Democracy and Devolution as a Strategy for Conflict Resolution,the Political Will as a Determinant: The Case of Sri Lanka

Introduction

The post-cold world war is characterized by ethnicity and ethnic identity politics. Ethnic conflict is a growing phenomenon threatening internal politics and challenging State systems. This is especially true in previously colonial State systems where the political culture was more subject than participant. The urge to participate in the political process gained momentum in the post-colonial period.

Identity politics was a characteristic of the colonial rule. Divisions, on ethnic lines, were constructed and sharpened by the colonial masters. This made the process of accommodation of interests difficult to achieve. Therefore, post-independence, internal strife on ethnic lines was a serious challenge faced by the State system.

The integrity of the State as a neutral party in the conflict was also challenged. In most cases, the State was seen as a party to the conflict. Despite this, the State remains an important stakeholder in the conflict resolution process. This makes the conflict resolution process more complicated.

Democracy and devolution of power can be regarded as a viable strategy for conflict resolution. Democracy is a contested concept. There are varied interpretations of democracy. For some, democracy is merely the arrangement of institutional processes and elections, and for some others, it is a source of conflict management and conflict resolution (Baker, 1996, p. 642). This article, however, uses the term democracy to mean a system of governance that seeks the participation of all the stakeholders. Democracy is viewed as a system of political governance whose decision-making power is subject to the controlling influence of citizens who are considered as political equals. (International IDEA, 2007, p. 4).

However, to restrict democracy merely to a form of political governance is to devalue the idea. Democracy is also treated as a value system that includes the principles of participation, transparency and responsiveness to the demands and aspirations of communities who compose the whole. This takes democracy out of the realm of merely electoral politics and now looks upon it as a strategy of inclusion of the marginalized periphery. Conflicts occur and remain unresolved when democracy is considered to mean only electoral politics. The essence of democracy that goes beyond electoral politics has to be translated effectively.

Devolution of power leads to a broadening of democracy. It is seen as a strategy to increase public participation in the political and administrative space. It is essentially a power-sharing mechanism that has the capacity to develop policies that are better tailored to the economic and social conditions of their areas, encouraging local solutions to local problems (Jeffrey, 2002, p. 176). This is possible since devolution necessarily implies that some discretionary authority is given to the local bodies in the decision-making process. It can also be regarded as a form of administrative decentralization. Devolution can be used as a conflict resolution strategy. This can be done by increasing the autonomy that is granted to conflict regions within the state.

This is especially true in multiethnic pluralistic societies. An ethnic conflict has several dimensions. They are primarily the interests at stake, the actors involved in the process and the strategies for accommodation. Democracy through devolution of power acts as a good strategy for conflict resolution.

However, this is possible only if the gap between the actual strategy and the process of implementation is reduced. Sincerity in carrying out devolution is necessary for it to succeed. This sincerity has to be visible at the level of the political elite who define the conflict. It succeeds only if the actors—over different time periods—show the political will to accommodate, revise and redefine interests.

Ethnic politics revolves around the way the majority accommodates the interests of the minority. The nature of interpersonal relations between the majority and minority communities shape either consensus or conflictual politics. The ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ again cannot be treated as a ‘whole’. There are internal differences of interests and perception between them. This intra-group power play affects the inter-group accommodation of interest. It is believed that a majoritarian setting in polyethnic societies should seek to encourage consensus politics and allay the fears of the minority (Devotta, 2006, p. 154).

Conflicts are resolved only if ethnicities are convinced about their role in the decision-making and power-sharing structures. Democracy allows the civil society to thrive with freedom of expression as a guaranteeing principle. The demands made by the parties to the conflict are accommodated by more and more devolution of power. Any attempt to stifle demands lead to discontent, and if discontent is stifled, it leads to violence.

This article seeks to understand the role of the elite in the conflict resolution process. The premise used is that for conflicts to be resolved and lasting peace to be established, respect for democracy is essential. This respect should, however, be visible not just ideologically but also structurally. It is only through devolution of power and democracy that lasting peace can be attained. Democracy and devolution offers a more moderate method to resolve conflict. A reconstruction of the constitutional and structural institutions is a necessity. If power is shared, interests are accommodated.

The contention made in this article is that although democracy and devolution of power are important to the process, they are not enough. If this strategy has to succeed, then it must also be supported by the political will of the elite. It is the political will that determines the success of the strategy. It would not be wrong to say that if ethnic conflicts are created by the elite, then the extent of the conflict will also be determined by them. Peace processes have to be initiated with sincerity. The genuine will of each of the parties in the conflict create an opportunity for lasting peace and stability. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the conflicting parties to create windows of opportunity for dialogue.

The conflicting parties must also have the political will and desire to end the conflict. Democracy and devolution of power are the tools to resolve the conflict. However, who uses the tools and how is also an important point to be considered. The Sri Lankan ethnic conflict is a very good case in point since it involves a complexity of issues, multiplicity of actors and devolution as the popularly negotiated solution to these problems.

The devolution package was offered in the entire conflict resolution process in Sri Lanka. The conflict was over the extent and nature of devolution. The case of Sri Lanka is studied to understand how the nature of politics in Sri Lanka did not allow any of the negotiations to succeed. It is interesting to understand how the lack of a strong political will to tackle the core issues in Sri Lanka led to the failure of the efforts towards devolution leading to a military solution to the conflict.

