Biased,Therefore Unhappy: Disentangling the Collectivism-Happiness Relationship Globally

Abstract

A relationship between individualism and happiness has been observed in many studies, with collectivist cultures having lower indices of happiness. It is often argued that this effect arises because people in individualist countries have greater independence and more freedom to pursue personal goals. It appears, however, that the association is much more complex than this as many collectivist countries suffer from more basic problems, such as social conflicts, discrimination, and prejudice. We hypothesized that global differences in happiness could be the result of ingroup bias and its consequences, rather than of collectivism itself. To test our hypotheses, we applied a country-level design, where a country is considered a unit of analysis. We found that individualism predicted various aspects of a country’s aggregated level of happiness, but was only a marginal predictor of happiness when ingroup favoritism and group-focused enmity were controlled for. We discuss the implications of these findings from evolutionary and social psychological perspectives.

Keywords

happiness individualism collectivism ingroup bias ingroup favoritism group-focused enmity

Introduction

Why are some countries happier than others? Can the happiness of a whole nation be determined by its culture? Numerous researchers have attempted to answer these intriguing questions. Most research has shown that countries that score highly on individualism (such as Denmark, Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand; see Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010) also lead rankings of subjective well-being (Helliwell, Huang, & Wang, 2016). Closer analysis shows, however, that the relationship is more complicated than it first appears and that there is much about it that is not yet understood. For example, how should we explain why South Africa, which is considered an individualist country, has rather low indices of happiness whereas collectivist Brazil is among the 20 happiest countries in the world? And Syria, which has a similar level of collectivism to Brazil (Hofstede et al., 2010), is among the 10 least happy countries in the world (Helliwell et al., 2016).

These examples show that the relationship between the individualism-collectivism (I-C) dimension and happiness is actually very complex. Individualism alone is not sufficient to account for national differences in happiness, and collectivism is not entirely responsible for national unhappiness. A closer look at the recent history of less happy countries shows South Africa has suffered from racial conflicts for many years, and Syria has been experiencing civil war since March 2011. This information suggests that the association between unhappiness and collectivism might be superficial, stemming from more basic problems, such as social conflicts, discrimination, and ingroup bias, and, in this study, we aimed to investigate this possibility.

Determinants of Happiness

With the development of positive psychology, happiness has received a lot of attention from psychologists (Argyle, 2001; Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). It is usually described as emotional well-being (Keyes & Lopez, 2002), a dominance of positive over negative affect (Diener, Sandvik, & Pavor, 1991), or a positive evaluation of one’s quality of life (Veenhoven, 1999). Researchers often operationalize happiness as subjective well-being (SWB), which has two dimensions—emotional and cognitive (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). The emotional dimension of SWB takes the form of frequent experiences of pleasant emotions and rare experiences of unpleasant emotions, whereas the cognitive dimension represents a globally positive evaluation of one’s life. Many studies have been devoted to the search for the determinants of happiness, and this vast body of research has produced some important findings. There is evidence that satisfactory relationships are one of the main sources of happiness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Ryan & Deci, 2000), because they play a substantial role in fulfilling individuals’ needs for affiliation, intimacy, and security. Relationships are a source of social support and comfort, and they promote positive affect (Christopher, Kuo, Abraham, Noel, & Linz, 2004). It has been reported that married people are happier than single, divorced, or widowed people (Myers, 2000). Individuals who report high levels of happiness also spend more time participating in social activities (Diener & Seligman, 2002; Heidrich & Ryff, 1993; Waldinger & Schulz, 2010). Based on these findings, one might expect to find higher levels of happiness in collectivist societies that stress the importance of strong interpersonal bonds; in fact, however, the reverse relationship is consistently reported (Ahuvia, 2002; Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995; Veenhoven, 1999), suggesting that at the national level, perhaps it is individualism rather than collectivism that leads to happiness. The aim of our study was to extend understanding of this issue.

Among the happiness-related factors for which there is extensive empirical support are frequency of positive emotions (Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Fredrickson, 2001), optimism (Lyubomirsky, Dickerhoof, Boehm, & Sheldon, 2011), mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003), balanced time perspective (Stolarski, 2016), and realization of intrinsic goals (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Scholars generally agree that in wealthy nations, income has little bearing on happiness (Easterlin, 1974, 2005; Veenhoven, 2010): The association between income and happiness decreases as national affluence increases. As Ahuvia (2002, p. 24) noted, “Once one has a roof over one’s head, a job, and food on the table, increases in income generally explain less than 1% of the variance in SWB.” In other words, improvements in financial status only bring about changes in happiness in the poorest societies, in which many people’s basic needs are not met.

Some evidence, however, suggests that the understanding of happiness can vary on the cultural context (Delle Fave et al., 2016; Hitokoto & Uchida, 2015; Uchida & Oishi, 2016). For example, in Western cultures, positive emotions are believed to be a major source of happiness, and individuals aim to maximize the experience of positive affect to increase their well-being. On the contrary, in Asian cultures, happiness is understood as a balance between the self and others, an interpersonal connectedness experienced within shared relationships (Hitokoto & Uchida, 2015). Hence, some scholars postulate the existence of independent and interdependent happiness, where the former stresses the importance of individual factors such as self-acceptance, personal growth, and having purpose in life (Ryff & Keyes, 1995), and the latter focuses on similarity, connection, and harmony with close others (Hitokoto & Uchida, 2015). What is more, in Western cultures, positive and negative emotions are contradictory, with the latter being adverse for happiness. In contrast, in Asian cultures, they are seen as complementary, and both types of affect can contribute to happiness. Those discrepancies in understanding happiness imply that this construct should be defined and studied with a particular attention to cultural differences. Delle Fave and colleagues (2016) took such an approach, analyzing definitions of happiness constructed in 12 countries with different scores on the I-C dimension. They found that psychological definitions of happiness dominated, describing it in terms of inner harmony, and across contextual definitions, they associated it with family and social relationships. This study indicated that irrespective of cultural differences, some universal determinants of happiness also exist, making cross-cultural comparisons conceptually justified.

Numerous studies compared the level of happiness across cultures and analyzed cultural characteristics as potential determinants of happiness. Triandis (2000) listed elements of culture that enhance happiness: political freedom, social equality, social security, good relationships between clerks and citizens, public institutions that function properly and efficiently, and a high level of social trust. Tov and Diener (2008) stressed the importance of cooperation, frequency of volunteerism, and democratic attitudes. National differences in happiness have also been extensively analyzed in relation to the I-C dimension (Ahuvia, 2002; Hofstede, 2001; Lopez et al., 2002), and in this article, we focus on this aspect of culture.

