Motivation to Teach in the Current Climate: An Examination of Three School Districts in Transition

Abstract

This study employed survey research methods to collect data from teachers from a district with long-term, high conflict between teachers and the school board and teachers from two districts with short-term, medium conflict between teachers and the school boards. Teachers in highly politicized school districts had quite different perceptions of teaching than those in more stable contexts. Differences included diminished perception of the value of teaching as a job, questioning the impact they could have on social inequities and disadvantages, and less support received from family and friends about their teaching career, among several others.

Keywords

inservice teachers FIT-Choice scale teacher motivation conflict with board

There are approximately 3.6 million public school K-12 teachers in the United States working in more than 90,000 public schools (National Center for Education Statistics, 2016). Over the last two centuries, teachers’ roles and responsibilities in American society have ebbed and flowed from rudimentary baby-sitters, to “guardians of American morality,” cultural reformers, social workers, career and vocational trainers, “warriors,” to protectors of the global economy (Bailyn, 1960; Kaestle, 1983; Mann, 1841; Nash, 2005; Spring, 2016). As the positions of teachers evolved, so too did the professionalization of the profession, especially regarding social status, gender roles, compensation, certification and education requirements, and collective goals of the professorate (Darling-Hammond, 2010, 2013; Ingersoll, 2007; Spring, 2016). Currently, American teachers are charged with the daunting task of preparing the next generation of students to restore the economy of the United States to compete in the 21st century global market, while typically working long hours with little monetary compensation, low social status, and limited autonomy (Ingersoll, 2007; National Research Council, 2010; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2005). Given the extremely high risk and responsibility of taking on this challenge, but unknown level of potential of reward or compensation, the critical question arises: Why teach?

Despite this negative social stigma, many people still are motivated to become and remain teachers because they want to make a difference in students’ lives, give back to society, improve social inequities, and help shape the next generation (Balyer & Özcan, 2014; Fokkens-Bruinsma & Canrinus, 2012; Krečič & Grmek, 2005; Kyriacou & Coulthard, 2000; Manuel & Hughes, 2006; Richardson, Karabenick, & Watt, 2014; Spring, 2016; Yu & Bieger, 2013). Overall, working with children and adolescents is viewed across the educational landscape as perhaps the greatest motivational factor for entering the teaching profession (Balyer & Özcan, 2014; Krečič & Grmek, 2005; Salyer, 2003; Yong, 1995). Unfortunately, the current political and social climate is extremely volatile and has made it difficult for teachers to reach their goals of helping students reach their highest potential (Kumashiro, 2012; National Research Council, 2010; Ravitch, 2010; Spring, 2016; Strauss, 2014; Tienken & Zhao, 2013). Because the state of American education affects so many facets of American society, the stakes are incredibly high for the future of the nation: “The conviction is widely shared that the economic health of a nation depends on the quality of its education system, which in turn depends directly on how teachers are selected, prepared, supported, and evaluated” (National Research Council, 2010, pp. 185-186). As such, there has been a dramatic increase in educational reform by the federal government, private businessmen, and entrepreneurs in public education (Kumashiro, 2012; Ravitch, 2010; Strauss, 2014; Tienken & Zhao, 2013). This complex dilemma encompasses the difficult task of deciding the standards regarding what should be taught, the curricula, how that content should be taught, the pedagogy, as well as to what extent both the students and teachers will be evaluated for meeting those standards. Compounding this challenge is the ever-changing role of who is in a position of power and influence to make such decisions.

Currently, many people who possess power in society and education (e.g., White males, administrators, and politicians) may not necessarily value teachers’ work, contributions, and insights (Apple, 2013; Counts, 2013; Strauss, 2014; Wood, 2007) or others who are considered to have less “cultural capital as it relates to education” (Winkle-Wagner, 2010, p. 29). As Wood (2007) notes, there is a pressing need to

elevate the value of teacher experience and knowledge, particularly given the hubris of some educational researchers and policy-makers and the gendered nature of the teaching profession in a larger society that dismisses women’s experiences and the knowledge borne of it. (p. 729)

Unfortunately, the negative 19th century persona that teaching “was something any competently educated person could do” (Kaestle, 1983, p. 156) has still lingered in the minds of many Americans, and overall, the vocation of teaching is not held as one of high prestige. As a result, teachers have had little power and input into what occurs in education or have had the ability to influence their own practice (Apple, 2013; Counts, 2013; Strauss, 2014). The devaluing of the teaching profession has only worsened teachers’ confidence, motivation, and resilience, and subsequently, the ability to retain high-quality teachers (Darling-Hammond, 2010, 2013; Ingersoll, 2007; Strauss, 2014). Currently, the American education system is a US$500 to US$600 billion enterprise (Kumashiro, 2012), and the influence of so many stakeholders who are far-removed from the realities of the classroom has far-reaching effects. More often than not, these venture philanthropists and private stakeholders have often supported business-model “reform strategies that mirrored their own experience in acquiring huge fortunes, such as competition, choice, deregulation, incentives, and other market-based approaches” (Ravitch, 2010, p. 200). Furthermore, the creation of value-added modeling (VAM) scores and performance pay only hold teachers more accountable to the success, or lack thereof, of students (Imig, Wiseman, & Imig, 2011).

