Abstract
As a new nation-state in 1947, Pakistan’s relations with the larger Arab world were fraught with many tensions and contradictions. Ever since, many readjustments have taken place on both sides. These rearrangements derive from such tectonic shifts as the ebbing away of Arab nationalism 1967 onwards, petro-dollar rush in the 1970s, Iranian revolution in 1979, end of Third worldism, Afghan war, unipolarity post–Berlin Wall, 9/11 besides labour migrations, military alliances and domestic imperatives of various states and polities. Presently, Pakistan is tied to the Middle East in a three-pronged manner. Economically, it is dependent on petro-dollar rich Gulf Sheikhdoms. This relationship can be described as pure clientelism. Next, geographical proximity and Cold War compulsions have implied an unavoidable Iranian nexus. Finally, with the rather recent rise of Turkey as a subimperial power in the Middle East, Pakistan has also tilted towards Turkey of late. However, beyond geopolitics and economy, Pakistan’s embrace of the larger Muslim world has ideological connotations as well. Imagined as a Muslim Zion, commissars at the helm of ideological state apparatuses in Pakistan have always imagined Pakistan as an integral part of the larger Muslim community, numerous contradictions notwithstanding. Hence, informed by the theories of clientelism and subimperialism, this study argues that Pakistan’s relations with the Middle East are anchored in economics, geopolitics and identity.
Introduction
Owing to Israel’s otherization in Pakistan, it comes as a news for contemporary generations in South Asia that the country sided with Israel when the latter, flanked by the United Kingdom and France, invaded Gamal Abdul Nasser’s Egypt. During the 1956 Suez crisis, the Saudi king, Saud bin Aziz, met Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and openly criticized Pakistan’s position.
Ever since, many readjustments have taken place on both sides. These rearrangements derive from such tectonic shifts as the ebbing away of Arab nationalism 1967 onwards, petro-dollar rush in the 1970s, Iranian revolution (1979), the end of Third worldism, the ‘Afghan Jihad’, unipolarity post–Berlin Wall, 9/11 besides labour migrations from Pakistan to the Gulf region, military alliances and domestic imperatives of various states and polities in the Middle East as well as Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan is presently tied to the Middle East in a three-pronged manner. Economically, it is dependent on petro-dollar rich Gulf Sheikhdoms. This relationship can be characterized as pure clientelism. Next, geographical proximity and certain Cold War compulsions have implied an unavoidable Iranian nexus. Until the 1970s, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey constituted an anti-communist arc around the USSR without bothering Riyadh, Washington’s most trusted ally in the Middle East. However, the Iranian revolution and the ‘Afghan Jihad’ in the 1980s triggered new tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, often expressed in sectarian idiom. Finally, with Turkey as a subimperial power in the Middle East, Pakistan has also tilted towards Ankara. This tilt owes, partly to balance Saudi influence, partly it reflects growing Turkish economic, political and cultural influence in the Muslim world and beyond.
Beyond geopolitics and economy, Pakistan’s embrace of the larger Muslim world has ideological connotations as well. Imagined as a ‘Muslim Zion’, an exact nemesis of ‘Hindu India’, commissars at the helm of ideological state apparatuses in Pakistan have always imagined Pakistan as an integral part of a larger Muslim community, numerous contradictions notwithstanding. However, the Islamified identity and solidarity is conveniently adopted or deserted when economic interests are involved. Therefore, not merely Pakistan’s relations with the Muslim world, but the Middle East in particular, have been fraught with tensions and contradictions; these relations have been underwritten by a pragmatic approach anchored in economic imperatives and realpolitik. Hence, informed by the theories of clientelism, dependency and subimperialism, this study argues that Pakistan’s relations with the Middle East are anchored in economics, geopolitics and apparently identity. Aimed at examining the history of Pakistan’s relations with the Middle East, this study answers how Pakistan’s status as a client state shaped its relations with the Middle East. This study is organized in the following manner. The ‘Sculpting an Islamified foreign policy’ section historicizes the shaping of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Next, the ‘Conceptualizing a clever client’ section outlines the theoretical approaches that inform the analysis. The section ‘Ummah in practice’ documents the relationship with three key countries in the Middle East: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Iran and Turkey. Before ‘Conclusion’, a discussion and analysis is offered in the section ‘Analysis and discussion’.
