‘Afghanistan Factor’ in India–Russia Relationship

Imperialism and the Creation of Buffer States: First Phase (Nineteenth Century-1947)

In the first phase, Afghanistan found itself hemmed between two big empires, Russian and British during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. During this stage, it was mainly the competing nature of their expansionist colonial interests which determined their engagement over Afghanistan. The popular phrase to indicate this great power contest over Afghanistan is called ‘Great Game’ which originated in the nineteenth century (Hopkirk, 1990; Meyer & Brysac, 1999). When the Khanates in Central Asia came under Tsarist rule in second half of nineteenth century, Afghanistan became the centre of British-Russia rivalry in Eurasia, as it shared borders with the Tsarist Empire in its north and with British India in its south. In due course of time, Afghanistan emerged as a strategic buffer between Russia and British India during this phase. The Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission of 1885 demarcated north-western border of Afghanistan through the Pamir Agreement of 1895. Afghanistan got control over the Wakhan corridor in the Pamir Mountains which became its buffer against Russian Turkestan, British India and China. The Durand Agreement of 1893 delimited southern and eastern borders of Afghanistan.

However, none of these boundaries were sensitive to ethnic considerations. The northern border divided Badakhshan along with Uzbek and Turkmen territories while in the south, the Durand line cut across the Pashtun and Baloch areas (Karimi, 2005). Afghanistan has always resented the Durand agreement as it divided Pashtun clans, tribes and even families. In March 1949, Jalalabad Loya Jirga unilaterally declared all agreements and pacts between Afghans and the British as null and void (Alikuzai, 2013). Later, by signing the Anglo-Russian Convention (1907), both Great Britain and Russia agreed that they would not interfere in internal affairs of Afghanistan (Kamrany, 1982), thus, agreeing to maintain buffer status of Afghanistan. After concluding a Treaty of Friendship with Soviet Russia in 1921, Afghanistan also signed Anglo-Afghan Treaty in the same year which recognised Afghanistan’s complete independence in foreign affairs (Wilber, 1953). In 1931, a new treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan to ensure neutral status of Afghanistan and a mutual non-aggression pact was also signed. The treaty had nine clauses which were mainly intended to protect Soviet security and economic interests in Central Asia (Volodarsky, 1994).

Partition, the Cold War and New Fault Lines: Second Phase (1947–1979)

There were major cartographic changes in South Asia when the British left the region in 1947. While British India shared a border with Afghanistan, independent India did not as Islamabad continues to illegally control Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) since 1947 which borders Afghanistan. Since newly created Pakistan now shared borders with Afghanistan, Islamabad’s foreign policy choices were bound to have major implications for Kabul. Pakistan’s membership in Western military alliances (South East Asia Treaty Organisation in 1954 and Baghdad Pact in 1955) to contain Communism in Asia was a security concern for Soviet Union. In 1956, the Soviet leadership had bluntly told a Pakistani visiting delegation that they were disturbed by Pakistan’s participation in military alliances hostile to Soviet Union (Malik, 2016). For Soviet Union, it was yet another matter of concern that important strategic and military areas close to the Soviet territory were in hands of Pakistan (Chereshneva, 2021). In contrast, India and Afghanistan were members of the non-alignment movement and stayed away from anti-Soviet Union military blocs. One of the counter moves by the Soviet Union against Pakistan for joining the anti-Communist Western alliance was to support Afghanistan on the Pashtunistan issue. ¹ When Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin visited New Delhi and Kabul in December 1955, they supported India on Kashmir issue and Afghanistan on Pashtunistan issue (Bulganin & Khrushchev, 1955). Afghanistan also committed not to join the anti-Communist Western alliance, Baghdad pact in which its neighbours, Pakistan and Iran were members (Digital Archive Wilson Centre, 1956). The Soviet Union’s diplomatic support to India and Afghanistan on their border disputes with Pakistan was tactical in nature, as they supported a plebiscite on the Pashtunistan issue but opposed a plebiscite in Kashmir as they supported India’s position on Kashmir (Payind, 1989). Not surprisingly, Pakistan was concerned about a potential Soviet–India–Afghanistan axis and opposed Khrushchev’s visit to Afghanistan and Kashmir (The New York Times, 1955). In strategic terms, unsettled borders with Afghanistan and India posed ‘Two-front’ dilemma for Pakistan and deepened its existential challenges.