It is no secret that standardized testing has been a controversial topic in American education for decades (Ayers, 1993; Kennedy, 2008; Ravitch, 2010; Strauss, 2014; Styron & Styron, 2012). Although having a central or core value system is not necessarily a negative idea, maintaining an absolute “one-size-fits-all” mentality in education is problematic (Strauss, 2014). Many educators and researchers question the reliability and validity of these high-stakes tests, but “unfortunately, most elected officials do not realize this, nor does the general public” (Ravitch, 2010, p. 152). Furthermore, students who score poorly on high-stakes tests jeopardize not only their own success but also their teachers’ and school districts. In some schools, teacher motivation and morale are so low that many teachers do not want to take on the challenges of working with struggling students and/or schools which are considered “low-performing” (Ravitch, 2010; Strauss, 2014). Moreover, schools that consistently perform poorly by state and federal rankings are often under the threat of being shut down, which creates extremely stressful working environments for both students and teachers (Tienken & Zhao, 2013; Trujillo, 2013). Consequently, many communities and grassroots organizations have united to strengthen their schools, support their teachers, and provide the best educational experience for the next generation (Zeichner, 2003). As many researchers have posited, “the social motivation support of peers, parents, and others is an especially important feature that helps people persist in the face of difficulties” (Bransford, Derry, Berliner, Hammerness, & Beckett, 2005, p. 61).

Regrettably, this united front has not occurred in all areas of the country, and some communities are torn apart by conflicting interests. As Ingersoll (2007) notes, “in the past few years, the standards of the teaching profession have been the subject of increasing scrutiny by the government and the community” (p. 32). More specifically, when community members in power, such as local politicians, superintendents, and school board members are more influenced by venture philanthropists, state and federal politicians, and other external stakeholders, the needs of their own community, teachers, and students are often ignored (Kumashiro, 2012; Ravitch, 2010; Spring, 2016; Strauss, 2014; Tienken & Zhao, 2013). As Schirmer and Apple (2016) state, “those of us who believe in the value of democratic institutions must have an acute awareness of the vulnerability of things that we too often take for granted—such as local democratic control through school board races” (p. 150). This disregard can create a climate that is extremely hostile and demoralizing, especially for teachers, causing low morale and motivation (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004; Tienken & Zhao, 2013). Trujillo (2013) studied one such school district in California and reported, “high-stakes testing appeared to create not just school- and district-level pressures to produce results, but also individual-level pressures when board members interpreted test scores as singular indications of employees’ worth” (p. 347). Sadly, more and more teachers have lived in a constant climate of fear, depression, anxiety, and suspicion of losing their livelihood (Ravitch, 2010; Trujillo, 2013). In some extreme cases, this pressure has resulted in cheating scandals in schools and school districts across the nation, as evidenced by the highly politicized cases in Atlanta, Georgia, Washington, DC, and El Paso, Texas. Teachers and school staff were pressured by upper administration and district members to manipulate students’ grades and testing conditions, on standardized tests to ensure the schools made “Adequate Yearly Progress” and/or meet other state and federal requirements (Ravitch, 2010; Spring, 2016; Strauss, 2014; Tienken & Zhao, 2013; Trujillo, 2013). When teachers are stripped of their autonomy and are “regarded as little more than hired help” (Herbst, 1989, p. 3), yet their livelihood is contingent upon high-stakes testing, not only are they limited in their capacity to meet students’ needs but they also tend to lose their inspiration that they can actually make a difference in students’ lives: “Policy perversions, such as cheating, not only deprive struggling students of the extra help they need, but also damage the morale, reputation, and professional working conditions of their teachers” (Tienken & Zhao, 2013, p. 113). As the stakes continue to rise, and the pressure continues to build, teachers are being forced to produce “results” that sometimes resemble a hollow shell of what they hoped and wished for their students and for their own success as a teacher.

The combination of all these factors suggests many people might not feel motivated to choose teaching as a career because teaching may not be an attractive, rewarding, or sustainable career, as evidenced by the steady decline of people majoring in education (NCES, 2000, 2014). Moreover, even when teachers enter the field, they may become discouraged and lose sight of their original motivations for becoming a teacher, as evidenced by the increase in attrition and decrease in retention. These issues have all come to a head creating a continuous problem with the recruitment, education, preparation, and retention of motivated, committed, high-quality teachers in the United States (Darling-Hammond, 2010; Darling-Hammond, Wei, & Johnson, 2009; Ingersoll, 2007; Krasnoff, 2015; Sinclair, 2008; Zeichner, 2003). Now more than ever, it is necessary for those “who are committed to a critically democratic education for all of our children [to increase the support and be] respectful of the teachers who now labor so hard in uncertain conditions in our public schools” (Schirmer & Apple, 2016, p. 151). There is a pressing need to “advance our understanding of what motivates and sustains healthy, committed, and effective teachers” (Richardson, Karabenick, & Watt, 2014, p. xiv), as well as offer a better understanding of teacher quality and career development.

The purpose of this study was to investigate P-12 teachers’ motivation to teach in a climate where there is significant conflict with school boards. Currently, three school districts in this state have had new members join who have radically new ideas and beliefs about how the school district should conduct business. Having a climate with high conflict may impact the teachers’ motivation to teach (Alsbury, 2008a). The research question for this study was as follows:

Research Question: Is there a difference in motivation for teachers in conflict situations (both short-term and long-term) compared with other inservice teachers (as measured in Leech & Haug, 2015b)?

