Moving forward? How war experiences,interethnic attitudes,and intergroup forgiveness affect the prospects for political tolerance in postwar Sri Lanka

Abstract

How does civil war shape the prospects of lasting peace between formerly opposing ethnic groups after the end of violence? This article addresses the complex relationship between war experience, interethnic attitudes, interethnic forgiveness, and the willingness to permit basic civil liberties to former enemies in the context of postwar Sri Lanka. Despite the end of the 26-year-long civil war in 2009, social and political tensions between the two largest ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils, still prevail. Political tolerance is in the literature considered a crucial micro-level condition for peaceful coexistence, yet, its determinants, in particular the role of war experiences, have not received sufficient attention. Using new and unique all-island representative survey data (N = 1,420), we examine the mutual permission of civil liberties of these two ethnic groups. Our analyses reveal two important findings: first, the likelihood of granting civil liberties varies by civil liberty and ethnic group. Whereas most members of both ethnic groups are willing to grant the right to vote, to hold a speech, and to hold a government position, the right to demonstrate is highly contested, with only low shares of both Tamils and Sinhalese being willing to grant the other group this right. Second, the structural equation models reveal that the direct impact of war exposure is less powerful than expected and depends on the political right in question. Not forgiving the other ethnic group, partly driven by war experience and ethnic prejudice, appears to be a more consistent predictor of intolerance. These results imply that postwar efforts to further forgiveness are important to promote political tolerance and thereby long-lasting peace.

Keywords

civil war ethnic prejudice forgiveness peacebuilding political tolerance postwar society reconciliation Sri Lanka war experience

Introduction

The process of reconciliation – the removal of conflict-related emotional barriers blocking the end of intergroup conflict (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008: 39) – is now considered crucial to achieve lasting peace in post-conflict societies (Bar-Tal, Rosen & Nets-Zehngut, 2009; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004). The 26-year-long war between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil secessionist rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), has left a powerful social and human impact on the country (Newman, 2014). The ethnic nature of the conflict, its length, and its termination through a one-sided military victory pose particular challenges for postwar peacebuilding. Yet, while reconciliation has become a buzzword that has dominated the country’s postwar intellectual and public discussion (Rambukwella, 2012: 1), the micro-level conditions for lasting peaceful coexistence of the two groups have received less academic attention. In this study, we examine the relationship between individual war experiences and political tolerance in the aftermath of the civil war in Sri Lanka. Political tolerance – that is, granting basic civil liberties to opposing groups – is considered an essential factor supporting the agreement between different groups in society and a necessary condition for peaceful coexistence. We thus ask: how do war experiences directly and indirectly affect the formation of political tolerance in the aftermath of war?

With the help of new data that cover different aspects related to war experiences and political tolerance in the Sri Lankan context, we contribute to the existing research on civil war, political tolerance, and peacebuilding in two important ways. First, we add insights to the general literature on post-conflict peacebuilding by exploring how individual war experiences influence political tolerance in the postwar context. Without people’s willingness to accept differences and recognize the rights of others in the society, it is challenging to minimize disputes or potential conflicts that arise from the different religious, political, and moral beliefs that people have (Lee, 2014). The legacy of individual-level war exposure on tolerance has received little attention, even though it is known as one of the most important factors defining attitudes and behavior in postwar societies (among others Blattman, 2009; Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016; Grossman, Manekin & Miodownik, 2015; Kijewski & Freitag, 2018; Rapp, Kijewski & Freitag, forthcoming). Studies from related fields that explore the relationship between individual exposure to political violence and tolerance, however, show that war exposure ‘hardens’ one’s heart and makes people, among other things, less likely to support peace (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016; Grossman, Manekin, & Miodownik, 2015). Moreover, two studies examining the link between war exposure at the context level and general political tolerance reveal a negative relationship (Hutchison, 2014; Hutchison & Gibler, 2007). In the present study, we aim to provide a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between war experiences and political tolerance by studying the impact of individual war experiences on four distinct types of civil liberties – the right to hold public office, to vote, to make a public speech, and to demonstrate. By doing so, we reveal that the relationship between war exposure and guaranteeing civil liberties to opposing groups depends on the right in question as well as the respondent’s ethnic background.

Second, we add to the literature on political tolerance by exploring the mechanisms through which war experiences affect political tolerance levels in the aftermath of war. Political tolerance is a demanding task, which requires that individuals move past their initial dislike to become more willing to grant political rights to members of an opposing group. Emotional and interpersonal disruption during war may, however, create obstacles to political tolerance. Understanding the mechanisms through which individual war exposure influences individual attitudes in the postwar context is of high importance, as war experiences have been found to influence political identities and behavior across generations (Balcells, 2012). To comprehend the mechanisms through which war experience influences political tolerance, we draw on the body of research on reconciliation. In this literature, forgiveness and reduced ethnic prejudice represent mechanisms driving the restoration of relationships between different groups (Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016; Staub & Pearlman, 2003; Staub, 2006). By examining the interplay between war experience, ethnic prejudice, forgiveness, and political tolerance, we can scrutinize the processes that block individuals’ willingness to grant former enemies civil liberties. We argue that war experiences may inhibit political tolerance by fostering ethnic prejudice and reducing forgiveness. With the help of path analyses, we directly explore the possible obstacles on the road to political tolerance in Sri Lanka and reveal that the direct impact of war exposure is less powerful than expected and that such experiences mainly reduce political tolerance by making people less forgiving of the other group.