Sculpting an Islamified foreign policy
At the outset, two caveats are in place. First, Pakistan’s foreign policy is rooted in a realist approach, famously characterized by Morgenthau (1948), if one goes by the accounts of the country’s foreign policy Sultans or mainstream/semi-official discourses. For instance, Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar, a career diplomat for 39 years, delineates the country’s foreign policy as follows: [Pakistan’s] Foreign policy aims comprise preservation of peace and security, political independence and territorial integrity, promotion of economic and political ties, and cooperation with other members of the world community. Standard means include individual self defence capability, defence alliance, support of friends, and international goodwill. (Sattar, 2020: 356)
This realist approach is justified on the pretext of security threats posed, from day one of the country’s creation on 14 August 1947, by the ‘arch enemy’ and apocryphal ‘other’, that is, India. Sattar may also be quoted yet again from his cult-like book on Pakistan’s foreign policy that came out first in 2006 and went to press in 2020 for the fifth edition: ‘India . . . was intent from the start to impose its unilateral preferences. The divergence was aggravated by India’s primordial inclination as a more powerful state to exploit power disparity to its advantage’ even if Pakistan wanted to solve all mutual disputes ‘on the basis of law and equity’ (Sattar, 2020: 19). Sattar (2020) justifies ‘first turning point in Pakistan’s foreign policy, from non-alignment to alliance with the United States’ on the pretext of ‘Indian threat’ (p. 356). 1 Similar perspectives have been peddled by many others in Pakistan (see inter alia Ali, 2001; Kasuri, 2015: 783–784; Mustafa, 2001: 124–125). What Callard (1957) observed back in 1957 about Pakistan’s foreign policy remains true in the 2020s: ‘Her foreign policy has been dominated by one continuity factor: the desire for protection against India. On this issue nearly every political leader is agreed’ (p. 9). 2 Notably, an India-centric discourse is also vital to cement relations, at least for domestic consumption, with the Muslim Ummah. Second caveat is, militarization of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Andreskian (1968) describes militarization as the ‘subservience of the whole society to the needs of military’ (pp. 184–185). This militarization owes to the character of the Pakistani state. Pakistan has been invariably characterized as Praetorian, Overdeveloped and Garrison state (Alavi, 1972; Siddiqa, 2017; Sulehria, 2019). In each characterization, military is assigned a role at the helm. Understandably, foreign policy is considered an extension of the domestic policy (Goswami, 1983: 39) since it is shaped by the same ruling class. In the case of Pakistan, it is sculpted by an all-powerful military. 3 The former foreign minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, cautiously and implicitly acknowledges, ‘There is a perception that the army and the Intelligence Agencies play a key role in it. The question is not surprising in view of the repeated military interventions in Pakistan’ (Kasuri, 2015: 782). 4
In relation to the idiomatic Muslim world – in practice, it implies the Middle East – Pakistan’s foreign policy imperatives can be periodized into pre-1970 and post-1970 phases. During the former period, Pakistan antagonized most of the Arab countries despite lavishly paying lip service to various ‘Muslim world’ causes: notably Palestine or the Tunisian war of liberation.
5
Suez crisis, however, epitomizes the gulf between a nascent Pakistani state and key Arab countries. While Egypt was under attack after the nationalization of the Suez canal, Pakistani prime minister, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, blamed President Nasser for the crisis (Bahadur, 1983: 80–81). This policy was highly unpopular domestically. For instance, a 300,000-strong protest rally, biggest since Pakistan’s independence, was held in Lahore. Manifestations across the country were held (Hyder, 1987: 20). Although Pakistan’s policy during the Suez crisis mirrored Western pressure (Hyder, 1987: 16–31), economic imperatives also drove Pakistan to the anti-Egyptian trio. At the time, 56% of the country’s exports and 49% of its imports passed through the Suez canal (Hyder, 1987: 18). Hence, economy trumped the Ummah. Pakistan’s membership of the Central Asia Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Baghdad Pact further triggered suspicions among the Arab leaders. Hence, given the contradiction between Pakistan’s stated goals in relation to the Ummah and actual actions, the Arab countries were doubtful (Bahadur, 1983: 81; Burke and Ziring, 1990: 67). Burke and Ziring (1990) explain Pakistan’s paradox at the time, . . . the Indian Muslims . . . were surrounded by a non-Muslim majority . . . and Islam was their only defence against the threatened loss of identity . . . But Islam was not an issue in the politics of other Muslim lands. As the age of imperialism approached its end, nationalism in those countries took the familiar form of territorial, racial, and linguistic nationalism, for the problem there simply was how to get rid of European domination. (pp. 65–66)
The following incident demonstrates Pakistan’s paradox: Pakistan expressed solidarity with Indonesia against Dutch police action in December 1948. Pakistan suspended KLM licence since KLM aircraft were employed to aid Dutch military action. Likewise, Indonesian independence was celebrated by Pakistan by declaring a public holiday. Yet Indonesia felt close to India because the latter shared ideals of secularism, socialism and non-alignment. ‘During Nehru’s visit to Indonesia in December 1950, President Soekarno publicly said, Nehru politically was his “father”’ (Burke and Ziring, 1990: 67). The worst was yet to come: Black September 1970. Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq (later general and country’s third military ruler) commanded Pakistani troops in assisting Jordanian army to quell Palestinian uprising in Jordan. 6
The shift in Pak–Arab relations was catalysed, on one hand, by petro-dollars rush enabling the Gulf countries to patronize poor Muslim cousins, on the other, the break-up of Pakistan as East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971 forced Pakistan to look Westward, short of Europe (Ahmed, 1976; Ali, 1983: 125–127). According to Ali, before 1971, Pakistan heavily relied on the US aid. By 1970, Pakistan had received assistance worth $7 billion, largely from the United States. But the financial crunch caused by the 1971 war with India and loss of East Pakistan as a captive market forced Bhutto ‘to look elsewhere: the oil-rich Gulf kingdoms provided the obvious choice. Accordingly, from 1970 to 1975 Pakistan’s economy underwent a major shift of emphasis’ (Ali, 1983: 125). Pakistani exports to nine major Muslim trade partners (Iran, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Indonesia) increased from 6.6% in 1969–1970 to 24.8% by 1973–1974. In the next financial year, the exports to the Middle East alone exceeded 30% of the total (Ahmed, 1976). Another aspect of this dependence on the Middle East was labour export and concomitant foreign remittances sent home by the labour. Pakistan not merely leased skilled or unskilled labour but also soldiers and military officers. Labour remittances from the Middle East contributed to 20% of the foreign exchange earnings by the late 1970s (Ali, 1983: 125). The situation remains almost the same ever since (see Tables 1 to 3).
GCC FDI ($ million) in Pakistan 2011–2020.
Source: State Bank of Pakistan.
GCC: Gulf Co-operation Council; FDI: Foreign Direct Investment.
Workers’ remittances ($ million), a comparison between GCC and Rest.
Source: State Bank of Pakistan.
GCC: Gulf Co-operation Council.
Remittances ($ million) received from Pakistani diaspora in GCC (2011–2022).
Source: State Bank of Pakistan.
GCC: Gulf Co-operation Council.
