Natural Resources and Violent Conflicts: Water and Energy in Kyrgyzstan

Abstract

Water since 1991 has been at the centre of competition and controversy among the downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) and the upstream countries (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). In recent years, increasing competition for water at an alarming rate only added to an already uneasy tension. While the downstream countries require more water for their agriculture and domestic needs, the impoverished upstream countries are attempting resource nationalism to accrue benefits using the precious waters. In the context of this milieu, this article attempts to examine the connection between resourcefulness and interstate and intrastate conflict in Central Asia and particularly in Kyrgyzstan.

Keywords

Central Asia water energy natural resources conflict Kyrgyzstan

Introduction

It is an established impression that abundance of natural resources normally brings a windfall of benefits and bounties to the concerned nation. However, international experience explores something opposite to what has been mentioned above. The appreciation for natural resources as a driver of economic development and national strength has undergone a dramatic change in the last few decades. In the late 1970s and early 1980s it was generally believed that abundance of resources was advantageous. However, in 1990s another school of thought emerged in reaction to the prevailing rhetoric and advocated the opposite conclusion. It came with the new phrase ‘natural resource curse’ and proved it with adequate empirical and theoretical grounding. Since then, there is growing recognition that natural resources both in terms of abundance and dependence invite violent civil conflicts. In this context, the current study applies to the Central Asian region where both the factors of resource abundance (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) and resource dependence (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) very much exist. Nevertheless, conflicts associated with natural resources are not confined to any particular resource. Resources such as oil, gas and water have always been in controversy and conflict for their realization and control. Nevertheless, water has emerged over the decades as one of the prominent factors contributing to violent conflicts worldwide. It is probably one of the most politicized of all the resources. At least 42 violent conflicts worldwide have been attributed to water resources’ scarcity and control (International Crisis Group, 2002: 4). Since countries push against the limits of water availability and experience unprecedented levels of water stress, the rising concern over resources may very well result in violent conflicts. In fact, the then United Nations (UN) Secretary General Mr Kofi Annan warned of this emerging problem of water resources and cautioned the world over its use and management (International Crisis Group, 2002: 4). Since this paper focuses on the relations between natural resources and civil conflicts in the light of water and energy situations in Kyrgyzstan, it only relates to the scope of the water situation in Kyrgyzstan and the surrounding region, energy implications of hydropower and its relations to civic conflicts within Kyrgyzstan and with the surrounding neighbours.

Review of literature

The debate over the natural resources and conflict nexus perhaps is the most popular theme of research in international relations in recent years. The moment for conflict research gathered ground with the intense rise of the Cold War between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States. In fact, the term ‘resource war’ first came to light in 19980s in the United States when Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan (Le Billon, 2004: 1). It was stated in the United States intelligence reports that the USSR’s advance in Afghanistan was a threat to the United States’ access to the resources in the Middle East and Africa (Klare, 2001: 236). Resource war had its humble origin in the1980s thanks to the Cold War, but the debate over the resource–conflict nexus owes its origin to the Arab Oil Embargo of the 1970s (Dannreuther and Ostrowski, 2013). In the light of new terminologies such as oil war, blood oil, strategic oil, oil weapon, resource nationalization, great game, and resource curse, resource conflicts appeared by the mid-1990s. The ‘resource curse’ theory was first introduced by Auty (1993) although the writings of Sachs and Warner (1995) drew wider attention to the resource curse. Similarly, the terms resource conflict and conflict resources were popularized by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). The terms such as blood oil, and strategic oil are used by De Soysa et al. (2009).

In sum, varieties of the literature and intellectual ideas are devoted to the study of resource conflict which have lucidly explained violence, inequality and conflict by attributing these to both abundancy of natural resources and resource scarcity. For lucidity, the curious case of the natural resource and conflict debate with special emphasis on the water and energy nexus in Kyrgyzstan will be examined in the following subsections under three headings: resource scarcity and conflict; resource abundance and conflict; and the Water and Energy nexus in Kyrgyzstan.

Resource scarcity and conflict

The report of the World Trade Organization (2010), professed that access to natural resources in 21st century has become a national security risk. According to the World Trade Organization (2010), “stocks of materials that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and economically useful in production or consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing”. Similarly, an echo is equally heard in the statement of the then UN General Secretary Kofi Annan in 2004 when he said, “commodity shortages can help trigger social unrest and civil wars” (UNGA 2004). Another UN body, the United Nations Environment Programme found that, “there is significant potential for conflicts over natural resources to intensify in the coming decades” (United Nations General Assembly, 2009). The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research Conflict Barometer found resource conflict to be second-most frequent conflict out of 363 conflicts recorded in 2010 (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research Conflict, 2010). Hosts of scholars in their research find a positive relationship between resource scarcity and conflict. Researchers of repute such as Homer-Dixon (1994), Raleigh and Urdal (2007), Urdal (2008), Mildner et al. (2011), and Bayramov (2018) have suggested that resource scarcity induces violence and its intensity in recent years is increasing. Here both the renewable and depleted resource scarcity has been discussed widely with emphasis on both the demand and supply side scarcities.