Context for Current Study

One example of this influence was in the fall of 2009. This time marked the beginning of a significant shift in several school districts in a western state in the United States. Whereas school board elections had previously been nonpartisan and candidates did not actively promote political affiliations, one suburban school district saw candidates elected that were decidedly and vocally partisan. To protect the teachers in the school district, this section is written to protect the identity of the school districts in this study. Platform issues of the elected candidates in the affluent district included development of a school voucher program, increased support of charter schools, and anti-union planning. The election of these candidates was supported by money from sources outside of the community, and, interestingly, outside of the state; groups with ties to the GOP and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) poured money into electing school board candidates who furthered their organizational platforms: As Kumashiro (2012) suggests, “the conservative movement has emerged as an interconnected web of organizations with aligned missions and coordinated strategies, often facilitated by shared board members” (p. 13). Historically, the election of school board candidates has been the purview of local politics and community donors. However, the elections of fall 2009 changed school board elections from that point forward for this district as well as others in the state. Subsequent school board elections in other school districts in the state have seen the election of self-proclaimed “reform” candidates whose campaigns are financed almost wholly from outside of the state (Kumashiro, 2012; Lachman, 2014; Marcus, 2013; Ravitch, 2013; Redding, 2009; Roberts, 2009; Simon, 2010; Torres, 2013).

In fall 2013, in addition to the regular cycle of school board elections, there was a statewide ballot issue which called for significant revamping of school finance and included a tax increase. Slates of reform candidates, once again backed by political organizations and donors primarily from locations outside of the state, were able to position themselves as anti-tax candidates, which broadened their appeal among critical blocks of voters. In particular, senior citizens and voters without school-aged children appreciated the reform candidates’ stance against the amendment and against increased taxes to support schools. As Moe (2005) posits, legislators are able to adopt a control system in “such a way as to embed its own interests in the organization of the government, ‘stacking the deck’ to ensure an enduring flow of benefits for its own constituencies” (p. 3). The amendment was resoundingly defeated, and in several school board elections, anti-amendment reform candidates were handily elected. School board elections in fall 2013 resulted in two additional large front-range school districts having reform-majority boards who espoused the catch-all idea of “school choice.” These changes in school board majority membership (now in three large districts in the state) meant that in school year 2014-2015, approximately 170,000 students and 10,000 teachers attended school or worked in districts with reform-majority boards. This represents about 20% of total students and 18% of total teachers in the state. In addition, reform candidates made inroads in several other school districts, and began working immediately toward positioning their interests in anticipation of school board elections in 2014 and 2015.

While the casual observer might not see a local school board election as a seminal event in the larger landscape of American education, the implications of these particular elections have been striking in their impact upon communities, school districts, and educational professionals:

There is a strong tendency to overlook social, political, and cultural factors that have helped to create the situation—and that also serve to create both possibilities for and limitations on what schools and teachers can do at any particular time. Without such a perspective, teachers, who have been struggling to meet previously defined needs, are often blamed for inadequately addressing a newly defined one. (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004, p. 10)

Community members, while initially slow to understand the broader implications of school board election results, have become active and vocal advocates supporting their beliefs about schools. School board meetings in reform-majority board districts are frequently standing room only events in which district security guards and/or police have been called upon to escort audience members from the room when debate has become overly heated. In one district, the opportunity for public comment, a fundamental facet of school board meetings, was curtailed through policy change proposed and voted upon by the board that was facing increased scrutiny and vocal opposition. The limiting of public comment was viewed by many, including one member of that same board, as being an infringement upon first amendment rights as well as the dereliction of the responsibility of locally elected officials (Reuter, 2014). Even with concerns with regard to rights to free speech, the board moved forward with a majority voting for the restriction of public comment. One school board has been frequently accused of violating the state’s Sunshine Law, which requires meetings of publicly elected officials to be held in public, with very few exceptions to allow for closed meetings (i.e., an executive session). As a result of these among other actions by school boards, people have become increasingly concerned and committed to informing their communities about their local school boards through neighborhood house parties, canvassing, social media outreach, and other methods of grassroots organizing.

As systems, school districts in which reform boards have been elected have seen increased turnover in cabinet and central level leadership, as well as in school-based administrator and teacher positions. In two of the three districts, new superintendents have been hired, as have numerous central leaders. The hiring of new leaders has been necessitated by the exodus of leaders from these reform districts. Teachers in districts with reform-majority boards have also been dramatically impacted by changes in board direction and policy. Board members who identify themselves as reform have very publicly criticized and denigrated union (i.e., the American Federation of Teachers [AFT]) and association (i.e., the National Association of Educators—National Education Association [NEA]) members, calling them union thugs and accusing them of protecting so-called bad teachers. Increasingly, teachers have found that the very boards of education for whom they work vocally criticize them and their efforts in the classroom.

While school board elections have had a striking impact on school districts, legislation directed toward school-based educators has further altered the state’s educational landscape. In particular, legislation regarding what has become known as Educator Effectiveness significantly changed statutory requirements with regard to teacher and principal evaluation, nonprobationary status (i.e., tenure), and mutual consent.