Conceptualizing a clever client
In this section, such theoretical approaches as clientelism, dependency and subimperialism will be sketched out in order to situate Pakistan in global hierarchy. For the first, Pakistan can be characterized as a periphery state characterized by dependency not merely on the core but also on subimperial and rich patrons. In the context of this study, contemporary Pak–Turkish ties, or Pak–Iran relations in the pre-1979 period can be explained through the prism of subimperialism. However, the KSA is not a subimperial country. Nevertheless, it commands immense power by virtue of oil wealth and the US patronage. Hence, Pakistan’s relationship with KSA is best described by patron–client paradigm. Médard (1976) describes clientelism as ‘a relationship of dependence . . . based on a reciprocal exchange of favours between two people, the patron and the client, whose control of resources are unequal’. Medard deployed the patron–client lens to examine France’s role in Africa. However, the concept has gained currency in the field of international relations after it was introduced by scholarship associated with Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The FPA school conceives clientelism ‘as a negotiated solution to the problem of insecurity between unequal states’ (Ricardo, 2020). Notably, as Bourmaud flags, the clientelist approach focuses on the instrumentalist side (actors, personalities, family-type relations, practices) rather than the causes. Therefore, Bourmaud (2012) argues, the structures that breed patrimonial practices or foundations that provide spine to patron–client networks should not be ignored (p. 208). In the context of present study, a nuanced approach would be to gel clientelism with the notions of dependency and subimperialism. Such a conceptual integration of clientelism, dependency and subimperialism helps overcome two conceptual inadequacies in Medard’s framework. First, Pakistan’s relations with the Middle East are lent an international dimension Bourmaud mentions above. Second, the oil-rich Arab states cannot be characterized as subimperial. Yet, Pakistan’s clientelist relations with these countries can only be understood if Pakistan is globally situated as a periphery country dependent on metropolitan West.
The notion of dependency gained currency in the 1950s and the 1960s. Honed in the context of Marxist theories of imperialism, the dependency perspective emerged as a radical critique of mainstream development theory. Dependency theory ‘asserts that national sovereignty is not a sufficient safeguard against the possibility of de facto control of a nation’s economy by alien interests’ (Boyd-Barrett, 1982: 174). The dependency theories see the world capitalist system as divided into a core and a periphery (alternatively, metropolitan and satellite). Baran (1973 [1957]) had pointed out earlier in 1957 that capitalism as it concretely arises in the periphery is of a special, truncated form, which inhibits the development of complete capitalism: ‘Far from serving as an engine of economic expansion, of technological progress, and of social change, the capitalist order in these countries has represented a framework for economic stagnation, for archaic technology, and for social backwardness’ (p. 300). Thus, the normal processes of the global economic system cause the gap between the centre and the periphery, whereby the periphery is reduced to a state of dependence (Brewer, 1980: 161). While the conditions for the form of development that entrenches poverty are international, it is not just that there is one group of countries in the world which happens to be developed and another that happens to be poor.
The two are organically linked; that is to say, one part is poor because the other is rich. The relationship is partly historical – for colonialism and the slave trade helped to build up capitalism, and this provided the conditions for later forms of dependency – but the link between development and underdevelopment is also a process that continues today. (Biel, 2000: 78)
Approaching foreign policy of a dependent state such as Pakistan implies a ‘hierarchical structure of the international capitalist system [which] determines state options’ (Hinnebusch, 2003: 12). Galtung (1979) identifies two mechanisms that help sustain this top-down structure. First, owing to colonial history, core created and left behind elites and classes which have an interest in dependent relations. Second, vertical relation (core-periphery) displaces horizontal (periphery to periphery) relations. In terms of foreign relations, dependency condition creates a ‘constrained consensus’, claims Moon (1995). This consensus emerges from an overlapping of local elite’s economic interests, world views (through Western education) and threat perception (fear of radical movements) with those of core elites. Hence, unlike realism’s expectations, the elites in periphery countries bandwagon with metropolitan patron(s) to contain domestic or regional threats. Pakistan is not merely dependent on Western imperialism, its dependency on subimperialisms (Iran before 1979 and contemporary Turkey) is also evident. Subimperialism refers to ‘the stage of monopolies and finance capital in the dependent capitalism of the periphery countries’ (Varynen and Herrera, 1975: 165). To quote Luce (2015: 31–36), it is the highest stage of dependent capitalism. It is a policy of projecting economic power out of territorial borders albeit at a regional level.
Here a nota bene. Subimperialism should not be confused with semi-periphery. Despite apparent similarities between the notion of subimperialism and semi-periphery, there is a difference between the two concepts. Semi-periphery is a concept attributed to World Systems Theory (WST) elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein. In WST, semi-periphery plays the role of a depolarising entity (Chase-Dunn, 1998: 209–227; Wallerstein, 1979: 95–118). In contrast, subimperialism reproduces and reinforces global inequalities at the regional level (Chase-Dunn, 2013). Second, semi-periphery has existed according to WST since the 16th century while subimperialism is a post–World War II phenomenon. Likewise, the element of dependency is a central element in subimperial characterization, but it is not assigned a primacy in semi-periphery. More importantly, the unit of analysis in WST is the entire globe (Moore and Dannreuther, 2009: 142) while in the notion of subimperialism, a nation-state/country is the unit of analysis. Since neither the aim nor the scope of this paper allows a comparison between semi-periphery and subimperialism, suffice to flag the possibility that Turkey can also be explored from the perspective of semi-periphery if WST lens is deployed (see inter alia Moore and Dannreuther, 2009; Ozekin, 2019).7
Ummah in practice
This section begins by examining Pakistan–KSA ties in the context of patron–client relationship. Next, it will look at Iran and Turkey.
