposed, in the wake of the now repealed Communal Administration Code, the requirement to use a commission to conduct prior surveys into any communalization project. Everything seems to be proceeding as if the State’s logic of patronage and discretionary powers, very sensitive to its political and the lobbying of the maraboutic conglomerates, appears more prevalent in the process of creating new towns. The comments of the Minister for Decentralization about the government’s desire to undertake a new administrative reform for the elevation of Sendou as a commune, a community that comes within the commune of Bargny that had fallen in the last local elections into the hands of the Socialist Party (PS), far from being cautious, bear witness to the manifold strategies of the players eager to win over the local political field, ‘Expressing their wish, the inhabitants of Sendou said they want a commune, as was the case elsewhere. And I promised to study their request. And today we will make a commune of Sendou’ (excerpt from press conference). 5
Central authority and local authority: the case of the deliberations of the city of Dakar, or the democracy of ‘captured’ delegation?
The case of the deliberations about the commune of Dakar is a clear example of the multiple political processes at work in localized societies. It makes it possible to grasp how the players construct, through the social uses of the territories, spaces of expression, recognition and legitimization by using their mental ability. Without listing the many controversies that littered the path, a quick historical perspective of this bone of contention between the Senegalese government and the city of Dakar is necessary and might help to better understand the main features. Anxious to provide Dakar with promising projects for the benefit of citizens of the city, the commune decided, as part of a policy of resettlement of street vendors, to purchase its own hereditaments. Along these lines, in September 2010, the Dakar City Council deliberated on three questions relating to the acquisition of land valued at 15,353,183,700 CFA francs, the stake of the commune in the capital of companies and special permission governing income and expenditure. This decision to buy five lots, however, took another administrative turn as, during a Council of Ministers, President Wade asked the Minister of Decentralization to open a judicial inquiry against the local government of Dakar to shed light on the conditions of acquisition of this land. In New York where he made a cutting comment on the conflict between the State and City Hall, Wade admitted: ‘I have an obligation to ensure the proper management of public resources and in this case, there was attempted misappropriation of public funds. I said no, because all the deliberations of city hall are subject to the discretion of the prefect. Above the prefect, there is the Minister and beyond that, the Minister is answerable to me.’ The Minister of Decentralization stepped into the breach to assert that the procedures employed by the municipality to acquire land did not comply with the laws and incriminated the mayor of attempted embezzlement. Responding to various charges, the latter refuted any suggestion of wrongdoing: ‘We are resolutely waiting for elements from the Criminal Investigation Division and the Public Prosecutor. They are welcome to investigate and they will see that what we have said is the truth. The eight deliberations mentioned by the President of the Republic and the Minister of Decentralization and Local Government were adopted unanimously with the exception of three and for each one of those there was one abstention’ (excerpt from the press conference). In a twist to this case, the State of Senegal finally came to their senses by deciding to cancel the inquiry.
This observation effectively illustrates the difficult situation of coexistence between the liberal central authority and the socio-democratic local authority. Several factors account for the multiple flows between these different players, but we think that three in particular are important to address in view of their critical dimension. The first element is financial. It relates to the cost of purchasing land and the potential risks of abuse of the objectives put forward. The second factor relates to the potential beneficiaries of the resettlement project, the street vendors. Composed primarily of young people, they are considered by both sides as a significant potential electorate for the next political elections. Access to ownership and better working conditions in a context of job insecurity would provide them with a framework for self-promotion and work in favour of their socio-professional activities. The third factor relates to the location of the project, Dakar, the economic and administrative capital, which could, with the possible economic opportunities, revitalize its economy and thus become more than a capital issue for the city officials. The legality check of the State representative puts the government in a strong position and allows it to make the granting of land conditional on the cancellation of the deliberations of city hall. In reality, the various measures the State applied to the local public institutions in general, far from strengthening their capacity for mobilizing financial resources and managing projects of local interest, do not come free. They are perplexing for the ideologues of decentralization and seem to point to the likelihood that we are still far from the profession of faith of the Head of State who said in opening remarks to the governor of Dakar, ‘I will let you work.’ This strategy of obstruction and blockage of the municipal agenda by the central authority to prevent, according to some, local officials from rolling out their programmes, is naturally understandable, according to many political observers, if you consider that the presidential elections of 2012 are already looming on the horizon. It is, for many, in this Senegal of political and pre-electoral jousting, a mitigating factor to heap opprobrium and to demonize the agents of opposition parties.
