Symbolic Post-Conflict Recovery in the Rwenzori Sub-Region of Uganda

Introduction

Post-conflict recovery has, since the end of the Cold War, attracted global policy attention due to the increase in the number, intensity and effects of intra-state conflicts in developing countries (Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Osaghae, 1999: 62; Pearce, 1997: 438). Mneesha (2010) defines conflict in general terms as ‘anything that upsets the balance of relationship’ while post-conflict recovery refers to interventions used to address the adverse effects of violent conflict. This article opted to use the term ‘post-conflict recovery’ instead of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ because of its apparent distance from the infrastructure-oriented connotation according to Barakat and Azyck (2009: 1069). Notwithstanding the consensus by researchers and policy makers on the need for post-conflict recovery, there has been no agreement on the best way to do it (Moore, 2000: 11–12). The dominant framework is clearly biased towards rebuilding the ‘hardware’ which entails physical infrastructure and formal structures of the state (McKay, 2004: 19–20). However, available evidence shows that the neglect of rebuilding the ‘software’ in the form of the indigenous social institutions (social fabric) that bind communities together and improve livelihoods destroyed by conflict can have negative implications for post-conflict peace and stability (Ogbaharya, 2008: 397).

It is in light of these conventional views and frameworks that Uganda’s post-conflict recovery programme in the Rwenzori sub-region of western Uganda is analysed. I begin by giving a brief background of Uganda’s intra-state conflicts. Like many other African states, Uganda’s post-independence era was marred by prevalent and violent internal conflict (Karugire, 1988). Most of these conflicts were fuelled by creeping tendencies of political intolerance and authoritarianism after independence (Ibingira, 1973). Some conflicts were attributed to ethnic discrimination and marginalization as exemplified by the Rwenzururu conflict in the Rwenzori sub-region (Stacey, 2003; Syahuka-Muhindo, 1983). Other conflicts, such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), were driven by politico-religious motives. According to Hovil and Werker (2005) and Kayunga (2000), the ADF conflict was started by an extremist group of Muslims with links to al-Qaeda. It had its rear bases in the volatile region of Ituli in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It launched its attack in the Rwenzori sub-region in 1996 with the aim to overthrow government and establish an Islamic republic. These conflicts led to a series of socio-economic and political crises in the country during the 1980s and 1990s (Mutibwa, 1992). Even with the advent of President Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) government which ushered in relative peace and stability for much of the country, pockets of violent domestic conflict persisted, especially in the north, east and parts of the western region. According to the Chief of General Staff, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has fought and defeated 26 armed insurgent groups since it came to power in 1986. ¹ The spiralling domestic conflicts not only significantly weakened the state but also had devastating effects on the economy and people’s livelihoods. According to government reports, Uganda’s economic collapse since the 1970s had a cumulative effect on people’s welfare to the extent that, by 1992, 56% of the population were composed of the absolute poor (RoU, 1992). Green and Ahmed (1999: 189) confirm that violent intra-state conflicts in Africa perpetuate chronic poverty among the populace.

Despite the negative effects of violent domestic conflicts on people’s livelihoods, the NRM government initially paid less attention to post-conflict recovery of conflict-torn societies (RoU, 2010). Even in the case of the ‘Luwero Triangle’, ² which sheltered President Museveni’s guerrilla movement, there was no initial consideration of post-conflict recovery. Instead, the little post-war rebuilding assistance in Luwero was done by international humanitarian agencies. The neglect can be attributed to a number of factors: First, the NRM was overwhelmed by the magnitude of conflict-torn areas under circumstances of national economic incapacity. The intervention of the World Bank and IMF in 1987 to help fix the economy worsened the situation because of their strict conditions. They did not give leverage to government to allocate funds to rebuild areas torn by civil conflict. Moreover, the neo-liberal economic policy reforms in Uganda cared less about people’s welfare as exemplified by the radical cuts of government spending on social programmes (Mamdani, 1990). No wonder the dominant neo-liberal economic framework has been criticized for its failure to respond to the post-war rebuilding needs of resource weak states (Green, 2000: 360). The consequence of government’s delay to come up with a special package to rebuild conflict-torn areas was the recurrence of conflicts in some of these areas. The return of conflict corroborates the argument by McDonough (2008: 357) that neglect of rebuilding political and socio-economic preconditions of African civil wars in the aftermath of conflict frustrates peace building.

However, through a learning process, the NRM embarked on post-conflict recovery programmes because of the worsening socio-economic plight of the victims of conflict, mounting local and international political pressure criticizing government neglect, and the need to avert recurrence of armed conflict. The government with effect from 1992 began creating special ministers for conflict-torn areas, such as the ministers for Luwero, the northern region and Teso, to ensure that government efforts to rebuild areas torn by conflict were effectively coordinated and implemented. These ministers were housed in the Office of Prime Minister to give them clout since the Prime Minister is the overall coordinator and leader of government business. Likewise, recovery programmes for the northern region were initiated in 1992 to mitigate the effects of Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) conflict, even though the war had begun in 1986. These included the four-year Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP) (1992–1996), followed by the first phase of Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) in 2003–2009 and the second phase in 2010–2014. Later on, the Peace and Recovery Development Plan (PRDP), a comprehensive regional development plan, was conceived to rebuild the north after the end of a two-decade LRA conflict in 2006. Whereas the post-war recovery programmes for northern Uganda received generous financial support from the government and donors, they registered dismal performance (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010: 1231). The case of the Rwenzori sub-region was not any different from the two aforementioned cases in the sense that mounting internal and external pressure forced government to initiate a recovery programme. More particularly, the triggering factor was the cold reception given to the president during the 2006 election campaigns that led to the fear that the sub-region would fall to the opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) party. In response, the president pledged to rebuild the sub-region immediately after the elections. However, the post-conflict recovery process was delayed until 2010.