Saudi Arabia as Pakistan’s patron
It was petro-dollars rush that provided an economic basis to a patron–client relationship between Pakistan and KSA (one may view Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) as an extension of KSA in this patron–client nexus). Bredi, however, has conceptualized Pakistani dependence on KSA from the perspective of subimperialism ‘because it both comprises the utilization of a weaker country and a double, economic and ideological, interference which has to be seen in the framework of a strategy directed towards constructing a hegemonic position’. In her view, this hegemonic role could be interpreted in terms of subimperialism ‘inspite of Saudi Arabia’s conspicuous military inadequacy’ (Bredi, 1983: 10). Space will not allow a full discussion on demonstrating why KSA does not qualify as subimperialism. Arguably, KSA may emerge as a subimperial country. However, it is not merely ‘conspicuous military inadequacy’ but technological and political dependence on the West/United States, besides other factors (explored below in the case of Turkey) demonstrating that KSA is a rich country by virtue of oil royalties but not a subimperialism. The reality of KSA dependence on the United States was laid bare by President Trump’s undiplomatic remarks in 2018 when he told the Saudi King, Salman bin Abdulaziz, that he would not last in power ‘for two weeks’ without US military cover (Reuters Staff, 2018). However, in line with Bredi (1983), it is important to incorporate ‘superstructural level by introducing ideological and political elements, which, is the other dimension of Saudi influence’ (p. 311).
Therefore, for a systematic analysis, this section offers a brief review of Pak–KSA relations in a chronological order to understand the development of economic, political and ideological ties in the pre- and post-1970 eras. Despite a Treaty of Friendship (1951) with KSA (CPGS, 2014: 5), during Pakistan’s infancy as a nation-state, the former was publicly critical of the latter. First, when a Wahabist scholar and founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, Maulana Moudodi, was sentenced to death, KSA was furious. The death sentence was later annulled. An agitated KSA threatened to sever diplomatic ties with Pakistan over the death sentence (Bredi, 1983: 304). Second, as stated above, during the Suez crisis, King Saud met with Indian Prime Minister Nehru and criticized Pakistan’s joining of the Baghdad Pact (Bredi, 1983). Although the bilateral relations began to improve during the 1960s, the improvement came at the cost of ties with certain other Arab countries. In 1960, General Ayub Khan visited KSA. Next year, Pakistan began to supply light weapons to KSA. These weapons, in turn, were provided to KSA proxies in the Yemen war. Egypt, needless to say, siding with Yemen’s republican forces, was annoyed.
While the ‘Military Staff College Quetta had trained officers from British colonial armies across the Middle East since the 1920s’, the Pakistan military offered its services from the 1960s and extended these arrangements to Abu Dhabi and post-1972 to KSA when Bhutto came to power (Haroon, 2016: 306). Haroon (2016) states, ‘Bhutto continued to barter the skills of the Pakistan army for aid, preferential ties, and camaraderie and the creation of a front against India’ (p. 304). A protocol was signed, in 1982, with KSA allowing deployment of Pakistani troops to defend the ‘holy sites’. Until 1987, 20,000 troops were stationed in KSA, but were sent back in 1987 since Pakistani troops included Shia (Haroon, 2016: 307). While the 1982 protocol was signed in the context of an uprising by religious fanatics who occupied the Holy Mosque in 1979, the latter move was a response to Shia agitation on the occasion of Hajj. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait necessitated re-deployment of Pakistani troops. Hence, under the 1982 protocol, 13,000 troops and 600 advisers were back in KSA. Pakistani troops were deployed in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) too (Haroon, 2016: 308). ‘However, over time Saudi Arabia’s own internal recruitment and training made less dependent on this sort of military assistance’, Haroon (2016) observes. Other Gulf states also hosted Pakistani troops. In 1974, 3600 of the 11,500 military forces in Oman were Baluchs from Pakistan. In Abu Dhabi, of the 13,000 strong force, 115 officers and 1800 servicemen were deputed there from Pakistan (Vatanka, 2015: 107).
Pakistan’s next major export to KSA/GCC is slave-like labour. Despite horrendous working conditions for the Pakistani labour (not unlike rest of South Asian labour) and discriminatory migration policies/visa regimes, Pakistan strictly maintains an eerie silence on the violation of its migrant workers’ basic rights. This owes to, at least, two factors. First, the GCC labour market provides jobs that the domestic job market in Pakistan is unable to offer owing to a chronically poor economic situation. Hence, every incumbent government in Pakistan finds it convenient to externalize joblessness. Second, remittances from the GCC have constituted 20%–30% of the foreign exchange reserves, since 1970s (already by end-1970s, migrant workers were sending $2 billion home; Vatanka, 2015: 129), in a cash-strapped country. One may also flag the class-based indifference of Pakistan’s ruling elite. They themselves treat the labour in a similar slave-like manner. Besides labour market and the GCC remittances, Pakistan heavily depends on the Gulf oil supplies and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Petro-dollar injections keep the Pakistani economy afloat. By 2013–2014, the UAE had become Pakistan’s largest trading partner: The mutual trade was worth $9 billion. Pakistani imports stood at $6 billion while exports were $3 billion. Likewise, the UAE had become the second largest investor by 2013 by investing $21 billion, mostly in such sectors as banks, real estate, energy, infrastructure, ports, houses and aviation (CPGS, 2014: 8).
Proceeding with these details, it is now time to pass on to the super-structural aspect of KSA/GCC–Pakistan ties. According to Bredi (1983), Pak–Saudi relations are paradigmatic because they are relatively easy example of Saudi ways of penetration, given the ease with which one can point out the particular permeability of Pakistan, a poor country with a long ideological contact with Wahabi environment and tormented ever since its existence with a national as well as cultural identity crisis which became more acute after the secession of Bangladesh. (p. 314)
The increased dependence on Riyadh had led to blatant intervention in Pakistani affairs already in the 1970s (Ali, 1982: 126). Ali claims, The Saudi Arabian princes were not merely interested in Pakistan merely because its principle cities catered for ‘delights’ prohibited in their own kingdom. They also, for example, utilized Pakistan to educate and train Saudi students in medicine and engineering. But their main intervention was at the ideological level.