The civil war in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is a multiethnic island; the majority of its population are Sinhalese, though Tamils and Muslims represent sizeable minorities. From 1983 to 2009, the country experienced a protracted violent conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil militant secessionist group LTTE over the establishment of a separate Tamil state in the Northern and Eastern provinces of the country. Rather than being a result of ancient antagonisms, the ethnonationalist conflict was driven by political developments resulting from competing nationalisms (Samaranayake, 2007; Rotberg, 1999). From 2008, the government, led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, focused on a military solution to the conflict (de Mel, Samuel & Soysa, 2012) and defeated the LTTE on 19 May 2009 in the Northern province. The final battles of the war are estimated to have caused the death of 40,000 people (United Nations, 2011), with a total of 100,000 casualties from all ethnic groups during the entire war (Somasundaram, 2013; Husain et al., 2011).¹ Open violence mainly took place in the Tamil-dominated Northern province, in the ethnically mixed Eastern province, and in the ‘border villages’ between LTTE- and government-controlled areas. Terrorism in the form of suicide attacks and bombing, however, also occurred in Sinhala-dominated areas in the south of the country, as well as in the capital Colombo (Goodhand, Hulme & Lewer, 2000).

The intractable nature of the Sri Lankan conflict, as well as the failure to end the conflict through negotiations, pose particular challenges for postwar peacebuilding. Restoring a functioning relationship between the Sinhalese and the Tamils is crucial, as the two groups remain strongly polarized with high levels of distrust toward each other (Orjuela, 2003). Although the end of the war in 2009 represented a moment of relief for many Sri Lankans after almost 30 years of war, many remained skeptical and predictions on what would happen after the government’s military victory were difficult to make (Spencer, 2011). The ideological climate in the country did not speak for immediate reconciliation, with an outraged Tamil community on one side and a deeply insecure Sinhalese majority on the other (Hashim, 2013). The brutal military victory ending the war left the underlying issues that motivated the LTTE’s quest for independence unsolved, which threw a significant shadow on the peace and the potential for reconciliation. First, the triumphalism by the government during its victory celebrations soon raised the question whether a lasting and just peace would be possible or whether the conflict merely would be transformed into a new type of conflict (Goodhand & Korf, 2011). In the Tamil perception, the government celebrations represented a celebration of defeating all Tamils, not only the LTTE (Ganguly, 2016). The image of an inclusive government enforcing a just political settlement was difficult to believe, with the presence of a strong opposition to power-sharing and a government which remained strongly centralized and disinterested in minority rights (Goodhand & Korf, 2011; Höglund & Orjuela, 2011). Thereby, the grievances that led to the outbreak of conflict became further intensified (Byrne & Klem, 2015; Höglund & Orjuela, 2011; Keethaponcalan, 2016).

Second, the controversy with and handling of the military victory still remain significant obstacles in the relationship between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. The government and its representatives have been accused of extensive human rights abuses, including torture, extrajudicial killings, civilian killings, and sexual violence both during and after the war (United Nations, 2011; Amnesty International, 2017; Traunmüller, Kijewski & Freitag, 2019). Until now, the government has not acknowledged the cost of their victory in terms of Tamil civilian casualties (Byrne & Klem, 2015). Instead, during the presidency of Rajapaksa, there was a general failure to prosecute those responsible for such war crimes as well as a general unwillingness to allow independent investigations on the matter (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2015). This neglect prevents the provision of reparations to the war victims and their families and significantly disrupts the relationship between the Tamils and the Sinhalese majority. The continuing impunity for crimes perpetrated during the war by government representatives, the lack of accountability for such crimes, and the complete breakdown of the rule of law during the last months of the conflict, continue to represent serious concerns for members of the minority community (Samarasinghe, 2015).

The surprise victory by Maithripala Sirisena over Mahinda Rajapaksa in the presidential elections in 2015 (Thiranagama, 2016; Haviland, 2015) raised hopes of a more reconciliatory approach by the government. Sirisena won on a platform promising to fight corruption, improve governance, and return the country to parliamentary democracy, with large shares of support from the two largest minority groups (Haviland, 2015). It was labeled a clear democratic victory of the citizens of Sri Lanka (Thiranagama, 2016), reflecting a general optimism for democracy and the future of the country. Slow progress with constitutional reform and transitional justice, as well as the continuing use of wartime legislation such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) (Human Rights Watch, 2017), have, nevertheless, made minorities more skeptical toward the government again, putting a strain on interethnic relations in general. Reports of growing interethnic tensions and violence again increased in the second half of 2016 (Perera, 2016).