I-C and National Happiness

As cultural psychologists claim, culture has an impact on shaping self by providing the context in which people learn what is adaptive and valuable, and what is maladaptive and undesirable (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). One of the most widely studied cultural dimensions is the distinction between I-C that focuses on individual autonomy versus social embeddedness and interdependence with others (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). The construct received extensive interest after the studies conducted by Hofstede (2001), who examined it at the societal level as a one of four constructs that explain the variation in the values and work satisfaction of IBM employees across 40 countries. Since then, the I-C dimension has been applied in a vast number of studies (for a review, see Oyserman et al., 2002).

In nations described as individualist (including the United States, Australia, and the nations of Western Europe), self-serving behavior is common (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), and there is considerable personal autonomy. A basic human endeavor is to create and maintain a positive sense of self. Hence, great emphasis is placed on intrinsic needs, achieving success, and pursuit of personal development (Ahuvia, 2002; Veenhoven, 1999), and as a result, people follow lifestyles that are consistent with their preferences rather than fulfilling their social obligations. Obviously, individuals need relationships and group memberships as they help to attain self-relevant goals and satisfy the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Relationships, however, are perceived as impermanent, and when the costs start to exceed the benefits, people are ready to leave them (Oyserman et al., 2002).

In contrast, in collectivist societies (the majority of Asian, Latin American, and African countries), group membership is a central aspect of identity (Hofstede, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman et al., 2002). As a result, people are strongly connected with their ingroup, and “we” takes precedent over “I” in people’s self-definitions (Triandis, 1995). In collectivist societies, people describe themselves in terms of their social roles and responsibilities rather than their individual qualities. Valued personal traits are those that lead to maintaining harmonious relationships with close others, so people are inclined to subordinate their personal goals and priorities to the collective welfare and objectives of the community to which they belong. In individualist countries, people are more competitive and assertive, whereas in collectivist cultures, they are more willing to cooperate and avoid interpersonal conflicts (Cox, Loebel, & McCleod, 1991). Their group memberships are perceived as fixed and stable and an association to which people must accommodate rather than leave (Oyserman et al., 2002). The boundaries between ingroups and outgroups are firm and inflexible.

The I-C dimension, although widely investigated, poses some empirical difficulties. The most challenging part about studying this dimension is the multifaceted nature of the construct, which often is defined very broadly (Brewer & Chen, 2007). Whereas individualism seems to be a well-determined factor (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005), there is a conceptual confusion about collectivism, which appears to be more diversified and complex (Oyserman et al., 2002). Because ingroups can include family, ethnic, religious, and other groups, the term collectivism may refer to a broader range of values, attitudes, and behaviors than individualism. For example, Brewer and Chen (2007) postulate distinguishing relational collectivism, in which self is defined in terms of connections and relationships with significant others, and group collectivism, in which self is defined in terms of prototypical properties shared by members of the ingroup. Another distinction involves collectivist cultures of honor, developed in competitive environments of rough equals, and cultures of face, shaped by a strong hierarchy (Leung & Cohen, 2011). This multidimensionality makes the outcomes of collectivism particularly difficult to study, yet, at the same time, intriguing as there is much about it that is not yet understood.

Studies consistently show that happiness is positively related to individualism and negatively related to collectivism, even when income, human rights, and equality are controlled for (Basabe & Ros, 2005; Diener et al., 1995). What makes individualist countries happy and collectivist countries unhappy? Longitudinal data (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010) indicate that economic growth promotes individualism. A recent study conducted in traditionally collectivist China (Steele & Lynch, 2013) is consistent with these findings, indicating that although in China, happiness is predicted by both collectivist and individualist factors, the latter have become more important as the country has developed. As its affluence has increased, people’s access to resources has improved, and they no longer have to rely on their family, neighborhood, or other social groups to achieve their goals. A similar trend has been observed for Japan (Uchida & Oishi, 2016). This greater independence seems to promote individualism. Similarly, Inglehart (1997) hypothesized that wealth increases social well-being and enhances development of postmaterialistic values such as autonomy and self-expression. Veenhoven (1999) argued that economic growth frees people from networks of social obligation, which encourages them to follow their intrinsic needs, including personal growth. In other words, people in richer countries pay more attention to their personal well-being whereas members of collectivist societies prioritize their social image and acceptance by their ingroup over the pursuit of happiness.

A meta-analysis (Basabe & Ros, 2005) concluded that the more collectivist a country is, the higher the levels of nepotism and group loyalty and the greater the inequalities in income. It also reveals negative associations between collectivism and GNP, acceptance of immigrants, respect for human rights, and political freedom. Collectivism seems to be linked to cultural factors that are responsible for deterioration in national happiness (Triandis, 2000).

These findings give rise to an intriguing question: What qualities related to the I-C dimension are responsible for happiness at the national level? Collectivist countries are poorer and enforce social obligations, and their citizens display strong ingroup bias. Nevertheless, it seems simplistic and ideologically motivated to conclude that collectivism is a proximal cause of unhappiness. Evidently, some characteristics of collectivist societies, such as smaller pressure on personal success compared with individualist countries might have a beneficial effect for SWB. For example, it has been reported that self-esteem contributed more to life satisfaction of American students than Hong Kong undergraduates (Kwan, Bond, & Singelis, 1997), and the discrepancy between actual and ideal self was more strongly associated with depression in European Canadians than among Japanese (Heine & Lehman, 1999). Other central features of collectivist societies, such as stable social bonds or easily accessible social support, also should be linked to happiness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Cohen & Wills, 1985). The role of collectivism in diminishing happiness may seem particularly surprising if one considers the vast body of data indicating that strong interpersonal bonds and rich social networks are essential for SWB (Christopher et al., 2004; Diener & Seligman, 2002; Heidrich & Ryff, 1993; Myers, 2000; Waldinger & Schulz, 2010) and that higher individualism correlates with lower relationship commitment (Oyserman et al., 2002). Here, we focus on one aspect of the I-C dimension that could powerfully influence global happiness.