In 1971, the Soviet Union played an important role along with India in liberation of East Pakistan which became Bangladesh. India’s Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1971 neutralised American and Chinese threats to India and also protected India’s interests at the UN (Kennedy, 2011). However, India did not get any support from Afghanistan in 1971. This was also the case in the past when Kabul did not support India in 1962 war with China and 1965 war with Pakistan (Khosla, 2011). Afghanistan’s indifference to India’s security concerns was mainly due to India’s inability to support Kabul on its critical security concerns like Pashtunistan and Durand Line issues (Khosla, 2018). Mohammed Daoud Khan who came to power in Afghanistan in 1973 was one of the strong supporters of the Pashtun movement. Following the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, Daoud had asked for India’s assistance on Pashtunistan issue during his New Delhi visit in March 1975. However, India refused to do so (Khosla, 2011). Later, Ambassador of Pakistan to India, Abdul Sattar during his telephone conversation with India’s Foreign Secretary, J S Mehta appreciated that India did not include any adverse references to Pakistan in the India-Afghan communiqué issued after External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpeyee’s Kabul visit in May 1978. India had also taken the correct position on the Durand Line forming border between Pakistan and India (Record of the call by the Pakistan Ambassador Abdul Sattar on External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, New Delhi, 30 December 1978). There was consistency in India’s position that historically determined borders should be respected. If India had defended right of self-determination for Pashtuns, this would have allowed Pakistan to demand similar rights for the people of Kashmir. India wanted to have a peaceful relationship with Pakistan and supporting Afghanistan in its disputes with Pakistan would have impeded such a possibility (Khosla, 2018).

Moscow also signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Afghanistan in December 1978. It was second such treaty that the Soviet Union signed with a country in South Asia, other being with India in 1971. It was under this friendship treaty that the Soviet Union dispatched its troops a year later in December 1979 to safeguard the beleaguered Marxist government led by Noor Muhammed Taraki (Bakshi, 1994). This could unsettle Pakistan as Taraki was expected to give covert help to a left-oriented separatist movement in Baluchistan (The Washington Post, 1978). A Marxist government in Afghanistan eroded Kabul’s status as a buffer between Soviet Union and South Asia and there were concerns that in a ‘domino effect’, Pakistan was now facing the Communist threat directly from Soviet presence in Afghanistan (Pressler, 2017). The USA and Pakistan were now united to stop this eventuality.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The India–Russia Relationship in the Late Twentieth Century: Third Phase (1979–1991)

Given its close security relationship with Moscow, New Delhi avoided a knee jerk reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and settled for what has been termed as ‘mild censure’ (India Today, 1980). There was no public criticism of Soviet action but in private meetings with Soviet leaders, India continued to express disappointment. According to I K Gujral (2006), India’s former Ambassador to Soviet Union who participated in the meeting, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had categorically told visiting Foreign Minister of Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko in February 1980 that India could not appreciate Soviet actions in Afghanistan. He also recalls that, Foreign Minister P V Narsimha Rao visited Moscow in June 1980. In presence of Gujral, Rao advised the Soviet leadership to work out their way out of the Afghanistan trap. India took a neutral position, without siding with the USA or the Soviet Union and abstained from United Nations Security Council resolutions on this matter.

However, Soviet intervention provided legitimacy to external interference in Afghanistan by rival foreign powers while it also strengthened USA–Pakistan alliance. The USA gave massive economic and military aid to Pakistan, hailing it as a frontline state against Communism (Toor, 2018). China and the USA worked together with Pakistan which benefitted the Pakistani military. New Delhi felt that this cooperation resulted in the USA looking the other way as Beijing helped Pakistan’s nuclear program. Sino-US rapprochement had considerably reduced India’s strategic importance for the USA (Bakshi, 1994; India Today, 1980; Madan, 2020; Menon, 2021; Toor, 2018). For Pakistan, Soviet presence in Afghanistan was also an opportunity to settle scores with the Soviet Union for supporting India during 1971 Bangladesh liberation war. There were, however, unofficial attempts to diffuse the situation. To end the Afghan turmoil, one such proposal was made by Russian Indologist Prof Grogory Bondarevsky on March 24, 1980. He had suggested a plan to India’s then Ambassador to Moscow, I K Gujral involving India, Iran, Afghanistan and Soviet Union to collectively guarantee inviolability of the Durand Line. However, according to Gujral, in all probability, the Soviet Union was trying to bring back Brezhnev’s concept of ‘Asian Security’ from the back door (Gujral, 2011). Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had already rejected this Soviet-led security initiative twice in 1970s (Dubey, 2012). India remained against an external power providing security in Asia and instead favoured non-alignment and zones of peace (Mansingh, 1984).

