Non-State Actors,Sub-Conventional Warfare,and India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis Stability/Instability

Introduction

Non-state violence is complex and ranges from lone actors to state-armed proxy groups. The use of proxy fighters is problematic for international peace and security as it assumes that all violence is state-sponsored. Usually, states engage in proxy wars by hiding behind militant/terrorist organizations. At the official level, no state seems to accept the ownership of such organizations. Covertly, however, it often transpires that states fund, train, and patronize them. In many cases, the states themselves create such organizations clandestinely. The nefarious activities of non-state actors may lead to catastrophe with global repercussions. Unfortunately, this is the case in South Asia, where nuclear deterrence stability is fatally threatened by the presence of non-state actors and their alleged/reported use by India and Pakistan in various ways against each other. It is argued that the most immediate threat to peace and stability in South Asia is the role of non-state actors that can instigate a significant crisis with escalatory potential. The political, economic, military, and strategic issues between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan have their roots in the region’s various geopolitical and geostrategic realities, which exacerbate the tensions between the two. Jammu and Kashmir region is the main dispute to which both the countries lay claim has become the bone of contention for all crises and wars. The Line of Control (LoC) that divides the disputed territory continues to be tense, and the exchange of artillery is a routine. The enduring conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has every possibility that any crisis may escalate into a war. This war may result in an exchange of nuclear weapons (Ali and Sidhu, 2021). Regarding the conflict, both the states have a very particular mind-set that results in perceived or actual insecurities. Both view each other’s policies to maximize respective strategic gains in the region.

Pakistan reckons India as an occupying force in Kashmir that has committed horrific human rights violations besides unremittingly trashing UN resolutions on Kashmir. Pakistan deems the Kashmir issue as an unfinished agenda of sub-continent partition and proclaims that it is the “jugular vein” of Pakistan. Pakistan has remained baffled with grave reservations regarding increasing Indian inroads into Afghanistan before the fall of President Ashraf Ghani’s government in August 2021. The Pakistani anxiety was aroused from its reasonably good relations with Afghanistan’s monarchist, republican, and communist regimes preceding the Taliban’s first era (1996–2001). These anxieties continued to exist during Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani (Constantino, 2020). This era (2001–2021) between the two Taliban regimes was the nadir of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. The Indian support to Baloch insurgents in Balochistan province has perplexed Pakistan. The latter has voiced its concerns internationally by submitting dossiers to prove its claims against India at different forums, notably to UN General Secretary (Khetran, 2017). Also, Pakistan asserts that Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists having safe sanctuaries inside Afghanistan have been funded, assisted, and trained by Indian secret agencies to weaken Pakistan.

As far as India is concerned, it considers its conflict with Pakistan as a source of the impediment to its progress that has hindered India’s rise. It claims that Pakistan is harboring and sponsoring non-state actors and using them to wage proxy and sub-conventional warfare in the region, especially in Jammu and Kashmir. India staunchly believes that such a dangerous policy of Pakistan is an existential threat to their national security and integrity. Indian policy circles are dismayed that extending any concession to Pakistan by demonstrating any docility on Kashmir might have spillover effects on other parts of the country undergoing secessionist movements. Consequently, India continues to trumpet the issue of terrorism and militancy in Kashmir by linking it with alleged Pakistani support. India perceives that by pressurizing Pakistan at bilateral, regional, and international levels, it can deny any space to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. This tactic tries to camouflage the Kashmiri struggle for their right to self-determination. India considers Pakistan an “epicenter” of terrorism. On several occasions, it has threatened Pakistan to unleash punitive surgical strikes in the wake of any major terrorist attack originating from Pakistan. In response to a terrorist attack on an Indian military convoy, India launched a SPICE-2000 precision-guided munition at Balakot in Pakistan on 26 February 2019, which redefined the deterrence relationship (Ali and Sidhu, 2021). The current dynamics of sub-conventional warfare and militancy in South Asia manifest that non-state actors appear to be less dependent on nuclear rivals by establishing international networks to secure funds and weapons. These perceptions and strategies do not resolve the continuing conflicts prevalent in the region. They could even aggravate tensions to the detriment or complete failure of nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia.

Therefore, this article offers an objective and critical analysis of the question: is there any probability that non-state actors could cause a sub-conventional crisis between India and Pakistan that could escalate to the detriment of deterrence stability in South Asia? First, the phenomenon of sub-conventional warfare and the role of non-state actors will be discussed, especially in the context of Indian accusations regarding Pakistan’s involvement in the Kashmir dispute. Likewise, it would be equally essential to discuss the Indian role in fueling TTP militancy and Baloch insurgency directly or indirectly. In the end, the nuclear escalation control will be analyzed. The article concludes that the threat of non-state actors instigating a significant crisis with escalatory potential requires India and Pakistan to engage diplomatically to strengthen nuclear risk reduction measures and nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).