Historical Context

Sri Lanka, a small island at the extreme southern tip of India is composed of three major ethnic communities, namely, the Sinhalese, the Tamils and the Muslims. ¹ They trace their origin to the Arab, Persian and Malay merchants who came to Sri Lanka and settled there. Most of the Muslims speak Tamil. The remaining are the Burgers who are less than 1% of the total population. ² The dominant issue in Sri Lanka since the 1950s was the ethno-nationalist conflict, which took a violent turn after 1983.

The ethnic groups involved directly in the conflict were the Sinhalese and the Tamils who considered themselves to be different from one another on the basis of their religious, linguistic and racial characteristics. The Tamils in Sri Lanka are themselves divided into two categories. The Sri Lankan Tamils who comprise about 12% of the total population and the Indian Tamils who are about 6% who came to Sri Lanka to work as labourers on the tea and coffee plantations.

The Sri Lankan Tamils consider themselves to belong to Sri Lanka and have a claim to the land. This brings them into direct conflict with the Sinhalese who also consider themselves to rightfully belong to the island. It is believed that Sri Lanka originally did not have any human inhabitants. It was regarded as the land of the ‘nagas’ and ‘spirits’, although archaeological evidence suggests the possibility of human beings on the island (Tambiah, 1986, p. 87). There were indigenous people called Vaddas who lived in Sri Lanka in the pre-Buddhist and pre-historic times (De Silva, 1981, p. 23). Later, conquests and migrations are considered to be ways by which people settled there.

Sri Lanka was rich in natural resources attracting traders who settled there, thus pushing the original inhabitants into remote areas. The settlers came in several tribes of which the most powerful was the Sinhalese tribe. The Tamils, too, came to Sri Lanka as immigrants as early as the fifth century AD. This was accelerated due to strong trade links between South India and Sri Lanka. These early invaders settled primarily in the Jaffna peninsula in northern Sri Lanka. Others settled along the eastern coast.

Ethnicity was not a bone of contention between communities in Sri Lanka, initially, although a brief history of competition can be seen during the Chola period who conquered Sri Lanka around the 10th century. This created a Tamil sphere of influence, which over a period of time led to the Sinhalas moving towards the South and the West.

The colonial period can be regarded as the beginning of ethnic consciousness in Sri Lanka. The Portuguese followed by the Dutch indulged in missionary activities and created a Christian influence in Sri Lanka. Initially, it was the caste affiliation within these groups that mattered more. The Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese were internally not a monolithic community. People were at one time or the other identified on the basis of their regional affiliations whether coastal or interior or on the basis of their caste categories such as the Karava, Salagama and Goyigama among the Sinhalese and the Vellala, Karaigar and Mukkuvar among the Tamils.

The British influence in Sri Lanka began around 1795. The British rule in Sri Lanka can be regarded as a period of the initiation of conflict. It can be called the period of ethnic polarization. It was during the British era that cheap labour from South India was encouraged to work on the coffee plantations (Tambiah, 1986, p. 65). This created a division internally between the Tamil community—the Indian Tamils who were brought to Sri Lanka as cheap labour and the Sri Lankan Tamils. Along with this, the British also introduced the English language as the language of administration. Thus, an English educated administrative elite was created. They were mostly Tamils since the Sinhala community being the landed community did not initially feel the need for learning the language. The Tamils, on the other hand, learned the language and got administrative positions during the British era.

During the colonial period, the main demand of the Sinhala and the Tamil community was for granting some autonomy in the local administrative structure. A shift in the demand for autonomy to a demand for independence occurred around the 1920s. However, this was not without its own problems. In 1919, the Sinhala and the Tamil elites together constituted the Ceylon National Congress (CNC). ³ The Tamils during this period did not really think of themselves as the minority community. They had a perception of an equal representation within the polity (De Silva, 1986, p. 59). The beginning of polarization can be seen after the 1920s with the split in the CNC along ethnic lines. ⁴ The Donoughmore constitution (1931) ⁵ that accepted the principal of Universal Adult Suffrage and the Soulbury Commission (1944) that rejected the constitutional protection of minorities further strengthened the feeling of insecurity among the communities especially the Tamil community. These developments saw a shift in the Tamil demand from a reserved seat to the minority to a 50% seat sharing formula.

Therefore, we see that in Sri Lanka, ethnic mobilization and ethnic polarization was a result of the colonial era, which ultimately took the form of a conflict. This conflict became progressively more and more violent. The consciousness of ethnicity was a result of post-independence politics of chauvinistic State building in Sri Lanka (Tambiah, 1986, p. 101).

Post-independence, the government that came to power in Sri Lanka was a Sinhala dominated government. The formation of the new government in Sri Lanka coincided with the Buddhist Revival Movement in 1956. The government in power sought to reverse the colonial legacy by introducing certain constitutional and political changes. The Official Languages Act, ⁶ (Leach, 1973, p. 45), the Peasant Colonization Scheme (refer to endnote 13) and the changes in education and employment ⁷ sharpened the differences between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. The State was perceived to represent Sinhala interests and hence a party to the conflict. This made the conflict resolution process very complicated.