Educator Effectiveness requires that teacher and principal evaluations be based upon statewide “Quality Standards” that define specific criteria an educator must meet to be evaluated at a particular level of performance (Colorado Department of Education, 2016a). Although many districts have adopted the State Department of Education created evaluation tools and systems (Colorado Department of Education, 2016b), several other large districts have sought and received approval to use evaluation tools and systems of their own creation. The change in evaluation tools and differences in district-based systems has not only led to confusion on the part of teachers and principals, but also suspicion that evaluations will be used to dismiss teachers who do not agree with district and school board direction.

The most controversial elements of Educator Effectiveness, and the ones possibly most troubling to teachers in this state, are changes to nonprobationary status and mutual consent (Colorado Department of Education, 2016c). Standard practice in school districts statewide had been that after 3 years of successful evaluations, teachers earn nonprobationary status. This has not changed under Educator Effectiveness (Colorado Department of Education, 2016c). What has changed is that teachers can move between nonprobationary and probationary status over the course of their career, depending on their evaluation rating. Under the new system, if a teacher has two consecutive years of less than effective evaluations, they lose their nonprobationary status and are considered probationary, and therefore lose significant job protections (Colorado Department of Education, 2016c). In practice, a 20-year veteran could lose nonprobationary status after 2 years of less than effective ratings, and then be nonrenewed. While very few people would argue that an ineffective teacher should be working with students, there is concern that exists in the teaching community that poorly trained or unethical evaluators might use this system as a tool to “get rid” of teachers for reasons other than their actual classroom performance—personality conflicts, political agendas, or even retaliation. While Educator Effectiveness requires an appeals process be afforded to teachers receiving a second less-than-effective rating, again, many within the teaching community feel this is an inadequate remedy to address potential abuses of the evaluation process and established due process protections (Asmar, 2014; Engdahl, 2015; Masters v. School District No. 1, 2015; Meyer, 2010).

The provision of Educator Effectiveness referred to as “mutual consent” is also highly controversial among teachers. The broad underpinning of mutual consent as written in Educator Effectiveness is

A teacher may be assigned to a particular school only with the consent of the hiring principal and with the input of at least two teachers employed at the school and chosen by the faculty of teachers at the school. (Colorado Department of Education, 2016c)

If a nonprobationary teacher is in a position at one school and that position is eliminated, the teacher must then secure a position at another school based upon mutual consent rather than through direct placement, which was the historic practice (Colorado Department of Education, 2016c). The law also states that if a teacher does not find a position through mutual consent after two hiring cycles or 12 months (whichever is longer) then the teacher is placed on unpaid leave by the school district (Colorado Department of Education, 2016c). In one large school district, a class-action lawsuit has been filed against the school district by some teachers on the grounds that due process protections have been violated in that district. Teachers who are part of the class action were not able to find mutual consent positions and have been placed on indefinite unpaid leave (Asmar, 2014; Engdahl, 2015; Masters v. School District No. 1, 2015).

In recent years, the emphasis on standardized testing, high-stakes school improvement planning, and continued school finance funding shortfalls has led to widespread unease among educators (Long, 2014; Sawchuck, 2014; Shavelson et al., 2010; Westervelt, 2015). The changes to teaching and education via Educator Effectiveness and the politicization of school board elections by what many view as special interest groups has led to further apprehension within public school teaching and in administrative ranks throughout the state.

Theoretical Framework

The Factors Influencing Teaching Choice (FIT-Choice) scale was developed by Watt and Richardson (2007; Richardson & Watt, 2006) to understand motivation to go into the field of teaching. The scale is based on the expectancy-value motivational theory (Eccles, 2005; Eccles et al., 1983; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000) and has been found to predict motivations in regard to high initial career satisfaction, including altruistic-type motivations, the intrinsic value of teaching, and self-perceptions of teaching ability (Watt & Richardson, 2007). Using both exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with two cohorts of students in Australia, Watt and Richardson (2007) found factorial validity of the scale, identifying 17 factors with all but one fitting the hypothesized theory. Cronbach’s alpha for the factors ranged from .62 to .92.

The FIT-Choice survey has traditionally been used to research preservice teachers in multiple counties: China and the United States (Lin, Shi, Wang, Zhang, & Hui, 2012); Australia (Watt & Richardson, 2007); Norway, Germany, Australia, and the United States (Watt et al., 2012); Switzerland (Berger & D’Ascoli, 2012); and the Netherlands (Fokkens-Bruinsma & Canrinus, 2012). Yet, there has been little research conducted on the validity of the data from the FIT-Choice survey with inservice teachers in the United States. One study, Leech and Haug (2015b), investigated the validity of the FIT-Choice survey with inservice teachers in one state and found that the questions fit the factors differently than previous studies with preservice teachers. This finding led the authors to believe that the inservice teachers and preservice teachers were from different populations and viewed their motivation to teach in different ways.