This ideological influence was exerted through Jamaat-e-Islami and it also translated into madrassah networks which began preaching Saudi-style Islam (Ali, 1983: 127).
Of late, the following two developments are symptomatic of Saudi influence on Pakistan’s foreign policy. First, in December 2019, Pakistan withdrew from the ‘Kuala Lumpur summit’ under Saudi pressure. While KSA was not invited to this summit, rivals Iran and Qatar were invited. Seen as an attempt to build an alternative to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), ‘Kuala Lumpur summit’ was finalized in September 2019 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session by Turkey, Malaysia and Pakistan (Cobain, 2019; The New Arab, 2019). Commenting on Pakistan’s embarrassing absence, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told the press in Kuala Lumpur that KSA forced Pakistan to abstain (The Express Tribune, 2019). Second, a $7 billion bilateral gas pipeline project signed between Pakistan and Iran in 1995, due to be completed in 2014, has been stalled partly owing to US sanctions on Iran. But Saudi pressure is also a key factor (DW, 2019).
Over time, KSA has also emerged as a mediator in Pakistan’s political disputes. The incumbent prime minister, Shahbaz Sharif, a scion of Sharif dynasty, paid his first foreign visit to KSA on assuming power in April 2022 (his next destination was Turkey in June 2022). The Sharifs, when overthrown and imprisoned by General Musharraf, back in 1999, ended up in KSA as exiles. Since 1988, every newly elected/appointed head of government pays a visit to KSA almost soon after taking the oath of office. In the last two decades, a number of political bargains between Pakistan military and opposition were conducted via Riyadh. Bhutto is often credited with cultivating personal ties in order to win Arab support for Pakistan (Haroon, 2016: 306; Vatanka, 2015: 107). Riyadh in short, post-Iran revolution, has effectively replaced Tehran as a patron.
A nuclear periphery to subimperialism
‘The prevailing literature on the history of Iranian–Pakistani relations includes plenty of routine platitudes’, observes Vatanka (2015: ix). In these routinized narratives, the pre-1979 period is romanticized as an era of ‘brotherly ties’ 8 which got complicated in the post-1979 decades. The Shah of Iran, it is often pointed out in such narratives, was the first foreign leader to visit Pakistan, post-independence, or Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan at the United Nations Organization. Likewise, the two countries amicably demarcated the borders. Pakistan even ‘gifted’ part of territory to protect Iran’s oil exploration (Haroon, 2016: 304; Mohammadally, 2001: 145). A ‘closer scrutiny’, however, ‘shows that even the earliest years were much more complicated than the standard accounts’ (Vatanka, 2015: ix). Likewise, the impression that Pakistan unidimensionly sided with KSA/Arabs against Iran in the 1980s onwards is not very nuanced. For instance, even under Gen Zia’s military rule when Pakistan was closely allied with KSA in ‘Afghan Jihad’, Pakistan opened its Karachi port to Iran to facilitate Tehran in international trade traffic otherwise threatened by Iraq’s aerial raids (Vatanka, 2015: x). While Pakistan was facilitating Iranian trade through the Karachi port and bilateral trade was thriving (Vatanka, 2015), Pakistan was also becoming a battleground for KSA–Iran proxy war translating into Shia–Sunni clashes (Abbas, 2004; Vatanka, 2015: 171–194). Meantime, during the 1980s–1990s, Pakistan was also assisting Iran in achieving nuclear ambitions. Such contradictory bilateral relations have marked the 75-year history of mutual ties. In the post–Arab Spring context, KSA was actively attempting to court Pakistan as a member of anti-Iran alliance. Notably, during 2013–2018, Pakistan was steered by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who, as mentioned earlier, spent his political exile years in Riyadh as royal guest. Like other Pakistani leaders, Mr Sharif enjoyed personal friendship with Saudi royals. Yet, Pakistan wavered (Vatanka, 2015: xi).
However, it is not merely clever diplomacy by Islamabad. Iran also has a ‘soft power’ to influence Pakistan. Roughly 20% of Pakistan’s 220-million population is Shia. Although this does not imply that Pakistani Shia constitute a monolith, Shias in Pakistan factor in Iran’s ‘soft power’ (Vatanka, 2015: 226–257). Likewise, in the 1970s, the long reach the Shah had into the White House (Vatanka, 2015: 130) also reflected Iran’s ‘soft power’ as a subimperialism. Under the Shah, Iran not merely commanded this ‘soft power’, it also behaved like a subimperial country (Ahmed, 1973). In fact, the 1969–1979 period testifies to Iran’s subimperial character if the Pak–Iran ties are examined as a case study. Oil crisis during the Arab–Israeli conflict in 1973 translated into colossal windfall for Iran: oil exports went from $4.9 billion, in 1973, to $25 billion by 1975 (Tahir-kheli, 1977). This is the period Iran began to build up its position as a regional power capable of replacing the United Kingdom in the region (Mohammadally, 2001: 149). The following details further established Iranian role as subimperialism during the 1970s: while in 1974, Iran lent $1 billion loan to India (Vatanka, 2015: 111), it lent $580 million to Pakistan same year and another $150 million in 1976 (Mohammadally, 2001: 150). Troubled by the dismemberment of Pakistan, the Shah on one hand, implicitly threatened India against any further threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity; on the other hand, he also began to view Pakistan as a junior partner to be protected (Vatanka, 2015: 81). That Tehran mediated the disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan or the Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was pushed to launch a massive military operation in Balochistan province against the Baloch nationalists under Tehran’s pressure further indicated Iran’s might as a subimperialism. However, even before basking in petro-dollar inflow and associated power in the 1970s, the Shah had considered Pakistan a protectorate vital in Iran’s defence against the USSR. While anti-communism brought the two together, the Shah treated Pakistan like a junior partner from the start of relations. Every time Pakistan tried to assert itself by seeking new allies elsewhere in the Middle East, the Shah was annoyed, suspicious. A case in point is the Arab–Israeli war in 1967. Turkey and Iran had diplomatic relations with Israel. However, Pakistan sided with the Arabs in the war (meanwhile, Pakistan’s growing friendship with China was also bothering the Shah). The friction between the two neighbours was mirrored by the coverage in heavily censored, state-controlled media of both the countries. While Pakistan media began referring to the ‘Persian Gulf’ as ‘Arabian Gulf’, a term coined by President Nasser, Iranian media began to soften up to India, particularly over Kashmir (Vatanka, 2015: 57–59).