Prejudice and Ingroup Bias

One of the key characteristics of collectivist societies is the prominence of the ingroup-outgroup distinction that results in distrust of outgroup members and aggression toward them. In collectivist societies, group categories are constantly salient and highly accessible, due to intragroup interdependence and strong social bonds. In individualist societies, where intragroup interdependence is less pronounced, the distinction between ingroup and outgroup is less important. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which was based on early experiments on intergroup relations, posited that salient group categories were sufficient to produce ingroup bias and—in consequence—various forms of prejudice and discrimination. It is, therefore, reasonable to suggest that prejudice and conflicts would be more pronounced in collectivist societies, where group categories are more salient. Empirical comparisons of cultures that differ on the I-C dimension have provided support for this notion: Higher levels of ingroup bias and prejudice were observed in collectivist societies than in individualist societies (Oyserman, 1993; Triandis, 1995).

The consequences of ingroup bias are not limited to discrimination and passive forms of distancing. Highly salient group categories can lead to the dehumanization of outgroup members, perpetration of inhumanities, and collective violence (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). This kind of violence often takes place in the context of collectivist cultures in which social categories are more salient than they would be in an individualist culture. Wars, conflicts, riots, and revolutions occur more often in collectivist cultures than in individualist cultures. The analyses based on the Global Terrorism Database show that cultural tightness is a strong predictor of terrorist incidents (Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey, & Feinberg, 2013), whereas Basabe and Valencia (2007) provide evidence for positive correlation between collectivism and war. Collectivist culture might even be considered a risk factor for collective violence, ethnic conflicts, wars, and other extreme outcomes of ingroup bias (Oyserman & Lauffer, 2002). Most contemporary genocides were based on collectivist racism (e.g., the Holocaust, the massacre of Tutsi people in Rwanda), nationalism (Armenian genocide committed by Ottoman Turkey), or communism (Ukrainian famine in Stalin’s Soviet Union, Khmer Rouge’s genocide in Cambodia). Societal levels of happiness and psychological well-being may be lower in collectivist societies for objective reasons. Collectivist societies experience more wars and conflicts—which, in highly collectivist societies, can be expressions of ingroup bias—and these social factors may underlie the lower happiness observed in collectivist societies.

We propose, therefore, that global differences in happiness are a result of ingroup bias and its consequences (expressed both in everyday interactions and more serious group conflicts), rather than of collectivism itself. As ingroup bias is a combination of “ingroup love” and “outgroup hate” (Brewer, 1999), it is crucial to measure both these aspects accurately. The first component of ingroup bias can be operationalized as ingroup favoritism—a preferential treatment of ingroup members compared with outgroup members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The latter is reflected in the well-known phenomenon of group-focused enmity, an aggregated prejudice against all relevant outgroups (Zick et al., 2008). Based on social identity theory and cross-cultural psychological theories, we predicted that both ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and group-focused enmity (Zick et al., 2008) would be more pronounced in collectivist societies and would be reflected in lower levels of well-being and happiness in these societies.

The present study

The aim of this study was to investigate the role of ingroup bias in the relationship between I-C and happiness. In line with the results of previous studies, we hypothesized that, first, there is a robust relationship between individualism and happiness. Data from cross-national research show that individualism remains a predictor of SWB even when other factors such as income, human rights, and societal equality are taken into account (Basabe & Ros, 2005; Diener et al., 1995; Veenhoven, 1999). The association between individualism and happiness is often attributed to people in individualist societies having greater self-efficacy, greater control over their lives, and more freedom to pursue personal goals (Ahuvia, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Veenhoven, 1999); however, a vast number of studies also suggest that rich social bonds and fulfillment of the need to belong are essential for SWB (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Diener & Seligman, 2002; House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Waldinger & Schulz, 2010), and these are basic features of collectivist societies. What is more, global surveys consistently show that the happiest countries in the world are those in which a sense of social responsibility and solidarity is combined with a high degree of personal independence (Ahuvia, 2002; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). The relationship between happiness and the I-C dimension seems complex and so in this study, we aimed to analyze how it is affected by the salience of ingroup-outgroup distinctions, assumed to be stronger in collectivist societies. Because prejudice and ingroup bias expressed by the majority of the population can lead to actions that can be highly detrimental to national well-being (group conflicts and collective violence), it is worth investigating the extent to which they contribute to happiness at the national level. Therefore, we also predicted that, second, the relationship between individualism and happiness becomes robustly reduced when ingroup bias and prejudice are controlled for.

Method

In this study, we applied a country-level design (e.g., Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012; Stolarski, Jasielska, & Zajenkowski, 2015), considering a country a unit of analysis. The present analysis took into account a total number of countries ranging from 20 to 92, depending on availability of data in each of the considered sources. The conceptual scheme of the suggested model is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Model conceptual scheme.

Data Sources

Individualism-collectivism scores were taken from Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede et al. (2010). The full dataset is available online at www.geert-hofstede.com. For a replication of our major finding, we applied alternative I-C scores provided by Diener, Gohm, Suh, and Oishi (2000). Aware of certain limitations of Hofstede’s measure, we address them in section “Limitations” of the present article.

Country-level aggregated happiness was taken from the World Database on Happiness (Veenhoven, 2013). In the present analyses, we applied three indicators of life satisfaction: (a) Average Happiness, (b) Happy Life Years (an estimate of how long and happy the average citizen will live in that nation in this era), and (c) Inequality Adjusted Happiness (a linear combination of the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution of happiness in a nation). Veenhoven and Kalmijn (2005) endorsed the latter coefficient, arguing that “following the egalitarian principle, the quality of a society should rather be judged by the disparity in happiness among citizens, a society being better if differences in happiness are smaller” (p. 421). The full dataset is available at worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl.

In-group favoritism scores (indicator of ingroup bias) are a sum of compatriotism, nepotism, and familism, taken from Van de Vliert’s (2011) cross-cultural study of ingroup favoritism. To maximize the number of observations in each model, we included the set of countries with estimated levels of ingroup favoritism.

Group-focused enmity (indicator of prejudice) was estimated through a sum of 7 items from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS; conducted in 2010-2014; full data available on www.worldvaluessurvey.org). In one part of the WVS questionnaires, participants received a list of nine groups (including people who have AIDS, homosexuals, and unmarried couples) and were asked to mention any that they would not like to have as neighbors. They received one point for each given group and two points for every group that they did not mention. We decided to exclude two items that measured attitudes toward (a) heavy drinkers and (b) drug addicts, due to low loadings (<.30) of the general factor. The final indicator was, thus, a sum of 7 items, with an internal consistency of α = .74 (as measured on an individual level in the full WVS database). The scale was reversed to obtain an indicator of generalized group-focused enmity.