Resource abundance and conflict

While resource scarcity has been the widely known reason for violent conflict all over the world, resource abundance has gained stronger support among the conflict scholars for inducing violence. Adding on to the debate about the resource curse, several scholars in the early years of the 21st century have highlighted the positive relationship between resource abundance and conflicts in different parts of the world. Scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, Le Billon, 2001, De Soysa, 2002, Regan and Norton, 2005, Welsch, 2008, Lujala, 2009, Thies, 2010, Mildner et al. (2011), and Bayramov (2018) have dedicated their research to clarify the correlation between resource abundance and violent conflicts. The main academic debate offers a number of models and frameworks regarding the relationship between resource abundance and conflict such as greed versus grievance, onset versus duration, the resource curse, the ‘Great Game’, ‘Oil Geopolitics’, ‘Peak Oil Theory’, and ‘Club of Rome Thesis’, among others. Each of these theses provides both qualitative and quantitative findings to analyse the link between resource abundance and conflict.

Water and energy nexus in Kyrgyzstan

Natural capital including water and energy are important economic assets for the Central Asian countries for augmenting national development and growth. For that reason these countries are set out to use whatever natural resources available within their territory as a strategic tool for their growth and development. Since the countries of Central Asia are blessed with precious natural resources such as oil, gas, uranium and water, of late a nexus interlinking water and energy has emerged in the region between countries known to have energy and water, respectively. Kyrgyzstan is one such country which is blessed with huge hydro-power potentials while its oil and gas deposits are close to zero. However, the water resources in the region are trans-boundary in nature therefore water has assumed an interstate issues of conflict (Karthe et al., 2017). The upstream countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan due to scarce energy resources have started to use water for energy generation in winter and limited summer water releases for the lower riparian states (Jalilov et al., 2013). The downstream countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are heavily dependent on these waters for their irrigation, and agriculture is at odds with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for their water nationalism (Abdullaev, 2012). The core of water competitions between water for energy and water for irrigation is now seriously contested and has given rise to several conflicts between the upstream and downstream countries of the region (Rakhmatullaev et al., 2017).

In sum, most of the literature available on resource scarcity and abundance largely focuses on conflict within the society and state while outside interferences were found out to be an energy great game. This article in contrast to oil and energy as resources of conflict emphasizes on water as the new king of resources’ conflict with references to the water and energy situation in Central Asia.

Link between natural resources and violent conflict

Resources have been an integral part of the war equation since time immemorial. It means wars were waged for resources and resources are required to fight wars. There are varied schools of thought which have attempted to establish direct causal relations between resource availability or scarcity and the advent of civil or interstate war. For example, Le Billon examines several hypotheses about the link between resources and conflicts, and states that, “people fight to secure access to scarce resources necessary for survival, seems very intuitive and has been articulated by many scholars. But one can’t be certain that resource scarcity leads to war, it can lead to increased cooperation as well” (Le Billon, 2001).

Resource abundance

Contrary to the wider public acceptance about resource abundance, the opposite conjecture exists: any abundance of resources whether taxable or plunderable is attractive to elites and their competitors, which may lead to conflict. Moreover, natural resource abundance is often linked to poor governance and economic growth and diversification, which are often associated with a greater possibility of violent conflict (Schwarz, 2008). This is also one of the six mechanisms suggested by Humphreys (2005) to explain the link between natural resources and conflict. This may not be problematic in and of itself, but may lead to conflict when combined with what he calls the grievance mechanism. In his view, conflict can arise from an unequal or unjust distribution of resource wealth. For example, the concentration of oil wealth and gas fields in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan denying any kind of drawing rights to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who are blessed with huge potentials of hydro-power and not allowing its access by other countries may heighten the conflict in the future.

Resource scarcity

Unequal distribution of resources of any type is theoretically known as resource scarcity and any linkage of the resource with the poor plight of a country is called a resource curse. It is evident from several researches that resource scarcity has been the source of conflicts or war either within that country or with another state. However, Ohlsson points out that in cases of resource scarcity, a state has only two options: it must either increase the supply of the said resources; or manage the demand for it (Ohlsson, 1999). But Homer-Dixon highlights that water in spite of being a renewable resource leads to conflict in the case of scarcity, especially where the downstream riparian is significantly stronger than its upstream neighbour (Homer-Dixon, 1994). The situation of the Central Asian water crisis looks more relevant in this case. The unequal distribution of river waters in Central Asia and the exercise of rights by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to use water as a commercial commodity or political tool may give rise to a potential conflict or even war in the heartland region. In fact, Islam Karimov who was facing a water crisis in Uzbekistan threatened to go to war with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Stobdan, 2020).