Notably, only 2 years ago, Iran had lent Pakistan fuel as well as military and medical aid in its war against India in 1965 (Haroon, 2016: 304). Understandably, the Shah was livid when Pakistan sided with the Arabs in Arab–Israeli war. Likewise, the Shah refused to attend the OIC summit in 1974. Prime Minister Bhutto left no stone unturned to persuade the Shah, who initially boycotted the Summit. Presence of his Arab rivals such as Moammer Qaddafi 9 and Shah Faisal irritated the Shah. Although the Shah sent a delegation to partake of the Summit, his absence was conspicuous. When Bhutto signed military and economic pacts with Libya, the Shah refused to receive Bhutto, at least temporarily, in Tehran. Notably, Bhutto travelled to Iran seven times in his tenure of almost 5 years. The Shah also visited Pakistan thrice during the Bhutto period. However, visits were more frequent before pacts were signed with Libya (Mustafa, 2001: 106). In the post-revolution Iran, the ties with Pakistan got more complicated. Although the Zia regime was quick to welcome Ayotollahs and, as stated above, Islamabad facilitated Tehran in trade and nuclear programme, other irritants emerged out of Pakistan–KSA collaboration and Pakistan’s patronage of the Taliban. During the first Taliban stint in power (1997–2001), Iran and Afghanistan came close to a war.
The situation became more complicated in the post-9/11 scenario whereby Iran also tacitly, if not actively, supported the Taliban to destabilize the US occupation of Afghanistan. Likewise, Iran has been annoyed by the sanctuaries Jundollah, an anti-Shia militant group attacking Iran, has in Pakistan (Vatanka, 2015: 233–239). It is remarkable that Pakistan–Iran relations improve when the Bhutto dynasty is in power while the Musharraf regime stayed away from Iran, and Sharif dynasty at the helm created tensions between the two countries (Haroon, 2016: 316–324; Vatanka, 2015: 195–226).
Turkey as a new soft power
Turkey is increasingly unavoidable in Pakistan. Apparently, geographically and culturally remote from Turkey, Pakistan has become a key market for Turkish soap opera and, to a lesser extent, films. Turkey’s growing cultural influence in Pakistan can be explained through the lens of subimperialism. Like every subimperialism, Turkey is projecting its soft power in the countries it is economically and politically targeting. Although Turkish investments in Pakistan, on the rise in the last two decades, are not considerable either in comparison with Pakistan’s Gulf patrons or as an individual player (see Tables 4 and 5), Turkish penetration of Pakistan’s cultural and ideological state apparatuses is noteworthy (to be explored in a while).
Comparison of Pakistan’s trade ($ million) with Turkey, KSA and GCC.
Source: State Bank of Pakistan.
KSA: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; GCC: Gulf Co-operation Council.
FDI in Pakistan ($ million) in 2022, comparison between Turkey and GCC.
Source: State Bank of Pakistan.
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment; GCC: Gulf Co-operation Council.
Historically, Pakistan’s relations with Turkey have been largely cordial since 1947 (Ahmad, 2001: 158–159; Burke and Ziring, 1990: 68). A factor in fostering mutually genial relations is history. According to Burke and Ziring (1990), The deep agony with which Indian Muslims had viewed the decline of the Ottoman empire and the demise of Khilafat was transformed into admiration for the way the new Republic of Turkey emerged as vigorous, modern state from the ashes of the Sultanate. (p. 68)
Until the 1990s, Ataturk and Ismat Inonu, first prime minister of the Turkish republic, were featured in school books (Authors’ observations).
However, a decisive factor was anti-communism, not unlike the case of Iran, that brought the two countries together. Already in 1954, the two countries had signed a friendship treaty. Later, the Baghdad Pact, renamed as CENTO, and the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) signed in 1964 between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan further cementified this mutuality (Ahmad, 2001: 158–169). The CENTO was conceived as NATO’s southern/Middle Eastern version. While the United Kingdom joined the alliance, the United States stayed away as a member even if the military pact was patronized by Washington. At the time, neither Turkey nor Pakistan could benefit from each other militarily, economically or ideologically. Being periphery countries, both were dependent on the West. Therefore, on one hand, this relationship was restricted to mutual support on diplomatic fronts, on the other, both were playing the pawns on global chessboard. For instance, when President Iskandar Mirza visited Ankara in July 1956, Turkey promised to support Pakistan in settling outstanding disputes with India and Afghanistan while President Mirza supported Turkey on Cyprus issue (Ahmad, 2001: 164). Likewise, Western powers at the time were toying with the idea of creating a confederation of Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2001: 165). This thwarted effort perhaps was a response to the United Arab Republic. Fast forward to the 21st century, while post-Kemalist Turkey has embraced Islamic conservativism, Pakistan has also registered tectonic ideological shifts. The defeat of the left and centre-left projects coupled with a top-down Islamization under the Zia dictatorship as well as the ‘Afghan Jihad’ has turned the country into one of the most radical Islamist polities in the Muslim world. The Islamization of the two countries coincided with Turkey’s emergence as a subimperial country (Cengiz, 2020).