Political tolerance in postwar societies

The post-civil war society of Sri Lanka renders a paradigmatic case for the analysis of political tolerance. The intractable nature of the war, culminating in the decisive military victory by the government, and the tense postwar environment, underscore the importance of developing a functioning relationship between the two groups, as a ‘victor’s peace’ may create the conditions for the re-emergence of Tamil separatism in the future (Philipson, 2011: 117). Peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts are thus viewed with a considerable amount of suspicion but also with hope. Under these circumstances, the question of whether and how individuals from both former combatant groups are capable of leaving the past behind and moving toward mutual tolerance is of great significance to exit the ‘conflict trap’ (Collier et al., 2003; Kaufman, 2006).

In former war-torn countries, the development of means by which former enemies can live peacefully together is, as outlined above, necessary. In general, tolerance is the willingness to ‘put up with’ opponents or individuals one dislikes (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1993). It is thereby viewed as one of the few viable solutions to the challenges caused by cultural heterogeneity, holding pluralist societies together (Gibson, 2006b; Widmalm, 2016). Political tolerance specifically refers to an individual’s willingness to render political rights, such as taking part in elections or peaceful demonstrations, to groups one objects to or opposes (Freitag & Rapp, 2013; Hutchison, 2014; Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978; Stouffer, 1955) and represents an important micro-level factor facilitating a peaceful coexistence of opposing groups. After war, it can be regarded as one of the first potential outcomes of reconciliation processes. Scholars generally refer to it as a ‘minimalist’ conception of reconciliation (Gibson, 2006a; Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016). In the context of post-civil war countries, guaranteeing civil liberties to former opponents may be a fundamental step toward bridging the divide between two former enemy groups (Bakke, O’Loughlin & Ward, 2009; Dyrstad et al., 2011). To overcome societal conflict, people need to tolerate what they oppose (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1993; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Despite its role as a key principle of democracy, political tolerance is one of the hardest to maintain, especially when the society is under stress (Wang & Chang, 2006). A lack of political tolerance may lead to the resurgence of conflicts or persistent irreconcilable divisions between societal groups and inhibit processes of democratization and consolidation (Hutchison, 2014; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1993). While tolerance may not solve conflicts, it is capable of bridging the gap between opponents and paving the way towards respectful interactions. In that respect, tolerance seems to be a realistic basis for peaceful coexistence in postwar societies, as it does not require immediate harmony between opposing groups.

The formation of political tolerance in postwar contexts

War shapes individual and collective identities, preferences, and strategies (Kalyvas, 2007). At the individual level, the impact of war is, among other factors, driven by the individual experiences that people have during war. In the course of war, people are victims of or witness different types of violence and may be forced to displace. In its essence, it confronts people with threats to their lives (Jonas & Fritsche, 2013). Such experiences can disrupt, challenge, or even ‘shatter’ individual global beliefs or cause psychological distress, in the form of continuous feelings of fear and threat in the individual (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Tir & Singh, 2015). These anxieties may remain prevalent long after the war. In the literature on tolerance, threat perceptions play a key role in the formation of tolerance and intolerance (Gibson, 1992; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1993). When deciding whether to be tolerant toward a target or not, individuals first consider whether the target poses a threat (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1993). In detail, if threat perceptions are missing, we might assume that individuals can be tolerant, regardless of how much they object to specific groups. During war, individuals are exposed to a number of potentially traumatizing events in a continuously insecure environment (Rosner & Powell, 2006; Briere & Scott, 2006). Recent empirical studies on the political consequences of war indicate that war has a lasting, negative impact on the support for peace, intergroup relations, political behavior, and tolerance, which may reach far into the postwar era (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016; Grossman, Manekin & Miodownik, 2015; Hutchison, 2014; Hutchison & Gibler, 2007; Tir & Singh, 2015; Balcells, 2012). In the long term, continuous perceptions of threat may prevent the emergence of politically tolerant attitudes. In Sri Lanka, the war disrupted the lives of members of all ethnic groups, causing deaths and injuries, large-scale displacement, loss of property, and the destruction of communities (Silva, 2003). Accordingly, war-induced fears and anxieties are still likely to prevail. Specifically, we expect that individuals who were personally subjected to war, such as those who witnessed bombings and shootings and experienced the death of relatives, are less likely to be politically tolerant toward their former war-opponents.

However, it is possible that war experiences not only have a direct impact on political tolerance but also indirectly influence political tolerance. Drawing from the literature on reconciliation, war experiences are likely to interfere with two cognitive processes that are particularly relevant in the Sri Lankan case and tend to foster tolerance in the postwar era – namely, overcoming ethnic animosities and interethnic forgiveness. First, war experience may inhibit reconciliation by enhancing ethnic prejudice. In the literature on intergroup prejudice, perceived threat is identified as a main driver of ethnic prejudice (Blumer, 1958; Quillian, 1995). The literature on reconciliation stresses the necessity to overcome feelings toward members of opponent groups that are ‘destructive negative emotions aroused by the conflict’ (Stephan, 2008: 372) in order to facilitate peaceful coexistence. In a similar vein, Gibson (2007: 5) states ‘if reconciliation means groups getting along together, then obviously reconciliation requires that individual(s) […] eschew racism and embrace tolerance’. Tolerance may only be achieved if formerly opposing groups first discard their ethnic prejudice toward each other. However, in the aftermath of civil wars, this task is particularly difficult as attitudes toward the other ethnic group will be close to hatred (Stephan, 2008). Further, as a substantial number of civil conflicts occur due to irreconcilable ethnic animosities (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Kaufman, 2006), it is unlikely that these animosities will disappear after the war or even after the conflict parties sign a peace agreement (Kaufman, 2006). The presence of such negative feelings is likely to be stronger among direct victims of war than among other individuals. More severe war exposure relates to persistent ethnic prejudice and, thus, less political tolerance. Therefore, overcoming racist attitudes, particularly the belief that differences between ethnic groups are innate (Sniderman et al., 1991), marks the first step toward mutual tolerance. If this objective is not fulfilled – that is, if racial prejudice still prevails among ordinary people – mutual tolerance cannot be achieved.

