Three Schools of Thought on “African Solutions to African Problems”

Introduction

Since the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 2001, the maxim “African solutions to African problems” became a mantra for policy makers in Africa (AU Assembly, 2013, p. 34). The idea of African solutions is not a new invention given that it had always been the driving force behind the Pan-African movements since the 1900s and the quest for independence from colonial powers in the African continent (Mazrui, 1967; Nkrumah, 1961). Notably, Marcus Garvey had argued for Africa’s self-governance through his motto “Africa for the Africans” in the early 1900s. Kwame Nkrumah (1961) posited that

for too long in our history, Africa has spoken through the voices of others. Now what I have called the African Personality in International affairs will have a chance of making its proper impact and will let the world know it through the voices of Africa’s own sons.

Along these lines, Ali Mazrui in his 1967 work titled Towards a Pax Africana insisted on inter-African intervention to the challenges in Africa as against the external meddling in the newly independent states in the continent. Indeed, the quest for African-driven solutions motivated the formation of the OAU, in 1963, to harness the capacity of Africa’s weak states for a combined response to common challenges. But despite the independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the realization of African-driven solutions remains a long way from being fulfilled (Ani & Matambo, 2016). The imposition of external policies coupled with the ineptitude of post-independent African leaders continues to hinder progress in this regard.

The new wave of calls for implementing African solutions became more pronounced in the 1990s especially in light of the misgivings over the reliability, efficiency, and motive of external assistance. At the outsets of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 1990s, external actors, who were initially keen in interfering in Africa, did not intervene given that it was during the post–Cold War era when competition among superpowers for influence has declined. This led Nigeria—a hegemon in the region—to lead the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene in the two countries. The Rwandan genocide also dealt a significant blow to Africa’s reliance on the United Nations (UN) and other external powers.

In addition, the efficiency of external interventions in cases like the long-drawn UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and external support to regimes were cast in doubt. During the early years of Somalia’s crises, George Ayittey called on African states to be more proactive in resolving the conflicts on the continent to guard against unsuitable external solutions (Ayittey, 1994). This was at a time when a U.S.-led UN mission was deployed to Somalia. The mission eventually collapsed as the crises worsened and the UN withdrew without restoring stability. William Zartman (2000) surmised that despite the intervention of foreign seasoned peacemakers and peacekeepers in an attempt to solve conflicts in Africa, many conflicts in the continent remain unresolved.

Moreover, Africa’s long history of colonialism, experience of racial oppression, and external meddling for African resources affect the perceptions of externally driven interventions. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya and France intervention in Mali raise fears of neocolonialism and imperialist nature of external interventions. While global solutions to challenges are key, the international system is dominated by few actors who project their power and values as the standard for less powerful states to follow. As such, the values and perspectives of weaker states are often undermined and untested.

These misgivings are coupled with the view that the problems in Africa can only be addressed by Africans themselves (Konaré, 2007). This was highlighted in 2012 by Jean Ping, the former AU Commission Chairperson who surmised that “the solutions to African problems are found on the continent and nowhere else” (Pambazuka News, 2012). The establishment of the AU in 2001 was particularly aimed at enhancing Africa’s capacity and coordination for the realization of African solutions in African states ¹ (Apuuli, 2012; AU Assembly, 2013, p. 34). Alfred Nhema (2008, p. 3) argues that

there is a new realization in Africa that, while the role of external actors is indeed laudable, Africa will have to rely increasingly on its own to provide the long-term solutions to its own problems within the framework of its sub-regional groupings and the African Union and the United Nations.

While the maxim has been used to detract attention from the failures of African actors, the maxim largely mirrors a desire for Africa to drive its agenda. At a special meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in September 2007, Alpha Oumar Konaré (2007), the first chairperson of the AU Commission, insists that

. . . the primary responsibility for ensuring peace in Africa belongs to Africans themselves. They must shoulder that responsibility. Our partners must let Africans run their own business. Financing is important, but it does not justify unbridled intervention or conduct. . . . Africa is no longer a private hunting ground; it is no longer anyone’s backyard; it is no longer a part of the Great Game; and it is no longer anyone’s sphere of influence. Those are the few simple rules that will allow the continent to shoulder its responsibility and to demonstrate inter-African solidarity. (p. 17)

Solomon Dersso (2012) argues that “the political ideal of ‘African solutions to African problems’ is essentially an issue of self-determination” that “seeks to bestow Africa, as a matter of principle, the lead role or ownership in the endeavour to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts on the continent” (p. 21). Despite such resolve, the specificities of African solutions and what it entails in the face of actual problem scenarios remain a minefield of debate. There are a number of disparate articles highlighting various perspectives of what African solutions mean without noting the perspectives being subscribed to.