Control Variables

GDP per capita (indicator of national income) was taken from the World Economic Outlook Database provided by the National Monetary Fund. The dataset is available online at www.imf.org. For the present analyses, we used the October 2017 data release. As have many other authors (e.g., Meisenberg, 2012; Stolarski, Zajenkowski, & Meisenberg, 2013), we applied a logarithmic transformation because of the highly skewed and leptokurtic nature of GDP worldwide, which approximates to a normal distribution in the logarithmic form. Many variables correlate far better with logGDP than with untransformed GDP, probably due to the nonlinear impact of wealth on various outcomes (cf. Easterlin, 1974, 2005; see also Stolarski et al., 2013).

Peace Index was estimated using the Global Peace Index provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. It assesses global peace based on three major themes: the levels of violence and crime, the extent of ongoing domestic and international conflict, and the degree of militarization. The report has been published annually since 2007. It is developed by an international panel of peace experts; the data are collected and combined by the Economist Intelligence Unit. For the purposes of the present analyses, we applied an average indicator of peace for the last decade (2008-2017). The whole dataset is available online at visionofhumanity.org.

Results

The scores on I-C dimension, happiness, ingroup favoritism, and group-focused enmity, as well as control variables, for all the countries used in the analyses are presented in Appendix A. Intercorrelations between the variables are provided in Appendix B.

First, it is worth noting that both measures of I-C proved substantially intercorrelated, r(39) = .76, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) = [.55, .97], p < .001, as did the measures of favoritism and group-focused enmity, r(54) = .51, 95% CI = [.28, .75], p < .001. These correlations may serve as indicators of convergent validity of the applied measures.

To test our hypothesis, we conducted a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and mediation analyses, predicting each of the above-mentioned indicators of country-level happiness with one of two measures of I-C, introduced in step 1, and either ingroup favoritism or group-focused enmity, introduced in step 2. To calculate indirect effects and ratios of indirect to total effects, we applied Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS software.

To avoid formulating any conclusions using only one pair of predictors, we decided to take advantage of the availability of two datasets for each considered predictor. This procedure resulted in four combinations of indicators (two indicators of I-C × indicator of ingroup favoritism/group-focused enmity). Hofstede’s measures of I-C were applied in models 1 and 2, and Diener et al.’s in models 3 and 4. Van de Vliert’s indicator of ingroup favoritism was used for models 1 and 3, whereas our WVS-based indicator of group-focused enmity was introduced in models 2 and 4. The main results of the regressions are provided in Table 1.

Table 1.

Predicting Three Indicators of Country-Level Aggregate Happiness With Individualism-Collectivism, Measures of Group-Focused Enmity/Ingroup Favoritism, and Control Variables.

	Happiness indicators
	Average happiness	Happy life years	Inequality adjusted happiness
Model 1 (n = 92 countries)
Step 1
Individualism (H)	.38 [.19, .57] (<.001)	.44 [.25, .62] (<.001)	.44 [.25, .64] (<.001)
Step 2
Individualism (H)	.07 [–.20, .33] (>.250)	.15 [–.09, .38] (.234)	.10 [–.14, .34] (>.250)
Ingroup Favoritism	−.47 [–.23, –.71] (<.001)	−.43 [.19, .67] (<.001)	−.51 [–.27, –.75] (<.001)
Indirect effect:	.32 [.15, .53]	.29 [.13, .47]	.35 [.18, .57]
Ratio of indirect to total effect	.83 [.38, 1.77]	.67 [.29, 1.21]	.78 [.37, 1.58]
Step 3
Individualism (H)	−.17 [–.40, .06] (.137)	−.15 [–.33, .04] (.124)	−.14 [–.37, .09] (.243)
Ingroup favoritism	−.33 [–.55, –.10] (.005)	−.22 [–.41, –.04] (.021)	−.33 [–.56, –.10] (.006)
logGDP per capita	.59 [.40, .79] (<.001)	.73 [.57, .90] (<.001)	.55 [.34, .76] (<.001)
Global Peace Index	.02 [–.17, .20] (>.250)	−.05 [–.20, .10] (>.250)	−.06 [–.24, .13] (>.250)
Model 2 (n = 38 countries)
Step 1
Individualism (H)	.37 [.05, .68] (.022)	.36 [.05, .67] (.022)	.41 [.11, .72] (<.001)
Step 2
Individualism (H)	.08 [–.15, .30] (>.250)	.11 [–.15, .36] (>.250)	.15 [–.09, .40] (.198)
Group-focused enmity	−.75 [–.98, –.53] (<.001)	−.69 [–.92, –.41] (<.001)	−.69 [–.92, –.43] (<.001)
Indirect effect:	.29 [.12, .44]	.26 [.11, .39]	.26 [.11, .40]
Ratio of indirect to total effect	.79 [.49, 2.26]	.71 [.39, 2.51]	.63 [.35, 1.49]
Step 3
Individualism (H)	−.03 [–.26, .21] (>.250)	−.06 [–.27, .15] (>.250)	.04 [–.19, .27] (>.250)
Group-focused enmity	−.64 [.41, .88] (<.001)	−.47 [.26, .69] (<.001)	−.54 [.29, .78] (<.001)
logGDP per capita	.27 [.01, .52] (.039)	.43 [.20, .67] (<.001)	.30 [.04, .56] (.026)
Global Peace Index	−.09 [–.35, .17] (>.250)	−.18 [–.42, .05] (.123)	−.13 [–.40, .13] (>.250)
Model 3 (n = 39 countries)
Step 1
Individualism (D)	.52 [.24, .80] (<.001)	.57 [.29, .84] (<.001)	.57 [.30, .84] (<.001)
Step 2
Individualism (D)	.07 [–.27, .41] (>.250)	.18 [–.16, .52] (>.250)	.10 [–.22, .42] (>.250)
Ingroup favoritism	−.64 [–.98, –.30] (<.001)	−.54 [–.89, –.20] (.003)	−.66 [–.98, –34] (<.001)
Indirect effect:	.45 [.22, .70]	.38 [.16, .65]	.47 [.25, .71]
Ratio of indirect to total effect	.86 [.41, .1.55]	.68 [.28, 1.23]	.82 [.42, 1.38]
Step 3
Individualism (D)	−.02 [–.39, .36] (>.250)	−.03 [–.35, .28] (>.250)	.01 [–.33, .34] (>.250)
Ingroup favoritism	−.55 [–.91, –.19] (.004)	−.33 [–.64, –.02] (.035)	−.57 [–.90, –.23] (.002)
logGDP per capita	.18 [–.24, .60] (>.250)	.44 [.08, .79] (.019)	.19 [–.20, .58] (>.250)
Global Peace Index	−.07 [–.42, .27] (>.250)	−.17 [–.47, .12] (.240)	−.08 [–.41, .24] (>.250)
Model 4 (n = 20 countries)
Step 1
Individualism (D)	.47 [.04, .89] (.033)	.46 [.03, .88] (.038)	.55 [.15, .95] (.009)
Step 2
Individualism (D)	.06 [–.26, .39] (>.250)	.12 [–.27, .51] (>.250)	.21 [–.13, .55] (.214)
Group-focused enmity	−.80 [–1.17, –.48] (<.001)	−.66 [–1.05, –0,27] (.002)	−.68 [–1.02, –.35] (<.001)
Indirect effect:	.40 [.21, .57]	.33 [.20, .49]	.35 [.22, .54]
Ratio of indirect to total effect	.86 [.55, 2.35]	.73 [.39, 2,60]	.62 [.38, 1.66]
Step 3
Individualism (D)	−.10 [–.41. .21] (>.250)	−.20 (–.58, .17) (>.250)	.07 [–.35, .50] (>.250)
Group-focused enmity	.80 [.43, 1.17] (<.001)	.58 (.24, .92) (.002)	.65 [.26, 1.04] (.003)
logGDP per capita	.29 [–.17, .75] (.201)	.58 [.16, 1.01] (.010)	.24 [–.25, .72] (>.250)
Global Peace Index	.08 [–.34, .49] (>.250)	−.04 [–.43, .35] (>.250)	−.02 [–.47, .42] (>.250)

