Information and International Institutions Revisited

Abstract

In a recent article in this journal, Chapman presents a formal model of the informational role played by international institutions. Unfortunately, the equilibria given in the article are incorrect. In this article, we identify the errors in the analysis of Chapman and solve for correct equilibria to the model. Our results show little support for the empirical implications derived in the original article. Contrary to these original findings, we find that there may be no relationship between an institution’s policy position and its effect on domestic public opinion or the likelihood that leaders will consult the institution.

Keywords

information institutions domestic audience

The article “International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy” (Chapman 2007) presents a formal model of the informational role played by international institutions. In the model, a state leader chooses whether to consult an international institution before seeking domestic support for a foreign policy proposal. The leader and the institution have private information about the location of the proposal relative to the status quo, so their actions affect the domestic audience’s beliefs. Chapman (2007) uses this model to argue that leaders should be more likely to consult conservative institutions because the support of such institutions offers more convincing evidence to less informed domestic audiences.¹

Unfortunately, the analysis of the equilibria in Chapman (2007) is incorrect. We show that in this analysis, the domestic audience does not update its beliefs correctly, which in turn leads to a mischaracterization of the equilibria in the model. We demonstrate this by identifying some profitable deviations from the strategies given as equilibria in the original article. We then discuss the correct equilibria of the model. Although this model has many possible equilibria, we identify one in which the leader always proposes the policy unilaterally when the audience is revisionist and always consults with the institution when the audience is conservative.

Our findings are substantively important for the literature on institutional information transmission. In his discussion of the model’s empirical implications, Chapman (2007) focuses on the relative preferences of the leader and the institution’s pivotal member. He claims that as the pivotal actor’s ideal point moves closer to the status quo, institutional support is more credible and the leader becomes more likely to consult the organization. We find that this is not necessarily the case: there exist equilibria in which the institutional position has no effect on the leader’s choice of venue or the audience’s support for the proposal. Thus, the empirical implications derived in the original article lack support under our corrected equilibria.

Summary of the Model

In this section, we sketch the model presented in Chapman (2007). We closely follow the notation used there. Interested readers should consult the original article for more details.

There are three players in the model, the leader L, the pivotal member of the international organization V, and the domestic audience D. The sequence of moves in the model is given in figure 1 of Chapman (2007, 141-42). Nature chooses the outcome of a foreign policy $x \in [0, 1]$ , with the status quo normalized to 0. The leader L and the pivotal member V know the value of x, while D has a prior belief that x is uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$ . After learning the value of x, the leader proposes x unilaterally, proposes x multilaterally (i.e., through the international institution), or accepts the status quo.

Figure 1.

Reduced form game when $δ < γ$ .

If the leader proposes x unilaterally, the domestic audience D chooses whether to support or oppose the proposal. After observing the choice of D, the leader decides whether to implement the proposal. If the proposal is implemented, the pivotal member V decides whether to accept or obstruct the proposal. If the leader proposes x multilaterally, the sequence of moves is similar. The only difference is that the pivotal member V initially signals support or opposition to the proposal. The domestic audience D observes this signal before choosing whether to support or oppose.

All players have a policy payoff given by $U_{i} = - {(x - x_{i})}^{2}$ , where $x_{i}$ is player i’s ideal point, $i \in {V, D, L}$ . As in the original article, we assume that $x_{D} < x_{L}$ , meaning the domestic audience favors the status quo more than the leader does. In addition to the policy payoff, certain actions by the players entail costs. First, the leader pays a cost σ if he implements the proposal despite opposition by the public. Second, if the proposed policy is implemented, the pivotal member pays a cost γ if it obstructs the proposal and a cost δ if it accepts a proposal that it had earlier signaled opposition to. Finally, the domestic audience suffers a cost λ if the pivotal member obstructs the proposal.

Chapman’s Equilibrium

Chapman presents his solution in his “Statement of Equilibrium Conditions” (p. 146), which we partially reproduce here for the case $x_{V} < x_{D} < x_{L}$ .

Statement of Equilibrium Conditions

If $x \leq 2 x_{L}$ and $σ \leq σ^{*} = x_{L}^{2} - {(x - x_{L})}^{2},$ the leader proposes x, is indifferent about consulting the institution and implements x regardless of the audience’s decision. The audience is indifferent between supporting and opposing x.

If $x > 2 x_{L},$ the leader does not propose x.