Both in the case of resource abundance and resource scarcity conflict seems inevitable if resources are not properly managed. In the case of Central Asian states both the cases are relevant as three republics are rich in hydrocarbon resources (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) while two republics have very negligible energy resources but are blessed with huge hydro-electricity potentials (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). Unlike oil and gas resources, waters flow through rivers and have riparian states. In the case of Central Asia although major rivers such as the Amu and Syr Darya have their origin from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, they flow through Uzbekistan and other states. Therefore, the lower riparian states also have rights over the waters of the river and any disruption in water supply from the upper riparian states will invite conflicts.

The resource situation in Central Asia

Hydrocarbons and non-renewable resources

The Central Asian region is predominantly a gas producing region. Along with significant amounts of untapped oil resources (proved and probable), it also possesses huge reserves of uranium, coal mines and hydroelectricity resources. It has proven gas reserves of about 6.6 trillion cubic metres (tcm) of which approximately 2.9 tcm trillion cubic metres are found in Turkmenistan, 1.9 tcm in Uzbekistan and 1.8 tcm in Kazakhstan. The region represents about one-tenth of the known gas reserves of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Turkmenistan with 80 billion tcm per year and Uzbekistan with 50 billion tcm per year are the two leading gas producers although Kazakhstan also produces a significant amount of gas in the region (Patnaik, 2016).

So far as oil is concerned, Central Asia has an estimated 200 billion barrels of hydrocarbon reserves. Kazakhstan the main producer of oil in the region is projected to have between 30 and 40 billion barrels of crude oil reserves (British Petroleum, 2016). Turkmenistan, the most important producer of gas with 50.4 trillion cubic metres also has as many as 19 oil and gas–oil and 65 gas fields as of 2017 (Aliyeva, 2018). The fact of the matter is that Uzbekistan consumes more energy than any other country in the region. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan produce only small quantities of oil but have massive hydroelectric potentials.

In addition to Central Asia, the Caspian Sea region, of which Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are littoral states, possesses huge hydro-carbons and gas resources which are mainly untapped. Uzbekistan though is not a littoral state, but is generally considered to be part of the Caspian Sea region. According to the July 2001, report of the United States Energy Information Administration, the Caspian Sea region possessed about 34 billion barrels of proven oil and 235 billion barrels of possible oil reserves (Dorian, 2006). It is about one-quarter of the oil reserves of the Middle East. The proven natural gas reserves of the Caspian region including that of Uzbekistan were quoted at 243–248 trillion cubic feet (tcf). Thus, 88% of the Caspian oil reserves are located in the states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (United States Energy Information Administration, 2001). Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have the majority portions of gas reserves in the region. Therefore, it becomes essential to study the Caspian region while dealing with energy sectors of the Central Asian states.

With reference to uranium, Central Asia again has been a home to huge stocks. The uranium resources available in Central Asia can be of great help to India in the post Indo-US Civil Nuclear deal era. During the Soviet period, Central Asia was the supplier of raw material for its nuclear programme. After independence, Kazakhstan has closed its nuclear test range and has committed itself to being a non-nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it has not lost its uranium potentials. It was the third largest producer of uranium in the world in 2008 after Canada and Australia (Sharma, 2009: 4–5). With an expected stock between10,590 kgs and 10,940 kgs Kazakhstan is expected to achieve the top position in a year or two. Uzbekistan also has a significant amount of uranium reserves to its credit and ranks third in the entire CIS. Tajikistan has significant amounts of uranium reserves with the capability of enrichment. Kyrgyzstan also has a lot of nuclear waste left over as a legacy from the former Soviet Union.

Water resources

One of the key problems of Central Asia has been its deficiency of water resources. It is believed that the region is going to face acute ecological crises due to depleting water resources. According to some estimates, the existing water resources of the region would be sufficient only until 2025. On the top of it, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya have been shrinking while the population growth is multiplying and is expected to grow to 100 million by 2050 (Stobdan, 2020). With per capita water consumption in Central Asia getting doubled in comparison to developed nations, and Chinese diversion of Central Asian ricer waters, it is certain that the countries of the region very soon would face shortage of waters. Reflection on recent developments in the region shows the rise of serious conflicts over water-sharing of the Amu and Syr Darya between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Undoubtedly from a perennial source of life, water in Central Asia has become a commodity that has become a political tool of power, war and influence over the region.

Kyrgyzstan: Geographical and demographic background

Kyrgyzstan, a small mountainous landlocked country in the heart of Central Asia is located between 39^° and 43^° N and 69^° and 80^° E. It borders Kazakhstan in the north, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the east, Tajikistan in the south and Uzbekistan in the west. Nearly 95% of the country is mountainous – three-quarters of it always remains under permanent snow and glacier. Covering an area of 199,900 sq km, Kyrgyzstan is the second smallest country in Central Asia with a population of 5.7 million (Chandra, 2017). The great majority of people live away from the massive mountain ranges – Pamir Alay, Ala-Too and Tian Shan – on the periphery of the country. The mountainous central topography divides the country naturally and the peripheral areas have closer links with neighbouring countries than with the capital (Helvetas, 2002: 4).