India, however, tried to improve its relations with Pakistan to assure it that New Delhi did not pose a security threat to its survival. Due to Soviet presence in Afghanistan, it was now Pakistan that was a buffer between India and Soviet Union. In April 1980, India’s special envoy to Pakistan, Swaran Singh visited Pakistan and tried to convince General Zia about India’s genuine concerns about Pakistan’s security after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He told Zia that due to India’s self-interest, a strong Pakistan was needed and India would not wish to dismember Pakistan when Afghanistan was already in turmoil (Quasi-Verbatim record of the talks between President Zia ul-Haq and Special Envoy of the Indian Prime Minister Swaran Singh, Islamabad, April 2, 1980, 2012). However, according to Mitrokhin, a former KGB archivist, whose handwritten notes have been made public by the Wilson Centre, India–Pakistan rapprochement at this time would negatively impact Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This would have left Islamabad free to participate against the Soviets in Afghanistan and also raise anti-Soviet agenda at the international level. Hence, Soviet Union intelligence agency, KGB used ‘active measures’ to thwart any positive development in India–Pakistan ties (Mitrokhin, 2002). Around the same time in 1982, the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul proposed to his Indian counterpart that New Delhi should take advantage of Moscow’s presence in Afghanistan to take control of Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan (Radchenko, 2011). However, India calculated that this would intensify India–Pakistan tensions and also lead to India’s condemnation in the West. At the same time, China could feel encouraged to intervene in Kashmir and hence, this idea was a non-starter from India’s point of view (Dixit, 1998).

From 1981 onwards, Pakistan had a dual policy towards India—an apparent peace offensive accompanied by covert moves to weaken India’s unity and strength (Dixit, 2002). Pakistan started to create trouble in India’s Punjab by supporting the separatist elements. According to B Raman, former head of the counter-terrorism division of the Research and Analysis Wing, sometime after inception of India’s intelligence agency, R&AW in 1968, there began close trilateral cooperation with KGB and KHAD (intelligence agency of Afghanistan). Pakistan’s spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had started diverting some of the weapons it received from America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) meant for the Afghan Mujahideen towards Khalistani terrorists while it also set up training camps for them in Pakistan’s Punjab and North–West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Raman, 2013). ISI officers were trained by CIA in handling high-tech explosive devices and sabotage techniques. These methods were shared by ISI with Khalistani terrorists during their training in Pakistan. Hence, CIA-ISI cooperation was having a negative impact on India’s internal security. R&AW’s cooperation with KHAD and KGB was intended to secure important information on Afghan Mujahideen and ISI (Raman, 2013). KGB and KHAD also supplied vital information to R&AW related to presence of Sikh separatists in Pakistan’s tribal region (Hiro, 2015). In return, R&AW gave inputs to KHAD regarding arms supplied from Pakistan to the Mujahideens in Kandahar (Yadav, 2020). Hence, this intelligence cooperation reflected shared security concerns that Moscow and New Delhi had towards Pakistan–USA security cooperation in Afghanistan.

Apart from turning a blind eye to Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program, the USA also ignored India’s concerns regarding Pakistan’s support of Khalistan movement (Haqqani, 2013). In comparison, the Soviet Union had warned Pakistan against developing a nuclear bomb in July 1986 (The New York Times, 1986). Due to disagreements with Pakistan over its Afghanistan policy, Soviet Union had concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program making it less inclined to oppose India’s similar efforts (Szalontai, 2011). India was the only South Asian country to recognise and support Soviet-backed regimes in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 (Toor, 2018). During this decade when Soviet Union found itself isolated, cooperation with India allowed Soviet leaders to claim important support from a major independent country as part of their internal propaganda. A regionally dominant India was in Soviet interest in South Asia (Thakur, 1991). For India, Soviet support for its policy on the Tamil question in Sri Lanka and on Kashmir in 1990 when Pakistan-sponsored terrorism started in the Valley was crucial (Thakur, 1991). When the Soviet withdrawal started from Afghanistan, General Zia had proclaimed that the new power in Afghanistan would be Islamic, a part of the Islamic renaissance which would someday extend to Soviet Muslims (Central Asia) (Zia-u-Haq’s interview with Selig Harrison, published in Le Monde, cited in Coll, 2004, p 175). India and Russia were soon going to experience terrorism that would have close links with Pakistan and the Taliban.