If $σ > σ^{*}$ and $x \leq 2 x_{V} \leq 2 x_{L},$ the leader always proposes x through the institution, the pivotal member signals support, the audience supports x, and the pivotal member does not implement opposition.

(a) If $σ > σ^{*},$ $2 x_{V} < x \leq 2 x_{L}$ , and $δ < γ,$ there exists a $x_{D}^{*}$ such that if $x_{D} \geq x_{D}^{*}$ , the leader is indifferent between proposing x unilaterally or multilaterally, the audience supports x, and the pivotal member opposes x but does not implement opposition. (b) If $x_{D} < x_{D}^{*}$ , the leader accepts the status quo, anticipating public and institutional opposition.

(a) If $σ > σ^{*}, 2 x_{V} < x \leq 2 x_{L}$ and $δ \geq γ,$ there exists a $x_{D}^{†} > x_{D}^{*},$ such that if $x_{D} \geq x_{D}^{†},$ the leader is indifferent between proposing x unilaterally or multilaterally, the audience supports x, and the pivotal member opposes x and implements opposition. (b) If $x_{D} < x_{D}^{†},$ the leader accepts the status quo, anticipating public and institutional opposition.

We summarize these conditions in Table 1. It gives four of the five regions that Chapman delineates in the parameter space of the model and describes the behavior of the players as a function of x in the region.² More details are available in the Online Appendix.

Table 1.

Regions in the Parameter Space.

Region	Inequalities	Behavior
A	$x_{V} < x_{D} < x_{L}$ , $δ < γ$ , $x_{D} \geq x_{D}^{*}$	1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2(a)
B	$x_{V} < x_{D} < x_{L}$ , $δ < γ$ , $x_{D} < x_{D}^{*}$	1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2(b)
C	$x_{V} < x_{D} < x_{L}$ , $δ \geq γ$ , $x_{D} \geq x_{D}^{†}$	1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-3(a)
D	$x_{V} < x_{D} < x_{L}$ , $δ \geq γ$ , $x_{D} < x_{D}^{†}$	1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-3(b)

Unfortunately, this statement of equilibrium conditions is incorrect, for two reasons. First, in each of the regions identified in Table 1, there is at least one player who can increase his or her payoff by deviating from the proposed strategy. Second, the audience does not update its beliefs correctly.

As an example of a profitable deviation, consider region A in Table 1. The behavior of the players in this region is given by conditions 1-1, 1-2, 2-1, and 2-2(a). Specifically, in condition 2-2(a), when x satisfies $σ > σ^{*}$ and $2 x_{V} < x \leq 2 x_{L}$ , in the multilateral subgame “the audience supports x and the pivotal member opposes x but does not implement opposition.” Therefore, the pivotal member V will get a payoff of $- {(x - x_{V})}^{2} - δ$ in this subgame.³ However, if in this subgame the pivotal member V deviates to a strategy of signaling support and accepting the proposal, then it will get either $- {(0 - x_{V})}^{2}$ or $- {(x - x_{V})}^{2}$ . Since $x > 2 x_{V}$ , we have $- {(0 - x_{V})}^{2} > - {(x - x_{V})}^{2} > - {(x - x_{V})}^{2} - δ$ . Therefore, the pivotal member has a positive incentive to deviate in this region. Other profitable deviations exist in the other regions in Table 1. These are given in the Online Appendix.

The article also fails to correctly analyze the updating of equilibrium beliefs. This is particularly unfortunate because a key feature of the model is how the audience uses the actions of the leader and institution to learn about the policy. An example of this problem is how the audience updates its beliefs in response to the leader’s initial choice. The appendix of Chapman (2007) states that “if L has proposed x, D knows that L prefers x to the status quo, or $x \leq 2 x_{L}$ .” But the domestic audience D observes more than this. Specifically, it observes if the proposal x has been made unilaterally or multilaterally. If the leader chooses different kinds of proposals based on his knowledge of x, the audience should incorporate this into its updated belief. Again, consider region A in Table 1 and suppose $2 x_{V} < x_{L} - \sqrt{x_{L}^{2} - σ}$ . If the leader proposes x unilaterally in conditions 1-1 and 2-2, this means that a unilateral proposal is made only when $2 x_{V} < x \leq 2 x_{L}$ . Therefore, when the audience observes a unilateral proposal, it should update its belief to be that x is uniformly distributed on the interval $[2 x_{V}, 2 x_{L}]$ . This example shows how the beliefs of the audience must be determined by the actual strategy employed by the leader, not by the leader’s preferences, which is what Chapman does. Again, the Supplementary Appendix contains other examples of this error.