The Ferghana Valley extends into three Central Asian countries: Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; and Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley makes up 40% of the area and is inhabited by 51% of the population of Kyrgyzstan. In this border zone Kyrgyzstan has three administrative regions (oblasts): The Jalal Abad oblast with 869,529 inhabitants; the Osh oblast with 1,175,998 inhabitants; and the Batken oblast with 382,426 inhabitants (Helvetas, 2002). The demographic situation in the area is highly critical. It is one of the densely populated regions and mother of all interstate conflicts. In this conflict zone, water arises as one of the prominent factors of conflict not just within Kyrgyzstan but also between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as well. The overpopulation in the Ferghana Valley often results in conflicts over limited land and water resources, often with inter-ethnic overtones. Water is a critical issue throughout the region. Most agricultural activity depends on irrigation so that the absence of a super national authority over local political interests allows that local elites neglect collective needs, or in the worst case restrict water resources to themselves. A number of such disputes have been reported over time. On a wider scale, there has been tension between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan over the supply of water from major reservoirs. In case of disruption of supply, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan keep back their energy supplies to the energy poor Kyrgyzstan.

Economic situation

Kyrgyzstan has been a low-income country until recently and now has been reclassified to a lower-middle-income country in Central Asia.

Water profile of Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is well endowed with water resources. Probably the main source of its water resource is from melting snow and glaciers. Kyrgyzstan also has vast resources of underground and surface water. Most of its significant reserves are located in the rivers, glaciers and eternal snow arrays. The country has more than 3500 rivers and streams that belong to the seven major basins – Syr Darya River, the Amu Darya River, Chu-Talas River, Ili River, and Tarim River and Issyk-Kul Lake. Water of these rivers flows through the territory of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and on to the states of Central Asia (Isabekova and Mayjanova, 2009: 58).

The total annual natural runoff of the rivers, which are formed on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, is 44.5 cubic km. Taking into account the return flow, operational flow of 47.4 cubic km reaches the potential supply of fresh groundwater and exceeds 380 cubic metres/second (13 cubic km per year). Proven performance for industrial categories of fresh groundwater reserves are 2.2 cubic km/year. The Obey area of the country occupied by glaciers and snowfields is about 4.1% of the territory; these glaciers and snowfields are involved in the formation of river runoff into five separate pools (Votrin, 2003: 68–69).

Throughout the country there are 923 lakes. Fresh water in lakes is estimated at 1745 cubic km, or about 71% of the total national water reserves. The largest lakes – Lake Issyk-Kul, Son-Kul Kul Chater, and Sary-Chelek – are in closed basins. The rest belong to the Syr Darya River Basin. The largest mountain lake – Lake Issyk-Kul due to its size (1738 cubic km) and surface area (6236 square km), is a powerful factor in the climate across the basin of the lake (Koshmatov, 2004: 19).

Glaciers

In total there are 8208 glaciers of different sizes on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. The area of ice is 8169.4 km², or 4.2% of the republic’s territory. The main glacier centres are located in the extreme east, in the basin of the river Sary-Jaz, where the largest plain glaciers are located, and in the south of the Zailiy ridge. The supply of fresh water preserved in the mountain glaciers is 650 billion m³, which exceeds 12 times the river flow resources in the country. The trend to climate warming leads to stable intensive reduction of glacier surfaces. According to a forecast, by 2025 the territories of glaciers will be reduced by 30–40%, resulting in water volume diminishing by 25–35% (International Congress on River Basin Management, 2007: 172).

Lakes

There are 1923 lakes in Kyrgyzstan. The total area of water surface is 6836 km². The biggest lakes of Kyrgyzstan are Issyk-Kyl (the area of water surface is 6236 km²), Son-Kul (the area of water surface is 275 km²), and Chatyr-Kul (the area of water surface is 175 km²). There is a significant number of lakes and other natural reservoirs on the territory of the republic, with a common area about 6697 km² and with common annual volume of water about 1745 billion m². It is necessary to note that 84% of lakes are located at heights of 3000–4000 m in regions of tectonic origin. Potential annual stock of ground water is 13 billion m² and of ice-houses about 650 billion m² (International Congress on River Basin Management, 2007: 173).

Rivers

The longest river is the Narin, 535 km length. The river Chatkar is 205 km length and the river Chu is 221 km length with an annual flow rate of 5.83 km³. The rivers Talas and Assaa both have an annual flow rate of 2 km³ per year. More than 3500 rivers flowing on the territory of the republic supply water to the neighbouring states: Kazakhstan; Uzbekistan; Tajikistan; and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the PRC (International Congress on River Basin Management, 2007: 173–174).

Bogs

The bogs in the republic are 0.5% of the territory in the places where ground water is near the surface (Issyk-Kul Lake, Son-Kul Lake, river Chui valley, Talas, and Narin).