The scope of this article is restricted to a critical analysis of the performance of the Luwero-Rwenzori Development Programme (LRDP) in the rebuilding of the Rwenzori sub-region after the end of the ADF war in 2003. The article is derived from findings of a qualitative study conducted in Bundibugyo and Kasese districts since 2013. The research triangulated in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and documentary review to generate data. It involved in-depth interviews with 48 key informants comprising district officials, elected local leaders and CSOs. These were supplemented by two gender-based FGDs from each of the two worst affected sub-counties purposively sampled from Bundibugyo and Kasese districts, respectively. Each FGD consisted of 10 adult returnees from the internally displaced people (IDP) camps. The total number of people interviewed was 128. The article begins with conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of post-war recovery, traces the roots of the conflict, gives a detailed account of the nature and process of programme implementation, analyses the impact and reasons for dismal performance. It concludes with policy implications and suggestions for a pragmatic policy approach to post-conflict rebuilding.

Conceptualization of post-conflict recovery

Post-conflict recovery has not only become an international norm but also expanded in scope worldwide (Barakat and Azyck, 2009: 1069; Call and Cousens, 2008: 1). The term post-conflict recovery entails the reactivation of economic and social development and creation of a peaceful environment for preventing a relapse into violence (Barakat, 2005: 10). Despite agreement by academicians and policy makers on the importance of rebuilding countries torn by conflict, there is no consensus on the meaning of post-conflict rebuilding (Hasic, 2004: 1x). Green and Ahmed (1999: 189) contend that ‘rehabilitation after violent conflict is too narrowly specified . . . and too fragmented with no micro-strategic or conceptual frame’. The dominant framework of post-conflict recovery advocated for by Western donors is frequently interlaced with neo-liberal principles (Julien, 2008) and narrowly focused on rebuilding the ‘hardware’ (McKay, 2004: 19–20). It lays emphasis on disarmament, demobilization, demining, rebuilding formal institutions and physical infrastructure. Coupled with this ‘hardware’, the dominant view often advocates for creation of a market-friendly and liberal political environment (Blowfield, 2005: 520; Daley, 2006: 304; World Bank, 1998). The downside of the dominant framework is that it tends to be driven by ideological and institutional bias and often overlooks the subterranean social institutions; yet they are significant in post-conflict rebuilding (Ogbaharya, 2008: 398). Accordingly, the dominant view has been intensely criticized for neglecting the ‘software’ (Julien, 2008; Lederach, 1997: 24; Paris, 1997). The alternative view advocates for a community-centred approach that stresses the rebuilding of the social fabric (informal local level institutions) eroded by violent conflict and improving the livelihood conditions of the affected people (Barakat and Azyck, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Hoogenboom and Vieille, 2010; Quinn, 2007). It puts special emphasis on empowering people economically and rebuilding their customary institutions that traditionally held society together and mediated transactions and disputes. The indigenous micro-level institutions possess the potential to bring about social reconciliation and development if prioritized in the post-conflict recovery agenda.

The predominance of the former view in international and local policy arenas is attributed to the fact that the affluent Western states wield great power and influence over international and local policy making processes of poor states. Accordingly, post-conflict rebuilding is largely shaped by their view because they are the key funders of such programmes. The preference for the ‘hardware’ best serves their political and ideological interests. According to the dominant view, post-conflict recovery is about restructuring state institutions along the lines of free market economics and liberal politics (Guzina, 2007: 222; Paris, 1997: 56). The rebuilding of ‘hardware’ is preferred because it is less costly and represents a short-term engagement that will not commit donors for long (Moore, 2000: 13–16). The post-conflict rebuilding experience in Bosnia is a clear testimony to this perception and practice (Vukosavljevic, 2008). Conversely, rebuilding people’s livelihoods necessitates long-term commitment and considerable resources which donor states are wary of giving. They are hesitant to extend support to such programmes, especially at a time when Western economies are trying to recover from the 2008 financial crisis and are stressed by the refugee crisis.

Moreover, advocating for ‘hardware’ in post-conflict rebuilding also creates business opportunities for donor states, as experts and equipment for implementing such programmes are procured from these states. They also avail themselves of the leverage to influence policies of the recipient states. Policy making in poor states has since the 1980s been taken over by Western donors as exemplified by the neo-liberal economic and political reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. The post-reform era has also witnessed more external policy initiatives for poor states as evidenced by the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals. The other benefit is diplomatic. Donor recipient states find it difficult to go against the positions of their funders in international fora because they are obliged to reciprocate the support.