Method

District Classification

For purposes of this study, the following definitions were adopted. The district with 9 years of ongoing conflict within the Board and controversy between teachers, administration, and the Board is classified as long-term, high conflict. The two districts where conflict was more recent, 7 years or less, and judged to be less intense based on fewer administrator and teacher turnover are classified as short-term, medium conflict districts. The existing data set of statewide data of inservice teachers (from Leech & Haug, 2015b) is classified as no conflict, although the authors recognize that to some extent this is a misnomer because no district is entirely without conflict. The term no conflict is used to refer to a baseline situation in which the additional political pressures described in the introduction do not exist.

Participants

Within each district, schools were randomly selected and all teachers within each selected school were included in the sample. Teacher emails were collected from school websites. A total of 1,471 teachers were sampled, with 988 teachers from a district with long-term conflict between teachers and the school board (with approximately 3,297 teachers) and 483 from two districts with short-term conflict between teachers and the school boards (one with approximately 4,250 teachers and the other with 1,600 teachers). In total, 63 emails bounced back or were not functional; therefore, only a total of 1,408 teachers received the survey, with 955 teachers receiving the email in the long-term conflict district and 453 teachers receiving the survey in the short-term conflict districts. A total of 251 were completed, with 146 from the long-term conflict district (representing a 15% return rate), and 105 from the short-term conflict districts (representing a 22% return rate). For analysis purposes, data from the two districts classified as short-term, medium conflict were combined to increase the sample size in each group. This results in one data set from the long-term conflict district, one dataset from the short-term conflict districts, and one data set from the preexisting no conflict statewide sample, totaling three data sets representing three districts in transition and a statewide sample used as a baseline for comparison. Gender, age, and ethnicity of participants are presented in Table 1.

Table 1.

Demographic Information for the Three Samples.

		District with long-term conflict		Districts with short-term conflict		Statewide sample
		n	%	n	%	n	%
Gender	Female	93	63.7	77	73.3	148	63.2
	Male	23	15.75	28	26.7	44	18.8
	Missing	30	20.54	0	0	42	17.9
Age (years)	21-34	23	15.8	29	27.6	50	21.4
	35-44	33	22.6	28	26.7	50	21.4
	45-54	45	30.8	31	29.5	58	24.8
	55-64	17	11.6	15	14.3	35	15.0
	65 and above	0	0	2	1.9	0	0
	Missing	28	19.2	0	0	41	17.5
Ethnicity	American Indian or Alaska Native	1	0.7	1	1	1	<1
	African American	0	0	0	0	2	<1
	Hispanic or Latino	3	2.1	2	1.9	18	7.7
	Hawaiian	0	0	0	0	1	<1
	Guamanian	0	0	0	0	1	<1
	Laotian	0	0	1	1	0	0
	White not of Hispanic origin	100	68.5	98	85.7	162	69
	Missing	42	28.77	11	10.48	49	20.94

Procedure and Instruments

Three school districts, two with short-term conflict and one with long-term conflict with the school board, were identified. Email addresses of the samples of teachers from the three school districts were extracted from the district’s/school’s websites. An email was sent to the sample of teachers asking them to complete the survey on the online survey tool RedCap (Harris et al., 2009). The survey took approximately 12 min to complete. Data were collected for another study from a statewide sample of teachers, and this data set was utilized in the analysis as well.

The survey included statements and questions from the FIT-Choice scale (Watt & Richardson, 2007). Because the participants were already in the teaching profession, the statements and questions were modified from the original format into the past tense. Both the original and modified statements and questions from the FIT-Choice scale are included in Table 2. The intent of each original statement and question and thus the overall scale was preserved, though adapted slightly for the new population. The survey has three sections: motivations for teaching, beliefs about teaching, and decision to become a teacher. The motivations for teaching section asked the participants to respond to the stem of “I chose to become a teacher because . . .” with each statement having responses ranging from not at all important (1) to extremely important (7). The beliefs about teaching section included statements and questions with responses ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (7). Finally, the decision to become a teacher section included questions with responses that ranged from not at all (1) to extremely (7). CFA was conducted and it was found that the model fit the groups similarly.

Table 2.

Item Numbers, Subfactors, and Items for All FIT-Choice Questions.