The End of the Cold War, the Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Search for a Common Strategic Ground: Fourth Phase (1991–2001)

With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and disintegration of Soviet empire in 1991, new geopolitics and security challenges emerged not only at the global level but also in Afghanistan and South Asia which changed the regional dynamics. India–Russia relations struggled to find an overall common strategic ground after 1991 as there was a steep decline in this ‘time tested relationship’. With the emergence of independent Central Asian countries, the Russian and Indian borders moved further apart and India did not impinge on the immediate concerns of new Russia. This also eased earlier Indian concerns about conflicting Indian regional and Soviet global ambitions. New Delhi–Moscow ties started drifting under Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s term in early 1990s. Russia did not need India as a strategic ally since relations with the West were given top priority while India’s importance was downgraded (Bakshi, 1999; Kavalski, 2010; Nadkarni, 1995; Ollapally, 2002; Shukla, 1999). However, one possibility that could have brought India and Russia closer was a shared perception of an Islamic threat (Nadkarni, 1995). In this phase, radical Islamist ideology from Afghanistan and Pakistan emerged as a major security threat for both India and Russia, something that was missing in the earlier phases. It was mainly due to this mutual security threat that India–Russia cooperation began in this phase over Afghanistan as it impacted their national security.

Both India and Russia emerged as victims of religion-inspired terrorism in 1990s in Kashmir and Chechnya respectively. India’s Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 1990–1991 ² and 2002–2003 ³ clearly mention role of Pakistan in promoting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Around the same time, Russia was also facing the threat of Islamic terrorism. Pakistan and some financers from Saudi Arabia doubted durability of new governments in Central Asia. They wanted to see emergence of conservative Islamic governments in these countries. Hence, support was extended to Islamic rebels against the Tajik government during the Civil War in Tajikistan (Djalili & Grare, 1998). For Russia, Tajikistan was a gateway for extension of radical Islam not only in Central Asia but its own territory itself. The porous nature of Afghan-Tajik border and financial and logistical support received by Tajikistan’s Islamic opposition from Afghanistan were a security threat for Russia. Tajikistan is a member of Commonwealth of Independent States and its border with Afghanistan in a sense was Russia’s border with Afghanistan (Primakov, 2004). Interestingly, Hizb-i-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was disenchanted with India’s Afghanistan policy and due to his proximity with ISI; he could have well aided the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir (Ganguly, 1990).

It was in this background that India and Russia signed the Moscow Declaration on the Protection of the Interests of Pluralistic States in 1994 ⁴ during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s Moscow visit. The declaration identified religious and political extremism, terrorism and separatism as threats to pluralistic states like India and Russia. It also recognised the fact that territorial integrity and unity of the state is the key factor for viability of multi-ethnic states. This declaration has been often invoked by leaders of both sides to support each other’s territorial sovereignty and integrity (PMO, 2000). The joint declaration after Rao’s Moscow visit highlighted ‘deep interest in promoting peace and stability in the area between the borders of the Republic of India and the Russian Federation’. This was a reference to the security situation in Afghanistan and its potential impact on newly independent Central Asian states where India and Russia shared similar concerns (Mohanty, 2019). Russia and India remained two powerful poles at the opposite ends of the Central Asian countries which had become an arena of competition for outside powers that were trying to export militant fundamentalism by stroking the Afghan situation (Shukla, 1999).

After capturing power in Afghanistan in 1996, the Taliban emerged as a security threat for both India and Russia as they supported terrorism in Kashmir and Chechnya respectively. According to Shivshankar Menon, India’s former Foreign Secretary & National Security Advisor, Pakistan was paying the Taliban to take Kashmiri militants under its protection while it also encouraged Osama bin Laden to join hands with the Taliban, since he was also sponsoring bases for Kashmiri terrorists in Khost province of Afghanistan. Taliban leader Mullah Omar had openly supported jihad in Kashmir in 1998. It was clear to the Taliban that as long as they provided safe havens for Pakistani and Kashmiri militants, Pakistan would not refuse them anything (Menon, 2021; Rashid, 2000). Well-known American investigative journalist, Steve Coll has argued that Pakistan’s regional agenda around this time involved two elements: bleeding Indian troops in Kashmir and helping the Taliban to defeat Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. ISI facilitated training for Kashmiri radicals in Afghanistan, apart from providing funds and arms supplies (Coll, 2004).