Correct Equilibrium

Having identified the problems in the solution given by Chapman (2007), in this section, we analyze the correct equilibria of the model. The model is a signaling game with two signalers and continuous private information and therefore, as is usually the case with such games, there are a large number of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Focusing just on the action of the leader, we find a range of parameters such that it is an equilibrium for the leader to always propose x unilaterally, and another range in which it is an equilibrium for the leader to always propose x multilaterally. Importantly, in this solution, the international institution’s announcement of support or opposition does not depend on its own policy preferences, and the domestic audience’s actions in the multilateral subgame do not depend on the institution’s announcement.

In order to cut down on the parameter space, in what follows we assume that $δ < γ$ . For ease of exposition, we also assume throughout the rest of this section that $2 x_{L} \leq 1$ .⁴ With these assumptions, the equilibrium actions at the last two nodes of both the multilateral and unilateral subgames can be solved for using sequential rationality as follows. First, the pivotal member never obstructs the proposal x. Second, given this, if the domestic audience supports x, the leader implements x if $x < 2 x_{L}$ and does not implement it if $x \geq 2 x_{L}$ . If the domestic audience opposes x, the leader implements x if $x_{L} - \sqrt{x_{L}^{2} - σ} < x < x_{L} + \sqrt{x_{L}^{2} - σ}$ , and does not implement it otherwise. In order to state this result formally, we introduce the following notation. Let $y_{1} = x_{L} - \sqrt{x_{L}^{2} - σ}$ and $y_{2} = x_{L} + \sqrt{x_{L}^{2} - σ}$ , and let $I_{1} = [0, y_{1}], I_{2} = (y_{1}, y_{2}), I_{3} = [y_{2}, 2 x_{L}),$ and $I_{4} = [2 x_{L}, 1]$ . We can now state the following lemma:

Lemma 1: Suppose $δ < γ$ . In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium,

in both the unilateral and multilateral subgames, if D supports x, then L implements $x < 2 x_{L}$ and does not implement $x \geq 2 x_{L}$ .

in both the unilateral and multilateral subgames, if D opposes x, then L implements $x \in I_{2}$ and does not implement $x \notin I_{2}$ .

in the multilateral subgame, V accepts all $x \in [0, 1]$ .

Given this lemma, we can reduce the game tree by replacing the actions covered by the lemma with their payoffs, as in Figure 1. As indicated in the figure, the payoffs depend on which region the value of x belongs to.

We now describe two kinds of equilibrium behavior in this game: one in which the leader never consults the institution and another in which he or she always consults it. We do not claim that these are the only equilibria. There are others with more complex behavior, where the leader sometimes accepts the status quo and sometimes proposes the policy.⁵ We have chosen to focus on the two cases presented in the following because they most clearly illustrate our substantive points.

In our first proposition, we show that if the domestic audience is revisionist, then it is an equilibrium for the leader to always propose x unilaterally and receive domestic support. In the multilateral subgame, which is off the equilibrium path, the institution supports the proposal if and only if $x \in I_{2}$ , while the domestic audience implements opposition regardless of the institution’s signal. The equilibrium is stated formally in the following proposition.

Proposition 1: Suppose $δ < γ$ and $x_{D} \geq x_{D}^{*} = \frac{5 x_{L} + \sqrt{x_{L}^{2} - σ}}{6} - \frac{σ}{6 x_{L}}$ . A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by

L unilaterally proposes all $x \in [0, 1]$ . In both the unilateral and multilateral subgames, if D supports x, then L implements $x < 2 x_{L}$ and does not implement $x \geq 2 x_{L}$ , and if D opposes x, then L implements $x \in I_{2}$ and does not implement $x \notin I_{2}$ .

V signals support if $x \in I_{2}$ and signals opposition if $x \notin I_{2}$ . V accepts all $x \in [0, 1]$ .

D supports a unilateral proposal. In the multilateral subgame, D opposes the proposal regardless of whether V signals support or opposition.

In the unilateral subgame, D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$ . In the multilateral subgame, if V signals support, then D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $I_{2}$ and if V signals opposition, then D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $[max {y_{2}, 2 x_{D}}, 1]$ .