The variety of ethnic, geographical and political configuration of Sri Lanka made the conflict resolution process a complex one. Sinhala Tamil relations have gone through several phases of accommodation and non-cooperation. The conflict progressively became more and more violent with the demands ranging from a moderate demand for autonomy within the Sri Lankan state to an extremist call for a separate ‘Eelam’ (Alagappan, 1985, p. 103; Phadnis, 1989, p. 199). ⁸ The conflict resolution process in Sri Lanka saw a transition in the main actors on the negotiating table to a shift in the interests and the socioeconomic conditions that guided these interests.

The Initiation of Negotiations

In Sri Lanka, several efforts at making peace and evolving a consensus between the Sinhala and the Tamil groups have been made ever since 1956. Although 1956 is also the year of the Sinhala Buddhist revival movement and marks the beginning of a new phase in Sinhalese Tamil relations, measures to accommodate the interests of both the communities were simultaneously made. The importance of devolution of power was recognized right since the beginning.

Post-independence developments saw a rise in ethnic chauvinism in Sri Lanka. The United National Party (UNP) founded in 1947 ⁹ split in 1951 with Soloman West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike forming the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). ¹⁰ Thus, during this period, two parties representing the interests of the Sinhalese—the UNP and the SLFP emerged in Sri Lanka. The Tamils, too, constituted the Federal Party to represent the Tamil interests. ¹¹ As the name suggests, the main demand of the Federal Party was to introduce a Federal system in Sri Lanka as against a unitary system that was accepted. The demand for devolution through Federalism was a feature of the negotiation process right since the beginning.

In the 1956 elections, the Federal Party was the sole party representing the interests of the Tamils. The pressure lobbying by Chelvanayakam who had threatened Satyagraha compelled S.W.R.D Bandaranaike who had assumed power to evolve a consensus. The first such attempt was in the form of the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam pact that recommended the setting up of Regional Councils in 1957 within the unitary system. The Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam pact had a threefold agenda. It recognized Tamil as the language of the national minority and slowed down the resettlement of the Sinhalese in the Northern and Eastern provinces which were Tamil majority provinces. It also agreed to devolution of State power through Regional Councils. The sensitive issue of language found mention in the pact. The government, however, faced a backlash culminating in the assassination of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in September 1959. ¹²

D.S. Senanayake who succeeded Bandaranaike also played the role of a peacemaker. The Senanayake–Chelvanayakam pact of 1965 sought to make modifications within the existing unitary system of Sri Lanka. It also made recommendations along the lines of the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact. It suggested the setting up of District Development Councils or DDCs within the unitary system. Sri Lanka being a unitary state had a very strong centralising tendency. Participation of the Tamils in the governmental process needed to be secured. The DDCs aimed at establishing local units to enable local participation without in any way changing the basic framework of the constitution. It also recognized Tamil as the language of administration in the Northern and Eastern region (Chakravarty, 1987, pp. 3–5). This pact, however, could not be enforced due to the opposition from the Buddhist lobby. A feeling of giving too much too early prevailed. Here, we see how the lack of political will overpowers the strategy of devolution.

The best way to resolve conflict is not to allow it to escalate. Till 1970s, the Federal Party demanded a fair share in the administration, however with little success. If this demand of the Federal party had been accommodated, the conflict could have avoided escalation. A window of opportunity was created but ignored. This can be regarded as the first missed opportunity at resolution. In 1972, the Federal Party merged with other Tamil groups such as the Tamil Congress and Ceylon Working Congress (CWC) under the leadership of Chelvanayakam, G.G. Ponnabalam and S. Thondaman to form the Tamil United Front (TUF). It was only after repeated demands for power sharing were ignored that the Tamil groups hardened their stand and demanded the right of self-determination and the creation of a separate Eelam. The TUF was renamed as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and the demand for a separate Tamil Eelam was made. The CWC did not support the newly formed TULF.

By 1976, the TULF came to represent the interests of all the Tamils including the Indian Tamils. ¹³ The Indian Tamils were, however, not sympathetic to the cause of Eelam and dissociated with the TULF on this issue (Suryanarayan, 1975, p. 387). The 1970s also saw the rise of the youth organization Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The JVP was composed of largely youngsters who had a left orientation and sought to overthrow the State. Although it was basically against the government, it played upon the anti-Tamil sentiment to enhance its support base. Around the 1970s, there were five major organizations that represented Tamil interests of which the largest was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). ¹⁴

Although negotiations had been a prominent feature of the Sri Lankan conflict as of any other conflict, the entire process of settling differences between the two communities gained momentum only after the UNP assumed power in 1977. During this period, the TULF became the chief negotiating partner for the Tamils. The Sirimavo Bandaranaike government that preceded the UNP was pro Sinhala Buddhist and therefore lacked the initiative required to negotiate an end to the conflict. In 1977, after the UNP assumed power, the DDCs system that was proposed earlier was taken up for active consideration. However, the Tamils were sceptical of some of the policies of the government like the state-aided colonization scheme. ¹⁵ The Tamils feared that through this scheme, the government aimed at annihilating the geographical entity of the Tamils (Satchi, 1983, pp. 258–263).