There is also controversy about the appropriate mode of intervention in post-conflict recovery (Green and Ahmed, 1999: 189). One perspective advocates for the top-down while the alternative view argues for the bottom-up approach. The former view tends to be popular with international organizations and national governments while the latter is prevalent with non-state actors, such as civil society organizations (CSOs). The top-down approach to rebuilding is assumed to be cost-effective and faster to implement. However, the advocates of the bottom-up approach to rebuilding criticize the top-down approach for being insensitive to the real needs and priorities of the people because it is not participatory (Hoogenboom and Vieille, 2010). It is also faulted for being driven by ‘outsider’ technocrats who lack a deeper understanding of local level socio-cultural settings (Chambers, 1997). Often top-down approaches impose agendas that are incompatible with local circumstances (Duffey, 2000). They also tend to be bogged down by bureaucratic delays, corruption and politicization. Notwithstanding the criticisms levelled against the top-down approach, the bottom-up approach also has its flaws. Most frequently, community-driven recovery programmes tend to be riddled by subterranean social rifts underlined by gender, tradition, class differences, family feuds and political affiliation differences (Lederach, 1997: 24). Moreover, these differences are exacerbated by programme implementation weaknesses that characterize implementing agencies such as CSOs. Some of these weaknesses include corruption, local rivalries, insufficient and delayed funding, competition, lack of accountability and poor coordination, among others (Muhumuza, 2010).

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that post-conflict recovery is a complex undertaking that has increasingly necessitated a nuanced approach that combines top-down and bottom-up approaches. Though there are challenges associated with grafting different agencies and approaches, the benefits tend to be greater. The current trend shows that African states are increasingly partnering with non-state actors in post-conflict recovery situations despite their fundamental differences. This partnership is underpinned by various factors. On the one hand, African states have bowed to pressure from donors to work with CSOs because a bigger fraction of their post-war recovery support was increasingly being channelled through CSOs. This was due to the perception that CSOs are more effective development actors than the bureaucratic and corruption-riddled African states (Fowler, 1988). This perception also blends well with the neo-liberal view which considers the civil society to be essential ‘gap fillers’ and checks and balances to the predatory state in Africa (Kaldor, 2003). On the other hand, African states are willing to work with apolitical CSOs because they do not interfere in local politics and bring in the much needed resources to rebuild war-torn societies (Muhumuza, 2014). Most of these states are hard pressed to raise the necessary resources for post-conflict recovery. Their budgets hardly balance and funding gaps are plugged by donors. Given such circumstances, African states have no other option but to work with CSOs. The usual practice is for them to design post-conflict recovery programmes that aim at attracting funding from humanitarian agencies and international NGOs. The following section uses a historical perspective to examine the roots of conflict in the Rwenzori sub-region.

The historical roots of conflict in the Rwenzori sub-region

The Rwenzori sub-region surrounds the Rwenzori Mountains on the Ugandan side of the border. The sub-region is inhabited by about 10 ethnic groups. The Bakonjo occupy the upper slopes of the mountains while the other groups live in the lowlands. These ethnic groups were oppressed and discriminated against by the Toro kingdom’s pre-colonial rule. The advent of British colonialism upheld the status quo which caused serious discontent (Steinhart, 1977). Even after independence, the pre-colonial and colonial injustices inflicted on these people were never fully redressed (Doornbos, 1970). Further to the discrimination and oppression, these groups accused the colonial and post-colonial governments of marginalizing and dispossessing them of their land (63%) which was gazetted into conservation areas and government development schemes (Kasese DLG, 2011).

It was not until the 1950s that the leaders of Bakonjo and Bamba conspired to break away from Toro kingdom’s political grip by forming the Rwenzururu movement. This move marked the genesis of the protracted conflict in the sub-region. In 1962, the two groups openly rebelled against the Toro kingdom and created Obusinga Bwa Rwenzururu (OBR) (Rwenzururu kingdom). The demand to be recognized as a separate kingdom was pursued through armed rebellion in the Rwenzori Mountains. Successive Uganda governments tried to resolve the conflict without success. President Amin sought in vain to address the discrimination issue by creating the districts of Rwenzori for the Bakonjo and Semuliki for the Bamba in 1974. The rebellion resumed in the early 1980s and was also temporarily resolved by the second Obote regime with some concessions, though the discontent remained. Even under the NRM government, the disgruntled groups renewed their agitation for the granting of the Rwenzururu kingdom. This was after the government agreed to the conditional return of cultural institutions in Uganda in 1993. Initially, the government rejected the demand for OBR cultural institution which created political tensions and an environment of negative peace. Galtung (1969) defines the concept negative peace as the absence of armed conflict though the economic and political conditions that lead to violence continue to prevail. It is strongly believed that the ADF rebels took advantage of this discontent to obtain a sanctuary for organizing and waging a war in the Rwenzori sub-region from 1996 to 2003 before they were militarily defeated and fled back to their rear bases in the DRC.

Notwithstanding the ejection of the ADF rebels, peace and stability in the region remained elusive. The Bakonjo first desperately shifted their political allegiance to the FDC party in the 2006 general elections because of government’s refusal to grant them a kingdom. Later, the NRM government changed its mind and granted them a cultural institution in 2010 as a gambit to win area votes in the 2011 elections. However, discontent remained because of unresolved issues in the sub-region. As a result, the period from 2014 witnessed a renewal of violent conflict, especially after government supported the creation of Obudinghiya Bwa Bundibugyo (OBB), a splinter cultural institution for the Bamba-Babwisi people of Bundibugyo district who divorced from OBR in 2014 (Semakula et al., 2014: 4). The creation of OBB infuriated the Bakonjo and sparked a series of armed conflicts in the sub-region in which scores of people were killed, property destroyed and government security personnel and installations attacked (Nzinjah, 2014: 14). The cultural leader’s intransigent attitude and creation of a local militia group known as Kilhumila Muthima eventually prompted the army to attack his palace, arrest and arraign him before the courts of law (Vision Reporter, 2016: 4). The incarceration of the cultural head of OBR, Charles Wesley Mumbere, further heightened the tensions and posed a serious threat to peace and stability in the sub-region (Wesaka, 2017: 3).