Proof: In order to show that these strategies form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we must show that no player has an incentive to deviate from their equilibrium strategy given the other players’ strategy and their beliefs and that the beliefs are consistent with all players’ strategies on the equilibrium path.

By Lemma 1, the actions of L and V at the last two nodes of the game are sequentially rational. The remaining parts of the equilibrium strategies are examined in what follows.

For the leader, the equilibrium path of play gives L a payoff of $- {(x - x_{L})}^{2}$ for $x < 2 x_{L}$ and $- {(0 - x_{L})}^{2}$ for $x \geq 2 x_{L}$ . Note that for both $x < 2 x_{L}$ and $x \geq 2 x_{L}$ , the equilibrium payoff of L is the largest possible value among the payoffs to L in the game tree. Clearly, then there is no possible deviation for L that would result in a higher payoff.

For the pivotal member, we check his action in each of the four regions $I_{1}$ , $I_{2}$ , $I_{3}$ , and $I_{4}$ . Recall that D opposes the proposal regardless of whether V signals support or opposition. Therefore, if $x \in I_{1} \cup I_{3} \cup I_{4}$ , then the payoff to V is the same whether V signals support or opposition. It follows that signaling opposition is optimal for x in these ranges. On the other hand, if $x \in I_{2}$ , then signaling support yields a payoff of $- {(x - x_{V})}^{2}$ and signaling opposition yields a payoff of $- {(x - x_{V})}^{2} - δ$ . In this case, signaling support is clearly optimal. Therefore, the actions of V are sequentially rational.

For the audience, we must show that its equilibrium action is optimal given its belief at each information set. If x is proposed unilaterally, then D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$ . Therefore, the expected utility of supporting the proposal is

E u_{D} (S) = \int_{0}^{2 x_{L}} - {(x - x_{D})}^{2} d x + \int_{2 x_{L}}^{1} - {(0 - x_{D})}^{2} d x,

and the expected utility of opposing the proposal is

E u_{D} (O) = \int_{0}^{y_{1}} - {(0 - x_{D})}^{2} d x + \int_{y_{1}}^{y_{2}} - {(x - x_{D})}^{2} d x + \int_{y_{2}}^{1} - {(0 - x_{D})}^{2} d x .

Evaluating these integrals and solving shows that $E u_{D} (S) \geq E u_{D} (O)$ when $x_{D} \geq x_{D}^{*}$ . Therefore, supporting a unilateral proposal is sequentially rational for D.

In the multilateral subgame, there are two cases to consider. If V signals support, then D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $I_{2}$ . As D is indifferent between supporting and opposing $x \in I_{2}$ , it is sequentially rational to oppose in this case. On the other hand, if V signals opposition, then D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $[max {y_{2}, 2 x_{D}}, 1]$ . As $- {(x - x_{D})}^{2} \leq - {(0 - x_{D})}^{2}$ for all $x \geq 2 x_{D}$ , it follows that the expected utility of opposing x is at least as large as the expected utility of supporting x. Therefore, it is sequentially rational to oppose x in this case.

Finally, we note that the belief of D in the unilateral subgame is given by Bayes’ Rule and the strategy of L. In the multilateral subgame, we assume that D’s updated belief about x before V makes its announcement—which is unrestricted because it is off the equilibrium path—is uniform on $I_{2} \cup [2 x_{D}, 1]$ . The given beliefs are then consistent with the conditional Bayesian updating requirement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for multistage games (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, 331-33). □

In this equilibrium, the leader’s choice to propose the policy unilaterally is uninformative to the audience, since the leader does so for all $x \in [0, 1]$ . The requirement that $x_{D} \geq x_{D}^{*}$ ensures that the audience is better off supporting a randomly chosen policy than opposing it. Therefore, since the leader’s choice to propose unilaterally gives the audience no information, it is rational for D to support the policy. With guaranteed support for any proposal, the leader is free to implement any policy that he prefers over the status quo, meaning he gets his highest possible payoff for any policy x. Note that the institution could be conservative or revisionist in Proposition 1. In either case, the leader does not have an incentive to consult the institution because he gets his highest possible payoff from a unilateral proposal.

As is well known, perfect Bayesian equilibrium places no restrictions on the beliefs of players for actions that are off the equilibrium path. In this proposition, we have chosen the beliefs of the audience in order to make the proof as simple as possible. However, this same equilibrium path of play can be supported by other, more natural, beliefs at the expense of additional complication in the presentation.