The peasant colonization scheme aggravated the fear of the Tamils which was articulated by the TULF leader A. Amirthalingam who believed that these government schemes were ‘similar to what Israelis were seeking to do in occupied Palestine, in such a way as to make the Tamils a minority in their own homelands’ ¹⁶ (The Hindu, 1985, p. 1). From the government point of view, the problem of landlessness was more acute which can be gauged from the statement made by the National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali who said ‘the government was launching a massive project to settle Sinhalese people in the Tamil dominated district of Jaffna. These would make Jaffna their permanent home… The government believes that more Sinhalese settlers in the North would help find short and long term solutions to inter racial problems’ (The Hindu, 1984, p. 1).

From 1978 to 1982, negotiations became the chief tool for resolving the conflict. The DDCs were looked upon as a best possible solution to the ongoing conflict. They primarily focused on defining the power and structure of the proposed DDCs as a way of meeting Tamil demand for greater decentralization. The chief negotiating parties during this period were the TULF and the UNP (Wriggins, 1995, p. 39). By 1975, the TULF had emerged as a representative of the Tamil aspirations and the UNP enjoyed a long tenure in power from 1977 to 1989, which made it the official negotiating party. The two parties did not trust each other, which reduced the chances for the resolution of the conflict.

The first issue that was discussed by the TULF and the UNP was the setting up of the DDCs. The UNP saw the district as the smallest administrative unit and hence the least dangerous. However, the Tamils wanted more than mere setting up of DDCs. They wanted the DDCs to be structured in such a way that cooperation between the DDCs in the Northern and Eastern provinces would be possible. The Sinhalese who feared secession felt threatened by this interest of the Tamils. They argued that the District Councils would become the first step in a Tamil plan to dismember the country. The Tamils wanted maximum power and resources for the DDCs while the government attitude was to grant the basic minimum. The fear that decentralization will limit their power made them limited in their attitude towards the Tamils.

Here, it can be seen how elite competition for power created an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, which acts as a hurdle in the conflict resolution process. Conflict resolution efforts demand assimilation and integration of communities. A feeling of the ‘us’ as against the ‘they’ is not conducive to end the conflict (Emerson, 1960, p. 260). A sense of belonging among all groups must prevail. Democracy cannot be in structure alone. It has to be embraced as a way of life. A democratic society—where the principles of liberty and equality are the same for all—is a just society and a just society is a well contained society where a feeling of fraternity exists. The will for creating this assimilative feeling was lacking on the negotiating table in Sri Lanka.

The negotiations initially took place informally. The UNP and the TULF sought to quietly work together to shape a mutually acceptable formula. Around mid-1979, the government appointed a commission to study the details of the DDCs. The commission’s report was presented in February 1980, and by August 1980, the parliament had authorized the creation of the DDCs (Wilson, 1988, pp. 140–155). The DDC was a democratically constituted decision-making body responsible for preparing development plans for the district as a whole. However, the ultimate responsibility and authority was vested with the central government. The first elections to the DDCs were held in 1981 (Wriggins, 1982, pp. 171–179). ¹⁷ However, due to financial constraints, the DDCs did not receive the funds that were promised to it. The Tamils interpreted this as a deliberate act of the government that reflected its lack of sincerity towards the resolution process. This was a second opportunity missed by the government. There is a general belief that had the DDCs been generously financed then, events would not have taken a violent turn later. Moreover, the main opposition party, the SLFP, was also not favourably inclined towards the DDCs (Wriggins, 1981, pp. 203–211). ¹⁸

By this period, violence had spread quite extensively in the Northern and the Eastern provinces and the establishment of the DDCs was seen as an act that gave too little and came too late. Following racial violence in 1981, there were a series of informal consultations between the government and the TULF. The ongoing dialogue between the two parties broke down in 1982. Both the parties blamed each other for the failure of the talks. The government believed that the TULF had an anti-government attitude (Samarasinghe, 1984, pp. 250–256). ¹⁹ The TULF, on the other hand, blamed the government for the failure of the talks. It alleged that the government was not granting adequate funds and power to the DDCs to enable them to function properly. The continuation of terrorist activities by the LTTE in the north was also a disrupting factor so also was the misuse of the PTA by the government. The failure of the TULF to negotiate a solution brought the LTTE on to the table as a chief representative of Tamil demands. A sincere effort to implement the devolution package would have avoided the violence that followed. The UNP and SLFP were always critical of the policies of the other irrespective of its merit (Phadnis, 1989, p. 199). The differences had by now assumed the nature of a conflict that was moving more and more towards a violent and protracted conflict.

Emergence of an External Party in the Negotiating Process

The year 1983 proved to be critical in Sinhala Tamil relations. The fight was now mainly between the government forces and the LTTE. ²⁰ By 1983, the intensive fighting between the two parties forced the negotiations to be converted from a biparty to a multiparty one with active external intervention in the form of the participation of the Indian government. The Tamils parties in India exerted pressure on the Indian government to act on behalf of the Sri Lankan Tamils. An All-Party delegation from Tamil Nadu led by Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran called upon the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to discuss the Sri Lankan issue. They presented the Prime Minister with a memorandum tracing the history of the present crisis in Sri Lanka describing the plight of the Tamil people and pleading for energetic action by India (The Hindu, 1983, p. 9).