Theoretical framework

The researchers find a plethora of literature on the important subject of nuclear deterrence, both in theoretical as well as practical perspectives, especially in the context of Cold War nuclear equation between both the superpowers. However, after the overt nuclearization in South Asia in 1998, many scholars of strategic studies have extensively contributed literature to build up an increasingly intriguing South Asian nuclear discourse. A large number of books, monographs, articles, research reports, and blog entries have been written to divulge upon South Asian nuclear dynamics. Interestingly, while analyzing nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, most of strategic experts have applied Cold War nuclear deterrence model to solve the puzzle. Nevertheless, few nuclear analysts examine South Asian strategic template through the lens of Cold War balance of power theory. Yet, few others argue that Cold War nuclear deterrence equation cannot be taken as a perfect model for South Asian nuclear discourse. The bulk of the literature outlines that the logic of the nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan is the same as it was during the Cold War; however, the dynamics are largely different (Sadiq and Ali, 2022). For instance, during the Cold War non-state actors were not influencing the strategies of Washington and Moscow.

A necessary precondition for the development of a suitable explanatory model is a theoretical and conceptual approach that allows understanding the state behavior in domestic, regional as well as international contexts. Over the years, the concepts of non-state actors, nuclear safety and security, and nuclear terrorism have been used to explain many issues in international politics particularly related to nuclear field. The subject of this study is relatively new and expansively sensitive, that’s why, primary documents are very rare; however, few authors have discussed this subject but not at length, so the space remains for further research and study. For conceptual and theoretical understanding, there are number of well-researched and widely subscribed books and research articles that provide a detailed discussion of various aspects of nuclear deterrence theory.

The non-state proxy strategy invites a realistic assessment of Indian and Pakistani responses to it and the ensuing impact on nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia. Before analyzing the current state of affairs in nuclear deterrence, keeping in view non-state actors between both the states, it would be pertinent to clarify a few dangerous dynamics of past nuclear crises through a brief literature review. Historically, militants operating in Indian-controlled Kashmir, allegedly having roots in Pakistan, have caused several crises. Indian attempts to punish Pakistan resulted in nuclear stability/instability paradox. Cost-benefit analysis and increasingly higher stacks restricted Indian policymakers not to contemplate any military strike option. International interventions also played a very crucial role in managing those crises by pressuring one side or the other before India could take any retaliatory strikes. Bhumitra Chakma argues in his book that when India deployed additional troops on its side of Kashmir to check militants’ activity in the 1990s, Pakistan took it as preparing for a limited strike against Pakistan. It is believed that India reportedly had pondered taking limited punitive strikes against militant training camps in Pakistan (Chakma, 2012). Mark Fitzpatrick (2014) notes that

if the assertion by Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg is correct, Benazir Bhutto ordered the army and air force to get ready. A squadron of F-16s was moved to Mauripur, and we pulled out our devices . . . to arm the aircraft.

It was the first crisis between both rivals with a nuclear element.

The Kargil conflict of 1999 raised the eyebrows of nuclear deterrence optimists. The empirical evidence indicates that the so-called Jihadis backed by Pakistan were part of this conflict. They took part along with Pakistani troops to seize strategically important Kargil heights. The Kargil conflict proved that a conflict could occur despite overt nuclear capabilities between two adversaries. Kargil conflict had the escalatory potential, which prompted US intervention to end the conflict (Hoodbhoy and Mian, 2002). Neil Joeck (2013) argues that “ . . . the Kargil war, rather than being an example of deterrence ‘working’ to prevent escalation, was an example of India and Pakistan engaging in a competition in risk-taking that only ended when Pakistan backed down.” Eye-ball to an eye-ball military standoff of 2001 to 2002 in the aftermath of a lethal terrorist attack on the Indian parliament has many dimensions to worry about nuclear escalation. Both the states were involved in a dangerous belligerent posture and exchanged ominous threats, which kept the international community on its toes during the crisis. Nuclear threats were also exchanged. India’s Defense Minister George Fernandes said that “India can survive a nuclear attack, but Pakistan cannot” (Richardson, 2002). Indian Defense Secretary Yogendra Narain (2002) stated that “a surgical strike is an answer . . . We must be prepared for total mutual destruction”. The nuclear-tinged crisis could have escalated because both the states showed their resolve by displaying massive military muscles and confrontational rhetoric. Historically, India’s military planners adhered to the Sundarji doctrine as a core military ideology since the early 1980s. However, the slow mobilization and deployment of Indian military troops during Operation Parakram alongside the western border indicated this doctrine’s weakness. It took almost 3 weeks to mobilize the Indian strike corps to punish Pakistan, which provided plenteous space to the Pakistani military to take effective countermeasures.