Subfactor	Modified item	Original item from Watt and Richardson (2007)
Ability	I have the qualities of a good teacher.	I have the qualities of a good teacher.
	I have good teaching skills.	I have good teaching skills.
	Teaching is a career suited to my abilities.	Teaching is a career suited to my abilities.
Intrinsic career value	I am interested in teaching.	I am interested in teaching.
	I’ve always wanted to be a teacher.	I have always wanted to be a teacher.
	I like teaching.	I like teaching.
Work with children and adolescents	I wanted a job that involves working with children/adolescents.	I want a job that involves working with children and adolescents.
	I like working with children/adolescents.	I like working with children and adolescents.
	I wanted to work in a child/adolescent-centered environment.	I want to work in a child and adolescent-centered environment.
Enhance social equity	Teaching allows me to raise the ambitions of underprivileged youth.	Teaching will allow me to raise the ambitions of under-privileged youth.
	Teaching allows me to benefit the socially disadvantaged.	Teaching will allow me to benefit the socially disadvantaged.
	Teaching allows me to work against social disadvantage.	Teaching will allow me to work against social disadvantage.
Job transferability	A teaching qualification is recognized everywhere.	A teaching qualification is recognized everywhere.
	Teaching is a useful job for me to have when traveling.	Teaching will be a useful job for me to have when traveling.
	A teaching job allows me to choose where I wish to live.	A teaching job will allow me to choose where I wish to live.
Social contribution	Teaching enables me to “give back” to society.	Teaching enables me to “give back” to society.
	Teachers make a worthwhile social contribution.	Teachers make a worthwhile social contribution.
	Teaching allows me to provide a service to society.	Teaching allows me to provide a service to society.
Time for family	Part-time teaching could allow more family time.	Part-time teaching could allow more family time.
	As a teacher I would have lengthy holidays.	As a teacher I would have lengthy holidays.
	Teaching hours fit with the responsibilities of having a family.	Teaching hours will fit with the responsibilities of having a family.
	As a teacher I have a short working day.	As a teacher I will have a short working day.
	School holidays fit in with family commitments.	School holidays will fit in with family commitments.
Shape future of children/adolescents	Teaching allows me to shape child/adolescent values.	Teaching will allow me to shape child/adolescent values.
	Teaching allows me to influence the next generation.	Teaching will allow me to influence the next generation.
	Teaching allows me to have an impact on children/adolescents.	Teaching will allow me to have an impact on children/adolescents.
Fallback career	I was unsure of what career I wanted.	I was unsure of what career I wanted.
	I was not accepted into my first-choice career.	I was not accepted into my first-choice career.
	I chose teaching as a last-resort career.	I chose teaching as a last-resort career.
Job security	Teaching offers a steady career path.	Teaching will offer a steady career path.
	Teaching provides a reliable income.	Teaching will provide a reliable income.
	Teaching is a secure job.	Teaching will be a secure job.
Prior teaching and learning experiences	I have had inspirational teachers.	I have had inspirational teachers.
	I have had good teachers as role-models.	I have had good teachers as role-models.
	I have had positive learning experiences.	I have had positive learning experiences.
Social influences	My friends thought I should become a teacher.	My friends think I should become a teacher.
	My family thought I should become a teacher.	My family thinks I should become a teacher.
	People I’ve worked with thought I should become a teacher.	People I’ve worked with think I should become a teacher.
Expertise	I think teaching requires high levels of expert knowledge.	Do you think teaching requires high levels of expert knowledge?
	I think teachers need high levels of technical knowledge.	Do you think teachers need high levels of technical knowledge?
	I think teachers need highly specialized knowledge.	Do you think teachers need highly specialized knowledge?
Difficulty	I think teachers have a heavy workload.	Do you think teachers have a heavy workload?
	I think teaching is emotionally demanding.	Do you think teaching is emotionally demanding?
	I think teaching is hard work.	Do you think teaching is hard work?
Social status	I believe teachers are perceived as professionals.	Do you believe teachers are perceived as professionals?
	I believe teaching is perceived as a high-status occupation.	Do you believe teaching is perceived as a high-status occupation?
	I believe teaching is a well-respected career.	Do you believe teaching is a well-respected career?
	I believe teachers have high morale.	Do you believe teachers have high morale?
	I believe teachers feel valued by society.	Do you believe teachers feel valued by society?
	I believe teachers feel their occupation has high social status.	Do you believe teachers feel their occupation has high social status?
Salary	I think teaching is well-paid.	Do you think teaching is well-paid?
Salary	I think teachers earn a good salary.	Do you think teachers earn a good salary?
Social dissuasion	Were you encouraged to pursue careers other than teaching?	Were you encouraged to pursue careers other than teaching?
	Did others tell you teaching was not a good career choice?	Did others tell you teaching was not a good career choice?
	Did others influence you to consider careers other than teaching?	Did others influence you to consider careers other than teaching?
Satisfaction with choice	How carefully have you thought about becoming a teacher?	How carefully have you thought about becoming a teacher?
	How satisfied are you with your choice of becoming a teacher?	How satisfied are you with your choice of becoming a teacher?
	How happy are you with your decision to become a teacher?	How happy are you with your decision to become a teacher?

Note. FIT-Choice = Factors Influencing Teaching-Choice.

In addition, the survey included demographic questions, individual characteristics (e.g., self-efficacy, self-esteem) as measured by Judge, Erez, Bono, and Thoresen (2003), situational characteristics (e.g., links, fit, sacrifice) as measured by Ng and Feldman (2009), motivational forces as measured by Maertz and Campion (2004), and occupational commitment (Blau, 2003). Results from these other questions were reported elsewhere (Leech & Haug, 2016).

Analysis

The data were imported from RedCap (Harris et al., 2009) to IBM SPSS Version 23. To answer the question of “Is there a difference in motivation for teachers in high conflict situations (both short-term and long-term) compared with other inservice teachers (as measured in Leech & Haug, 2015b)?” descriptive statistics and t tests were conducted to assess whether means are statistically significantly different.

Results

To answer the research question, “Is there a difference in motivation for teachers in high conflict situations compared with other inservice teachers (as measured in Leech & Haug, 2015b)?” comparison of the mean responses for each subfactor was conducted; Tables 3 and 4 contains the raw factor means and a statistical test of the differences. As shown in Table 3, teachers from districts with short-term conflict with school boards had statistically significantly lower scores than teachers with no conflict on family time, job transfer, social equity, work with children, prior experience, and social influence factors. The teachers from districts with short-term conflict had statistically significantly higher scores than teachers with no conflict on expertise, difficulty, social dissuasion, and satisfied teaching factors. As shown in Table 4, teachers with long-term conflict with school boards had statistically significantly lower scores than teachers with no conflict on fallback career, job security, job transfer, social equity, prior experience, social influence, social status, and salary. Teachers with long-term conflict with school boards had statistically significant higher scores than teachers with no conflict on expertise, difficulty, and social dissuasion.