This article thus advances the discourse on African solutions by delineating three major schools of thought, namely, the agency, indigenous, and innovative perspectives on what constitute African solutions. Although the perspectives are overlapping in certain instances, the article provides some illustrations of contexts where the distinct views of each school have been considered particularly at the continental level and in the field of peace and security. Indeed, much of the debate has often focused on the continental solutions for peace and security issues (Nathan, 2013). By expounding the three perspectives on African solutions, the article provides understanding of the extensive view of “African solutions” and the multipronged ideas about Africa’s mechanisms and substantive values that could solve regional issues, and by extension, global challenges.

This article is developed from extensive engagement with research and policy materials on Pan-African initiatives and quest for self-determination especially in issues of peace and security. The article is further enriched by the author’s dedicated monitoring and assessment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The article sets out with the theory of constructivism which provides a framework for understanding the usage of the maxim “African solutions to African problems” in contemporary Africa. The next sections examine the agency, indigenous, and innovative perspectives on African solutions, respectively.

A Constructivist Theory on “African Solutions to African Problems”

Constructivism provides a useful framework to understand how the idea of “African solutions to African problems” became a common mantra in the continent. The theory became significant when it was introduced by Nicholas Onuf who coined the term in his 1989 work titled World of Our Making. The striking feature of constructivism is that it diverges from the fixation of dominant theories—realism and liberalism—on the influence of material capabilities in the international order. Constructivists consider ideas as the significant influence in international relations as opposed to the material.

For constructivists, the international system exists only as an intellectual and ideational phenomenon that is developed from social relations. It is the intersubjective ideas that are shared among people and states as well as the institutionalized ideas that are expressed as practices and identities (Legro, 2005). Hence, the concerns relating to security in the world order, for instance, are not just about the consideration of the resources, weapons, and other material elements of other states as espoused by neorealists. Rather it is about ideas that prevail in the international system based on historical and behavioral relationships of states.

In his “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics of 1992,” Alexander Wendt (1992) illustrates this by arguing that 500 British nuclear weapons, for instance, are less threatening to the United States than five North Korean nuclear weapons. In this claim, the United States sees Britain as a friend, while it harbors an idea of enmity with North Korea whom it views as capable of acting aggressively. If the case is merely about material capability, the United States would be warier and threatened by Britain than North Korea. For Wendt (1992), such view is consequent from the historical and behavioral interpretations of the relations with Britain on one hand and North Korea on the other. Thus, material resources only acquire meaning and prompt human action through the structures of ideas they exist in.

In tandem with the constructivist framework, the idea of shared identity, challenges, and goals has contributed to states being part of regional organizations such as the AU, the European Union (EU), and Arab League, among others. In Africa, the shared geographical experiences, challenges, values, interests, and concerns have engendered the prevailing idea of Africa’s collective response to common challenges as indicated by the maxim “African solutions to African problems.” This is in line with the idea of Pan-Africanism which began in the early 1900 as a movement against racial oppression (DeSaulnier, Haney, & Knapp, 2008).

While the idea of Pan-Africanism was initially focused on the challenges of diaspora Africans, the movement was cognizant of the colonial domination of Africans in their homelands. Marcus Garvey insisted that Africans, in diaspora or in their homelands, should be allowed to govern themselves and path a way for their destiny (Adogamhe, 2008). This is through his motto “Africa for the Africans” which raised excitement around reuniting diaspora Africans with other Africans in their native homelands (Garvey, 1922).