In addition to racial animosities, personal war experiences are likely to further have an impact on political tolerance through one’s likelihood to forgive. Political tolerance is a demanding attitude, requiring individuals to move past initial dislike and objection to be willing to grant members of the other group civil liberties. When individuals are harmed or offended by others, an interpersonal debt is created between those individuals (Exline & Baumeister, 2000). As argued by Tir & Singh (2015), individuals may use political intolerance to ‘punish’ members of other groups. Individuals who continue to feel that members of the other group are in debt to them or have desires to take revenge, are less likely to see

Figure 1.

Pathways to political tolerance – theoretical model

past their dislike and grant members of this group democratic rights. Political tolerance thereby requires the reduction of the individual desires for revenge, which can be achieved through forgiveness – letting go of the wish to punish someone after an event or a person has caused harm (Massey, 2009). Further, it involves canceling the interpersonal debt that is created when someone has become offended (Exline & Baumeister, 2000). In this process, individuals let go of their anger and desire for revenge (Staub et al., 2005; Massey, 2009). In other words, forgiveness means taking a step toward former enemies by coming to terms with the past (Bakke, O’Loughlin & Ward, 2009: 1015). Yet, a previous study by Bakke, O’Loughlin & Ward (2009) demonstrated that war exposure significantly reduces the likelihood of forgiving. War experiences may hamper forgiveness by representing concrete evidence for transgressions by members of the other group, promoting feelings of debt and desires of revenge in the individual. Although the intergroup dimension of forgiveness has received less attention, it is an important aspect of the analysis of how political tolerance can be achieved after ethnic conflicts. In the intergroup context, forgiveness refers to ceasing one’s negative emotions toward the other group’s members (Baumeister, Exline & Sommer, 1998). The act of forgiving another ethnic group is regarded as more demanding than forgiving a single individual (McLernon, Cairns & Hewstone, 2002). We thereby expect that war exposure significantly hampers interethnic forgiveness and that a lack of forgiveness reduces an individual’s likelihood of being politically tolerant. In addition to war experience, we expect that the ability to forgive is further affected by the individual level of ethnic prejudice. Previous studies have already revealed that ethnic prejudice inhibits an individual’s ability to forgive members of other groups (Cairns et al., 2005).

Figure 1 summarizes our expectations regarding how war exposure influences mutual political tolerance between Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese. We expect that war experiences directly and indirectly impede the formation of political tolerance through the promotion of ethnic prejudice and the prevention of interethnic forgiveness.

Data, method, and operationalization

To examine our research question, we used representative all-island survey data of the Sri Lankan population collected between January and June 2016, about one year after the victory by Maithripala Sirisena. The survey includes 1,800 respondents above the age of 18 years who were selected with a multistage stratified random sampling technique from all of the 25 districts and the four main ethnic groups. Of the respondents, around 920 identify themselves as Sinhalese and 500 identify themselves as Sri Lankan Tamils. Moreover, there are approximately 400 Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Muslim respondents. Trained interviewers conducted the face-to-face interviews, which on average took 60 minutes. The interviews were conducted in Sinhalese and Tamil, depending on the language spoken by the respondent.² Respondents were selected through a multistage stratified random sampling technique. The 25 districts served as the primary sampling units (PSUs), followed by households and individuals. Within each district, one Divisional Secretariat was selected randomly, from which we selected three Grama Sewa Wasam (GN divisions) randomly, representing the units at the lowest administrative level in Sri Lanka. We collected data from 75 GN divisions.

We focus on the political tolerance of the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils toward each other (N = 1,420), and excluded the Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Muslims from our analyses, as we are mainly interested in the level of tolerance of the main conflict parties. The average age in our sample is 42 years; 58% of the respondents are female, and most of the respondents (63%) have a medium level of education. The Sri Lankan Tamils thereby are slightly younger than the Sinhalese and we have a significantly larger share of female respondents in the Sri Lankan Tamil sample – this, however, reflects general patterns in the population where we collected the data. The educational level does not differ between the two groups. Given the geographical division of ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan Tamils mainly come from the Northern districts, whereas the Sinhalese form the majority in the South. However, the sample also includes some mixed districts, such as Kaluthara in the Southwest or Mullaitivu in the Northeast, where both Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese were interviewed. A more detailed description of the sample distribution, the sampling technique, and the question wording of our main variables can be found in Table A1 in the Online appendix.