Table 3.

Statistically Significant Differences Between a Statewide Sample (Leech & Haug, 2015a) and Districts With Short-term Conflict (N = 105).

Factor	Districts with short-term conflict		Statewide sample		t	p	95% CL
Factor	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	95% CL
Ability	5.97	1.03	6.06	0.89	−0.92	.362	[–0.29, 0.11]
Intrinsic career value	5.70	1.22	5.88	1.05	−1.53	.130	[–0.42, 0.05]
Fallback career	1.51	0.82	1.63	0.84	−1.45	.150	[–0.27, 0.04]
Job security	4.10	1.33	4.27	1.44	−0.134	.183	[–0.43, 0.08]
Family time	2.53	1.09	2.82	1.30	−2.69	.008	[–0.50, –0.08]
Job transfer	2.78	1.33	3.08	1.42	−2.32	.022	[–0.56, –0.04]
Shape future	5.73	1.21	5.83	1.05	−0.87	.384	[–0.34, 0.13]
Social equity	4.77	1.59	5.12	1.53	−2.29	.024	[–0.66, –0.05]
Social contribution	5.97	1.11	5.95	1.07	0.23	.821	[–0.19, 0.24]
Work with children	5.44	1.34	5.81	1.22	−2.81	.006	[–0.63, –0.11]
Prior experience	4.97	1.22	5.37	1.46	−3.39	.001	[–0.64, –0.17]
Social influence	2.72	1.45	3.07	1.73	−2.44	.016	[–0.63, –0.07]
Expertise	5.90	0.90	5.55	1.63	4.04	<.001	[0.18, 0.53]
Difficulty	6.66	0.45	6.03	1.70	14.22	<.001	[0.54, 0.72]
Social status	2.97	1.00	3.09	1.40	−1.18	.241	[–0.31, 0.08]
Salary	2.35	1.15	2.45	1.42	−0.87	.385	[–0.32, 0.12]
Social dissuasion	3.89	1.72	3.30	1.67	3.49	.001	[0.25, 0.92]
Satisfied teaching	5.76	1.06	5.42	1.79	3.29	.001	[0.14, 0.55]

Note. CL = confidence limit.

Table 4.

Statistically Significant Differences Between a Statewide Sample (Leech & Haug, 2015a) and a District With Long-term Conflict (N = 146).

Factor	District with long-term conflict		Statewide sample		T	p	95% CL
Factor	M	SD	M	SD	T	p	95% CL
Ability	6.11	0.97	6.06	0.89	0.57	.568	[–0.12, 0.21]
Intrinsic career value	5.90	1.03	5.88	1.05	0.25	.803	[–0.15, 0.20]
Fallback career	1.35	0.64	1.63	0.84	−5.00	<.001	[–0.39, –0.17]
Job security	3.83	1.46	4.27	1.44	−3.44	.001	[–0.69, –0.18]
Family time	2.75	1.23	2.82	1.30	−0.71	.482	[–0.29, 0.14]
Job transfer	2.58	1.32	3.08	1.42	−4.34	<.001	[–0.72, –0.27]
Shape future	5.83	1.10	5.83	1.05	0.048	.962	[–0.18, 0.19]
Social equity	4.19	1.77	5.12	1.53	−6.07	<.001	[–1.24, –0.63]
Social contribution	5.86	1.07	5.95	1.07	−1.00	.318	[–0.28, 0.09]
Work with children	5.85	1.18	5.81	1.22	0.44	.663	[–0.16, 0.25]
Prior experience	4.75	1.29	5.37	1.46	−5.57	<.001	[–0.84, –0.40]
Social influence	2.76	1.62	3.07	1.73	−2.22	.028	[–0.59, –0.03]
Expertise	5.85	0.92	5.55	1.63	3.73	<.001	[0.14, 0.46]
Difficulty	6.63	0.50	6.03	1.70	13.92	<.001	[0.52, 0.69]
Social status	2.66	1.06	3.09	1.40	−4.71	<.001	[–0.61, –0.25]
Salary	2.19	1.10	2.45	1.42	−2.78	.006	[–0.45, –0.08]
Social dissuasion	3.63	1.70	3.30	1.67	2.25	.026	[0.04, 0.62]
Satisfied teaching	5.47	1.10	5.42	1.79	0.49	.623	[–0.14, 0.24]

Note. CL = confidence limit.

Discussion

This study was conducted to answer questions about teacher motivation to teach in districts undergoing significant and varying levels of transition in leadership and ways to measure teacher performance. As Webb, Neumann, and Jones (2004) posit, “within current school reform and accountability environments, schools exist in very complex political arenas” (p. 254). This context of the study exemplifies this point, as school board elections in these districts had become highly politicized and combative, and the outcomes of elections led to substantial changes in district and school leadership. State policies were adopted that fundamentally altered teacher performance evaluations and left significant latitude with local school boards and administrators for implementation, which compounded teacher angst about new leadership. Using a motivation to teach scale, teacher perceptions were measured and compared across settings varying in intensity of these pressures. This study accomplished the goal of statistically comparing the motivating factors for teachers in highly politicized contexts to a third sample of inservice teachers experiencing a more stable work environment.