After World War II, African nationalists who had come in contact with the diaspora Pan-Africanists adopted Pan-Africanism in their quest to battle against colonialism and White dominance in the African continent. These issues coupled with the perception of common values and interest nudged African actors to cooperate and unite for the attainment of independence of African colonies. Over the years, Pan-Africanism continues to inspire Africans to concrete action as seen in the coordinated fight for the liberation of Africa as well as the establishment of the OAU, now AU (AU Assembly, 2013).

It is worth noting, however, that the diversity on the continent faults any attempt to simplify the idea of African solutions by implying absolute unity and commonality of values in Africa. While the idea of commonalities is common at the earlier time of African independence, contemporary quest to establish commonalities faces difficulties particularly in light of more information about the social, religious, ethnic, and economic variances between African states and societies. At the 30th AU Summit, the AU adopted a protocol on free movement of people within the continent, but this was after several years of contentions since the Abuja Treaty of 1991 called for such protocol. Moreover, the implementation of the protocol will face impediments not only at the political level but also at the community level where the interests of migrants and locals clash. For instance, the anti-immigrant violence in countries like South Africa and Libya indicate the economic and social tensions between migrants and locals. Moreover, while people in the so-called “Sub-Saharan” Africa could readily identify themselves as Africans, people in North Africa tend to be hesitant to consider themselves as sharing the same African identity as those from the so-called Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the idea of commonalities and unity in Africa could arguably be seen as a move to provide blanket understanding of the continent.

That said, however, there remains a body of research and evidence that suggest significant linkages in many African societies, especially as it pertains to culture, norms, beliefs, and values. Discourses on African philosophy, for instance, thrive on such claims of commonality. Besides the shared geographical experiences of Africans, these commonalities have been the basis for Africa’s cooperation and quest for African solutions as will be highlighted by the different perspectives on what “African solutions” entails as will be discussed in the following sections. Interestingly, the AU’s (2006) “Study on an African Union Government: Towards a United States of Africa” highlights that

Although Africa has, for well-known historical reasons, lost some of its self-sustaining characteristics, it is of paramount importance to use the shared values as a leverage towards closer unity and joint purpose of action by African countries and people. They should particularly be used at the national, regional and continental levels to devise and implement developmental policies and programmes that are people centred and well rooted in African traditions. Thus, through a skilful combination of indigenous and modern knowledge systems, African countries could devise well thought-out and creative strategies for the transformation of their social structures, political systems, and economic organizations to the present world environment so that the continent as a whole would successfully claim the 21^st century. (p. 7)

This highlights a dominant idea, or rather a constructivist perspective, of Africa’s shared values and the quest to invoke them to address the challenges within the continent. However, what constitutes African solutions in the global order remains a minefield of contention. The following sections delineate the three schools of thought on what African solutions entail.

The “Agency” School of Thought

The “who” question is one of the central aspects of the debate on what “African solutions” entail. Jean Ping, the former AU Commission Chairperson, provides a context to this by noting that African leadership and central role in addressing issues are key because Africans know their problems and how to solve it. Many authors have emphasized the bigger role being played by African people and institutions in addressing challenges in the continent (Dersso, 2012; Franke & Esmenjaud, 2014; Nathan, 2013; Williams, 2011).

Franke and Esmenjaud (2014), for instance, argue that African subregional and regional actors have since the 1990s taken immense responsibility in addressing Africa’s challenges. In the 1990s, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) played a key role in addressing the security challenge in Liberia and Sierra Leone prior to the UN involvement. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) continues to respond to the conflict situations in Lesotho. Given that these were ad hoc and arbitrary interventions in Africa, some conflicts like the case of Rwanda and Sudan were left unattended to in the 1990s. In the late 1990s, African actors woke up to the need to address the challenges within the continent in light of the reluctant effort of other foreign powers—including the UN—in the region. After the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2001, most of the peace operations in the continent were initiated by the AU and subregional organizations before a UN involvement in some cases. This is evident from the AU missions in Burundi from 2003 to 2004; Comoros in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008; Sudan from 2004 to 2007; Somalia since 2007; Mali from 2012 to 2013; and Central African Republic from 2013 to 2014.

In the case of Sudan, the AU continues to lead the peace process and the hybrid mission with the UN since 2008. In Somalia, the AU remains the peacekeeper in the region with the support of the UN and the EU. Despite the UN peacekeeping missions in South Sudan, DRC, Mali, and Central Africa Republic (CAR), the AU and subregional bodies continue to lead the mediation aspects of the peace processes. This includes the mediation efforts in South Sudan and the DRC where the UN has peacekeeping missions.