Conversely, Indian strategic planners conclude that this doctrine has been unsuccessful in integrating nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian strategic thought. This conclusion led to the unveiling of a new strategy in April 2004 by the Indian army chief—famously called the Cold Start doctrine (Sultan, 2011). Neil Joeck (2013) points out that “The idea behind Cold Start was to restructure the Indian Army so that it could address the defects made evident in 2002.” It is essential to analyze how this new doctrine impacts nuclear deterrence stability between the states in the context of non-state actors and sub-conventional warfare in the region. Before the Cold Start doctrine, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent capabilities were mainly aimed at countering the threat of India initiating an all-out war during crises. The threat of unacceptable damage to India might have worked at the strategic level by restricting the scope of crises. However, this new doctrine exploits the space at tactical and operational levels by launching quick punitive strikes without crossing nuclear thresholds. It posits new challenges to Pakistan, as its earlier posture of replying massively with nuclear weapons seems disproportionate if India materializes the Cold Start doctrine. If Pakistan opts not to respond at all, that will undermine the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. To overcome this security dilemma, Pakistan came up with NASR tactical nuclear weapon in 2011. Both India’s Cold Start doctrine and Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons pose grave challenges to nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia, where non-state actors have been causing many crises and are likely to do the same.

The threat of non-state actors bringing India and Pakistan to the brink of all-out war was very much present during the Mumbai crisis of 2008. Ten terrorists, believed to be originated from Pakistan, stormed two luxury hotels, a Jewish center, and the Railway station in Mumbai, killing 164 and wounding more than 300 others. One of the terrorists was caught alive by Indian security forces, who revealed that he was a member of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and from a district of Punjab, the major province of Pakistan (Ghani, 2012). Arguably, there was intense pressure on Indian political leadership from its military and public to go for punitive measures against Pakistan—who, according to them, is the epicenter of terrorism. India did not repeat the mistake of the Twin Peak Crisis. It refrained from significant military mobilization instead of weighed upon launching limited surgical strikes on alleged militant camps in Muridkay near Lahore. Notwithstanding the military’s earlier declaration of the Cold Start strategy, India did not respond militarily.

The instability injected into the South Asian strategic environment due to India’s evolving Cold Start doctrine or proactive operations strategy, and Pakistan’s responses (NASR tactical nuclear weapon) may be intriguing to discuss in the light of more recent crises. During most of 2015, both the states continued with blame game and threats, counter threats. But, at the closing month of that year, Indian Prime Minister Modi paid a surprise visit to Lahore, where he attended Premier Nawaz Sharif’s granddaughter’s wedding ceremony. The meeting between the two premiers appeared to be encouraging, and expectations for the resumption of bilateral dialogue went high. But then the Pathankot incident happened. On 2 January 2016 non-state actors/militants attacked an Indian airbase in Pathankot that killed several Indian soldiers. India took no time to hurl allegations at Pakistan. Michael Kugelman (2016) comments that “diplomatic breakthroughs are often sabotaged by terrorist attacks or other provocations regarding India-Pakistan relations. In this sense, Pathankot was a case of déjà vu all over again.” Pathankot attack revived the terrible memories of the 26/11 Mumbai carnage. India threatened to go after the perpetrators. However, government officials seemingly had no clue how to state threats to Pakistan regarding punitive actions. India’s defense minister Manohar Parrikar threatened Pakistan that whoever hurts India should also receive the pain of such activities, but the time and place should be of India’s choosing (Malik and Khan, 2018).