The essence of Luwero-Rwenzori Development Programme

As earlier observed, the government did not earmark a special recovery programme for the Rwenzori sub-region after the war. Instead, it resumed the implementation of nation-wide development programmes that had been suspended in 1996 due to violent conflict. The fact that government did not come up with a special recovery programme after the conflict and instead resumed the implementation of earlier programmes was perceived as political neglect and caused political disenchantment in the sub-region. People from the sub-region accused government of not treating them differently from other parts of the country that had not been affected by war. They also complained about being discriminated against compared with the northern region which benefitted from three recovery programmes. The question is, why was preference given to the rebuilding of the northern region which was an opposition stronghold while paying lip service to the Rwenzori sub-region that happened to be the home region and a strong support base of the ruling elite?

The motive of the NRM political leadership needs to be understood in the context of the politics of the country. The LRA conflict started in 1986 and was waged for two decades until it ended in 2006 while the ADF conflict started in 1996 and ended in 2003. Irrespective of the similarities between the two armed conflicts, such as being driven by politico-religious fanatics, the use of religious indoctrination as a major strategy for training, benefiting from external support and waging trans-border military campaigns, the two also had stark differences. The distinction between the two conflicts was that the LRA conflict was being waged in the region that was hostile to the NRM government while the ADF conflict was in a relatively less hostile political environment. The armed conflict in the north was more lethal and posed a serious threat to national security. It also escalated beyond the traditional north to the eastern region parts of Teso which posed a significant political threat to the NRM regime. It was in this light that immediate effort was mobilized to contain it rather than the ADF conflict which was mostly confined to the Rwenzori Mountains and was less threatening.

Besides, more international attention was paid to the northern insurgency which received wider publicity than the Rwenzori conflict. Hence, government was under great international pressure to end the conflict and rebuild the northern region. Moreover, the government had to stem the sentiments and allegations from northern elites that it hated northerners and wanted to punish them for supporting the predecessor government (Gingyera-Pinchwa, 1989). Consequently, government had to focus more attention to the recovery of the north. This was important for purposes of ensuring national unity and guarding against possibilities of secession ³ since some northern politicians were already advocating it. As a matter of urgency and prioritization, the government had to intervene with a mid-conflict recovery programme for the north as early as 1992 to mitigate the effects of conflict on the people’s welfare. It was also intended to demonstrate government commitment to relieve the suffering of the northern people contrary to the view that it hated and wanted to punish them Gingyera-Pinchwa (1989), a view peddled by northern opposition politicians and anti-government forces. This mid-conflict recovery programme was also aimed at dissuading local people from supporting the LRA. The treating of the northern region as an emergency somehow diverted government’s attention from the Rwenzori sub-region. The variation in the two political environments also explains why it took so long to end the LRA conflict compared with the ADF conflict.

Given such circumstances, the government delayed the development of a post-conflict recovery programme for the Rwenzori sub-region. It was not until August 2007 that government initiated the Luwero-Rwenzori Development Programme (LRDP), a five-year, post-conflict recovery plan that sought to rebuild the Luwero Triangle and the Rwenzori areas ravaged by the National Resistance Army (NRA) and ADF conflicts of 1981–1986 and 1996–2003, respectively (RoU, 2010). The government included Luwero to avoid a political backlash from the area since it was never rebuilt after the war. The two wars had adverse socio-economic effects on the two areas. According to RoU (2010: 9), the objectives of LRDP were to redress the socio-economic effects of war by improving the economic wellbeing of households, repair infrastructure, increase access to and improve social service delivery, protect and sustainably manage the environment, and promote peace building and conflict mitigation. The post-conflict recovery initiative was designed in the context of the ongoing national and sectoral policy framework. It was an amalgamation of all the national programmes and its geographical coverage spanned the central, south-western and western regions. In other words, the LRDP was ambitious given that it covered 39 districts that were to be rebuilt in five years. It also had various components that were not necessarily specific to post-conflict recovery.

The government’s motive for post-conflict recovery of the Rwenzori sub-region was largely underpinned by political considerations. While it is the obligation of the state to serve the needs of all its citizens, politics tend to influence the way this is done. The ruling elites weigh their choices before intervening in certain situations. According to Green (2011: 424), they choose to intervene in those areas where they expect to reap immediate political benefits. It is in this context that the NRM’s process of rebuilding the Rwenzori sub-region should be analysed. The delay in rebuilding the area cost the government political support yet it used to be a political stronghold of the NRM prior to war. Museveni’s first party (Uganda Patriotic Movement) not only won the only parliamentary seat in the Rwenzori area during the controversial 1980 elections but it also provided a second sanctuary to the NRA guerrillas during the 1980s (Museveni, 1997). Given the people’s perception that the NRM had abandoned them at their hour of greatest need, they switched their electoral support to the opposition FDC party which won many parliamentary seats in Kasese district during the 2006 elections. Cognizant of the political repercussions of delaying to rebuild the area, government had to hastily intervene to stem political discontent and reclaim the lost political ground in the 2011 general elections. It was also necessary to guard against the sub-region being used as a future launch pad by subversive forces. Drawing from earlier experiences with NURP and NUSAF, government also sought to attract the attention of development partners to support the LRDP initiative.