There are inherent limitations to the current study. The study utilized a survey that was self-report; therefore, the participants may have responded differently than would have been found through direct observation. In addition, all participants were all from one Western state, thus making generalizations to participants in a very different context possibly problematic. Finally, the representativeness of the respondent samples is uncertain. The high and medium conflict districts had response rates between 15% and 22%. The limited number of responses from each of the two medium conflict districts required they be analyzed together, which may have masked underlying differences between them.

What Can be Learned About Differences Among the Groups of Teachers Experiencing Different Levels of Conflict?

Teachers in the school districts in transition had quite different perceptions of teaching than those in more stable contexts. Teachers in transition districts were less motivated about the value of teaching as a job that would allow them to live where they chose, the impact they have/could have on social inequities and disadvantages, their own prior experiences with inspirational teachers, and the support received from family and friends about their teaching career.

In addition to the long list of lost motivational factors reported by both district-in-conflict samples, teachers in the district with long-term conflict also had less motivation stemming from other areas. Compared with teachers in more stable environments, they rated the security of their job lower, the social status of the teaching profession lower, the morale of teachers lower, and the salary compensation for the work performed lower. It seems that the longer the turmoil and instability in the district went on, the more these teachers lost sight of the powerful positive aspects of their profession.

As teachers in transition districts lost sight of the positive, their perceptions also accentuated the more challenging aspects of their profession. For example, teachers in transition districts perceived the expertise and specialized knowledge required to do their jobs and the overall difficulty and emotional demands of their work as higher than counterparts in more stable environments. In addition, they were more likely to indicate they were encouraged by others, such as friends and family, to consider other careers besides teaching. The tenor of the contexts in which they worked was negatively impacting their motivation to remain in their teaching jobs, which supports existing research (Long, 2014; Sawchuck, 2014; Shavelson et al., 2010; Westervelt, 2015). Ironically, the reforms at the heart of the teachers’ angst were intended at least in part to improve the teaching profession.

School board members are at the top of the hierarchy in which teachers work; when board members publicly criticize and insult teachers, it is demoralizing and disappointing. Findings from this study suggest that it is not sufficient to simply get intrinsic rewards from work, but extrinsic rewards, such as appreciation and job security, also contribute heavily to morale. This is linked to Wood (2007), who states,

Because schools always operate as part of larger systems (Senge et al., 2000), changing them is always complicated. For instance, working in public becomes risky for public educators in the contemporary accountability climate, which ratchets up the anxiety of both administrators and teachers. Thus, initiatives like this one can be regarded with suspicion, particularly by teachers who have seen a series of reforms come and go. (p. 718)

In combination with school board members’ vocal condemnation of teachers, the new State law that removed teacher tenure made it more difficult to find new teaching positions, all of which resulted in teachers with even fewer reasons to stay in the profession.

This study contributes to other research on teacher motivation and the use of the FIT-Choice scale, but additional studies are needed to support these findings. In particular, continued research on the motivations of inservice teachers to persist in the profession when faced with substantial leadership change and political instability is needed. Methodologically, further research is needed on the validity of the FIT-Choice instrument with inservice teachers both in the United States and internationally to assess scale functioning with inservice American teachers and inservice teachers in other countries.

Recommendations

Local school board elections can have dramatic influence through policy and changes in top district leadership that may have a domino-effect throughout district and school administration, with a potential to tremendously impact teachers’ work conditions. Reform agendas described in this study are examples of recent policy changes that have been consequential to teachers’ work lives, resulting in less motivation to teach: “Without an understanding of some of the factors that generate these shifts and without the tools to appraise them, frustration, disenchantment, and alienation are likely to result” (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004, p. 10). Having a deeper understanding of teachers’ motivations to teach and external forces that shape their motivations can hopefully help the field better understand how to retain effective ones. Based on findings reported here, we offer three specific recommendations:

Reform, change, and improvement are perennial efforts in education, and appropriately so. As new policy is developed and implemented, critical stakeholder groups should be allowed an authentic voice in shaping decisions that will affect them in an effort to maximize the extent to which all stakeholders’ goals can be realized. There are many stakeholders involved in public education and teachers are among the most critical stakeholders. Policy decisions rest with the local school board; teachers’ professional lives are affected by the decisions and successful implementation may be dependent on teachers. To the extent teachers’ concerns can be honored in policy decisions, reform may have a greater chance at success.

When possible and appropriate, teachers’ work should be publicly acknowledged and appreciated. Sincere extrinsic rewards are vital.

The effects of particular types of reform agendas should be considered when applied to a field such as teaching that already faces challenges in attracting highly qualified teacher candidates. Maintaining and boosting the morale of teachers is essential to a strong teaching workforce. Recent emphases on standardized testing and high-stakes school improvement planning exist in most districts and, when combined with increased politicization of school boards and special group interest in school boards, have led to further apprehension of teachers.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Nancy L. Leech

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