Right since the beginning, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was against direct intervention in the Sri Lankan crisis. For all demands for Indian intervention, she maintained that ‘you want action but we are another country and whatever action we take must help the Tamils and not harm their cause’ (The Hindu, 1984, p. 1). However, the Indian government genuinely believed that the Sri Lankan government would make concessions to the Tamils only if they were forced to do so. One way of doing this was by strengthening the militants. The Indian government aided and provided refuge to the Tamil militants (De Silva, 1986, p. 346).

The cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils had now become a global cause with the international diaspora created a lobby like the Tamil Information Centre to provide extensive support to the Tamils in Sri Lanka. To counter this growing pressure from the international community, the Sri Lankan government too sought help from nations like Britain for setting up the intelligence organization (The Hindu, 1984, p. 1). Similar help was extended by the Israeli intelligence agency because of the insistence from the Americans (Kumaraswamy, 1987, p. 1342 and The Statesman, 1984, p. 1).

This complicated matters between the Indian Government and Sri Lankan government. India had to take these developments very seriously since any external interference in Sri Lanka would complicate matters for India. The lurking danger of the American interference on Sri Lankan soil would have harmed the strategic interest in the Indian subcontinent. Hence, India agreed to act as a mediator in the conflict. This offer by India was acceptable to both the parties—the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil groups who felt that India would show some sympathy to their cause.

Gopalaswamy Parthasarthy was sent as the special envoy to discuss the devolution package. The efforts of the Indian government right since the beginning were ensuring that a devolution package acceptable to both the parties could be successfully worked out. The devolution package discussed in this first phase is popularly also called the ‘Parthasarthy Formula’ or ‘Annexure C’ ²¹ (Rao, 1988, p. 419). This devolution package devised a broader power-sharing agreement than what already existed. The Parthasarthy Formula sought to replace the existing DDCs with a broader area of Regional Councils. These Regional Councils would cover the areas of the Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern regions. The Indian stand was that something wider than a District Council was required to take the negotiations one step forward. A larger autonomous unit of administration would ensure that the system was moving closer to a federation but stopping just short of it. This would help in accommodating the interests of the Tamils for greater share in power and also satisfy the Sri Lankan government by not offering a federal solution out rightly. This, however, was the point of contention between the parties right since the beginning. The government was unwilling to grant such wide powers to the Northern and Eastern regions for fear of its secession form Sri Lanka (Tiruchelvan, 1987, p. 24).

In 1984, An All Party Conference (APC) was held to discuss the stalemate over the Parthasarthy Formula. ²² The Tamils wanted to extend the basic unit of administration to the Regional Councils and the Government however was firm on its stand to discuss power sharing only up to the District Council level. The APC too met with failure with both the parties holding firmly onto their demands and showing complete lack of faith on each other. Both the SLFP and TULF rejected it for reasons of their own.

Another attempt by the Indian delegation to garner a solution was the Thimpu talks held in 1985. The Thimpu talks were historic because they brought all Tamil groups including the militant LTTE onto the negotiating table. The government was still insistent on its stand of treating the district as a basic unit of administration. The Tamils, however, had increased their demands to include the recognition of Tamils as a distinct nationality with the Tamils being given the right to self-determination and the creation of a single administrative and linguistic unit in the Northern and Eastern provinces that would recognize the existence of a Tamil homeland.

This demand met with strong opposition from the Sri Lankan government. The Sri Lankan President ruled out the merger of the Northern and the Eastern provinces. He said, ‘The Eastern province did not vote for the TULF leader Amirthalingam’s stand in 1977 when the TULF entered a general election on a separatist platform. If he feels things are different, then we can test it at democratic elections’ (The Hindu, 1985, p. 1). He also rejected the demand of the Tamils to self-determination. He said, ‘the demand that the proposals for a political settlement should recognise the right of Tamils to self-determination extends to the point of an absolute right it can only mean the totally unacceptable claim to a separate state by whatever name it is called’ (The Hindu, 1985, p. 1).

In 1985, ‘A Draft Framework of Accord and Understanding’ suggested a formula for settlement (Wriggins, 1995, p. 35). The overall trends in the negotiations suggest that the Tamils were hoping to have a Federal solution to the conflict. The TULF leader A. Amirthalingam said, ‘we are suggesting that the geographically contiguous Tamil areas traditionally occupied by the Tamil people be made into a linguistic province’ (The Hindu, 1985, p. 7; Pfaffenberger, 1987, p. 155). The 1986 summit held in Bengaluru suggested that instead of a total merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces, institutional linkages between the two would be established with the Eastern province trifurcated into Tamil majority Batticaloa, Sinhala majority Trincomalee and a Muslim majority Amparai province ²³ (Economic & Political Weekly, 1984, p. 2201). The LTTE chief Prabhakaran was also offered the Chief Ministership of Jaffna (De Silva, 1993, p. 112).

The LTTE did reject this offer and also established an autonomous government which blocked the efforts at negotiations. Thus, we find that India’s role as a mediator in the conflict did not bear much fruit. The IPKF accord changed the role of India from a peacemaker to a peacekeeper (Jayawardene, 1990, p. 123). The Indo Sri Lankan accord tried to bring about a settlement in terms of conducting elections in the North and East provincial councils and to treat the North and East as single administrative units. This, however, was met with strong resistance form the government. The Sinhalese looked upon the IPKF accord as a betrayal of the Sinhala population. The Tamil moderates were satisfied with the agreement, but the LTTE rejected it since it nowhere mentioned the word Tamil Eelam which was now the final demand of the Tamils.