For Russia, Taliban in Afghanistan posed a security threat not only for Central Asian countries but Russia’s sovereignty itself. Moscow was concerned about potential expansion of Taliban in the North, into former Soviet Central Asia. Northern Afghanistan directly shares borders with Central Asian countries and that is why, Russia’s concerns mainly relate to northern Afghanistan (Trenin, 2010). Russia feared that Taliban would support radicalisation in southern part of former Soviet Union, starting from Central Asia to North Caucasus and other Muslim republics of Russia (Trenin & Malashenko, 2010). Former Prime Minister of Russia, Yevgeny Primakov has highlighted a strategic extremist Islamic triangle which is a security threat to Russia: Afghanistan, the North Caucasus, and Kosovo (Primakov, 2004). Spurt in radicalisation and terrorist activities in Afghanistan, thus, have serious security implications for Russia. Russian experts on Afghanistan have highlighted that in 1990s, office of former Taliban leader, Mullah Omar depicted a map that showed borders of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan extending into former Soviet space, even into the Russian territory (Safranchuk & Knyazev, 2023). Even according to American experts, Laden, who was advising Mullah Omar envisaged revival of ancient Central Asian Islamic empires which would ultimately reach contemporary Russia (Coll, 2004). Moscow’s concerns became a reality as the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan served as a sanctuary and training ground for Chechen and Uzbek terrorist groups. Taliban not only recognised secessionist government of Chechnya but also allowed the rebels to open an embassy in Kabul and a consulate in Kandahar in 2000 (Rashid, 2000). By opening diplomatic links with the Chechen terrorists, Taliban directly undermined Russia’s sovereignty over Chechnya by recognising its independence. Economically, social unrest in these countries triggered by Taliban could lead to a mass exodus of almost 10 million ethnic Russians back to Russia which would have worsened Moscow’s already fragile economic conditions (Withington, 2001).

Hence, India and Russia were facing similar security threats from Taliban-ruled Afghanistan which posed challenges to their internal security and sovereignty. Their security concerns converged in terms of containing Taliban within Afghanistan and halting its expansion. Both countries supported leader of Northern Alliance (or the United Front), ⁵ Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Tajik military commander from Panjshir Valley who opposed both, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. Northern Alliance was annoyed with Pakistan for supporting Taliban while they had also promised that all militant camps would be closed if they came to power. These were enough reasons for India and Russia to support them (Coll, 2004; Rashid, 2000; Withington, 2001). New Delhi had gifted two Mi-8 helicopters between 1996 and 1999 while a military hospital was also maintained at Farkhor near Afghan-Tajik border to treat wounded fighters of Northern Alliance (The Hindu, 2019). India’s first Ambassador to Tajikistan, B R Muthu Kumar, in his interview with the author said that he was the messenger between Ahmad Shah Massoud and Government of India. India had given wholesome assistance to Northern Alliance that included funds, medicines, some military hardware and uniforms (Interview with B. R. Muthu Kumar, 2023). Russia had supplied lethal military hardware to Northern Alliance fighters. However, according to Russia’s leading expert on Afghanistan, Alexandre Knyazev, regional countries like India, Russia, Iran and Uzbekistan were working in an ad-hoc manner and there was no fixed channel of communication between them on how to coordinate assistance to Northern Alliance. There was a regional understanding that Taliban was a threat which needed to be contained in Afghanistan (Interview with Alexandre Knyazev, 2023). Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 echoed the same sentiment, arguing that interdicting the export of terrorism from Afghanistan was one of the main aims of Moscow’s security policy.

When President Vladimir Putin came to visit India in October 2000, the two countries signed a strategic partnership and during his address to Indian Parliament; he had said that same terrorist organisations were responsible for terrorism in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Northern Caucasus (Putin, 2000). However, these were not same groups but a network of closely allied terrorist groups that aided and cooperated with each other in 1990s and early 2000s, although group goals and control over group actions remained independent of each other. One of the strategic pillars of India–Russia ties was convergence on terrorism and Putin fully supported India’s stand on international terrorism (Raghavan, 2020). During Putin’s visit, Indo-Russian Joint Working Group on Afghanistan was also established in October 2000 to coordinate their policies towards Kabul. It could be argued that the term ‘cross-border terrorism’ was not only applicable to India’s security concerns but it was equally applicable to Russia’s concerns on terrorism as both faced problems from Taliban-supported terrorist groups in Kashmir, Central Asia and Chechnya. Putin also said that cooperation with India was a top priority for Russia and needless to say, Afghanistan played a key role in this context. During the 1990s, Western intelligence agencies were not sensitive to India’s concerns about Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir. They did not share any intelligence with India on this matter mainly because they had limited contacts within Indian intelligence during the Cold War and were at odds with the Indian government over proliferation-related issues. They did not even admit it was terrorism while supporting the Pakistani view that J&K was a disputed territory (Raman, 2013). This is why; India–Russia cooperation on terrorism became very important for India at a time when the Western countries did not even recognise this problem due to their pro-Pakistan attitude. Afghanistan under the Taliban became an important factor in bringing India–Russia together where they shared and supported mutual concerns on terrorism. By supporting the Northern Alliance, India and Russia along with other countries were able to halt Taliban’s northern advance and ensured that Pakistan was not able to extend its ‘strategic depth’ to Central Asia.