The implementation process of LRDP

The LRDP was budgeted for USh 540.9bn (US$216m) to be funded by Uganda government and donors. It was to be implemented using the decentralization framework where funding was to be channelled through the respective district and sub-county local authorities and utilized according to established guidelines. The Chief Administrative Officers who worked closely with political and technical leadership in the districts were to implement the programme while the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) was to oversee and coordinate through the Minister for Luwero Triangle. In short, the role of the OPM was to provide policy direction, ensure standards, mobilize resources, give guidelines and undertake monitoring and evaluation of the programme through the Permanent Secretary. Accordingly, a Programme Management Unit was created in the OPM to coordinate and facilitate the implementation of LRDP. The LRDP was first piloted for two financial years (FYs) and started with 15 pilot districts in 2009/2010 FY but later expanded to 39 districts in 2010/2011 FY. The full scale implementation of the programme in all the districts was supposed to be effected in the 2011/2012 FY for a five-year period but was continually postponed due to lack of funds (RoU, 2011).

Given its wide geographical coverage, the targeted districts were graded according to the impact of the conflict. They were categorized into high intensity, medium intensity and low intensity. The intervention was to be implemented in 40% of the parishes of high intensity districts, 20% of the parishes in medium intensity districts and 10% of the parishes in low intensity districts. In light of this, government provided guidelines for the selection of four of the worst affected sub-counties and 15 parishes from the four sub-counties in Kasese and Bundibugyo districts, respectively, for programme implementation. In Kasese district, the three worst affected sub-counties of Kitholhu, Kitende and Bugoye were selected to benefit from the LRDP funding. Government guidelines provided that each of the three sub-counties gets USh 46m (US$18,400). Each of the remaining sub-counties of Bwera, Lake Katwe and Kalambi, which were least affected by conflict, received little funding of USh 16m (US$6,400) for livelihood improvement for only one parish in each sub-county. In the case of Bundibugyo, the LRDP funds were distributed to four beneficiary sub-counties. Kasitu received USh 34m (US$13,600), Ndugutu USh 38m (US$15,200), Bubandi USh 29.5m (US$11,800) and Busani USh 26m (US$10,400).

Of the LRDP proposed budget, 44.5% was to be committed to community interventions while 53.5% was for physical and social infrastructure and service delivery. The remaining 2% was to cater for administrative costs. The community intervention component was aimed at economically empowering the victims of conflict, such as the civilian veterans and ex-combatants, orphans and vulnerable children, widows and widowers and child-headed households using a community-driven development approach. Based on this approach, community groups were to be given grants to procure inputs for enhancing household incomes of members and consequently relieve them of poverty. To achieve this objective, the programme specifically targeted improving the economic wellbeing of 105 households per parish in 523 parishes by enabling each of them to earn at least USh 20m (US$800) per annum by 2015. The composition of beneficiaries was to be 40% women and 20% youth. Community grants were channelled through the sub-county savings and credit cooperative societies (SACCOs), which were responsible for managing and disbursing the funds on behalf of the district. Each benefiting parish received USh 16m (US$6400) annually. The grants comprised a 50% grant and 50% repayable loan to each beneficiary at an interest rate of 13% per annum and recoverable in two equal instalments. The grant was treated as a revolving fund based at the parish level.

The community intervention component not only received less funding than that for physical infrastructure but also targeted the economically active community groups. It also excluded those that had benefitted from other government economic empowerment programmes before. According to figures available in the two districts, government released USh 177.5m (US$71,000) to Bundibugyo District with a population of 254,107, on 23 April 2010 (Bundibugyo DLG, 2010). According to its accountability report, 5% (USh 2,836,100) (US$1,134) of the funds was used for mobilization and awareness building, USh 8m (US$3200) was transferred to sub-counties for sensitization and production of reports by focal persons, USh 5m (US$2000) was used for monitoring, while USh 128m (US$51,200) was transferred to SACCOs for provision of grants and loans to groups to improve people’s livelihoods. The situation in Kasese District was similar to that of Bundibugyo as it only received USh 302.7m (US$121,080) in the FY 2009/2010. The beneficiary sub-counties that were selected in line with the criteria of the OPM received less funding than that initially suggested. Cases in point include Kitholhu which received USh 32m (US$12,800) instead of USh 46m (US$18,400) and Bwera sub-county that got USh 11,515,000 (US$4606) in 2009/2010 FY instead of USh 16m (US$6400) as expected. Given that the funds were too little to be distributed to groups for purposes of improving their livelihoods, ⁴ sub-county leaders diverted the funds to infrastructural development.

The procedure for accessing community grants required that funds be first deposited with SACCOs. Then, an advert was displayed in public places calling on members of the public to organize into enterprise groups to apply for grants from the Beneficiary Selection Committee (BSC).The composition of BSC included the sub-county chairperson, committee members of Prosperity For All (PFA), LRDP focal point officer, National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) officials, committee members of Uganda Farmers Association and SACCO officials from the sub-county. The selection criterion was that the enterprises had to have a high potential for financial returns. The onus was on the sub-county leadership to select viable enterprises for financial support. Once the applications were made, BSC met to appraise the loan applications and select eligible applicants. Although the BSC was initially supposed to select all the beneficiaries according to LRDP, they were later limited to applicants for micro-projects. The selection of applicants for medium-scale enterprises was centralized and applications for financial support were submitted directly to the OPM.