After the elections in 1989, President Premadasa who came to power was a critic of the presence of the IPKF on Sri Lankan soil. After a long-protracted conflict, the Indian presence in Sri Lanka finally led to the withdrawal of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in 1990. Now, the major partners on the negotiating table were the government and the LTTE. The presence of the LTTE as a primary representative of the Tamils was now a fact (Singer, 1990, p. 409). In 1991, a proposal was again put up with the CWC leader S. Thondaman asking for the merger of the North and the East but at the same time safeguarding the rights of the Muslims and the Sinhalese in these areas (Hennanayake, 1993, p. 157). The TULF, however, was still insisting on a federal solution to the conflict.

Emergence of Chandrika Kumaratunga at the Helm of Affairs

In this atmosphere, a new presidential election took place in 1994 and a new government headed by Chandrika Kumaratunga came to power. The UNP that had been in control since 1977 lost the elections. Kumaratunga throughout her campaign spoke about peace and the end of the ethnic conflict. Her stress was on negotiations, and to emphasize this, a government mission was flown to Jaffna to hold an initial round of direct talks with the LTTE (Keerawala & Samarajiva, 1995, pp. 53–59).

This helped her win the support of both the communities. The result of all these efforts was that the LTTE agreed to cease all hostilities and hold further talks. The government and the LTTE had on a number of occasions gone back on their promises. The government was faced with the delicate task of negotiating with the Tigers as a serious political and military force and of avoiding to strengthen the self-portrayal of the LTTE as a government of an independent Eelam (Schaffer, 1996, p. 217). Talks with the LTTE broke down after the LTTE attacked and sank two naval boats in the Eastern port of Trincomalee. The LTTE opposed the peace process because the common people were slowly becoming admirers of Kumaratunga (Kumar, 1995, pp. 1179–1192). They feared that once a peace proposal was accepted, they would lose control over the Tamil masses and become powerless. During the course of its struggle, the LTTE had made a lot of foes who might seek revenge. Therefore, the LTTE saw the peace talks as a way to buy time, replenish their resources and resume hostilities. The LTTE used the peace talks to bolster their military strength.

For the resumption of the peace talks, Kumaratunga laid down three conditions, viz., of complete cessation of hostilities, a symbolic laying down of arms by the LTTE and an agreement by the LTTE to negotiate within a specific time period. To get the LTTE to agree to the talks, she used a tripartite strategy of applying military pressure on the LTTE, providing relief and rehabilitation to Tamil civilians in liberated areas and also offering a genuine devolution of political power (Schaffer, 1996, pp. 216–223).

The Devolution Package

A devolution package was announced by the Kumaratunga government. It was the last hope for peace on the island since it offered a solution short of Eelam. The devolution package accepted that only a federal solution is viable for resolving the ethnic conflict. However, it did not outrightly use the word ‘federal’, though that was what it proposed. For reasons of semantics, the term ‘union of regions’ was used (Kumar, 1995, pp. 1179–1192). ²⁴

The devolution package sought to change the Sri Lankan polity into an ‘indissoluble Union of Regions’ with substantial autonomy and responsibility being granted to every regional unit. This was a concession short of Eelam. Regional units assumed more powers in the new system and the central dominance ceased. These units were to be constituted from the already existing local units that were created for the sake of administrative efficiency. Adjustments wherever necessary like in the Eastern region where the Muslims feared Tamil domination were to be made.

The regional government was to be headed by a Chief Minister who could not be removed from office as long as he enjoyed the confidence of the Regional Councils. Power between the Centre and the regional units was to be divided on the basis of lists incorporated into the constitution. There was, however, no concurrent list since the Centre seemed to assume more powers under it. The Centre was to be assigned power and responsibilities related to defence, foreign affairs, currency and FOREX, customs, transportation and posts and telecommunications. The regional units would enjoy power on land and land settlement and law and order (Schaffer, 1996, pp. 216–223). This was seen to be a major concession made to the Tamils. It was also accepted that priority in land settlement schemes would be first given to the local inhabitants of the district and then the region. This would ensure a secure atmosphere for the Tamils who could no longer complain about victimization by Sinhalese colonisers.

The power to maintain law and order meant that the regional governments could create their own indigenous police force under the authority of the CM. Taxation powers were to be divided between the Centre and the regional units and a National Finance Commission was to be set up to allocate grants to the units keeping in mind balanced regional development (Schaffer, 1996, pp. 216–223). However, the overriding power of the Centre over the units was maintained to ensure the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. The Centre retained the power to dismiss a regional government if it seemed to be working against the established national interest.

Although the package announced by the government was comprehensive, to become effective, it was to require a two-thirds majority in the parliament and then majority support in a national referendum. This meant that devolution had to be accepted by the UNP, which was the major opposition party and with which the SLFP did not share cordial relations. Although the UNP, which was now in the opposition, had not outrightly rejected the devolution package, it was trying to delay the implementation of the package (The Hindu, 1997, p. 15). ²⁵ The acceptance of the package would give credit to the SLFP for ending the conflict that was not in the electoral interest of the UNP.