The ‘War Against Terror’ and Divergent Trajectories: Fifth Phase (2001–2021)

In this phase, the India–Russia convergence on Afghanistan (as explained in the previous phase) disappeared mainly because of differences brought upon by three factors – the USA, Pakistan and the Taliban. Russian expert, Aleksei Zakharov agrees that India and Russia’s paths have diverted in Afghanistan since 2001 and convergence of views has disappeared (Zakharov, 2021a). In 2001, Afghanistan again had presence of foreign troops as the USA and its allies invaded Afghanistan following the 9/11 terror attacks to dismantle Al Qaeda network. The USA became an important factor in Afghan policies of New Delhi and Moscow which injected certain divergence in their Afghanistan approach. India and Russia supported America’s campaign in Afghanistan as they too were victims of terrorism. The USA and its allies overthrew the Taliban, something New Delhi and Moscow both wanted. India empathised with the USA as both countries agreed to cooperate against terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan which was a mutual threat (India & USA Joint Statement, 2001). According to the Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report 2001–2002, ⁶ the USA started to take a stronger position on the issue of terrorism faced by India. The report further says that the USA also acknowledged that war against terrorism also included terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (MEA, 2001–2002). Similarly, Russia too supported America’s fight against terrorism and its efforts to establish military bases in Central Asia. However, there were opposing voices in Russia but Putin ultimately had made up his mind to improve relations with the USA (Tsygankov, 2016). He reversed 200 years old consensus of Russian foreign policy of treating Central Asia as its ‘sphere of influence’ (Mcfaul, 2001). Both India and Russia hoped to improve relations with the USA after 9/11, however, the trajectory of their bilateral relations with the USA shows a different picture—India and USA today have a global strategic partnership while USA–Russia relations are in their worst phase ever.

As the Cold War ended, Indian policymakers developed a positive view towards the USA as it could not only balance the growing Chinese power but also fill the vacuum in India’s foreign and security policy left by the disintegration of Soviet Union (Kapur & Ganguly, 2007). In 2005, US President Bush announced a unique nuclear cooperation agreement to help India become a major power amidst rising China in Asia (Tellis, 2015). However, Russia’s intended rapprochement with the USA did not go as per its plans. Russia’s support to the USA military campaign in Afghanistan could not help in overall improvement in Russia–USA relations due to three factors—differences over Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty and NATO expansion in former Soviet space (Stent, 2014). Later, more problems cropped up over Iraq and ‘colour revolutions’ in Russia’s backyard—Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan which were direct challenges to Russia’s interests (Stent, 2014). Hence, two weeks before announcement of India–USA nuclear deal in July 2005, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation at its Astana summit, asked the USA to set a deadline by which it would withdraw its military assets from Central Asia. Russian experts agree that American and Western regional policies were hostile to Russia. Moscow supported Washington in Afghanistan presuming that the US goals in the country were strictly to counter terrorism and not geopolitical. Russia expected the USA to achieve its aims in about two years and withdraw from Afghanistan (Safranchuk & Knyazev, 2023). In contrast, Indian interests were served well by the US presence in Afghanistan as it prevented the country from falling into the hands of pro-Pakistan Taliban (Burgess, 2019). A Russian expert has also supported this view arguing that India wanted the Western coalition to stay in Afghanistan (Trenin, 2010). Other Russian scholars have pointed out that India wanted to make most of the opportunities that arose due to the US intervention in Afghanistan (Safranchuk & Knyazev, 2023). One such instance was India–USA–Afghanistan trilateral dialogue that was started in 2012 for better coordination among the members regarding security scenario in Afghanistan. In contrast, NATO had suspended all practical cooperation with Russia including Afghanistan following the Crimea crisis in 2014. In this phase, the USA gradually became sensitive to threat of cross-border terrorism faced by India, as India–USA joint statements regularly highlight names of Pakistan-based terror groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. This has reduced India’s dependence on Russia to seek support against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Lastly, in terms of geography, Russia perceives Afghanistan as part of Central Asia rather than South or West Asia (Interview with Kirill Likhachev, 2023). That was one of the main reasons why Russia was ambivalent about America’s attempts to make Afghanistan a bridge between Central and South Asia through its Greater Central Asia vision that excluded Russia (Dundich, 2013). In contrast, India welcomed America’s Greater Central Asian vision and wanted its full-scale implementation (Press Trust of India, 2017; Safranchuk & Knyazev, 2023).