In our second proposition, we show that if the domestic audience is conservative, then it is an equilibrium for the leader to always propose x multilaterally. The institution supports the proposal if $x \in I_{2}$ and opposes it otherwise. The domestic audience opposes the proposal in all cases, including the unilateral subgame, which is off the equilibrium path. We state this result formally in the following proposition:

Proposition 2: Suppose $δ < γ$ and $x_{D} \leq x_{D}^{*} = \frac{5 x_{L} + \sqrt{x_{L}^{2} - σ}}{6} - \frac{σ}{6 x_{L}}$ . A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by

L proposes all $x \in [0, 1]$ through the institution. In both the unilateral and multilateral subgames, if D supports x, then L implements $x < 2 x_{L}$ and does not implement $x \geq 2 x_{L}$ ; and if D opposes x, then L implements $x \in I_{2}$ and does not implement $x \notin I_{2}$ .

V signals support if $x \in I_{2}$ and signals opposition if $x \notin I_{2}$ . V accepts all $x \in [0, 1]$ .

D opposes a unilateral proposal. In the multilateral subgame, D opposes the proposal regardless of whether V signals support or opposition.

In the unilateral subgame, D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$ . In the multilateral subgame, if V signals support, then D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $I_{2}$ ; if V signals opposition, then D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $I_{1} \cup I_{3} \cup I_{4}$ .

Proof: Once again, we must show that no player has a profitable deviation available and that the beliefs are consistent with equilibrium strategies. By Lemma 1, the actions of L and V at the last two nodes of the game are sequentially rational. For the leader, the equilibrium path of play gives payoff $- {(x - x_{L})}^{2} - σ$ for $x \in I_{2}$ and $- ({0 - x_{L})}^{2}$ for $x \notin I_{2}$ . Making a unilateral proposal gives the same payoff in all cases; accepting the status quo gives the same payoff for $x \notin I_{2}$ and strictly less for $x \in I_{2}$ . Therefore, L’s proposed action is sequentially rational. For the pivotal member, the argument from the proof of Proposition 1 carries over, since D again opposes regardless of V’s action.

For the domestic audience, there are three cases to consider. First, in the multilateral subgame, if V supports the policy, then D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $I_{2}$ . The audience is indifferent between support and opposition for all $x \in I_{2}$ , so opposition is sequentially rational. Second, in the multilateral subgame, if V opposes, D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $I_{1} \cup I_{3} \cup I_{4}$ . The expected utility of supporting is

E u_{D} (S) = \frac{1}{1 + y_{1} - y_{2}} [\int_{0}^{y_{1}} - {(x - x_{D})}^{2} d x + \int_{y_{2}}^{2 x_{L}} - {(x - x_{D})}^{2} d x + \int_{2 x_{L}}^{1} - {(0 - x_{D})}^{2} d x],

and the expected utility of opposing is

E u_{D} (O) = \frac{1}{1 + y_{1} - y_{2}} [\int_{0}^{y_{1}} - {(0 - x_{D})}^{2} d x + \int_{y_{2}}^{1} - {(0 - x_{D})}^{2} d x] .

Evaluating these integrals and solving shows that $E u_{D} (O) \geq E u_{D} (S)$ when $x_{D} \leq x_{D}^{*}$ . Therefore, D’s opposition is sequentially rational. Finally, if x is proposed unilaterally, then D’s belief about x is uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$ . Using the same calculations as in the proof of Proposition 1 establishes that D’s payoff from opposing is at least as great as that of supporting when $x_{D} \leq x_{D}^{*}$ . Therefore, D’s opposition is sequentially rational.

Finally, note that D’s beliefs in the multilateral subgame are given by Bayes’ Rule and the strategies of L and V. Its belief in the unilateral subgame is off the equilibrium path of play and is therefore unrestricted.

In this equilibrium, the condition on the audience’s ideal point means that it opposes a randomly chosen $x \in [0, 1]$ . If the institution announces support, D infers that $x \in I_{2}$ , which means its support or opposition makes no difference—the leader will implement the policy no matter what. If the institution announces opposition, the requirement that $x_{D} \leq x_{D}^{*}$ ensures that D on average prefers opposition over support for $x \notin I_{2}$ . In either case, it is rational for the audience to announce opposition. Since the institution’s announcement has no effect on the audience’s behavior, and hence no effect on the final policy, it has no incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy, regardless of its own ideal point. Finally, the leader faces public opposition no matter how he chooses to propose the policy, so he has no incentive not to propose multilaterally. □

It is worth emphasizing that no matter what the preferences of the audience are, the leader’s choice of venue does not depend on the policy position or whether the international institution is conservative or revisionist. In the next section, we consider the implications of these results for the substantive conclusions drawn in Chapman (2007).