Another obstacle that the government faced in the implementation was the holding of a national referendum. This meant that majority of the Sinhalese masses should agree to be ready for devolution. The hatred and violence that had marred Sinhala Tamil relations for decades could not be easily wiped out especially in the light of the threat from the LTTE in the Northern Province. The Tamil parties, too, had not given an enthusiastic response to the package. The LTTE had out rightly rejected the package. It now wished to have nothing short of an Eelam (The Hindu, 1997, p. 13). ²⁶ The Tamil moderates, too, like the TULF were reluctant to accept the package readily for fear of being targeted for selling out Tamil interests. Moreover, the internal coalition partners of the alliance government like the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) were also not very keen to accept the package. They wished to protect the interest of the Muslims especially in the Eastern province.

Peace Process 2002 and Later

It was after a fairly long gap that the role of Norway as a facilitator was accepted and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on 22 February 2002 (Podder, 2006, p. 576). This MoU marked the beginning of a new phase in the negotiations, which were marked by six rounds of talks. The Government of Sri Lanka had to de proscribe the LTTE, which was a pre-condition to the talks (Sarvanamuttu, 2006, p. 3). The most important of these rounds was the third round of talks at Oslo where the LTTE made a substantive shift from the Thimpu declaration and expressed its willingness to explore a solution founded on the principles of self-determination based on a Federal structure within a united Sri Lanka (Sinha, 2005, p. 86).

This was historic since it is the only time in the peace process that there was a convergence in the demands of both the parties. This, too, proved to be a missed opportunity since the talks failed. The 2002–2003 round of talks proved that Sri Lankan peace process was a victim of populist democracy that was high on rhetoric but nothing else. The LTTE was adamant on an interim administration that would run along the lines of the federating unit that would be fully autonomous and the government on its part wanted to tone down the demand to merely the establishment of Regional Councils. The Oslo talks instead of establishing an interim administration—as had originally been planned—only implemented a provincial mechanism. The Sinhalese had all along only wanted a unitary form of government and this lack of political will to implement a federal solution harmed the peace process.

One of the reasons cited for the failure of the talks was the lack of unity within the ranks of both the parties. Split in the ranks of the LTTE along with the introduction of a new constitution of 1978 wherein the President and Prime Minister could belong to two different parties was one of the reasons for destabilization of the process (Jayasuriya, 2005, p. 88). Considering the history of aggressive competition between the UNP and SLFP, this aggravated tensions further between them.

In 2003, a meet was organized in Washington, which the LTTE could not attend since the Americans had declared the LTTE as a terrorist organization. The LTTE saw this as a deliberate attempt on the part of the government to gain political ascendancy. ‘The Washington meet was arranged to gain leverage and political ascendancy and hence was not acting as a partner in negotiations’ (Balasingham, 2004).

Against this backdrop, the Geneva talks of 2006 were held. The talks mainly focused on the ceasefire agreement and since the positions over the ceasefire agreements were asymmetric the talks failed. When Mahinda Rajapakse came to power in 2009, he once again proposed an APC to develop a consensus over the issue. Although portrayed as a hardliner, he showed a willingness to negotiate. However, the LTTE attack on army commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka in Colombo in 2009 and the blocking of the water supply from a major dam to the farmers in the East, Rajapakse retaliated and sought to eliminate the LTTE. Finally, after several attempts at negotiations, the LTTE action of killing the military general led to an outright war and culminated into a military solution to the conflict.

Obstacles to the Process of Conflict Resolution

There were several obstacles to a solution in Sri Lanka both from the Tamil side and from the Sinhalese side. The most important point of divergence was the Federal option for Sri Lanka. The discussion over this dates back to the 1920s when the Sinhalas from Kandy signed a petition in favour of a Federal system in Sri Lanka. Interestingly, around this period, the Tamil groups like the Tamil Congress were opposed to this idea. They wanted a Unitary pattern of governance in Sri Lanka. It is around 1956 that a reversal of demands can be seen where the Tamil groups like the Federal Party asked for a Federal system and the Sinhala groups like the UNP and SLFP were completely against it. In the 1970s, the Federal Party proposed that Sri Lanka should be divided into five states on the basis of the majority that they enjoy in the provinces. Several models of Federalism were studied, which included models based on linguistic, religious, cultural diversity to non-territorial federations. The Swiss Confederal model was explored; however due to the greater extent of autonomy that the federating units enjoy, it was rejected. The Indian model was considered to be the best since it was closer home geographically and culturally. However, due to the small geographic area of Sri Lanka, the Sinhalas feared disintegration of the country. Critics of Federalism argue that secession is easily possible in Sri Lanka first of the Tamils and then of the Muslims. They argue that meaningful devolution is possible even in a Unitary State.

The Federal debate was given voice once again at Oslo where the LTTE agreed to a federation within a united Sri Lanka. However, the pertinent question here is, do both the parties attach the same meaning to the word federal? For the LTTE, Federal meant complete autonomy in the Northern and Eastern region leading finally to an independent government, and for the government, Federal implied the establishment of Regional Councils. G.H. Peiris suggested a quasi-federal model wherein matters of foreign policy, defence were to be tackled by the Centre and issues like health, education, etc., were to be tackled by the States (Peiris, 2006, p. 72). However, the LTTE was not in favour of this kind of distribution of power because this would mean giving up its claim of establishing a separate Eelam. The Sinhalese, too, still perceived any form of devolution to be a threat to their interests. There was always a fear in the minds of the Sinhalese that an acceptance of a federal solution was merely a step away from accepting the secession of Sri Lanka and the creation of an independent Eelam. Centralist tendencies in both the parties denied this kind of a model leading to the failure of a federal arrangement for Sri Lanka.