The second factor that created differences between India and Russia over Afghanistan in this phase was Pakistan. India–Pakistan relations and Russia–Pakistan relations moved in opposite direction in this phase. Continuous and sustained political engagement between India and Pakistan has failed to materialise after the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008. Abrogation of Article 370 by India in Jammu and Kashmir and the domestic politics in both countries have further wrecked chances of a thaw in bilateral relations. In comparison, Moscow and Islamabad ties have vastly improved in this phase. As a response to India’s growing proximity with the USA, Russia has gradually deepened its ties with Pakistan. In 2014, Russia lifted its embargo on the sale of offensive military weapons to Pakistan by agreeing to supply Mi-35M Hind-E assault helicopters. The two countries also conducted their first military exercise in 2016 (Donaldson & Nadkarni, 2019). India had raised concerns with Russia regarding sale of these attack helicopters in 2014 (Indian Express, 2014). Russian scholars have highlighted that in the long term; four issues make Pakistan important for Russia—terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking and nuclear security (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2014). Russia’s former ambassador to Pakistan, Alexey Dedov highlighted in 2018 that Pakistan’s importance cannot be ignored in Eurasian integration projects like Belt and Road Initiative and Eurasian Union. He even acknowledged Pakistan’s fight against terrorism and efforts to bring regional stability (Dedov, 2018). In April 2021, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov visited Pakistan and said that Russia was ready to strengthen anti-terrorism potential of Pakistan including supplies of special military equipment (Hindustan Times, 2021a). Russia’s growing engagement with Pakistan over the issue of terrorism is in contrast to India’s approach which seeks to isolate Pakistan and expose its role in promoting terrorism (Times of India, 2019). At the Goa BRICS Summit in 2016, India was surprised by Russia’s refusal to back New Delhi’s demand to include two terrorist groups from Pakistan in the declaration which prevented isolation of Pakistan on the issue of terrorism. It was mainly due to growing strategic mistrust with the USA that Russia had started a trilateral dialogue on Afghanistan (later called as Moscow Format) in 2016 involving Pakistan and China, a development which recognised Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. India was excluded from this dialogue. In 2021, Russia had justified India’s exclusion from the talks saying New Delhi had no influence on the Taliban (TASS, 2021a). This showed communication gap and differences between the two countries in Afghanistan. Dmitri Trenin had earlier similarly argued that there was little consultation, and virtually no coordination, between the two countries on Afghan issues (Trenin, 2010). The Indian government refrained from making public statements in this regard. However, prominent Indian foreign policy experts attributed India’s absence from Moscow Format to ‘Russia’s attempts to checkmate the USA in South Asia through Pakistan and China’ (Pant, 2017). The talk of emerging Russia–China–Pakistan axis could be a little premature, however, these developments could be seen in the context of India’s closeness with the USA and endorsement of Quad and Indo-Pacific.

