Not Just ‘Sinking Islands’: Climate Change and Adaptation in Small Island Developing States

Abstract

Small Island Developing States are among the countries which are hit the most by climate change, and especially by sea-level rise. In this article, I argue against the narrative focused on plans for collective relocation for the populations of Small Island Developing States. I argue that focusing exclusively on relocation leads us to endorse a ‘doomsday’ approach, which normalises the inevitability of territory loss, and obscures theoretically distinct and pressing problems related to how to tackle the current environmental issues and resource scarcity affecting those countries. In the first part of the article, I argue that adaptation efforts, which are systematically neglected in the dominant political theory literature about Small Island Developing States, should be prioritised over plans for relocation. In the second part of the article, I start to cast light on some of the normative dilemmas raised by a close focus on adaptation, and I defend a community-based approach to adaptation in Small Island Developing States.

Keywords

climate adaptation climate change Small Island Developing States Kiribati relocation

During the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference, COP27, the President of Kiribati, Taneti Maamau, addressed world leaders highlighting the increasingly challenging living conditions in Kiribati. He stressed the impact of climate change on Kiribati’s atolls; how climate-related issues disrupt the availability of essential local resources; and how this situation affects the livelihoods of the I-Kiribati (i.e. members of the Kiribati population). President Maamau asked wealthy countries for ‘data, capacity building and technology transfer, and country specific science projections to make our adaptation planning much more effective’.¹ His policy plan is focused on in situ adaptation measures to ensure that the I-Kiribati will not lose their country and unique way of life (Government of Kiribati, 2016).

Small Island Developing States (SIDS), such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Maldives and the Marshall Islands, are some of the most hit countries by the effects of climate change. In recent years, the possibility of these entire countries disappearing due to sea-level rise has captured increasing attention under the label of ‘sinking islands’ (Boas et al., 2019; Farbotko, 2019). Several scholars have discussed theoretical solutions to the scenario of ‘inevitable relocation’ for populations of SIDS (e.g. Angell, 2021; Heyward, 2016; Kolers, 2012; Nine, 2010; Ödalen, 2014; Risse, 2009; Stilz, 2019; Vaha, 2015). While these are relevant works in the eventuality that collective relocation becomes inevitable, these authors have tended to assume the uninhabitability of SIDS regardless of uncertain scientific projections. In response to the ‘sinking island’ framing, an increasing number of scholars have instead offered arguments in favour of considering in situ adaptation as a relevant aspect of addressing climate mobilities beyond relocation plans (Baldwin, 2022; Boas et al., 2022; Capisani, 2021; Farbotko et al., 2020; Farbotko and McMichael, 2019; Klöck and Nunn, 2019; Zickgraf, 2018). As recognised by scholars (e.g. Baldwin, 2022; Farbotko et al., 2023; Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Perumal, 2018), focusing on relocation leads us to endorse a ‘doomsday’ narrative that normalises the inevitability of territory loss and reinforces a narrative centred on the vulnerability and powerlessness of populations of SIDS. Furthermore, it obscures theoretically distinct and interesting problems related to managing resources that are growing scarcer and scarcer in the short- to medium-term, whether or not relocation will eventually become necessary.

This article is an intervention in the debate regarding climate change and adaptation in SIDS. Given the unprecedented pace of anthropogenic climate change coupled with sea-level rise, the question of the habitability of low-lying atolls is especially salient. How to address the effects of climate change in SIDS is one of the most pressing issues of our time, one that needs significant and timely action and effective policy development and implementation. Currently, solutions are not efficiently drafted and adaptation efforts are substantially underfunded. In this article, I grapple with this urgent issue by contributing to questioning the narrative of the ‘sinking islands’ and exploring the possibility of a community-based in situ adaptation.