Water reservoirs

There are 13 artificial reservoirs with a total area of 378.2 km³, and the volume of water is 23.41 km³ in Kyrgyzstan. About 75% of the river runoff goes out from the republic to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the PRC. More than 10 large reservoirs for irrigation were built to regulate runoff of the transnational rivers: Chui; Talas; Naryn; Ak-Bura; and Kara-Darya. Damage from agricultural yield shortage on the territories occupied by reservoirs is estimated at US$11.3 million (International Congress on River Basin Management, 2007: 174).

Consumption of water

Kyrgyzstan uses 23.5% of available water supplies. Much of the water resources in the country (94%–96%) is used for irrigation and agricultural purposes, which is 4100–4550 million cubic metres a year. The majority of them (80%–85%) is used in the growing season (International Congress on River Basin Management, 2007: 175) (see Table 1) .

Table 1.

The volume of water withdrawn and use, in million cubic metres, in Kyrgyzstan.

Withdrawal of water from water sources including:	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Withdrawal of water from water sources including:	8025	10390	8463	7555	7851	7888	8007	8530	8469	7600	7561
Of the aquifers, from ground	302	502	342	336	345	304	306	333.7	445.8	299.4	324.3
Water consumption including:	4976	5754	5417	4560	4542	4485	5289	5547	5315	4729	4477
For production purposes	48	96	141	124	79	59	72	72.8	74.6	79.2	90.6
For irrigation and agricultural use	4749	5528	5183	4351	4298	4235	4215	4549	4445	4424.9	4163.3
For domestic needs	182	124	93	85	164	149	128	159	136.8	180.3	205.9
Water loss during transportation	1667	1494	1739	1672	1777	1781	1831	1738	2062	1862	1768
Discharged waste water – all of which include:	–	1156	2240	1491	1513	775	701	1037	1017	174.8	153.9
Amount of regulatory discharge of treated waste water	–	134	108	86	158	138	148	354	345	162	–
The volume of waste water discharged (treated and under-treated)	3.8	7.5	13.8	16.0	12.2	12.2	12.6	20.0	18.5	6.4	–

Source: National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Water situation in Central Asia

Central Asia is a dry and arid region with immensely diverse topography ranging from high mountains and glaciers to vast and dry steppes and deserts. The region is rich in water resources but more than 90% are concentrated in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The region’s two main rivers, Syr Darya and Amu Darya, originate in these two countries, while Uzbekistan, the single biggest consumer of water, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, are located downstream. As much as 40% of the region’s water resources are concentrated solely in Kyrgyzstan (Glantz and Kobori, 1998: 19).

Competition for water is increasing in Central Asia at an alarming rate, adding tension to what is already an uneasy region. Agriculture is the mainstay of the region’s economy and thirsty crops such as cotton and rice require intensive irrigation. Water use has increased rapidly since the Central Asian states became independent in 1991 and is now at an unsustainable level. Irrigation systems have decayed so severely that half of all water never reaches crops, and several years of drought have cut available water by one-fifth even as demand continues to soar.

The problem of increasing demand and declining supplies has been compounded by the failure of the region’s nations to work together. An annual cycle of disputes has developed between the three downstream countries – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – that are all heavy consumers of water for growing cotton and the upstream nations – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The downstream countries require more water for their growing agricultural sectors and rising populations, while the economically weaker upstream countries are trying to win more control over their resources for agricultural purposes in summer and for electricity generation in winter. This further leads to droughts for the downstream countries in summer and floods in the winter. Thus, the main cause of tension between the regional countries is centred on mismanagement of water.

Tensions focus on the two main rivers of the region that both flow to the Aral Sea – the Syr Darya from Kyrgyzstan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and the Amu Darya from Tajikistan through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Amu Darya and its tributaries form part of the border between the Central Asian countries. Since the paper focuses on the water and energy situation in Kyrgyzstan and its increasing relation to rising and perceived civil conflicts within the state and with the surrounding neighbours, the study of Syr Darya has become inevitable, because Syr Darya is the river which unites Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in a complex array of barter agreements involving water use and energy provisions.

Barter of energy and water: The Syr Darya

There are two key areas of conflict and misunderstanding between and within the Central Asian states over water. One is how to divide and share the trans-boundary waters and the second is the functioning of various barter and payment procedures that bundle water and energy together to provide the upstream countries with the latter, and the downstream countries with the former. One such barter is involved around Syr Darya river water use between Kyrgyzstan on the one hand and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the other and the provision of energy supply.

In the Syr Darya basin, the potential for conflict is also tremendously high. The river embraces the Ferghana Valley, which is the most sensitive part of modern Central Asia, given the fact that it is divided between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its ethnically mixed demographic composition led to episodes of violence in 1989 (Mosello, 2008). Furthermore, the tension gets fuelled from conflicts over the Toktogul reservoir. This is a massive hydroelectricity facility, built in the 1970s by the Soviets in the Kyrgyz part of the Syr Darya and it is linked to a massive set of water control installations on the same river (Mosello, 2008).

Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan

These two neighbours have the most controversial history over water and energy in the entire region. Although, a barter agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan has existed since 1998, it has been broken by both countries time and again.

It is believed that Uzbekistan does not have the energy potentials to meet the barter agreement as it is not energy self-sufficient as well. Gas pipelines in Uzbekistan are in urgent need of repair. Hence, transfer not just to neighbours but within its own territory also often gets disturbed. In addition, the gas quality of Uzbekistan is also very poor, being wet gas with high water contents. During winter, the water freezes and clogs the gas pipeline. Hence, the country always fails to provide Kyrgyzstan with the negotiated amount of gas. Nevertheless, there are some technical and political factors also involved in the disruption of the barter arrangement between the two neighbours. But the standout factor is that though Uzbekistan has committed to provide gas to Kyrgyzstan, it actually does not have enough gas to meet its domestic demands.

Since Kyrgyzstan is neither energy self-sufficient nor has oil and gas resources, it has to use its water resources for electricity generation for meeting its domestic demands. This results in fewer water supplies to the downstream country – Uzbekistan. With less water availability in summer, the Uzbek agriculture sector faces a drought situation and excess discharge of water in winter from the Kyrgyz side results in flood in Uzbekistan.

Kyrgyzstan–Kazakhstan

Like the Kyrgyz–Uzbek relation, the Kyrgyz–Kazakh relation with regard to the barter agreement is also not smooth. The two Kazakh provinces that depend on water from Toktogul reservoir of Kyrgyzstan are: South Kazakhstan; and Kzyl Orda (International Crisis Group, 2002: 15). As a part of the water sharing agreement these southern provinces of Kazakhstan have to purchase electricity from Kyrgyzstan. The problem has been caused due to exorbitant electricity prices from the Kyrgyz side. Delineating the background of this problem, it would be accurate to say that, before Kazakhstan had privatized its coalmines, it was in agreement with Kyrgyzstan to provide it with clean coal. However, with privatization Kazakhstan no longer was able to provide Kyrgyzstan with free coal. On the other hand, coal available in Kyrgyzstan is of poor quality and production costs are too high. Since, Kazakhstan could not abide by the barter arrangement Kyrgyzstan increased its price to an exorbitant rate. In order to deal with this problem, Kazakhstan has requested several times for the exchanges shift from barter to normal purchases at market prices. However, Kyrgyzstan is not agreeing to the cash purchase.

Water is a key factor in the socio-economic well-being of the Central Asian countries; therefore, it is quite natural that water resources are the subject of inter-state interests. Neighbouring states of Kyrgyzstan are in need of water for irrigation purposes mainly during the summer growing season. The main bone of contention between Kyrgyzstan on the one hand and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the other hand, is the energy deficit in Kyrgyzstan in winter for which it uses its hydropower resources to produce more energy to meet the rising demands in the winter season leading to floods in the downstream countries, and in the summer season the problem is even worse since agriculture in Kyrgyzstan demands more water and it is not able to supply the agreed volume of water to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. As around 95% of Kyrgyz water consumption is attributed to agriculture, it fails to abide by the international agreement of water supply to the neighbouring countries. Changing the water scenario in one country inevitably affects the interests of other countries. Therefore, this situation gives rise to several inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the Central Asian region, particularly between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Energy policy of Kyrgyzstan

Emphasis on electricity is backed by abundant water power, mainly from the country’s location at the mountain headwaters of the Syr Darya, one of the two largest rivers in Central Asia. On the Naryn River, the chief tributary of the Syr Darya, a series of hydroelectric stations have been built. The largest of which is the Kürp-Say Hydroelectric Plant, fed by the Toktogol Reservoir in central Kyrgyzstan. Other major hydroelectric plants are located at Atabashin, Alamedin, and Uchkorgon. Such stations have made possible the net export of electric power, worth an estimated US$100 million in 1994 (Curtis, 1996). That figure was only about half the value of Kyrgyzstan’s 1990 exports, however, because demand in the neighbouring republics dropped considerably in the early 1990s. The main customer is Kazakhstan, with which power is exchanged through the Central Asian integrated system.

Only about 10% of Kyrgyzstan’s hydroelectric power potential and only about 3% of the potential of its smaller streams are currently being exploited. The Naryn River is estimated to afford an additional 2200 megawatts of easily accessible rated capacity. Meanwhile, the Fergana Valley, the only working oil field in the country, has remaining reserves of 14 million tons of oil that require expensive recovery technology. No serious oil exploration has been done elsewhere, although the Chu and Aksay valleys are believed to be promising (Curtis, 1996).

The Kyrgyzstan electricity grid consists of more than 10,000 kilometres of power transmission lines of 35-kilovolts or greater and more than 58,000 kilometres of high voltage lines of 0.4–10 kilovolts. There are more than 500 operating substations of 35–500 kilovolt capacity. Kyrgyzstan has identified construction of a new 500 kilovolt transmission line from Frunzenskaya to Kemin as a strategic need for the country. Implementation would help improve the reliability of electricity supply to the northern part of the country. The German bank KfW has financed a feasibility study for the project, and might be one of the financiers.