In relation to Pakistan, Turkey’s subimperial role is less visible in the field of economy. For instance, during 2010–2021, Turkish FDI in Pakistan was $352.5 million. In comparison, the UAE’s FDI during the corresponding period is $1128 million (Board of Investment, 2022). However, the signs of Turkish subimperialism are not absent in the Pakistani economy. For example, Turkish conglomerate Koc Holding bought over Pakistani concern Dawlence for $258 million. Huge contracts such as waste management in Lahore, Pakistan’s second largest city, were outsourced to Turkish companies in 2012 (Rafiq, 2021). Turkey has also emerged as the fourth largest source of military hardware. While Turkey has provided overhauling facilities for a few decades now, yet arms export is a new trend. During 2016–2019, Turkey exported arms worth $112 million. However, when some fresh deals are materialized, Turkish arms export will exceed $ 3 billion (Rafiq, 2021). However, Turkish subimperialism, as stated above, has translated into a new soft power in Pakistan.
From Ishq-e-Mamnoh (Ask-i Memnu) telecast in 2011 to Ertugral aired in 2021, Turkish tele-productions have been all the rage since 2011 with two visible consequences: Turkey has replaced India on mini-screen and Turkish TV content is economically undermining Pakistani television industry too (for details, see Sulehria, 2018a: 104–106. For an explanation of Turkish soap operas’ popularity, see Sulehria, 2018b). Having displaced India on Pakistani TV screens, the influence of Turkish soft power was aptly stated by the then Pakistani Prime Minister, Imran Khan, in 2020. Holding a joint press conference in Islamabad, Pakistani capital, with President Erdogan, Khan had said, ‘I can safely say that he[Erdogan] can win next elections in Pakistan’ (Sulehria, 2022: 186). Another growing sign of Turkish soft power is the chain of ‘Pak Turk Schools’. Consisting of 27 branches, this chain has a student population of 13,000. Politically, Ottomanism is increasingly enticing ‘Islamic Zion’ away from decades of Pakistani romance with Arabification.
Analysis and discussion
The Cold war had gripped the global order already at the cusp of Pakistan’s independence in 1947. As a nascent state struggling for survival in the 1950s, Pakistan with a triumvirate of civil–military bureaucracy, feudal lords and fragile bourgeoisie at the helm of a postcolonial state wholeheartedly embraced anti-communism for two reasons. First, the founding fathers were decidedly anti-communist. It must, however, be pointed out that anti-communism of the Pakistani elite is also replete with contradictions. While it was staunchly anti-communist in the case of the USSR, the communist China has remained ‘a true friend’. Second, anti-communism was deployed to seek US patronage. At the time, the Arab world was largely swayed by Arab nationalism and Arab socialism. It is therefore understandable that a country created in the name of Islam bands together with self-declared ‘secular Muslim states’ Turkey and Iran. 10 In other words, the ruling elites in Pakistan would conveniently trump the Muslim Ummah when required. For instance, during the Suez crisis, Pakistan’s economic interests preceded the concerns for the Arab brothers. Or, for instance, Iran’s or Turkey’s diplomatic ties with Israel posed no problem ever to sign RCD even if Pakistan vocally sided with Palestine in 1948. Likewise, when Muslimhood could be translated into economic gains, particularly after the petro-dollar rush, on one hand, and break-up of Pakistan in 1971, on the other hand, the Bhutto government was enthusiastically hosting the Islamic Summit to discuss the aftermath of 1973 Arab–Israeli war. Similarly, Pakistan conveniently replaced subimperial Iran with a rich patron like KSA because the former had lost the status of a subimperial power. ‘Afghan Jihad’ further helped this replacement. Turkey also factors as an important case study in this analysis. The rise of Turkey as a subimperial power offered Pakistan a situation to briefly and occasionally ally with Ankara in a bid to ease Saudi pressure. That Turkey lacks an economic muscle in terms of offering hard cash, Pakistan returned to KSA’s fold in every decisive stage when Ankara and Riyadh were on two sides of the fence. The ‘Kuala Lumpur Summit’ is a case in point. In short, it is not Pakistan’s self-projected identity but the economy that guides the czars of foreign policy-making in Islamabad.
Second, Pakistan is not merely an ordinary client. On the contrary, it is a clever client with some bargaining power. At least, over the years, it was able to build bargaining power. The most important bargaining chip has been the ability to provide military troops to the GCC countries besides cheap, easy-to-exploit manpower. Although the arrangements bred by such a bargaining were mutually beneficial, KSA/GCC maintains an upper hand owing to a superior economic situation. Not merely the dependence on Pakistani troops has been reduced by diversifying military dependence, the threat to expel the labour is also a blackmailing tool mustered by KSA/GCC. Likewise, in the case of post-Revolution Iran, when Tehran was no longer a subimperial capital, and Iran under the Ayotollahs became a frenemy, Pakistan used the export of nuclear technology to maintain a balance between KSA/GCC and Islamic Republic of Iran.