Another obstacle to the peace process was the side lining of the ‘minorities within the minorities’. The negotiation process and discussion often neglected the Muslim community in the power-sharing debate (Wangner, 2006, p. 87). Although it was projected throughout as a conflict between two parties, there were other marginalized groups like the Muslims who also had their own demands. The Muslims had never supported the separatist demand in the North East and this led to an onslaught on the community increasing their fears of ethnic cleansing at the hands of the LTTE. The demand for autonomy by the Muslim groups emerged around the 1980s especially in the East. The first autonomous demand was proposed in 1986 by the East Ceylon Muslim Front calling for a Muslim majority provincial council in the Northern and Eastern provinces (Mohideen, 1987, p. 26). The first Muslim political party, the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, gained popularity and was an alliance partner in the Peoples Alliance government. However, like all other groups, they too could not put up a united front and split into two factions. It became easy for the parties to ignore the Muslim demand due to their internal fragmentation. This diluted their presence in the process of negotiations.

There was also no unity among the Sinhalese groups. Any concession made by one party was seized upon and attacked by the other. When two major ethnic parties compete for the allegiance of the same ethnic group, any concession made by the party in power was seized upon by the party out of power as a sign of weakness (Horowitz, 1985, p. 697). On its side, the government was gaining the confidence of wiping out the LTTE in armed combat. Therefore, they were less willing to seek the passage of the package than before.

From the side of the Tamils, too, there were hindrances to a solution. The Tamil groups did not have confidence in the Sinhalese government. They had gone back on their promises far too often in the past. Moreover, they believed that Kumaratunga’s package was completely devoid of power sharing at the centre. Among the Tamil elite as well, there was no consensus. The Tamils were even more divided than the Sinhalese. There were several groups and subgroups of Tamils seeking to further their own interests (Singer, 1992, pp. 712–722). The LTTE happened to be the most militant. It had eliminated all opposition Sinhala and Tamil groups. Thus, no solution to the conflict was possible unless the LTTE demands were taken into consideration.

The government had refused to hold talks with the LTTE unless it stopped its militant activities in the North and the East. As the Sri Lankan foreign minister put it, ‘what the LTTE seems to be fighting for, namely, a separate state in Sri Lanka is something which no political party, no responsible body of opinion in the rest of the country, can possibly countenance’ (The Hindu, 1997, p. 14). One of the chief demands of the LTTE—of a sovereign separate state—was non-negotiable. It was because of this dissonance in basic objectives that talks failed to provide the breakthrough in the ethnic struggle (Kumar, 1995, pp. 1179–1192).

Conclusion

It is evident from the above that the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict—as of any other ethnic conflict—involves a variety of dimensions that makes it very complex to resolve. In Sri Lanka, several attempts at brokering peace and reaching a political settlement were made but in vain. Lack of consensus over the extent and nature of devolution and the absence of a strong political will to negotiate a solution can be cited as two factors for the failure of the peace process. Devolution in Sri Lanka can be envisaged on a continuum. At one extreme was the unitary state with a strong centralist preference and on the other was an independent state of Tamil Eelam. Devolution to succeed had to lie in between these two (Singer, 1992, pp. 712–722).

Throughout the peace process, there was no agreement between the two parties over the unit of devolution and the powers to be vested to it. Power sharing should take into consideration the pluralistic nature of the Sri Lankan society. The Federal experiment can be seriously considered as an option for shared ownership of the political and administrative structures along with an enhanced role in the decision-making process. This might accommodate the interests of the marginalized groups.

But for this to happen, a strong political will has to be shown by the parties involved. Internal political rivalry between the Tamils and Sinhala groups made it difficult to implement a solution. Both the parties refused to compromise and negotiate over their fundamental positions. The highly competitive nature of politics between them and within their groups proved to be a primary hurdle in the resolution process. The political will as a variable existed throughout the conflict and will remain as a determinant in any future political landscape that develops.

The lack of a genuine political will on both the sides finally led to a military solution to the conflict. However, military action cannot resolve a conflict, it can only manage it and end violence. Feelings of injustice and exploitation among communities have to cease. This can be done not through a centralist approach but by creating systems that ensures the participation of all. Conflicts cannot just be managed, but they have to be resolved. For resolving conflicts, there is no alternative to a strong political will that incorporates democracy and a genuine devolution of power. Devolution, decentralization and regional autonomy are ways through which harmony can be achieved in multiethnic societies.

They are the only source of lasting peace. The Sri Lankan case however reaffirms the point of how democracy and devolution are at the mercy of political will. A strong political will to end the conflict definitely ensures that affirmative steps in that direction are taken. Conflict in Sri Lanka has been managed, but it is a long road ahead to resolution. Hence, to conclude, it can be said that if democracy and devolution are a Strategy for Conflict Resolution, the Political Will is a Determinant.