Kyrgyzstan’s electricity distribution grid is presently in need of rehabilitation, because enough resources have not been allocated in previous years for maintenance. As much as US$180 million could be required for this upgrade. The result of these years of neglect is that there are substantial electricity losses of up to 25% that occur during transmission through the grid. Grid management is also in need of improvement – non-payment of electricity is common (especially in Bishkek), and there are payment privileges for certain customers. Overall, almost half of all electricity generated does not produce any revenue.

Kyrgyzstan exports over 10% of the electricity it produces, and increased exports are planned. However, Kyrgyzstan currently lacks the transmission lines to implement this. The possibilities for constructing transmission lines to the PRC are being studied. Kyrgyzstan has tried to improve its electric system. In July 2000, the Ala-Archa substation on the outskirts of Bishkek was opened. The Asian Development Bank has partly funded this project with aid of US$ 11 million. The substation is intended to prevent interruption of the service to people in Bishkek and northern Kyrgyzstan.

Four regional electricity distribution companies have come into existence as independent joint stock companies. Among them, Vostok-electoset will serve the eastern part of Kyrgyzstan and will incorporate the distribution grids of the Naryn and Issyk-Kul regions; Osh-electroset will service the Osh region of the country; Djalal-Abadelectro will service the southern Djalal-Abad region; and Sev-electro will service the regions of Bishkek, Chu, and Talas (Global Security, 2010: 2). While concluding this subsection, it is quite evident that the energy crisis in Kyrgyzstan is more than just a shortage of water and electricity.

Background of the water–energy nexus

Under the Soviet system, water and energy resources were exchanged freely across what were only administrative borders, and Moscow provided the funds and management to build and maintain infrastructure. However, after disintegration of the Soviet Union, rising nationalism and competition among the five Central Asian states has rapidly increased tension in the region. Indeed, the tensions linked with water and energy issues have been second only to Islamic extremism as a source of tension in recent years. The tension in fact has become an annual event between the three downstream and two upstream nations.

Some of the most serious tensions have centred around barter agreements and payments. The upstream countries trade water to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for energy in the form of gas, coal or power. Since energy deliveries have been unreliable, Kyrgyzstan has responded by releasing more water through its hydropower dams in winter, which results in downstream flooding and less water for irrigation in summer. Attempts by Kyrgyzstan to demand payments for water have been resisted by the downstream countries. Furthermore, unreliable energy supply by the downstream countries to Kyrgyzstan in winter forces the energy-poor country to generate more electricity in winter to meet its domestic demands.

Water, energy and conflict in Central Asia

Water distribution along with the border division was a hot issue even during the Soviet period, but Moscow with its central management system was able to suppress the issue. However, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union water usage, which had previously been a domestic issue, suddenly assumed an international character. A zero-sum game has developed over water, and each of the now sovereign countries have enshrined the concept of “sovereignty over resources” in its national constitution.

As each country has started to view the water problem as a zero-sum game, it has taken steps to increase control over water, often to the detriments of the other. There is increasing uncertainty in Central Asia over plans to build new reservoirs and dams or to expand irrigation. There has been little consultation over most of these projects, leading to increased suspicions between states. Tensions over water and energy have contributed to a generally uneasy political climate in Central Asia. Not only do these tensions tend to provoke hostile rhetoric, but they have also prompted suggestions that the countries are willing to defend their interests by force if necessary. Uzbekistan has carried out exercises that look suspiciously like practice runs at capturing the Toktogul Reservoir. The gas shortages and winter flooding that Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have inflicted on each other have a direct and widespread impact on the peoples of those countries and have the potential to inflame ethnic tensions in the Ferghana Valley in particular. Since, competition for water will only increase, tensions will rise and they will have a direct effect on the people of the region.

In 1991 all Central Asian countries gained their independence from the Soviet Union though they were not well prepared for this step. The countries rich in oil, minerals, and other natural resources such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, with their oil and gas fields, have attracted foreign investments. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have capitalized on their cotton and mineral industries while Kyrgyzstan, the poorest country in the region, has been left to develop hydropower resources alone with some gold mines. Since the region is located within the arid and semi-arid climatic zone for irrigation and habitation, water has become an important factor.

Water is critical to the sustenance of the entire region and key to its development. It remained a source of acute tension and growing conflict in the region since 90% of the water resources are concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while the main consumers – Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan – can supply only 14% and 45%, respectively, of their water needs. Uzbekistan alone consumes more than half the region’s water resources. As a result, though, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control the water needed by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The upstream states view water as a commodity for trade and profit, especially since they are poorly endowed with other resources. Control over water is also important for them as they need it to generate much of their own power needs.