Note. 95% Confidence Intervals are given in square brackets. p Levels are given in round brackets. The ratio of indirect to total effect is a continuous index showing how much variance in Y (dependent variable) is explained directly or indirectly by X (predictor); see Iacobucci, Saldanha, and Deng (2007) recommendation. Step 4 includes two control variables. (H) = data taken from Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010); (D) = data taken from Diener, Gohm, Suh, and Oishi (2000); logGDP = per capita GDP (logarithmic transformation).

For each of the 12 conducted regressions, the same pattern of results was observed: Individualism was a significant predictor of happiness when introduced as a single predictor; however, after adding a measure of ingroup favoritism/group-focused enmity, its predictive role diminished to nonsignificant and apparently small. Among 12 conducted regressions, the applied indicators of prejudice explained between 62% and 86% of the effect of I-C on happiness, with a weighted (by n of countries in each model) average of 75.3%. This clearly supports our hypotheses that the relationship between happiness and individualism weakens when ingroup favoritism and group-focused enmity are added to the model. In terms of mediation analyses, we may conclude that collectivism was related to happiness only indirectly, through ingroup bias or prejudice, but there was no significant direct effect of individualism on happiness in any of the tested models.

The effects described above could result from a covariance of the major variables of our interest with other fundamental predictors of happiness. Therefore, we have decided to run the 12 models controlling for per capita GDP (see section “Method” for rationale for using a logarithmic form) and the Global Peace Index, which was thought to represent incidence of wars and other negative social phenomena associated with group biases, that may also robustly influence national aggregate happiness levels. The results of these analyses are provided in Table 1 (see step 3 in each model). In most of the models, GDP proved to be a robust positive predictor of happiness, however, in each case, the effects of ingroup favoritism and group-focused enmity were still significant and vital. Therefore, our results cannot be explained with poverty of countries characterized by higher levels of collectivism or prejudice. The Global Peace Index, although significantly associated with happiness in zero-order correlations (see Appendix B), did not prove significant in any of the models. Thus, the effects of ingroup bias and outgroup enmity on happiness cannot be simply ascribed to higher incidence of wars and ethnic conflicts that are characteristic for cultures with elevated levels of prejudice (see Appendix B for associations between prejudice indicators and the Global Peace Index).

Discussion

Main Findings

We examined the relationship between I-C and country aggregated happiness level. We found that individualism predicted the level of happiness, yet its role weakened to a marginal and statistically insignificant level when ingroup favoritism or prejudices were controlled for. These findings were consistent across all happiness indicators and data from five different databases. The effects remained significant even after the national income and peace index were controlled. The incidence of wars and conflicts in the previous 10 years did not explain the differences in the level of happiness. It should be noted that the Global Peace Index proved related both to individualism and ingroup bias/group-focused enmity, as well as to indicators of well-being (see Appendix B), however, its effects were no more significant when analyzed jointly with other variables in one regression model (see Table 1, step 4 in each model). The results seem to support our argument presented in the introduction: Incidence of wars and conflicts is a relevant feature of prejudiced (and collectivistic) cultures, and it also remains a vital prerequisite of happiness. At the same time, the effects of group bias on well-being seem to be broader and not reducible to those peace-related features, presumably because they remain crucial not only for actual measurable features of living in the particular society, but also for experienced emotions of hostility, anger, or anxiety (Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, Vasquez, & Wickens, 2007). Here, we discuss the results from two perspectives. First of all, in countries where people experience economic or political hardship severe enough to pose an existential threat, having good relationships with ingroup members can be the best way to ensure financial and personal security (Van de Vliert, 2011). Having strong, interpersonal bonds with the people in their social network means that members of collectivist cultures have access to support and help in times of distress. However, collectivist cultures set in motion processes that lead to closed-mindedness, ingroup commitment, and mistrust of others (Richter & Kruglanski, 2004), and, hence, members of such cultures become more reserved and prejudiced against outgroup members. This account of intergroup relationships is closely related to an evolutionary explanation: When living conditions are unpredictable and dangerous, forming groups and maintaining stable social bonds might be the best way of increasing one’s chances of survival. At the same time, trusting outgroup members may be a risky strategy because one cannot predict the outcomes of interactions with them (Buss, 2001; Triandis & Suh, 2002). The emergence of collectivist culture and an associated ingroup bias may be due to external adversity. This account of collectivism is also consistent with empirical evidence that in poor countries, individualism is negatively associated with happiness whereas in wealthy countries, it is positively associated with happiness (Veenhoven, 1999). Yet, the question of whether collectivism itself influences societal resilience to economic or social crises remains. Perhaps when life conditions are tough, it is not the I-C dimension that is critical to national well-being, but rather—as some scholars have claimed—the social fabric in the form of social support, a high degree of trust, and high-quality societal institutions (Helliwell et al., 2016). This issue requires further investigation.