The supplementary role played by donors need not be ignored. These included bilateral agencies, UN humanitarian agencies and both international and local CSOs. Though the majority of them did not contribute funds to the LRDP budget, their intervention was in-kind. They delivered social services, repaired social infrastructure, engaged in sensitization, psycho-social therapy and rebuilding the livelihoods of returnees. The common characteristic of their interventions was that they were short-term, tended to be isolated from government and their impact was not sustainable (Commins, 2010: 596; Muhumuza, 2014). It is only the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) case that was unique. Its intervention differed from the stand-alone approach pursued by other donors. Its funding support was given directly to the affected districts of Kasese and Bundibugyo. According to one district councillor, ‘BTC funded almost 40% of the Kasese District budget, equivalent to about USh 11bn (US$2.7m) annually for a five year period’. ⁵ Its five-year integrated development programme supported various sectors that included rebuilding physical infrastructure, enhancing the institutional capacity of local governments, economically empowering returnees to rebuild their livelihoods and supporting service delivery.

The performance of LRDP in post-conflict recovery

Interviewee responses from the two districts about the performance of the programme were deeply divided between the views of government officials and the affected communities. The official view in the districts was that the LRDP was relatively effective in rebuilding the sub-region, a view that was disputed by people in the area as detailed in the following discussion. There was evidence that government with the support of donors was relatively effective in rebuilding institutional and physical infrastructure. In order to ensure peace and stability, the government rebuilt state structures and reasserted its authority in the areas affected through increasing the presence of the army and police, especially along the border with the volatile DRC. Interview reports revealed that more police constables were recruited from the sub-region to enforce peace and security. Apart from beefing up the presence of the security forces in the area, interviewees reported that government intensified community-based security awareness campaigns and intelligence gathering; ‘the government mobilized, sensitized the returnees from IDP camps on issues of security and how to resolve minor community conflicts such as domestic violence and land wrangles’. ⁶ The community-based approach to resolve conflicts of a non-criminal nature was promoted in partnership with CSOs. Community agents known as paralegals were identified and trained to resolve minor cases. This approach reportedly achieved positive results. The Community Development Officers (CDOs) in the two districts confirmed a decline in reports of community-level minor conflicts to the sub-counties as a result of vigilance by the paralegals prior to the 2014 recurrence of violent conflict.

Further evidence showed that government registered relative success in rebuilding physical infrastructure. More particularly, the upgrading of the Fort Portal to Lamia road to bitumen was indeed a tremendous achievement. The poor road network to Bundibugyo had adversely affected the development prospects of the area and subsequently caused political discontent. The improved road access to Bundibugyo District and rural electrification unlocked the vast economic potential in terms of cross-border trade, agriculture and tourism. The Rwenzori sub-region also greatly benefited from the government’s construction of security roads in the rugged mountainous areas where they never existed before. Whereas security roads were constructed to ease troop movement at the height of the ADF conflict, they subsequently facilitated access to the remote areas of the sub-region for the benefit of the communities. This boosted cocoa growing and trade. The region generally witnessed a boost in rebuilding of infrastructure compared with the period before the ADF conflict. Likewise, the LRDP in partnership with CSOs improved the access to and coverage of clean drinking water, especially gravity water flow. Individual interview accounts and FGDs revealed that new health centres and schools were constructed while those destroyed by war were rebuilt. It was widely believed that the local council electoral gains made by the NRM in the sub-region in the 2011 general election were attributed to such post-war recovery initiatives. It was evident that LRDP interventions ushered in temporary peace to the Rwenzori sub-region until it relapsed into conflict in 2014.

Whereas the LRDP did relatively well in the post-conflict recovery of ‘hardware’ such as the physical infrastructure and formal state institutions, it performed poorly in economic empowerment of households and the rebuilding of grassroots collective social institutions regardless of their saliency. Indeed, all the individual returnees interviewed and FGDs complained about government’s poor response: ‘here in Kikorongo, we supported government but when the war came, it neglected us, which made people to dislike it’. ⁷ This failure was confirmed by a government report which noted that: ‘despite a seemingly elaborate process, complaints continue among communities about the inadequate impact of the programme’ (RoU, 2011: 2). This showed that the main objective of LRDP to improve people’s livelihoods, the fulcrum of lasting peace and security, was not given due emphasis. Though there were efforts to improve access to social services in the sub-region, the delivery was lacking because of the delayed and insufficient funding, lack of necessary equipment, inadequate staffing, low staff morale and corruption. District officials complained about little government funding released to the rebuilding of the sub-region: ‘no more special funds have been sent since 2010. Government keeps on sending indicative planning figures to the district’. ⁸ This evidence affirms that the LRDP was symbolic in the sense that the livelihood-related aspects were never translated into reality.

It is further believed that government’s eventual recognition of the OBR cultural institution in 2010 greatly contributed to the relative return of peace in the sub-region. Government also pushed for improved bilateral relations through cross-border meetings with the DRC leaders. Despite these efforts, the continued presence of the ADF insurgents in neighbouring DRC poses a security threat to the sub-region. Even the deployment of a UN combat force in the eastern DRC dismally failed to pacify the volatile area. The next sections explain why the LRDP registered limited impact and conclude with policy suggestions.

Reasons for the dismal performance of the programme

The limited impact of LRDP was partly caused by the short time frame and wide geographical coverage of an approximate area of 105,015 km² with a combined population of over 12 million. This constituted a third of Uganda’s total population, which was unrealistically big. Its major undoing was that it was not only thinly spread to the areas devastated by conflict but also extended to those areas that were partially affected. Besides, the programme did not specifically target the victims of conflict but mostly the economically active people.