Third, this effort to maintain balance between frenemy-Iran and brotherly KSA/GCC taught Pakistani diplomats the art of bilateralism early on. From almost the 1960s onwards, Pakistan has skillfully used bilateralism to maintain militarily and economically beneficial ties with such Muslim and Arab countries, which otherwise were hostile to each other. For instance, Iran and various Arab countries remained antagonistic before and after the revolution in Iran. A case in point is Libya under Qaddafi. Even when Qaddafi was publicly declaring the Shah a sell-out on Palestine question, Bhutto was able to garner generous financial support for Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions besides being the second largest recipient, after Egypt, of Iranian aid in the 1970s. This bilateralism was also achieved through personalized diplomacy. Apparently, ‘personal friendships’ cultivated by the Pakistani rulers with rich patrons in the Gulf or the Shah in Iran, have helped Pakistan to maintain a fine balance in many difficult situations. Bhutto is often credited as the architect of personalized diplomacy. Flagging this kind of personalized diplomacy, Haroon (2016: 306) claims, ‘the events of 1972-74, allowed Bhutto to initiate personal relations with heads of Muslim states. Bhutto struck up close relations with Sheikh Zayed . . . and King Faisal’. His daughter Benazir Bhutto set up her base in Dubai after the dissolution of her first government in 1990 and after her second ousting in 1996. Likewise, three-time prime minister Nawaz Sharif chose Saudi Arabia as his home in his period of exile from Pakistan (1999–2007) (Haroon, 2016: 309). Vatanka (2015) has also highlighted this aspect: Gulf leaders, including Sheikh Zayed of the United Arab Emirates, would become regular visitor to Pakistan, where they were often treated to all sorts of extravaganza including rare-bird hunting excursions, much beloved of Arab sheikhs. The personal ties that were cultivated were accompanied by generous Arab financial support. (p. 107)
However, Bhutto was not the original architect of personalized diplomacy. Highlighting a case of ‘early defining personal ties’, Vatanka (2015: 106) identifies Iskandar Mirza as the pioneer of such personalized diplomacy. His second wife was an Iranian, and after his death in exile was buried in Iran. In the context of France–Africa patronage networks, Bourmaud (2012: 214) observes that intimate personal relations characterize such patrimonial links. This holds equally true in the case of Pakistan as a client and its patrons in the Gulf.
Finally, it is important to explore and examine Pakistan’s relations with the rest of the Muslim world, including the Middle East, through the lens of such conceptualizations as dependency, clientelism and subimperialism. For instance, during the 1965 India–Pakistan war, Iran (with little exception) and Turkey being periphery states dependent on the United States themselves, refused to militarily fortify Pakistan against India lest they should offend Washington. ‘If the Pakistanis detected a lack of solidarity, the Iranians and the Turks viewed their stance as dictated by other overriding priorities, namely placating US anxieties about containing the Indi-Pakistani conflict’, Vatanka comments. He adds, ‘When a Turkish defence official was asked about the prospects of Pakistan receiving aid from Turkish troops, he replied, “We are keeping them for Cyprus”’. Combat jets were also refused on the pretext that the Turkish air force was under NATO command (Vatanka, 2015: 49).
As the evidence documented in previous sections demonstrates, Pakistan being a dependent, periphery state has always been on a tightrope. From personal ties to bilateralism, it always tried to manage tensions rather than solve them. As a client, even when it has been able to bargain with Saudi/Gulf patrons, it never was in a driving seat. The Saudi patronage only increased KSA intervention in Pakistani politics and social fabric (through mosque and madrassa networks) and strengthened their grip on Pakistani economy. The trade and investment imbalance between Pakistan and GCC members testifies to this patron–client relation besides Pakistan’s subservient position politically, ideologically and in the realm of foreign policy. Likewise, in relation to subimperial Iran-of-the-yore and Turkey, Pakistan was and remains an interesting case study. For instance, in relation to newly emergent subimperial Turkey, Pakistani exports to and investments in Turkey hardly merit an examination. However, Turkey is flexing its economic muscle accompanied by considerable soft power. This is despite the fact that Pakistan is not high on Turkey’s priority list either economically, strategically or politically.
Conclusion
As the second largest Muslim-majority country and the only nuclear power in the Muslim world, Pakistan remains in the global limelight but is rarely under scan for academic studies, especially when it comes to the country’s foreign policy. From the viewpoint of imperialisms, almost every country carries a strategic value. However, Pakistan’s creation at the start of the Cold war as a state physically located on two sides of India lent it an extra advantage to rent itself for US imperial realpolitik. This strategic importance did not diminish even after the secession of East Pakistan. The ‘Afghan Jihad’ in the 1980s catapulted Pakistan to importance yet again. In the post-September 11 scenario, the country was yet again under the global gaze for about 20 years. It is, however, not merely the strategic importance but also the praetorian character of the Pakistani state that has shaped the country’s domestic politics, foreign policy and nuisance value internationally.
That Pakistan was created in the name of Pakistan – Pakistan’s third military ruler Gen Zia therefore compared it with Israel – therefore its foreign policy in relation to the Muslim world, the Middle East included, has always been couched in Islamificated discourses. However, it is not Pakistan’s overt confessional identity that has defined the foreign policy. This study demonstrates that economic and political interests of Pakistan’s ruling troika (military, feudal lords and bourgeoisie) have singularly superseded every other interest. The way troika has exploited Islam to justify their rule, foreign policy twists and turns have also been enveloped in Islamificated narratives.
When examined, Pakistan’s relations with individual countries in the Muslim world demonstrate that Pakistan’s Muslimhood and concern for the idiomatic Ummah are guided by pragmatism rather than any ideological commitment to Islamic world. For instance, such countries as Indonesia or Morocco or Senegal and Sudan hardly matter in any meaningful manner. Owing to the country’s geographical location and periphery status in the global political economy whereby Pakistan allied with the United States during the Cold war, the Middle East occupies a special importance for Pakistan.
In the case of the Middle East, economic priorities of Pakistan’s ruling elite have guided the Foreign Office’s orientation. When the Arab world, in particular, the Arabian peninsula, was swayed by Arab socialism and lacked an economic affluence, Pakistan sided with Iran and Turkey. However, Pakistan conveniently replaced Iran as a patron with KSA when the latter was able to afford and ready to patronize Pakistan as a client.
Finally, this study also indicates the importance of analysing Pakistan’s foreign policy through such theoretical lenses as dependency, subimperialism and clientelism. Mainstream discourse on foreign policy of Pakistan remains grounded in realist and neo-realist approaches. This study demonstrates that research on Pakistan’s foreign policy may yield important insights and empirical evidence when anchored in critical approaches.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