However, an alternative explanation of our findings also seems plausible. Collectivist cultures make group categories salient, and this categorization process is known to cause discrimination and prejudice (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, collectivism enhances ingroup preference and ethnocentrism and leads ultimately to prejudice and discrimination (Triandis, 1995). Negative intergroup attitudes increase the risk of conflicts and collective violence, which are much more visible in the collectivist societies of the global South and East (Bilewicz, 2012; Hewstone et al., 2002; Zick et al., 2008). Ultimately, this process reduces quality of life and well-being in collectivist societies—it is not their collectivism that is crucial, but the intergroup conflicts, wars, and other acts of violence that arise as a result of the stronger, more salient, ingroup biases of collectivist societies. At the same time, it is not only the war and conflicts that deteriorate well-being in collectivist societies. Although it is well-established that wars are more likely in collectivist societies (Basabe & Valencia, 2007), the Global Peace Index used in our analysis did not explain the effects of collectivism on happiness as much as ingroup bias did. Group-favoring processes could not be reduced to mere occurrence of violence as they include also acts of subtle discrimination, group oppression, and prejudice. Therefore, the group-based aspects of collectivism may have a detrimental effect on happiness because they reduce social capital and trust, which are strong predictors of SWB (Bjørnskov, 2008; Growiec & Growiec, 2014; Jasielska, 2018; Kuroki, 2011; Tov & Diener, 2008). Other features of collectivism (such as stable interpersonal bonds) may have neutral or even positive consequences for national happiness.

We did not analyze other features of collectivism in this study, and they warrant further research especially as collectivism appears to be a very complex dimension. First of all, aside from ingroup bias, positive qualities of harmonious relationships with close others should be taken into consideration, to check whether people in collectivist cultures derive more happiness from interpersonal bonds than members of individualist countries. What is more, such regions as Asia, Latin America, and Africa substantially differ in terms of living conditions and culture so it seems natural that collectivism in each region also may have a different form and may have a different role in different contexts. For example, using violence in the defense of an insulted family member may be perceived as an adequate reaction in Venezuela and a blameworthy behavior in South Korea. What is more, in African and Latin American cultures, the I-C dimension is understudied, which limits the ability to make reliable generalizations about the differences and similarities of cultures (Oyserman et al., 2002). The distinctions of collectivistic cultures into cultures of honor (Latin American) and cultures of face (Asian; Leung & Cohen, 2011) or relational collectivism versus group collectivism (Brewer and Chen, 2007) may provide some help in clearing ambiguities, but certainly further studies are required to obtain a clear picture of diversified collectivism. Finally, we did not assess the underlying factors behind strong group identities that obviously could affect both prejudice and, ultimately, happiness such as sense of uncertainty (Fischer & Derham 2016; Hogg, 2000) or long histories of conflict creating a “cycle of violence” (Littman & Paluck, 2015). It would be highly desirable considering that collectivist Latin American countries are among the happiest nations in the world (Helliwell et al., 2016). In collectivist cultures, people tend to derive happiness from fitting into their environment and culture and having good relationships rather than from autonomy and independence (Matsumoto et al., 1999). Several studies indicate that people can be even happier in collectivist cultures than in individualist cultures as long as they internalize their culture’s values (Rego & Cunha, 2009; Ryan & Deci, 2000).

Thus, it seems that collectivism per se does not diminish national happiness; rather, there are specific features of collectivist cultures, such as ingroup favoritism and prejudice, that affect people’s well-being. They do not have to be a core part of all collectivist cultures, however. As Tajfel et al. (1971) stressed, ingroup bias should be considered in the specific macro social and cultural contexts. Hence, collectivist societies that are able to address the problem of conflicts arising from group-based categorizations might be able to offer their citizens a similar level of happiness to that enjoyed by members of individualist societies. If prejudice is not an inevitable consequence of collectivism, then high societal well-being need not be limited to individualist societies. We believe that psychology should explore the relationship between collectivism and prejudice and clarify the factors and processes involved as this would enhance understanding of the connection between happiness and the I-C dimension, which does not seem to be so evident.

Limitations and Future Directions

Our conclusions are limited by the cross-sectional nature of the study. We did, however, use three different indicators of happiness, two indicators of I-C, and two independent indicators of ingroup bias. We controlled the national income and incidence of wars and conflicts in the last 10 years. Our data were derived from five international databases. Thus, robustness of the effects and their consistency across the different databases suggest that we may have identified some particularly powerful processes. Of course, replication of our main finding using hierarchical linear regression, with both individual- and country-level predictors, would be valuable; however, this kind of analysis would require a gigantic, cross-national database with individual-level data on all the variables included in the analysis. We are not aware of any dataset that meets these conditions.

In this study, we applied a country-level design, which has several implications. First of all, it is important to note that individual-level constructs (such as ingroup bias) should not be directly used to make inferences about national-level differences (by stating that people living in country X are characterized by a certain level of ingroup bias and, thus, they behave in a particular way, which in turn results in particular outcomes). Instead, the results and their size should be interpreted under the notion that they are affected by the population of the particular nation. In a country where the predominant population exhibits ingroup bias, inhabitants are more often exposed to its consequences (such as discrimination or shared negative emotions toward outgroups) in various social and interpersonal situations. As a result, they are more likely to experience lower level of happiness, which in turn affects the aggregated, national level of happiness. This dynamical social mechanism can lead to synergic effects that may powerfully influence each and every final outcome. For example, if the majority of people tend to favor their ingroups, it may affect various aspects of social life such as cooperation and communication. The country-level design allows for obtaining powerful effects, yet the results should always be interpreted with caution.

Another important issue typical for a vast majority of country-level analyses is in regard to the causal characteristics of the provided interpretation. Like most studies in the field of happiness, we treated happiness as the final outcome in a chain of causes and effects; however, several longitudinal studies have shown that, in some cases, contrary to common beliefs and expectations, happiness may be the cause rather than the result of some of the relationships observed (e.g., Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001; Marks & Fleming, 1999). This implies that it is possible that national happiness influences other country-level variables, including ingroup biases and/or the I-C level. Longitudinal research on the variables analyzed in this study is clearly desirable, but in the case of many countries, longitudinal data are not available for most of the variables we investigated (the exceptions are the happiness variables; see Veenhoven, 2013).