In order to analyze the hypothesized relationships, we implement path models (structural equation modeling), because they allow us to test how concepts are linked theoretically and indicate the (causal) directions of the relationships (Schreiber, 2006). The structural model displays the paths between variables as a succession of structural equations, similarly to running several multiple regressions. It thereby takes dependencies between the variables into account and allows the separation of direct and indirect effects.

Political tolerance

Following well-established measures of tolerance (Gibson, 1992; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1993), we operationalize the dependent variable as the willingness of the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese to extend basic civil liberties to members of the opposing ethnic group. We measure the permission of different civil liberties based on the answers to the following question: ‘Do you think that the Sinhalese/Sri Lankan Tamils should be allowed…(a) to hold official government positions; (b) to make a speech in this village/city/town/community; (c) to hold public demonstrations; (d) to vote in elections.’ Capturing basic democratic rights, these items have been widely used in previous studies of political tolerance (Hutchison, 2014; Hutchison & Gibler, 2007; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003). In contrast to prior studies, we implement each of the four rights as a single dependent variable instead of constructing one political tolerance indicator, since the impact of war experiences on the willingness to grant these rights may vary with their saliency in a postwar environment. These dependent variables are dichotomous variables, indicating whether or not the individual is willing to grant this right.

War experience

In order to examine the impact of war on political tolerance, we capture war exposure with the help of a dichotomous measure indicating whether the respondent directly experienced any acts of war, ranging from witnessing shooting, bombing or other attacks to having been held captive or having to leave the country.

Table I.

Descriptive statistics of main variables; comparison of Sri Lankan Tamil and Sinhalese respondents

	Sri Lankan Tamils		Sinhalese
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	F	p
War experience	0.85	0.36	0.10	0.30	5715.7	0.00
Ethnic prejudice	4.26	2.32	3.94	1.72	4.85	0.03
Never forgive	1.79	1.09	1.24	0.74	98.04	0.00
Political tolerance
Holding public office	0.73	0.45	0.75	0.43	1.56	0.21
Voting in elections	0.73	0.44	0.94	0.24	140.91	0.00
Demonstration	0.06	0.24	0.36	0.48	167.72	0.00
Public speech	0.67	0.47	0.60	0.49	7.43	0.00

To address the potential obstacles laid out by war experiences on the way toward political tolerance, we use the following question to capture Ethnic prejudice: ‘Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: Differences between ethnic groups are innate’; answer categories range from strongly disagree (0) to strongly agree (7). The variable Interethnic forgiveness measures how respondents cope with the aftermath of war: ‘I can never forgive the members of the other ethnicities in this country for what they have done during the war, and I want nothing to do with them’. The categories range from strongly disagree (0) to strongly agree (3), with higher values indicating a greater tendency toward not forgiving former enemies.

In addition to these variables, we further include each respondent’s ethnicity, in terms of either being Sri Lankan Tamil or Sinhalese. Due to the differences in war experiences between these two groups as well as potential cultural determinants of political tolerance, it is important to control for this personal characteristic. Additionally, we control for the respondents’ age, gender, and educational level; however, we do not focus on these variables’ respective impact on political tolerance. Our primary interests are the pathways from war experiences to political tolerance between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese.

Empirical results

As a first step, we examine the descriptive statistics in Table I. Regarding the four political tolerance measures, we observe that the willingness to grant the specific rights varies by the right in question as well as by ethnic group. Whereas a majority of both ethnic groups are willing to grant the other group the rights to vote, to make a speech or to hold public office, only small shares of each group will grant the other ethnic group the right to demonstrate. Only 6% of the Sri Lankan Tamils and 36% of the Sinhalese are willing to grant the other group this right, which indicates that demonstration is a highly contested civil liberty in the Sri Lankan context. Further, the Sinhalese and Tamils differ with regard to their support of the right to vote: while 94% of the Sinhalese would support the right to vote for their former opponents, only 73% of the Sri Lankan Tamils would render this right to the Sinhalese. In contrast, we see no substantial differences between the two ethnic groups in rendering the right to hold public office and only a small difference in the support of making public speeches.

Turning to war experiences, we find that their distribution is highly unequal between the two ethnic groups. Sri Lankan Tamils were significantly more exposed to war than the Sinhalese. In our sample, 85% of the Sri Lankan Tamils experienced war, whereas roughly 10% of the Sinhalese were directly exposed to the war. Concerning ethnic prejudice, Table I shows that Sinhalese individuals (mean = 3.94, sd = 1.72) have a significantly lower level of ethnic prejudice than Tamils (mean = 4.26, sd = 2.32). Similarly, the Sinhalese (mean = 1.24, sd = 0.74) are significantly more likely to forgive than the Tamils (mean = 1.79, sd = 1.09).

To test our research question of whether and how war experiences influence political tolerance directly or indirectly through forgiveness and ethnic prejudice, we estimate path models with the sem-command in Stata 14.2. The results of the path models are displayed in Figure 2 – full results can be found in Table A2 in the Online appendix. Overall, the findings concerning the four different rights reveal a complex relationship between our variables: war experiences show no effect, a positive effect or a negative direct effect depending on the civil liberty in question. The willingness to allow public speech and to hold public office is increased by war experiences, which speaks against our theoretical expectations. At the same time, war experiences clearly diminish one’s

Figure 2.