In the article, I focus on the Republic of Kiribati, where the surge in climate-related issues raises distinct problems of justice that hinder the possibility of maintaining suitable living conditions for the I-Kiribati, regardless of future territorial loss. Many of the considerations valid in this case are relevant for similar cases, but a full account of justice for SIDS must be context-sensitive (Walshe and Stancioff, 2018). Throughout my analysis, I propose an original capabilities-based response that justifies the I-Kiribati’s claims over their particular territory, since specific places and resources are essential and non-substitutable for their ability to exercise relevant capabilities. In addition, I argue that addressing environmental problems in Kiribati is required right now, regardless of future territorial loss. I stress the importance of respecting the I-Kiribati’s agency and their right to maintain their collective self-determination. Finally, I justify a community-led approach to climate adaptation drawing from the capabilities approach.

The article is structured as follows. Section ‘Kiribati: An Island Nation Facing the Threat of Climate Change’ sets out the salient features of Kiribati’s situation and its special vulnerability to climate change. Section ‘Against the “Doomsday” Narrative’ defends in situ adaptation plans as normatively significant in the context of climate mobilities in SIDS against a narrow focus on cross-border relocation plans. Section ‘Climate Adaptation: A Community-Based Approach’ defends a community-based approach to climate adaptation. Section ‘Conclusion’ concludes.

Kiribati: An Island Nation Facing the Threat of Climate Change

Here, I provide an overview of the Republic of Kiribati, necessary to understand the precariousness of living conditions in Kiribati. Note that this article’s emphasis is on normative questions; hence, a comprehensive empirical analysis goes beyond the scope of the analysis (see Government of Kiribati, 2007, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2019; Hay and Onorio, 2006; Oakes et al., 2016; UNDRR, 2020).

The Republic of Kiribati consists of 33 islands extending over 3.6 million km² in the Pacific Ocean. 32 of these islands (21 inhabited) are low-lying atolls rising no more than 2–3 m above sea level. The most populated atolls are South Tarawa and Kiritimati. The other islands – called ‘outer islands’ – are less densely populated and accessible. Land, vegetation and agricultural resources are scarce in Kiribati. Guaranteed provision of water is also a challenge. Only marine resources have been traditionally abundant, given the size of Kiribati’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Kiribati became independent from the UK in 1979. Several factors, including the isolated geographical position, the country’s environmental features and the history of colonial domination, have contributed to an extreme level of poverty and a low standard of living. The main problems affecting Kiribati today include an increasing scarcity of natural resources; issues of over-population coupled with a lack of economic and financial resources and inadequate infrastructure; high levels of unemployment; an underdeveloped economy, whose main sectors are fishing, selling of fishing licences to foreign vessels and agricultural exports of copra.² With a population of 119,438 (in 2020), the country is forced to rely on sources of foreign aid to sustain itself.³

Kiribati is among the countries hit the most by climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023: Chap.15; World Bank Group and Asian Development Bank, 2021). Aside from accelerating sea-level rise, additional climate-related issues contribute to the rapid deterioration of Kiribati’s environment (e.g. floodings, extreme weather events, soil salination). Climate change intersects with existing economic, social and political vulnerabilities, and exacerbates issues that are traditionally drivers of voluntary or forced migration, such as unemployment, over-population and poverty (Draper, 2022a). Hence, the problem is not only climate change per se or the future loss of land due to sea-level rise but also how environmental changes jeopardise people’s ability to maintain their lives and livelihoods in their country.

Against the ‘Doomsday’ Narrative

In this section, I contribute to questioning the ‘sinking islands’ narrative and defend the relevance of in situ adaptation measures for the population of Kiribati through a capabilities-based response. As several scholars contend (Baldwin, 2022; Farbotko et al., 2023; Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012), we should refrain from adopting the trope of ‘sinking islands’ when those islands have not sunken yet. The problem with selectively focusing on relocation plans is that the ‘doomsday approach’ leads to normalising a loss that has not occurred yet (Barnett, 2017; Farbotko, 2010). Although in some SIDS, parts of the land are already submerged by the sea and habitable land will likely be further submerged (IPCC, 2023), the complete loss of territory and inevitability of ex situ relocation remain future projections. Not all scientific projections correspond to observed empirical changes in the environmental conditions of SIDS and the timeframe of these projections is uncertain (Barnett, 2017; Farbotko and Campbell, 2022; Jarillo and Barnett, 2022).