Subregional bodies have also established missions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, the G5 Sahel joint force against terror and transnational crimes in the Sahel, and the regional task force against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Hence, like never before, African actors are taking a more proactive role in responding to security threats on the continent. The growing African agency reflects the AU’s (2018) vision of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena” (p. 1).

The “Indigenous” School of Thought

The second school of thought on the African solutions debate is in part an answer to conceptual lacuna of the mainstream debate on African solutions especially at the continental level. The indigenous school draws from disparate discourses on Africa’s traditional conflict resolution approaches in order to unravel the substantive aspects of what African solutions can contribute to conceptual discussions on peace and security. Indeed, a number of authors consider the distinctive element of African solutions by examining the viability of indigenous approaches to conflict resolution (Boege, 2011). There are two perspectives to the indigenous school of thought: one focuses on indigenous practices and the other on the indigenous principles.

The “Innovations” School of Thought

The third school of thought focuses on contemporary innovations of African actors to solve African challenges whether the innovations are founded on traditional approaches, international standards, or a mixture of both. This school draws from the challenge of identifying what could be considered essentially African—as well as European, Chinese, and so on—given that culture is in constant flux due to external influence (Gellman, 2007). “Tradition is likely to have been updated, adjusted, and opened to new accretions in order to stay alive through changing times . . . tradition does not mean unaltered or archaic” (Zartman, 2000). Through historical exchanges between Africa and rest of the world, Africa has inevitably been influenced by new cultures and systems like it has influenced values and systems elsewhere. This makes it difficult to differentiate between exogenous and endogenous values in the continent.

Indeed, postcolonial African countries and organizations adopted both local and international standards to address contemporary challenges of statehood. After independence, many states adopted the constitutions and institutional structures of their erstwhile colonial masters while time allowing the practice of customary law and traditional institutions. This at times entailed merging local laws and institutions with adopted ones. At the continental level where the focus of this article is on, the AU is an innovative organization that reflects local and external standards. Notably, the AU which was relaunched from the OAU has similarities with the EU and the UN’s systems. The AU has various similarities, and some institutions bear similar names such as the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Parliament (Babarinde, 2007).

However, the continental body also reflects many local particularities that highlight the innovation built on local and external realities. Unlike the EU, the AU is made up of building blocks which include the regional economic communities (RECs) in the continent, thereby reflecting the particularities in the region. In terms of addressing conflict, for instance, the AU often differs from RECs and other regional mechanisms to address the challenges in their regions. On its part, the AU provides legitimacy and support as it continues to work toward developing a stronger supranational authority.

Like the UN, the AU adopted a nonindifference principle which allows it to intervene in the affairs of member states parallel to the UN’s interventionist role in matters of peace and security. Article 4 (h and J) of the AU constitutive Act enables the AU to intervene in response to human rights violations, genocide, war crimes, and threats to peace and security. The AU developed the APSA which serves as a network of peace and security structures, objectives, principles, and values at the national, subregional, and continental levels. The APSA harnesses and coordinates the capacities in the continent for the efficient prevention, management, and resolution of security threats in the continent. The architecture is coordinated by the AU PSC which was established by the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (known as the PSC Protocol) in 2004.

Similar to the UNSC, the 15-member PSC is responsible for maintaining peace and security with a continental focus. ³ The PSC is, however, unique in the sense that it has no veto rights and permanent members like the UNSC. The absence of veto rights and permanent members highlights Africa’s dissent with the restrictive UNSC permanent membership which does not have any African membership, and efforts to reform the UNSC have continually failed. The PSC is based on the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation in such a way that the members are representative of the north, south, central, east, and western regions of the continent as stipulated by Article 5(2) of the PSC protocol. Ten members of the PSC are elected for a 2-year term and the other five members are elected for a 3-year term, thereby nurturing a built-in mechanism to ensure that the workings of the PSC do not discontinue and start anew with the election of new members into office. The PSC has broad mandate to promote peace, democracy, and good governance, as well as anticipate and prevent conflicts, promote and implement peacebuilding, and coordinate continental efforts.