Results path diagram analyses

likelihood to support the right to hold a demonstration. Turning to the indirect effect of war experience, we see that ethnic prejudice is not influenced by war experiences in any of the models. This is not the case with forgiveness: war experience makes individuals less forgiving. This corresponds with earlier findings by Bakke, O’Loughlin & Ward (2009). More specifically, not forgiving is determined by one’s degree of war experiences and ethnic prejudice. The direct effect of ethnic prejudice on the four civil liberties is quite unstable: we observe either no effect or a negative effect. Being ethnically prejudiced seems to matter only for one’s tendency to render the right to hold public office and to allow public speeches. In contrast, the findings concerning interethnic forgiveness are much clearer: not forgiving has the strongest negative impact on all four political tolerance measures. These diverse findings need some more clarification.

Table II summarizes the total and direct effects of the estimated path models in the upper half of the table. First, looking at the total effects, we see that the counterintuitive positive direct effect of war experiences loses its significance as well as half of its impact on the dependent measures of holding public office or a public speech.

Table II.

Direct and total effects on political tolerance

	Public office		Vote in elections		Demonstrate		Public speech
	Direct effect	Total effect	Direct effect	Total effect	Direct effect	Total effect	Direct effect	Total effect
Full sample
War experience	0.10** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	–0.02 (0.03)	–0.05 (0.03)	–0.15*** (0.03)	–0.16*** (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Ethnic prejudice	–0.01*** (0.00)	–0.02*** (0.00)	–0.00 (0.00)	–0.01** (0.00)	–0.00 (0.01)	–0.01 (0.00)	–0.03*** (0.00)	–0.04*** (0.00)
Never forgive	–0.13*** (0.01)	–0.13*** (0.01)	–0.06*** (0.01)	–0.06*** (0.01)	–0.06*** (0.00)	–0.06*** (0.03)	–0.14*** (0.01)	–0.14*** (0.01)
Tamil subsample
War experience	–0.08 (0.06)	–0.13*** (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	–0.07 (0.06)	–0.11*** (0.00)	–0.12*** (0.02)	–0.06 (0.06)	–0.13* (0.06)
Ethnic prejudice	–0.00 (0.00)	–0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	–0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	–0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.02)	–0.00 (0.00)
Never forgive	–0.06*** (0.02)	–0.06*** (0.02)	–0.11*** (0.02)	–0.11*** (0.02)	–0.02* (0.01)	–0.02* (0.01)	–0.11*** (0.02)	–0.11*** (0.02)
Sinhalese subsample
War experience	0.19*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.06)	–0.03 (0.03)	–0.02 (0.03)	–0.18*** (0.04)	–0.19*** (0.04)	0.14** (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)
Ethnic prejudice	–0.03*** (0.00)	–0.03*** (0.00)	–0.02*** (0.00)	–0.02*** (0.00)	–0.02 (0.01)	–0.02* (0.00)	–0.06*** (0.00)	–0.06*** (0.00)
Never forgive	–0.19*** (0.02)	–0.19*** (0.02)	–0.02 (0.01)	–0.02 (0.01)	–0.10*** (0.02)	–0.10*** (0.02)	–0.17*** (0.00)	–0.17*** (0.00)

Standardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table III.

Path model – single civil liberties as dependent measures: Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese subsamples

	Allow to hold public office	Allow to vote in elections	Allow to demonstrate	Follow public speech
Sri Lankan Tamil sample
DV: Ethnic prejudice
War experience	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
DV: Never forgive
War experience	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Ethnic prejudice	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
DV: Granting civil right
War experiences	–0.07	0.00	–0.20***	–0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Ethnic prejudice	–0.03	0.05	0.02	0.05
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Never forgive	–0.16**	–0.26***	–0.11*	–0.25***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
N	461	461	461	461
aic	9,434.09	8,640.29	8,640.29	9,465.60
bic	9,516.76	8,722.96	8,722.96	9,548.27
Sinhalese sample
DV: Ethnic prejudice
War experience	–0.08**	–0.08**	–0.08**	–0.08**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
DV: Never forgive
War experience	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic prejudice	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
DV: Granting civil right
War experiences	0.13***	–0.04	–0.11***	0.09**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ethnic prejudice	–0.10***	–0.12***	–0.06	–0.20***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Never forgive	–0.31***	–0.06	–0.16***	–0.25***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	1,011	1,011	1,011	1,011
aic	18,699.70	18,951.65	18,951.65	18,956.97
bic	18,798.07	19,050.02	19,050.02	19,055.35

Standard errors in parentheses; standardized coefficients; models are controlled for age, educational level, and gender. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

More precisely, although there is a positive effect of war experiences on the permission of basic civil liberties, this effect is considerably hampered by the intermediate mechanisms; in particular, one’s tendency of not forgiving. In sum, these results imply that direct war experiences represent hurdles on the path toward political tolerance by impeding the cognitive process of forgiveness.