At the end of the day, whatever the real intentions of central government may be, controlling the actions of local governments is not a danger in itself. While it is established that decentralization does not mean total independence or exclusive local autonomy, the control of the central authority or its representatives over decentralized bodies and their actions can contribute to the achievement of good governance. However, this kind of control of the State must rely on the normative system governing the running of local governments since, according to the decentralization laws of 1996, the Senegalese legislature, considering that the decentralized governments had by now reached a certain degree of maturity, introduced an important innovation by bringing in a new system to control local actions that would de facto eliminate the concept of authority in the local government system. The pre-approval check, which was centralized by nature, was replaced by an a posteriori legality check that was more flexible and closer. Along these lines, all local governments have since been subject to a single control method (Fall, 2004) in which a posteriori control is now becoming the rule and a priori control the exception. Monitoring the legality of local actions stems from a desire to ensure that the decisions of the territorial councils are being taken in accordance with the rule of law and are consistent with the general interest. The legal and legislative provisions have unequivocally given new leeway to Senegal’s local governments. These serve as legally recognized frameworks for decision-making and the management of development projects. In compliance with the laws and regulations, local governments are solely responsible for the appropriateness of their Orders and only submit for prior approval by the representative of the State the deliberations on the initial and additional budgets, on loans and loan guarantees, regional, communal and rural development plans and regional planning, financial agreements relating to international cooperation involving commitments amounting to 100 million francs or more, matters related to land use and urbanism, guarantees and equity investments in private companies engaged in activities of general interest with public participation and public contracts totalling between 15 and 100 million, according to the decentralized governments.
Conclusion
This contribution provides a series of possible readings of the power dynamics and their multi-factor effects on the Senegalese political and administrative scene. The politico-socio-anthropological literature discussed above seems to reveal, in many cases, a fairly significant discrepancy between the rhetoric of autonomy and its actual operation, despite the observed broadening of the transferred powers (Ghana, Morocco, South Africa) or the deletion of a priori controls in favour of a posteriori controls (Senegal, Mali, etc.). In Senegal, far from being disconnected from politics and its congenital defects (partisan patronage, influence peddling, power struggles, transhumance, infiltration, etc.), the decentralization policies inaugurated under successive governments are severely tested by the inhibiting logic of the State, despite the rich experience accumulated during the pre-colonial age. The weak administrative capacity of local institutions, their conflicting relationships with the State and the events simultaneously encountered illustrate that the influence of the State on territorial public governance has not weakened in favour of a truly autonomous status of the periphery. In many local governments, the power of the State impacts the deliberations of the local Councils and it continues to exercise certain competencies, even those that have been transferred. The land question is a good case in point. It is a revealing example of the multiple socio-political dynamics at work in rural Senegalese societies. In theory, it is Law 64-46 of 17 June 1964 that governs State-owned property. It proposed to amend the colonial land tenure system and customary land law. According to this law, those living in rural communities and who have the ability to develop the land may dispose of it. This new flexibility that was introduced has greatly reduced the powers of the traditional masters of the land and reconfigured the socio-politico-economic development of rural governments that, because of their significant land and water resources are increasingly attracting national agricultural economic entrepreneurs (public authorities, marabouts) and foreign players (multinationals, private equity 6 ). Traditional leaders are not, however, ready to be ejected from the local political-economic spectrum. Due to their traditional legitimacy, they retain residual powers and exert pressure on the Rural Councils in the field of land management. Village chiefs are ex officio members of the commission and are united with the Agents in the management of State-owned land. The State, through the control of its representatives, is relinquishing its hold over local affairs to sometimes deal with them directly. According to the findings of the study, it holds control over local economic resources and, in many cases, bends the decisions of local governments in ways favourable to its objectives (including in education, planning and land management).