Some of the 12 presented models, particularly those including both Diener’s indicator of I-C and group-focused enmity, were tested on very small samples of countries. Such sample sizes, oscillating around N = 20, would be inacceptable if presented separately from the remaining models. However, in the present consideration, results obtained for these models are fully supported by the remaining ones, based on sufficiently large samples of countries, and, thus, we decided to present them to show that the effects are (a) stable across all possible combination of indicators, and (b) powerful enough to be observed in particularly small samples.

While performing analyses on the present data, we came across some effects that may uncover a bit more complex nature of the major result presented in this article. One that seems to be worth mentioning here is a moderated mediation effect, where ingroup bias proved to be not only a mediator but also, at the same time, acted as a moderator of the association between I-C and well-being. The result, though certainly intriguing, was much less robust than our main finding, and observable only for group-focused enmity, but not for ingroup favoritism. Furthermore, the moderation seemed hardly predictable from hitherto theories and research, and its interpretation would be definitely data-driven. Therefore, we decided to not include it in the present article. However, future analyses could further explore this effect, seeking for potential mechanisms responsible for this interesting result.

Finally, it should be noted that some authors have criticized Hofstede’s database, in particular, the reliability of the Values Survey Module, and have highlighted oversimplifications in Hofstede’s reasoning, including poor connection between conceptualization and operationalization of the construct, the implicit equation of nation with culture, and ignoring individual variation within each culture (e.g., Baskerville, 2003; McSweeney, 2002; Spector, Cooper, & Sparks, 2001; Taras & Steel, 2009). Scholars criticize the unidimensionality of the Hofstede model, indicating that individualism and collectivism may be orthogonal factors rather than opposite categories, with the latter being more complex than the former (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Oyserman et al., 2002). Applying separate measures to assess each construct, however, also raises some concerns. Several instruments that have been developed receive criticism both on methodological and empirical grounds as they appear to focus on different categories of experience. As Brewer and Chen (2007) point out, individualism measures primarily are about beliefs and cognitive representations, whereas collectivism measures primarily are about values and duties. It would be useful to create a new, larger, more reliable, and more theoretically sound database of country-level estimates of I-C, with other measures of individualism and collectivism, and use it to replicate the findings presented here.

Footnotes

Appendix A

Dataset Used in the Analyses.