In what follows, I explore the following points raised by President Maamau’s speech at COP27 in support of in situ adaptation measures: (a) the close link that runs between the livelihoods and identity of the I-Kiribati and their territory; (b) the current environmental problems in Kiribati, which constitute a serious challenge to the I-Kiribati’s lives and livelihoods; (c) the population’s hope that they will not be forced to relocate elsewhere. In section ‘Capabilities and Environmental Conditions’, I outline an original capabilities-based framework to justify the normative significance of the I-Kiribati’s relation with their territory, providing theoretical support for its non-substitutability. More precisely, I clarify the notion of place attachment and argue that many of the I-Kiribati’s relevant capabilities depend on the specific territory and resources available on the atolls. In section ‘The Importance of the Timeframe’, I consider the significance of the timeframe for adaptation/relocation measures and argue that guaranteeing suitable living conditions in Kiribati for as long as possible can help ensure the respect of fundamental aspects of the I-Kiribati’s agency. In section ‘The Democratic Argument for In Situ Adaptation’, I defend a democratic argument, according to which the I-Kiribati’s voices and preferences should be heard to draft efficient policy and guarantee their self-determination. Finally, in section ‘Political Realism and the Political Cost of Relocation’, I note how their right to self-determination is unlikely to be respected after relocation.

Capabilities and Environmental Conditions

The following analysis clarifies the moral relevance of the concept of place attachment invoked by theorists in the context of climate migration in SIDS (Farbotko et al., 2023; Farbotko and McMichael, 2019; Perumal, 2018). I argue that analysing the relationships between individuals and their surrounding environment using the concept of capabilities isa fruitful way to defend the right of some communities to maintain access to their territory, providing support for in situ adaptation measures.

Capabilities are a possible metric of justice, introduced by Sen (1980, 1999) to assess states of affairs in society. A capability ‘represents the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve’ (Sen, 1992: 40). Capabilities are considered elements of human flourishing (Nussbaum, 2000) and are a mediating concept between the provision of resources to individuals and their ability to achieve well-being. Robeyns (2020: 3–4) argues that ‘capabilitarian accounts of wellbeing serve as a less-abstract account of wellbeing’ since they specify relevant dimensions of well-being, by outlining a pluralistic account that is context-dependent and close to people’s lived experiences. Relevant capabilities (and functionings) that matter to people are decided via a bottom-up approach, which avoids prescribing a ‘set in stone’ list of valuable capabilities. For the case of SIDS, this is useful so as not to misrepresent the experiences of the population and oversimplify each specific context. An additional advantage of the capabilities approach is its sensitivity to interpersonal variations. Individuals have different abilities to reach functionings even when given the same amount of external resources. The key idea is that several conversion factors (i.e. personal, social and environmental) affect people’s ability to convert resources into functionings. For the present analysis, environmental ones are especially salient.

At this point, it is helpful to consider Capisani’s (2021) argument in favour of respecting people’s right to a suitable locality in the context of climate mobilities. Capisani draws from the capabilities approach to ground ‘a right to a livable locality’. Her argument is significant in the context of SIDS since it supports policies aimed at protecting people’s ability to adapt to the (new) space they occupy, including in situ adaptation measures. According to Capisani (2021: 240), being in a liveable space is a relevant functioning that ‘involves being in a co-constitutive relationship to the places one occupies’. Disruptions to such relationships compromise people’s stability and sense of security. However, the relationship is ‘co-constitutive’ since Capisani accounts for the ongoing process of people’s choice-making and adaptation within the spaces they inhabit. Capisani rightly recognises the fundamental importance of place and stresses how the interactions between places and people are dynamic and mediated by different conversion factors, including environmental ones.