Apart from the wide geographical coverage, the programme had an ambitious multi-sectoral approach. The objectives of the LRDP were congested hence complicating their implementation in the given period. This grand programme was unrealistic and portrayed symbolism given that it was largely intended to score political goals in the sub-region at the onset of multiparty political dispensation. The government sought to use the promise of LRDP to achieve momentary electoral gains from the two conflict-torn areas in the 2011 elections. The politically driven motive corroborates the observation by Khasalamwa (2009) who warned of ‘the danger of government wanting to use peace-building assistance to gain electoral advantage at the expense of groups most affected by war’. While the political motives sufficed, the programme was overstretched to the extent that a few areas were barely touched. Apparently, the government did not learn from the shortcomings of NUSAF to make the LRDP better.

Further to the argument of wide coverage was the issue of insufficient and short-term funding. The LRDP received meagre funds compared with the magnitude of the problem due to the absence of a standby fund to handle disasters. Whereas government put in place the National Preparedness and Management policy in 2008 that provided for early warning, a national disaster fund and creation of District Disaster Preparedness Committees, the policy was not translated into practice due to resource constraints (Muhumuza and Jones, 2013; RoU, 2008). Moreover, the biggest LRDP release ever made was once in the 2009/2010 FY and made no serious impact. The funds allocated for livelihood improvement were too meagre to support group investments. These amounts would have made economic sense if they were for individual rather than group projects. The funds were so insufficient that out of the 41 selected projects identified in Bundibugyo for funding only 30 were actually funded. A critical review of these projects also showed that there were few benefactors of the 30 funded projects. Even the group funds accessed through SACCOs had stringent requirements which made it difficult for many deserving people to qualify. Besides, the socially engineered process of accessing LRDP funds through spontaneously formed groups was not sustainable compared with giving such support to existing self-help informal groups. In short, the programme faced a challenge of mismatch of high demand for reconstruction funds and resource availability. The government was already facing resource constraints, especially having been economically overstretched by the LRA conflict in the north. Yet Kumar (1997: 35) contends that sufficient and long-term resource commitment was crucial for achieving sustainable recovery results.

The LRDP objective of improving people’s livelihoods also dismally failed due to design and implementation flaws. The microfinance intervention was inappropriate as people had lost everything and had to start from scratch. They needed relief first to kick-start them with loans brought in later after they had recovered from the initial shock. Besides, the preferred intervention with microfinance disbursed through SACCOs was inadequate in terms of amounts given and coverage. Only a few beneficiaries in selected parishes accessed microfinance from SACCOs. The failure of the programme to prioritize and give a special package to the victims of conflict who had lost property and stayed in IDP camps for many years caused discontent.

The programme was centrally conceived and planned and the targeted beneficiaries were never consulted. This was conceded by a key district informant who stated that ‘given the nature of an emergency situation, only key players within government structures were consulted’. ⁹ Yet, the argument that beneficiaries should take centre stage in post-conflict recovery programmes had long been recognized and emphasized by the architects of the Marshall Plan as early as the 1940s (Wexler, 1983). Furthermore, Khasalamwa (2009: 76) warns that ‘when the process of rebuilding is not guided by the inspirations of the affected people, it tends to compromise achievements’. The little consultation was with the district technical staff that had been detached from the grassroots due to the environment of conflict. The seven years of conflict had made local governments dysfunctional to the extent that most of the staff had fled the area and only returned after the war. Furthermore, beneficiary communities were not adequately organized and sensitized prior to implementing the livelihood component of the programme. The failure to consult and sensitize the community had negative connotations for ownership and sustainability of the LRDP.

Another major implementation flaw was the inherent lack of transparency and entrenched corruption in the implementation process of LRDP. The corrupt tendencies dogged the procurement of inputs, tendering process and administration of justice as confirmed by both the Auditor General’s Office and the Criminal Investigations (CID) Department of the police. The Auditor General’s Report (RoU, 2014) noted serious irregularities in the management of LRDP funds, such as ‘wrong routing of funds, extravagant dispensation of money to micro-support projects without appraising them and paying gratuity to non-combatant war veterans (civilians) without having a full data base of combatants paid’. The Director of CID was also quoted by the press to have revealed that USh 62bn (US$24.8m) of the LRDP funds had been stolen or abused by government officials by 2013 (Dear, 2013: 4). Corruption also characterized the process of selection and disbursement of funds to beneficiaries by SACCO officials. Interviews revealed that the process of giving grants and loans was riddled with bribery and favouritism: ‘government had poor interventions where some people benefitted more than others because of corruption and favouritism.’ ¹⁰ This was confirmed by a government report (RoU, 2011: 2) which noted a challenge of ‘persisting complaints that would-be genuine parish grant beneficiaries were side-lined by political cronies of sub-county officials’. It was further reported that district political leaders secured contracts for themselves which they in turn sold off to private business people. The end result was half-baked projects that did not provide value for money. The district officials could not reprimand these contractors because they were compromised. The consequence was the limited impact of the programme on the welfare of the people in the sub-region, which resonates with Grant’s (2005: 444) observation that ‘lack of government capacity and the persistence of corruption are significant obstacles to successful reconstruction’.