Country	Individualism		Ingroup bias		Happiness			Control variables
Country	IDV (H)	IDV (D)	I-GF	G-FE	Avg H	H L Yrs	In Adj H	logGDP	GPI
Albania	20		0.61		4.6	35.2	35	2,523	1.91
Angola	18		0.38		4.3	17.8	26	1,919	2.11
Argentina	46	4.80	0.08	7.28	7.3	54.9	62	3,029	1.86
Australia	90		−1.51	7.60	7.7	62.5	67	3,910	1.43
Austria	55	6.75	−0.54		7.4	58.9	62	3,897	1.27
Bangladesh	20		0.97		5.3	33.3	42	1,437	2.07
Belarus		4.00	0.70	9.62	5.2	35.5	43	2,924	2.15
Belgium	75	7.25	−1.04		7.3	57.7	63	3,835	1.40
Brazil	38	3.90	0.21	7.32	7.5	53.5	61	2,741	2.09
Bulgaria	30	5.00	1.03		4.4	32.0	33	3,072	1.70
Burkina Faso	15		0.95		4.4	22.4	37	633	1.95
Canada	80	8.50	−1.41		7.8	62.5	66	3,874	1.33
Chile	23	4.15	−0.12	7.72	6.7	52.4	54	3,202	1.58
China	20	2.00	0.51	8.81	6.3	45.8	47	2,811	2.14
Colombia	13		0.16	7.84	7.7	55.8	63	2,671	2.69
Costa Rica	15		0.09		8.5	66.7	73	2,842	1.67
Croatia	33		0.63		6.0	45.3	47	3,182	1.65
Czech Rep.	58	7.00	0.01		6.5	49.3	53	3,562	1.38
Denmark	74	7.70	−1.91		8.3	65.0	73	3,904	1.25
Dominican Rep.	30		0.04		7.5	53.7	60	2,831	2.09
Ecuador	8		0.89	9.41	6.4	47.6	53	2,419	2.08
Egypt	25		0.79		5.7	40.0	40	2,564	2.22
El Salvador	19		0.28		6.7	47.6	56	2,190	2.21
Estonia	60	4.00	−1.06	9.10	6.0	42.5	49	3,499	1.71
Ethiopia	20		0.99		4.2	21.8	33	748	2.46
France	71	7.05	−1.00		6.6	53.0	54	3,774	1.77
Germany	67	6.70	−1.19	8.19	7.1	56.3	60	3,916	1.43
Ghana	15		−0.62	9.32	5.2	30.8	41	1,527	1.81
Greece	35		0.18		6.4	50.8	52	3,324	1.94
Guatemala	6		0.94		7.2	50.2		2,101	2.25
Honduras	20		1.53		7.0	48.8	55	1,705	2.31
Hong Kong	25		−0.24	8.69	6.6	54.3	56	4,111
Hungary	80	6.00	0.19		5.5	39.8	42	3,364	1.50
Iceland	60	7.00	−0.73		8.2	66.4	71	3,954	1.16
India	48	4.40	0.34	10.44	5.5	35.1	45	1,970	2.54
Indonesia	14		0.62		6.3	43.8	51	2,516	1.87
Iran	41		1.17		5.9	41.3	45	2,997	2.35
Iraq	30			10.56	4.7	31.1	36	2,833	3.38
Ireland	70	6.00	−0.49		7.6	59.6	65	4,285	1.37
Israel	54		−0.69		7.0	55.9	56	3,590	2.83
Italy	76	6.80	0.00		6.7	53.8	57	3,637	1.70
Jamaica	39		−0.41		6.7	48.4		2,221	2.16
Japan	46	4.30	−0.92		6.5	53.5	54	3,753	1.31
Jordan	30		0.89	10.10	5.9	42.5	45	2,525	1.93
Kenya	25		0.13		3.7	19.1	30	1,252	2.35
Kuwait	25		0.78		6.6	51.0		4,244	1.73
Latvia	70	4.00	−0.03		5.4	38.6	43	3,307	1.74
Lebanon	40		0.37	10.00	4.7	33.7	36	2,970	2.63
Lithuania	60	4.00	0.43		5.5	40.0	44	3,464	1.73
Luxembourg	60		−1.25		7.7	60.1	64	4,693
Malawi	30		−0.41		6.2	28.7		159	1.85
Malaysia	26		−0.25	10.21	6.5	48.2	56	3,363	1.57
Malta	59		0.81		7.1	56.2	58	3,750
Mexico	30	4.00	0.52	8.01	7.9	59.7	64	2,969	2.39
Morocco	46		1.43	9.53	5.4	37.9	43	2,153	1.92
Mozambique	15		0.88		3.8	16.4	34	236	1.87
Nepal	30		0.63		5.3	33.0	48	990	2.02
Netherlands	80	8.50	−1.94	7.62	7.6	59.9	68	3,981	1.55
New Zealand	79		−1.78	7.49	7.5	59.5	63	3,651	1.23
Nigeria	30	3.00	0.26	9.39	5.7	26.3	46	1,780	2.75
Norway	69	6.95	−1.65		7.9	62.8	68	4,257	1.39
Pakistan	14		−0.32	9.10	5.0	32.5	38	1,678	3.02
Panama	11		0.35		7.8	58.3	65	3,189	1.85
Peru	16		0.05	8.29	6.2	44.1	49	2,591	2.08
Philippines	32		0.69	9.07	5.9	41.8	45	2,108	2.47
Poland	60	5.00	0.54	7.89	6.4	48.0	51	3,376	1.56
Portugal	27	7.05	−0.02		5.7	44.4	47	3,410	1.40
Romania	30	5.00	0.18	8.95	5.7	41.0	44	3,178	1.63
Russia	39	6.00	0.50	9.11	5.5	36.1	43	3,328	3.00
South Africa	65	5.75	−0.53	8.62	5.8	29.6	43	2,595	2.31
South Korea	18	2.40	0.35	10.62	6.0	46.9	50	3,673	1.77
Saudi Arabia	25		−0.09		6.5	47.0	53	4,012	2.21
Senegal	25		0.61		4.5	27.9	41	985	1.97
Serbia	25		1.00		5.4		41	2,719	1.92
Sierra Leone	20		0.38		3.5	14.8	27	583	1.86
Singapore	20		−0.04	8.59	6.9	54.6	60	4,506	1.52
Slovakia	52	7.00	0.28		5.9	43.9	46	3,493	1.55
Slovenia	27	5.00	0.21	8.05	6.9	53.2	56	3,528	1.37
Spain	51	5.55	−0.34	7.37	7.2	58.4	62	3,642	1.57
Sri Lanka	35		0.13		5.1	36.2	42	2,565
Sweden	71	7.55	−2.32	7.24	7.8	62.9	68	3,937	1.37
Switzerland	68	7.90	−1.17		8.0	65.2	71	4,117	1.33
Syria	35		0.48		5.9	41.3	50		2.98
Taiwan	17		0.20	8.56	6.2	47.4	50	3,909	1.65
Tanzania	25		−0.22		2.8	14.4	16	1,189	1.86
Thailand	20		0.36	9.63	6.6	45.8	57	2,878	2.33
Trinidad & Tobago	16		−0.30	7.81	7.0	48.5	55	3,439	2.07
Turkey	37	3.85	0.29	10.59	5.6	39.7	42	3,275	2.48
United Arab Emirates	25		−0.52		7.3	57.2		4,223	1.75
United Kingdom	89	8.95	−1.39		7.2	56.5	60	3,776	1.72
Uruguay	36		0.58	7.25	6.7	51.0	56	3,111	1.61
United States	91	9.55	−1.51	7.76	7.4	57.9	64	4,086	2.12
Venezuela	12		0.28		7.5	55.1	57	2,517	2.42
Vietnam	20		0.47		6.1	45	52	1,928	1.77
Zambia	35		0.81		5	20.1	37	1,386	1.76

Note. IDV (H) = Individualism-Collectivism taken from Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede et al. (2010); IDV (D) = Individualism-Collectivism taken from Diener et al. (2000); I-GF = Ingroup Favoritism; G-FE = Group-Focused Enmity; Avg H = Average Happiness; H L Yrs = Happy Life Years; In Adj H = Inequality Adjusted Happiness; logGDP = per capita GDP (logarithmic transformation); GPI = Global Peace Index.

Appendix B

Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson’s Correlation Matrix Between Variables Included in the Present Analyses.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1. Individualism (H)	—
2. Individualism (D)	.76[.54, .97]	—
3. Ingroup Favoritism	−.66[–.81, –.51]	−.71[–.94, –.47]	—
4. Group-focused Enmity	−.36^a [–.67, –.05]	−.51^b [–.92, –.09]	.51[.27, .75]	—
5. Average Happiness	.39[.20, .58]	.53[.26, .81]	−.46[–.61, –.31]	−.63[–.85, –.42]	—
6. Happy Life Years	.44[.26, .63]	.57[.31, .83]	−.51[–.64, –.37]	−.57[–.80, –.34]	.96[.91, 1.01]	—
7. Ineq. Adj. Happiness	.45[.27, .64]	.58[.31, .84]	−.51[–.65, –.36]	−.61[–.83, –.38]	.98[.94, 1.01]	.95[.90, 1.00]	—
8. GDP per capita	.55[.38, .71]	.66[.46, .91]	−.49[–.70, –.41]	−.30^c [–.56, –.04]	.74[.63, .86]	.83[.74, .93]	.72[.60, .84]	—
9. Global Peace Index	−.43[–.62, –.24]	−.45[–.74, –.17]	.44[.30, .59]	.49[.25, .73]	−.44[–.59, –.29]	−.51[–.66, –.37]	−.47[–.63, –.31]	−.52[–.66, –.39]

Note. 95% Confidence Intervals are given in square brackets. All correlations are significant at p < .001 except for those marked with superscripts, for which p values are as follows: a = .023, b = .019, c = .027. N of observations used for the calculations varies between 21 and 155 depending on the availability of data for particular countries in each of the included databases. Ineq. Adj. = inequality adjusted.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Support for this work was provided by The Maria Grzegorzewska Pedagogical University research funds BSTP 41/16-I

ORCID iD

Dorota Jasielska

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