Yet another crisis developed in 2016 when non-state actors/militants attacked a highly guarded army camp in an Indian Army brigade headquarters in Uri—a place in Indian-controlled Kashmir. The terrorist attack resulted in the killing of 19 Indian soldiers. Indians claimed that “the Uri attack was a carefully planned terrorist attack that saw Pakistani handlers exploiting a fleeting opportunity to inflict maximum casualties on Indian troops” (Chadha et al., 2016). Unlike during earlier crises, the Indian government explicitly expressed its resolve and intent to inflict punitive surgical strikes to send Pakistan an unambiguous message. The most dangerous crisis flared between both states after the Pulwama incident. On 14 February 2019, a suicide bomber struck a heavy convey of India’s Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), killing 40 personnel. India immediately blamed Pakistan-based terrorist outfits have carried out the deadly attack. But Pakistan categorically denied these allegations and maintained that it was the work of a disgruntled indigenous Kashmiri fighter against the Indian atrocities (Ali and Sidhu, 2021). Indian Air Force conducted an airstrike to bomb an alleged Jaish-e-Muhammad terrorist training camp at Balakot, located inside Pakistan. Pakistan responded after 2 days of the Balakot strike, and there was an ensuing dogfight between fighter jets of both states. Pakistan Air Force destroyed an Indian fighter jet and captured its pilot alive. The next day, Pakistan returned the pilot to India (Asoori, 2020).

The Pulwama incident tested the political resolve of Indian political leadership. It was the first time that India did not worry about Pakistan’s possible nuclear threats. In the words of Abhinav Pandya, “the post-Pulwama Indo-Pak standoff marks a strategic change—a much more assertive Indian state in response to the terrorist activities of Pakistan-sponsored non-state actors . . . Any misadventure from the Pakistani side will likely result in gruesome retaliation, likely escalating into a nuclear face-off” (Pandya, 2019). Vipin Narang argues that Pulwama-like incidents are likely to occur again for reasons ranging from disaffection among young local Kashmiris and their exploitation by Jaish-e-Muhmmad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). He further notes that both the states were entangled in a loose talk during the Pulwama crisis threatening each other about the salience of nuclear weapons. India might take more risk to strike the mainland in Pakistan next time. But Pakistan could feel emboldened to retaliate more aggressively. The Pulwama aftermath displayed that escalation could be perceived as easy to stride by both the states. But who knows where it will end.

India has an increasing realization that it must wage a sub-conventional war against Pakistan. It should manipulate Baloch separatist militant groups, sectarian religious groups, and anti-Pakistan militant groups such as TTP. India should also use low-cost, high-impact tools to dent Pakistan’s obsession with proxy strategy by involving cyber operations (Joshi, 2019). India-Pakistan’s explosive strategic landscape has gotten messier after India revoked Kashmir’s special status by repealing article 370 from its constitution. Under this article, India- controlled Kashmir had some autonomies. The event unleashed chaos; authorities deployed a heavy number of forces and blackedout all communication channels to curb any impending protests by Kashmiris (Salam, 2020).

India has deployed its first regiment of S-400 missiles on the Pakistani border. The system has been acquired from Russia to equip its military for a possible two-front war (Arif, 2021). It has provided its air force with 36 Rafael state-of-the-art fighter jets, which it bought from France under a multibillion deal. Media reports suggest that India will buy 144 fighter planes from the United States, Sweden, and France (Hussain, 2022). To counter Rafael, Pakistan has procured Chinese J-10 jets. Under this security and arms race intensive environment, if another crisis develops in the wake of any terrorist attack on any iconic place in India or Pakistan, escalation is more likely to happen. It will not be the same as in the past; either state could use nuclear weapons if a full-fledge war starts between both the states.

Sub-conventional warfare by India and Pakistan

The rebellious nature of the Kashmir issue makes South Asia an increasingly dangerous place in the world. Both India and Pakistan have had wholly opposing positions on the Kashmir issue since the very first day of their birth. To add to this, both also find themselves poles apart on the Afghanistan issue and the Taliban’s recent takeover of Kabul. India’s alleged abetting of Baloch insurgency inside Pakistan’s Balochistan province has also ruined bilateral relationships. Each belief with varying intensity and evidence that the other is entertaining aggressive designs by purporting violence through sub-conventional warfare in the region. Such contending perceptions have caused an intense arms race in conventional and nuclear realms (Perkovich, 2013). Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy and Indian tactics in Balochistan are briefly elaborated as under:

Nuclear escalation control in South Asia

The devastating nature of nuclear weapons and their salience in the international political arena demands sensible nuclear stewardship that should aim to avoid crises between nuclear adversaries. Suppose, for some reason, a crisis spews. In that case, then responsible nuclear stewardship is essentially helpful in mitigating the chances of nuclear escalation and providing a mechanism for negotiation to manage or resolve the crisis (Krepon and Haider, 2004). However, nuclear-armed India and Pakistan have taken several unilateral measures to show the world their respective “responsible” nuclear stewardship. Nonetheless, it is unfortunate that they have dangerously insufficient cooperative mechanisms—military or nuclear-related CBMs and nuclear risk reduction measures—to resolve any nuclear crisis. Past nuclear crises were not settled; instead, they were managed because of the perceived threat of nuclear escalation and international pressure—primarily from the US administration. Michael Krepon points out that “Military-related CBMs and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures (NRRMs) have been few and far between over the past 15 years” (Krepon and Thompson, 2013). India and Pakistan institutionalized a few confidence-building measures to avoid accidental and unintentional war in the pre overt nuclearization era. These include a hotline between the prime ministers used episodically, a hotline between the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs), the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Maneuvers and troop movements, and the 1988 agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities. This agreement was ratified in 1991.

In the post overt nuclear era, both the states have failed to achieve concrete measures to manage any towering nuclear crisis bilaterally. The significant nuclear CBMs are few, and there is a big question mark on their effectiveness in thwarting any impending nuclear crisis. Lahore declaration was a big success as it contained a complete roadmap and a comprehensive plan of engagement for nuclear CBMs. But it was soon jeopardized by the Kargil conflict. Once the dust of the Kargil conflict settled, few elements of the Lahore Declaration were implemented. Overall, there are some success stories in concluding agreements to reduce the chances of nuclear confrontation that may result from some misperception or miscalculation. The applicable agreements include the following:

Keeping in view India-Pakistan entrenched antagonism and historical mistrust, the possibility of nuclear crisis—sooner or later—could be a fact hard to refute. Given the nuclear escalation measures in place, there is a deep skepticism that these would be sufficient to prevent, manage or resolve any nuclear crisis. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal (2005) pointed out that “in both states, the adversary is painted as black as possible, an attitude that has overshadowed the CBMs that New Delhi and Islamabad have periodically initiated.”

India and Pakistan continuously develop new military/nuclear technologies and revisit respective nuclear doctrines. Such trends are outpacing nuclear CBMs and nuclear risk reduction efforts between both states, which looks pretty difficult for the region. Michael Krepon argues that “the few CBMs and NRRMs reached since 1998 have not begun to serve as a stabilizing offset to technological and doctrinal developments” (Krepon and Thompson, 2013). The current state of affairs in nuclear escalation control arrangement/agreements in South Asia requires persistent and continuous diplomatic work. There is an urgent need to conclude several new and effective nuclear CBMs and nuclear risk reduction mechanisms.

Conclusion

Nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia is an increasingly complex and challenging undertaking to analyze and debate. With varying degrees and magnitude, the region’s unique geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics seriously challenge the Cold War nuclear deterrence model. The region is going through a critical phase of its history where non-state militant organizations have undermined the stable modern nation-state system. Both hard and anecdotal evidence suggests that nuclear rivals pitch non-state actors, through sub-conventional warfare, against each other. With a hostile historical legacy, India and Pakistan have limited strategic options to use the non-state actors and methods akin to sub-conventional warfare. With the increased uncertainty and constant threats in Balochistan and regions bordering Afghanistan, India has successfully climbed the rungs of the “escalation ladder.” Nevertheless, the history of India-Pakistan relations reveals that the most immediate threat is the role of non-state actors that they could play in instigating major crises with escalatory potential.

Unfortunately, the Kashmir issue is likely to remain a “nuclear flashpoint” for the foreseeable future. At the same time, the Indian departure from traditional deterrence to a more escalatory posture has forced Pakistan to limit the use of non-state actors in Kashmir. But Indian direct meddling in Balochistan, retaliatory strikes in response to Uri (2016) and Pulwama (2019) militant attacks vis-à-vis Pakistan’s readiness and ability to discourage India from gaining any strategic advantage has constantly been undermining the deterrence equation while leaving the two with limited strategic options to pursue. It has resulted in nuclear deterrence stability-instability paradox fraught with frequent bilateral crises which could have escalated to a nuclear exchange. Perhaps, the classification of South Asia as the most dangerous place in the world seems to be without an exaggeration.

The current state of affairs in nuclear escalation control arrangement/agreements between the two states demands persistent and continuous diplomatic work. Doctrinal and technological developments by India and Pakistan have already offset the existing nuclear CBMs and nuclear risk reduction measures. There is an urgent need to conclude several new and effective nuclear CBMs and nuclear risk reduction mechanisms. Hence, if current uncertainties continue to prevail on the India-Pakistan strategic landscape, there is a probability that a terrorist act by non-state actors in either state may escalate the tension and lead to a nuclear crisis in South Asia.