To further test the robustness of the above-presented results, we ran additional path models for Sinhalese and Tamil subsamples separately (see Table III). These results offer helpful insights on the mechanisms at play. First, it is evident that the direct positive effect of war experience on the right to make a speech and hold public office is present only in the Sinhalese sample. We do not find this relationship in the Tamil sample. More interestingly, the direct negative relationship between war experiences and granting the other group the right to demonstrate is present among members of both ethnic groups. This is the only significant direct effect of war experience in the Tamil sample. The displayed total effects support our assumption that war experience triggers less tolerant attitudes, even though this is only evident through intermediate mechanisms. We may therefore conclude that the direct effect of war experience on political tolerance is less powerful than we expected. Second, the results indicate that the indirect mechanisms at play differ between the subsamples. The results for the Sri Lankan Tamil sample do not essentially differ from those of the full sample above. They support our main finding that ethnic prejudice does not play a role in the formation of Sri Lankan Tamils’ political tolerance, whereas ethnic prejudice seems to be very important for the formation of political tolerance of the Sinhalese towards the Sri Lankan Tamils.

Third, these subsample analyses confirm the relevance of forgiving for political tolerance: never forgiving is the only indicator that has a consistent, negative and significant influence on all four civil liberties. The results show that war experiences and ethnic prejudice play a decisive role by reducing one’s likelihood to forgive. Moreover, when looking at the direct and total effects in Table II, we see that war experiences gain in influence through the mechanism of forgiveness, in particular in the Sri Lankan Tamil sample; this can be seen by the larger total direct effect. This means that war experience impacts the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils’ levels of political tolerance through the intermediate mechanisms of not forgiving and ethnic prejudice. The first effect is the strongest explanatory factor for political tolerance in the Sinhalese subsample. These findings underscore the necessity of analyzing the intermediate mechanisms between war experience and tolerance formation, in particular, as the establishment of political tolerance highly differs between the two ethnic groups. Moreover, the presented findings show that an additive index of political tolerance, which is often used in other studies on political tolerance, would conceal the variation in the willingness to guarantee these four basic civil liberties. It should, however, be noted that the above analyses contain a very small proportion of Sinhalese people with war experiences (i.e. 10% of the Sinhalese sample) and Sri Lankan Tamils without war experiences (i.e. 15% of the Tamil sample).³

Discussion and conclusion

A number of scholars have emphasized the necessity of reconciliation to create lasting peace in postwar countries (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Bar-Tal, Rosen & Nets-Zehngut, 2009; Nadler, Malloy & Fisher, 2008; Staub et al., 2005). In this article, we focused on the distinct path from war experiences toward political tolerance, arguing that political tolerance is a condition facilitating postwar peaceful coexistence. We asserted that such shattering experiences are life-changing and, thus, are likely to impact individual attitudes toward members of the former opponent ethnic group. Yet, we were particularly interested in analyzing the intermediate mechanisms between war experience and the formation of political tolerance, namely, moving on from ethnic animosities and forgiving the other group – two cognitive processes known to influence the peaceful coexistence of opposing groups.

Although our findings indicate that political tolerance can be promoted by letting go of ethnic prejudice and embracing interethnic forgiveness, they also show that individual war experiences represent significant obstacles to political tolerance. While prior studies, which rely on an additive index of political tolerance, have emphasized a direct, negative influence of war experiences on political tolerance, our results revealed a more nuanced picture. We argue that civil liberties differ in their salience and the potential threat they pose. Our findings suggest that while allowing opponents to make a public speech, hold public office or to vote are almost equally acceptable for Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese, the right to demonstrate is highly contested. Moreover, we found that the effect of war exposure on granting this right is strongly negative for both ethnic groups. In the case of the three other rights, the effect is either positive or not significant. Yet, although our main conclusions appear to be rather consistent (cf. Table S1 in the supplementary material in the Online appendix), these conclusions are drawn based on a sample containing small proportions of Sinhalese people with war experiences and Sri Lankan Tamils without war experiences.

Overall, our findings demonstrate that the total effect of war is negative on all types of political tolerance: by making individuals less forgiving, war exposure decisively reduces their likelihood to grant civil liberties to opponent groups. Interethnic forgiveness thereby plays a crucial mediating role in the relationship between war exposure and political tolerance formation. Part of the unwillingness to forgive is explained by ethnic prejudice. For members of both ethnic groups, ethnic prejudice is related to a stronger unwillingness to forgive the other group. Whereas war experiences do not appear to explain Tamil levels of ethnic prejudice, contrary to our expectations, war experiences reduce ethnic prejudice in the Sinhalese sample. Where does ethnic prejudice come from and how can the positive impact of war on ethnic prejudice be explained? Ethnic prejudice may be a part of a person’s personality (Adorno et al., 1950) or a sociocultural norm (Turner & Giles, 1981). Life-changing experiences, such as war exposure, may also change an individual’s deeply rooted evaluation of opposing groups. The finding that prejudice is reduced by war experience among the Sinhalese is contrary to our expectations. Although it can be theorized that war may have a ‘sobering’ effect on ethnic prejudice where ethnic prejudice is already high, further analysis is needed to explore the driving factors of this relationship.