Lastly, there has been a big gap in India’s and Russia’s views on Taliban during this phase as the days of Taliban as a ‘common enemy’ are far behind, although Moscow continues to designate Taliban as a terrorist organisation. As the threat of terrorist organisation Islamic State (ISIS) loomed over Afghanistan, Russia started to engage the Taliban from 2015 onwards, although contacts existed even before (Ramani, 2021). Russia said these contacts involved intelligence sharing with the Taliban to fight the Islamic State (CNN, 2015). In the same year, Zamir Kabulov, Putin’s special envoy to Afghanistan had said that Taliban was now behaving like a national liberation movement, which was defending their cultural and religious traditions against the Americans (Interfax, 2015). Taliban has politically benefited from the rise of ISIS in Afghanistan as countries like Russia believe that the Taliban is acceptable compared to a bigger threat like ISIS. In 2019, Russia and the Taliban had jointly demanded withdrawal of US-led coalition foreign troops from Afghanistan (Voice of America, 2019). Unlike Russia, India refrained from engaging the Taliban in this phase. New Delhi cautiously monitored the Afghan situation and resisted the temptation of communicating with Taliban, even if its former Northern Alliance partners, Russia and Iran were already doing it (Joshi & Sharma, 2017). Regarding India’s delay in engaging the Taliban, Russia had said that Taliban is a reality in Afghanistan and India will have to decide its own role in the country (Times of India, 2021). Instead of the Taliban, India continued to support the government and people of Afghanistan to ensure peace in the country (The Mint, 2021a). Russia, however, saw elected Afghan governments from a different lens. Russian experts have highlighted that during the US occupation of Afghanistan; all governments were under the US control and acted as its tool in regional geopolitics and geoeconomics (Safranchuk & Knyazev, 2023). Kabulov had even said that the Taliban was a more credible negotiating partner than Afghan puppet government (TASS, 2021b). Hence, in this phase, Russia’s view on the Taliban changed: from seeing it as a ‘creation of Pakistan military and its intelligence in concurrence with the USA’ (Primakov, 2004) to ‘the most independent force in Afghanistan which is no one’s client’ (Safranchuk & Zhornist, 2021). On the other hand, Indian experts on Afghanistan hint that India may have persisted with the dogmatic view of the Taliban being a mere proxy of Pakistan (Bhadrakumar, 2021) while also pointing out that New Delhi was late in engaging the Taliban (Katju, 2022).

Taliban Redux and the Future of India Russia Security Relations

The Taliban’s ascendance to power in August changed the nature of India–Russia engagement in Afghanistan. In October 2021, India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar indicated some dissatisfaction with the USA by saying that India was not kept fully in loop about USA–Taliban deal in 2020 (Hindustan Times, 2021b). With the USA–NATO military presence coming to an end in Afghanistan, there was a realisation both in New Delhi and Moscow to consult and cooperate about the new reality in Afghanistan in order to contain its security impact on both countries. A week after Taliban’s takeover, Prime Minister Modi and President Putin had a phone conversation and agreed to establish a permanent consultative mechanism on Afghanistan between the Security Councils of both countries. The two leaders agreed to counter spread of terrorist ideology and drug trafficking from Afghanistan’s territory (Hindustan Times, 2021c). Such a mechanism was established by Russia with India only while New Delhi was the only destination visited twice by Secretary of Russian Security Council Nikolay Patrushev following Taliban’s power capture in Afghanistan (Zakharov, 2021b). The then Russian Ambassador to India, Nikolay Kudashev had said that India and Russia had a common concern that Afghan territory is not used for spreading terrorism while there was a danger that terrorism could reach Russian territory and Kashmir (The Mint, 2021b).

Further, during Putin’s India visit in December 2021, the joint statement welcomed Delhi Regional Security Dialogue hosted by India in November 2021 to discuss security situation in Afghanistan. India and Russia also finalised a roadmap of interaction in Afghanistan, which showed their mutual and shared concerns about Taliban-controlled Afghanistan (India–Russia Joint Statement, 2021). Russia, while engaging Taliban, has been beefing up security cooperation with the Central Asian countries, signalling the fact that it does not fully trust the Taliban and wants to be ready for any security emergency emanating from Afghanistan. At the moment, New Delhi and Moscow are following a policy of ‘engagement without recognition’ towards Taliban. One of the reasons for India’s change in its Taliban policy is that non-engagement with Taliban would have left enough room for China and Pakistan to act against India’s interests, establishing Chinese hegemony in India’s western neighbourhood without India even contesting it (Katju, 2021). With the USA out of Afghanistan, Moscow and New Delhi may have more convergence about preventing rise of another hegemon (China) in this area (Zakharov, 2021b). India had been invited by Russia to Moscow Format talks in October 2021 where Taliban delegation also participated and the Indian delegation met Taliban leaders indicating India’s support to people of Afghanistan. The future of India–Russia cooperation in Afghanistan would depend on two critical issues – Taliban’s behaviour (not allowing use of Afghanistan’s territory by terrorists and other issues as detailed in UNSC Resolution 2593) and Taliban’s capability to demonstrate itself as an autonomous and rational actor which can protect India and Russia’s interests in Afghanistan without being influenced by other countries.