Implications

In this section, we discuss how the corrected equilibria to this model call into question the empirical implications described in the original article. Chapman (2007, 149-50) summarizes the substantive importance of the original findings in a list of four observations. Each of these four claims fails to find support in the results described earlier. In particular, the players’ behavior in these equilibria does not depend at all on whether the institution’s pivotal member is conservative or revisionist.

The first two observations concern the effect of international institutions’ signals on domestic public opinion (p. 149):

Observation 1: Support for foreign policies is likely to be higher when a leader consults an international institution and gains the institution’s support than when a leader does not consult an international institution.

Observation 2: Given that a leader has gone to an institution for authorization and the institution signals its support, the public is more likely to support as the preferences of the pivotal member of the institution become more conservative. Likewise, failure to obtain support is less likely to affect public opinion as the pivotal member of the institution becomes more conservative.

Neither of these statements is consistent with the equilibrium behavior characterized in Propositions 1 and 2. In both cases, D always opposes the proposal in the multilateral subgame, even if V signals support. In fact, in Proposition 1, the domestic audience is more likely to support a unilateral proposal than a multilateral proposal that receives institutional support. These results do not depend on any particular assumptions about the institution’s conservatism or revisionism. If $δ < γ$ , then for any arrangement of the players’ ideal points, at least one of the propositions’ conditions are satisfied—meaning there is an equilibrium in which international institutions have no effect on domestic opinion.

The next observation is about the relationship between the pivotal member’s ideal point and the leader’s initial decision (p. 150):

Observation 3: Leaders are more likely to consult international institutions the more they desire public support for policies and as the preferences of the pivotal member of a given institution become more conservative.

The basis for the observation is that acquiring support from a conservative institution “guarantees public support” for the leader’s proposal—which, as we have already seen, is not true. Consequently, the observation does not hold.

The final observation concerns the conditions under which institutions can effectively constrain leaders’ policy choices.

Observation 4: Institutions whose pivotal member is relatively revisionist will constrain policy makers via anticipated opposition regardless of their members’ enforcement power. Institutions whose pivotal member is relatively conservative are less equipped to constrain leaders through a threat of opposition but may force leaders to be selective in proposing policies that will garner institutional support.

Both statements rest on the implicit assumption that the pivotal member makes a sincere announcement of its preferences, which we have shown is not necessarily true in equilibrium. The first part of the observation is contradicted by Proposition 1, in which the leader is effectively unconstrained, regardless of whether V is conservative or revisionist. Even if the leader anticipates opposition from a revisionist institution to a policy he or she favors, in equilibrium he or she will propose it unilaterally and receive public support. The second part is contradicted by Proposition 2, in which the leader proposes all policies through the institution, again regardless of V’s ideal point. In this case, there is no need for the leader to be selective even if the institution is conservative, because he or she faces public opposition no matter how he or she makes the proposal or what the institution announces.

We have shown that none of the original article’s main substantive claims holds up under the equilibria we have found. To be clear, we do not claim that these observations are impossible to support as equilibrium behavior; the model has many more equilibria that we have not characterized here and we cannot rule out the existence of equilibria consistent with these claims. However, our results show that there are reasonable equilibria in this model that do not reflect the systematic relationship between institutional preferences, public opinion, and venue choices that are posited in the original article. This fact calls into question the originally claimed empirical implications of the model.

Conclusion

We have shown that Chapman’s (2007) statement of equilibrium conditions is erroneous and provided a corrected solution. Moreover, we have demonstrated that the empirical implications claimed in the original article are not supported by the equilibria in Propositions 1 and 2. In particular, the role of institutional conservatism or revisionism has been overstated: there is not necessarily any relationship between an institution’s ideal point, its ability to affect domestic support for a policy, and the likelihood that a leader will consult the institution in the first place. Our results suggest that a promising direction for future research would be to consider the informational role of other institutional features that have been left out of this model.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Supplemental Material

The online appendix is available at .

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