The few households that accessed the programme’s microfinance neither had tangible results nor were they able to repay the loans because of lack of training and sensitization. The timing of the release of LRDP funds eight months before the 2011 elections was misconceived as political freebies which inadvertently affected the meaning and utilization of the microfinance funds. Recovery of the community loans became difficult because of their unprofitable use. This was attributed to the politicization of the programme, which caused a stampede as people hastily formed groups of convenience to access a government funding ‘windfall’. It was not surprising that many of the created enterprise groups disintegrated soon after accessing the micro-project funds. The local and national political leaders also politicized and discouraged loan repayment arguing that people had suffered major losses during the war and did not have the capacity to repay. Government eventually became reluctant to enforce loan recovery for fear of a political backlash. Whereas the role of enforcing loan recovery was given to district officials, they were later cautioned by the President not to harass people and they stopped. The later development gave credence to the argument that the programme was not a genuine post-conflict reconstruction strategy but a symbolic act to dupe the people in the Rwenzori sub-region into continuing to give political support to the ruling NRM government.

Equally important was the issue of poor coordination. Though the programme was supposed to be implemented under the decentralization framework where local authorities were to play a leading role, this arrangement was not fully followed. The OPM did not restrict itself to oversight but also usurped the district role of procuring inputs, selection of beneficiaries and release of funds to medium-scale enterprises. This undermined the role of local authorities in programme implementation despite their proximity to the people. In the case of implementation of micro-enterprises, the roles were duplicated between the sub-counties and districts. The funds released for mobilization, sensitization and production of reports were not clearly specified. The districts retained the funds yet much of the work was being done by the sub-counties. This was proof that the coordination of the programme was poor since the relationship between different levels of authority was not clarified, which adversely affected monitoring, supervision, reporting and sometimes generated duplication and role conflicts. It was not until the OPM realized that the implementation of the LRDP caused conflict and registered poor performance that it later instituted reforms that eventually shifted the management of programme beneficiaries from sub-county SACCOs to the district local authorities. This confirms the argument by Ruhizal et al. (2012: 194) that planning and coordination challenges posed by reconstruction programmes tend to be underestimated by planners who fail to cope and instead strictly stick with normal planning methodology.

Moreover, the two districts faced human resource constraints. They lacked relevant officers to implement the programme because of government’s freeze on local government recruitment due to insufficient funds. Consequently, the affected districts lacked the key personnel, such as field extension workers, CDOs and Assistant CDOs that were crucial to the implementation of the LRDP. There was no clear framework regarding the engagement of CSOs during the implementation process. Although the LRDP document provided for a close working relationship with CSOs, it was more theoretical than practical. It was apparent that the government’s intention was to benefit from CSOs’ funding rather than build a mutual and genuine partnership with them.

Conclusion

Whereas the nature of conflicts in Africa during the Cold-War era tended to be ideologically driven and dominated by inter-state wars, the post-Cold-War era witnessed a prevalence of intra-state conflicts. According to Busumtwi-Sam (2002), these conflicts were mostly driven by contentions over the state and distribution of political power, manipulation of ethnic divisions and the state’s failure to equitably distribute economic benefits to society. The intensity and viciousness of intra-state conflicts had devastating effects on the people. Uganda suffered the scourge of intra-state conflict for four decades and attempts were made to rebuild war-torn areas as exemplified by the LRDP in the Rwenzori sub-region. However, the dominant post-conflict recovery framework pursued by both international agencies and national governments emphasized the rebuilding of the ‘hardware’ at the cost of the ‘software.’ This attitude often led to political discontent by the affected people due to the feeling of neglect and destitution. The tendency apparently characterized Uganda’s post-conflict recovery of the Rwenzori sub-region. The LRDP initiative was preoccupied with rebuilding physical infrastructure, re-establishment of state authority and control structures rather than rebuilding people’s livelihoods and informal local level social institutions. The LRDP performed dismally due to a host of factors that inter alia included pursuing of a top-down strategy, insufficient funding, poor selection of beneficiaries and coordination, politicization and corruption. The symbolic nature of LRDP compromised the peace building efforts in the sub-region. The consequence was the reversal of earlier peace building gains as evidenced by the 2014 relapse to conflict of the sub-region.

The handling of post-conflict recovery in the Rwenzori sub-region provides useful lessons to other states faced with similar circumstances on how to avoid a similar predicament. The LRDP case showed that while the dominant framework was necessary, it was also important to rebuild the social fabric and livelihoods of societies torn by conflict so as to heal the scars and avoid the chances for renewal of conflict. In short, post-conflict recovery necessitated a synergy of reconstructing physical infrastructure and livelihoods of society as a basis for the creation of long-lasting peace and security. Besides, reconstructing the livelihoods of victims of conflict should not have hinged on microfinance loans that favoured the ‘active poor’. Instead, the returnees required unconditional grants to enable them first to access the basic needs of life. Hence, it is in order that areas emerging out of conflict situations should be given special grants rather than loans so that they are able to rebuild their lives. Then, other interventions, such as microfinance, may come later.

Additionally, post-conflict rebuilding needs to be carefully conceived and designed. Interventions to rebuild war-torn areas should be community-centred, tailored to the needs of targeted beneficiaries, and should try as much as possible to rebuild the social fabric because it binds communities together and helps to resolve disputes. The role of the national government should be limited to provision of the needed resources and oversight. Lastly, political symbolism aimed at achieving short-term gains, such as winning an election, should be avoided in post-war rebuilding. The focus should be on long-term goals of socio-economic empowerment by addressing what Gerd and Verkoren (2004) referred to as the structural issues responsible for violence. This is vital not only for the success of post-conflict recovery but also for ensuring sustainable peace and stability. This goal definitely requires having a standby fund to help deal with unforeseen emergencies, such as post-conflict interventions to avoid vulnerability and dependency on international donors.