On one hand, our results provide ground for slight optimism about the future of peaceful coexistence among these two groups in Sri Lanka, as war victims and the general population are not as intolerant as expected. Large shares of both ethnic groups are willing to grant the rights to vote, hold public office, and make public speeches to the members of the other group. These relatively high approval rates most likely reflect the past and present political reality in Sri Lanka, as well as the level of perceived threat related to their exercise. The current political situation is still marked by an asymmetric political relationship, with the Sinhalese majority dominating Sri Lankan politics. This asymmetric power relationship lowers the threshold for the Sinhalese to grant Tamils the rights of voting, holding public office, and public speech without feeling threatened in their position or their politics. Further, the higher willingness to grant these rights may represent an acknowledgement of the need to grant Tamils a stronger voice within the political institutions, in order to prevent future conflict. The share of the Tamil minority which is willing to grant these rights to the Sinhalese is also surprisingly high, considering the less reconciliatory postwar political environment. There are at least two possible explanations for these high rates of tolerance. A relatively optimistic explanation for these high shares can be that many Tamils are tired of conflict and view tolerance as one path to build a future of peace. It may, however, also reflect the Tamil realization that they live in a political system where the Sinhalese form such an overwhelming political majority that whether or not they grant them these rights is irrelevant for their own political reality. Nevertheless, we cannot completely exclude the possibility that these high rates among the Tamils are somewhat influenced by the time period in which the survey data was collected – a relatively optimistic period for democracy, right after the election of President Sirisena. With the democratic victory over former President Rajapaksa, Tamils’ belief in democratic institutions may have returned or at least have grown. This may have reduced the perceived threat posed by the Sinhalese through the exercise of regular political rights, increasing Tamils’ willingness to grant these more institutionalized civil liberties. Further studies on political tolerance within this context are needed in order to assess the general reliability of these results.

On the other hand, we also found that the right to demonstrate is a highly contested civil liberty for both ethnic groups. How does the right to demonstrate differ from the other rights? The right to demonstrate may be more controversial in post-conflict settings than the other rights due to the risk of confrontations arising between groups when this right is exercised. In Sri Lanka, demonstrations and protests have often developed into violent clashes between opposing groups. Further, demonstrations may particularly induce perceptions of threat among members of the Tamil minority, due to their experience of insufficient protection by the state during riots in the past (e.g. during Black July in 1983). Such protests are also likely to be perceived as the most invasive in areas where minority members are in the majority, possibly explaining the extremely low willingness among Tamils to allow Sinhalese to demonstrate. Finally, individuals exposed to war are likely to perceive more threat in general, making war victims particularly reluctant to grant this right, possibly explaining the extremely low willingness of Tamils to grant this right to the Sinhalese.

The negative relationship between war experiences and political tolerance, largely driven by the reluctance to forgive and ethnic prejudice, directly speaks to the broader body of literature on the negative legacy of war on postwar attitudes and behavior, which has documented long-term negative implications of violence for intergroup relations, as well as for support for peace and group-based voting patterns (Balcells, 2012; Grossman, Manekin, & Miodownik, 2015; Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016). Seen in the light of this literature, our findings imply that postwar efforts to promote forgiveness are necessary for members of both groups to move beyond the desire for revenge. Studies from post-conflict Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina indicate that positive intergroup contact promotes forgiveness, even in highly segregated societies (Cehajic, Brown & Castano, 2008; Hewstone et al., 2006; Tam et al., 2008).

Moreover, the presented findings also have implications for the current political context in Sri Lanka. Although our findings show that certain favorable conditions for peaceful coexistence are already present, they also imply tensions and potential for confrontations between the two groups. The level of controversy related to the right to demonstrate is most likely an indication of the more profound challenges that the country faces, also at the macro level, in the development of sustainable peace between the two groups. In order to further promote political tolerance, institutional reforms signaling that the government of Sri Lanka represents and protects all citizens are needed. Further, it is essential to address the grievances that fueled the war. The reconciliation of the government and the Tamil citizens through reparations and transitional justice can spill over to micro-level relations between members of the two groups, further fostering intergroup tolerance and trust. In the end, it is the combination of political tolerance on both the micro and macro levels that may foster a continuous peaceful coexistence and moving forward on the path towards reconciliation.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material, Online_appendix_Supplementary_material - Moving forward? How war experiences, interethnic attitudes, and intergroup forgiveness affect the prospects for political tolerance in postwar Sri Lanka

Supplemental Material, Online_appendix_Supplementary_material for Moving forward? How war experiences, interethnic attitudes, and intergroup forgiveness affect the prospects for political tolerance in postwar Sri Lanka by Sara Kijewski and Carolin Rapp in Journal of Peace Research

Footnotes

Replication data

The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, along with the Online appendix, can be found at .

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the editors of the Journal of Peace Research and the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. In addition, we are grateful to the participants in the workshops at the 75th Annual MPSA Conference in Chicago, and the ECPR General Conference 2017, Oslo, where an earlier version of the article was presented. All remaining errors are our own.

ORCID iD

Sara Kijewski

Notes

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