Innovatively, the PSC protocol also established subsidiary bodies to the PSC, namely, the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the African Standby Force (ASF), the AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, and the Peace Fund. ⁴ Among these, the AU PoW and the ASF are two unique structures that reflect particularities within the continent.

The PoW is composed of five members with outstanding profiles of past contributions to peace, security, and development. The PoW is expected to use its expert knowledge and moral influence to facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflicts through diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation. In 2010, the PoW adopted a policy where former members of the Panel are retained as Friends of the PoW, and more recently, a structure known as the Pan-African Network of the Wise (Pan-Wise) was established to include the personnel from subregional organizations and civil society organizations. In 2017, the AU also established a subsidiary body of the Pan-Wise called the FemWise which is a network of African women in conflict prevention and mediation who could be deployed in potential and actual crises situations. The PoW/Pan-Wise/FemWise are African innovations that highlight AU’s strong aspiration to resolve conflicts through negotiations and mediation. Despite limitations, the PoW/Pan-Wise/FemWise have led mediatory efforts in Kenya, DRC, Mali, and Madagascar, among others.

The Pan-Wise network is the only active international coalition that is responsible for mediation because other international mediators are recruited on an ad hoc basis. The AU Pan-Wise network allows for a decentralized approach to mediation on the continent by encouraging the engagement of national, civil, and regional actors. Ingeniously, the PoW/Pan-Wise/FemWise networks provide an avenue for Africans to champion the traditional conflict mechanisms ⁵ and values, although the extent of their knowledge and application of African approaches in conflict settings are debatable.

Speaking during the opening Address of the 14th Meeting of the AU Panel of the Wise, Ambassador Smail Chergui, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, notes that

Since its inception, the Panel of the Wise has captured African (and one could add international) curiosity and imagination. After all, we created a structure at the heart of our organisation—of our decision-making on conflict prevention, management and resolution—inspired by the centuries’ old practice of African elders’ centrality in dispute and conflict resolution in our communities. Indeed, in creating a Panel of the Wise, the AU has in many ways recognised the importance of customary, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and roles and the continuing relevance of these mechanisms in contemporary Africa. Independence, experience, maturity, respect—these are but some of the characteristics of our Panel’s members. Above all, as called for in the 2002 Peace and Security Council Protocol, Panel members must be highly respected African personalities who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on our Continent. (AU, 2014)

The ASF is another innovative mechanism that is envisaged to serve as the operational arm of the continental body that is poised to be deployed to crisis regions across the continent. The ASF conceptualization remains the only international standby force at an advanced stage of being established in contemporary times. The ASF framework consists of five brigades at each of the subregions in Africa and it is composed of military, police, and civilian components “in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice” (AU PSC Protocol, 2002, Article 13.1). While the ASF is still work in progress, the AU has made remarkable effort to establish the force and is verifying the operational readiness of the standby forces.

The innovative school of thought thus highlights creative mechanisms, approaches, and structures that are built on local and external influences to address contemporary challenges in Africa. The challenge with the innovative school of thought, however, is that African organizations have made several grandiose and ambitious innovations that go beyond the bounds of their capacities (Williams, 2011). Africa’s nonindifference stance to human rights abuses as well as projects such as the ASF and the entire APSA mechanisms is constrained not only by funding but also by lack of political will, half-hearted measures, and inability to challenge incumbent regimes that are responsible for grave violations on the continent. ⁶

Conclusion

This article has thus far situated the discourse on “African solutions” in three schools of thought, namely, the agency, indigenous, and innovative perspectives. This article gives perspective to the different research materials that have emphasized one or more of these approaches as they attempt to understand what African solutions entail. While the agency school of thought focuses on “who” solves issues on the continent, the indigenous perspective explores the role of African traditional practices and principles in addressing conflicts at the local and global levels. The innovative perspective concentrates on creative initiatives drawn from local and modern standards to address Africa’s challenges.

The idea of “African solutions” remains an interesting topic in both regional and international debates for remedies to the challenges facing the African continent, especially in the area of peace and security. By expanding on these three perspectives, the article intends to raise further debate on what “African solutions” entail and how they could provide remedies to regional and global challenges.