This situation of multiple formal and informal standards (Le Meur et al., in Blundo and Mongbo, 1998) greatly affects local autonomy and prevents the decentralization policy from fully flourishing. Another striking illustration of the many prevarications of the State is related to transfers of financial resources devolved to local authorities. In Senegal, as in much of Africa, decentralized governments derive most of their resources from tax revenues, rebates granted by the State, funds for infrastructure and staffing. In most cases, to cover their financing needs, the Senegalese government has implemented many projects and programmes nationwide (Programme for the Reinforcement and Equipping of Local Governments, National Good Governance Programme) to give a boost to the resources of the territorial councils and to reduce poverty, often using as a framework the Strategic Poverty Alleviation Document (DSRP). According to the Report drawn up on behalf of the Commission for laws, decentralization, labour and human rights on the Draft 2009 Budget of the Ministry of Decentralization and Local Governments, the overall financial commitments mobilized by the State in favour of local governments in Senegal in 2008 amounted to Fcfa 35,394,000,000, 16,600,000,000 of which was for the Decentralization Allocation Fund, 11.5 billion for the Local Government Infrastructure Fund, 4.65 billion for the Consolidated Investment Budget (education and health) and 2.644 billion for rebates granted to the communes. According to the same sources, rural communities have seen a 50 percent increase in their decentralization allocation fund compared with 2007. These funds amounted to Fcfa 667,103,990 for the regions, 869,833,950 for the communes and 1,075,525,060 for the rural communities.
But considerable as the funds allocated may be, the evaluation shows that progress made in terms of the transfer of resources has been generally insignificant. A realistic analysis of the situation of local finance leads us to believe that the budgets of local governments in Senegal are in a woeful state. Sources from the Directorate of local governments revealed that 97 percent of rural communities and 26 percent of communes had annual budgets of less than 20 million CFA francs and the latter spent an average of 70 percent of their ordinary resources on staffing costs. By studying in detail the specific situations in many African countries, the review highlights in parallel the same trends and wide disparities in local finance. Quoting the World Bank, Demante and Tyminski (2008: 27) explain that the total annual resources of African governments in 2005 was approximately €8.5 billion, of which €7 billion was for South Africa (82 percent), €1 billion for Morocco and Tunisia (12 percent) and 500 million for sub-Saharan African countries (6 percent). And yet Ben Letaief et al. (in Marcou, 2008: 39) indicate that the capacity of local governments to generate their own resources is very limited: ‘for example, about 50% in Kenya, even less in Nigeria, a rate of 20% for the recovery of property taxes in Tunisia (recovery by local governments), 45 or 50% on average in the Ivory Coast and Niger (recovery by the State)’.
However, these pitfalls should not minimize the many internal efforts of the States to promote democratization and the construction of development at local level. There is little doubt that the decentralized governance that has been introduced constituted important milestones in the emergence of public spaces in Africa. Some gains in terms of participatory democracy are indisputable (Ibrahim, in Chole and Ibrahim, 1995: 137).
Nevertheless, in view of the permanent fragmentation of local public action and the persistent gap in administrative democracy that weaken the functioning of local authorities, it is necessary to build a renewed democracy of devolution. To allow the emergence of decentralization and local governance that can ensure its rightful functions within the towns and in the countryside, it is now urgent to overcome the many contradictions that the State continues to cover up. Decentralization is not just limited to the legal dimension and is not only driven by the centralized power and the heavy supervision of the State, which intervenes as it sees fit to dissolve local assemblies. More importantly again, the practice of decentralization in Africa must be based on increased promotion by the State of local freedoms and the right of local governments to training so that a democratic climate can be anchored in them conducive to dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution. Specifically, the aim here in particular is to upgrade local governments that need more than ever to find their way around the school of decentralization. Through the drawing up of guidelines in national languages and periodic restitutions, the focus should be on participatory democracy and land management. These responses are necessary in a context where the return to the land and reintegration in rural areas are proclaimed with great fanfare in many countries, including Senegal with the Great Push Forward for Agriculture, Food and Abundance (GOANA).