In the downstream countries of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, especially in the latter, the political leadership is heavily dependent on the cotton industry, the single biggest economic sector and largest consumer of water. Kazakhstan is an exporter of wheat. Other pressures also exist in these countries. Widespread poverty in rural areas has encouraged militant and separatist groups. The overpopulated, poverty-stricken, cotton-producing valley, home to 20% of the region’s entire population, has been the scene of many violent incidents since 1989.

With independence, the downstream countries have undertaken a policy of energy self-sufficiency and reduced their dependency on imported hydropower from their neighbours. Upstream countries have pursued a policy of developing and utilizing their hydropower potential which has significantly reduced the water flows to downstream countries. The urban population of upstream countries is, to a large extent, dependent on the gas and coal supply from downstream countries, especially during winter. The downstream countries thus want water for cotton and can use their energy supplies to bargain for it; the upstream countries can bargain with their water but their energy strategy requires retaining more of it. Thus, water is a key issue in the region.

Hence, the downstream and upstream countries face different domestic pressures. Their interests are often diametrically opposed to each other and offer little flexibility in negotiating the terms of joint use of water resources. Uzbekistan could reduce its water needs by shifting away from cotton. However, cotton is such a big asset to generate revenue and foreign exchange that the government is unwilling to restructure its agriculture. Any fall in cotton income – which is heavily dependent on water supplies – would only further impoverish a rural population already in difficult straits.

In some ways, though, the upstream countries are even worse off. They are poorer, less powerful, and have few resources to develop. Water is one of the few assets Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess. Yet, if they face retaliatory cutbacks in gas supplies, their urban populations put pressure on the governments for a more flexible water strategy. Giving up more water, however, undercuts their hydroelectric production which only makes them more vulnerable to energy blackmail from their downstream neighbours.

Water thus remained a central point of all conflicts in Central Asia and particularly the Ferghana Valley Region of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Given all these above factors, it is not surprising that bilateral and multilateral water arrangements are constantly being renegotiated, a factor which only increases the importance, controversy and tension around the distribution of this resource. The conflict of interest over water resources between the upstream and the downstream states is now addressed in an ad-hoc manner, through annual bilateral negotiations involving compensations of the upstream states, in the form of coal, natural gas or electricity supplies by the downstream states. However, the implementation of these bilateral agreements is difficult, if not impossible.

An agreement on the joint use of water and energy resources was reached on 17 March 1998 in Bishkek between three countries: Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; and Uzbekistan. Three months later Tajikistan also joined the agreement. The agreement was primarily driven by the biggest consumer of water – Uzbekistan (Karaev, 2005). Although Tajikistan controls a significant part of water resources, it was not invited. The situation surrounding those negotiations and the resulting agreement provides an interesting case study on these matters.

In 1997 tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan escalated, involving a military build-up by Uzbekistan across from the water reservoir located close to its border on the territory of Kyrgyzstan (Karaev, 2005). This move raised concerns and anger in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz government adopted a resolution declaring water as a tradable commodity, and codifying its right to use it for profit. It threatened to sell water to the PRC if Uzbekistan failed to pay for it.

Not long before the negotiations started, in February 1998, Uzbekistan cut off gas supplies to both water-rich countries – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Eggleston, 2000). This action also aroused anger in those two states, with the Kyrgyz government using especially strong rhetoric in denouncing it. The Uzbek side answered with similarly tough words. Apparently, aside from the water itself, the Uzbek government was also trying to make gains on territorial disputes with its neighbours (Karaev, 2005).

Threatening to use water as a weapon, Kyrgyzstan suggested that it might release so much water from its Toktogul reservoir as to destroy large cotton fields. Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also announced that they would raise the production of hydropower – that is, using more water – to reduce the need to import Uzbek gas. Tense relations marked the beginning of negotiations (Hogan, 2000).

Conclusion

Water is a fugitive resource – one which crosses political boundaries without a passport in the form of rivers, lakes and aquifers. Trans-boundary waters extend hydrological interdependence across national frontiers, linking users in different countries within a shared system. That is why water is perceived as a global common. But in Central Asia the case is altogether different. Water here has assumed an international character. Because of its strategic importance and zero-sum position due its potential for national growth and development and concerns about its potential for fuelling conflicts between and within regional states, the Central Asian states include water in their national security agendas. Water is thus playing an important role in the strained relations between Kyrgyzstan and its neighbouring countries and also contributes to the local conflicts. If not leading to armed conflict, the water situation in Central Asia particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may lead to some violent conflicts both between and within them. Water shortages are already inhibiting economic growth and rural employment scopes and hence generate tensions for its better management. The paper while dealing with the hypothesis that natural resources abundance or dependence leads to violent civil conflicts has dealt in detail with both sides of the story in the context of the water and energy situations in Central Asia and their increasing links to growing conflicts in the region, particularly between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and within the Ferghana Valley Region.

Footnotes

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Ramakrushna Pradhan

Author biography

Ramakrushna Pradhan is an assistant professor of Political Science in the Department of Social Science, Fakir Mohan University, Balasore, India. He served as a visiting professor at L. N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana, Kazakhstan. He holds a PhD from the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

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