As in Capisani (2021), I also draw from the capabilities approach to account for the normative significance of places and justify in situ adaptation measures. However, I specifically zoom in on environmental conversion factors rather than focusing on the broader concept of liveability. Capisani (2021: 251) considers different conversion factors that influence liveability but does not single out environmental ones specifically. Instead, I follow Holland’s (2012) insight, as she conceives the environment as a ‘meta-capability’ prior and necessary for exercising any other capability. In my view, adequate environmental conditions are a pre-condition for exercising any capabilities and require more careful examination besides other conversion factors. Adequate environmental conditions shape people’s ability to reach well-being, acting as the stable background against which they can exercise capabilities and convert them into functionings (e.g. Holland, 2012; Polishchuk and Rauschmayer, 2012).

Although it might be argued that all capabilities are, to some extent, ‘place-based’ (Robeyns, 2020) since every capability requires a place/environment in which it can be actualised, there are cases in which individual capabilities (and correlated functionings) depend on particular environmental conditions. We can specify the concept of place-based capabilities by considering two different cases. In the first case, every capability – to be exercised and actualised into a functioning – requires access to generic environmental conditions and resources, such as water, food sources and clean air. This grounds a general right to suitable environmental conditions and the resources necessary for people to exercise their capabilities, starting from survival. In the second case, some capabilities can be instead exercised only with access to specific environmental conditions and use of local natural resources. This would ground special rights (e.g. access, use) to a particular environment for some individuals and communities.

Theorists of territorial rights and natural resource justice address this second case from outside the capabilities approach in their analyses of ‘attachment claims’ to territory and resources (Armstrong, 2017; Moore, 2019; Stilz, 2019). Similar to the concept of ‘place attachment’ discussed, for instance, by Farbotko and McMichael (2019) in the context of SIDS, ‘attachment claims’ refer to meaningful relationships that people form with specific places. Notably, Stilz (2019: 157–186) acknowledges the existence of ‘practice-based interests’ that some individuals/populations, such as Indigenous or resource-dependent communities, have in carrying on a distinct way of life in a particular territory. In these cases, general basic interests towards fulfilling conditions of well-being are replaced with practice-based interests that can be sustained only within a specific environment, which becomes non-substitutable. Members of these communities are hence entitled to rights to that particular territory and resources (Armstrong, 2017; Stilz, 2019).

Consider, however, that the aforementioned theories, which ground special resource rights in the relevance of individual ‘practice-based’ interests, are under-specific since they cannot always precisely discriminate between what counts as a normative significant relationship between people and places versus what is only an expensive preference (De Biasio, 2024; Lo Coco and Schuppert, 2021; Mancilla, 2021). The same issue of indeterminacy underpins the concept of ‘place attachment’ to which scholars refer to justify the deep connection between populations of SIDS and their land (Farbotko, 2019; Farbotko and Campbell, 2022; Perumal, 2018). Among others, Capisani (2021) recognises the importance of specific localities for people. However, her account does not precisely state which aspects of people’s co-constitutive relationships with places are normatively significant. For instance, she mentions that small island communities in the Philippines object to relocation due to ‘concerns about livelihoods and the potential loss of fishing-related activities’ (Capisani, 2021: 224). Although this is sound, there is an underlying question that remains unanswered, namely which interests underpin people’s normatively significant relationships with places. Answering this question would provide a clearer way to decide when in situ adaptation is fundamental and relocation elsewhere would irremediably disrupt people’s well-being.

Through the capabilities-based framework that I outline, I specify which kinds of interests (in terms of valuable capabilities) can ground normatively significant relationships between some people and particular places. Therefore, exploring the connection between capabilities and environmental conditions helps specify the relevant concept of ‘attachment to place’ in the context of SIDS. A capabilities-based response that focuses on the idea of ‘environmental conversion factors’ clarifies which normatively significant interests justify the non-substitutability of a particular territory for members of SIDS. Consequently, it provides further support for the prospect of in situ adaptation measures, which would respect the non-substitutable relationship between populations of SIDS and their territory.

Although I have mentioned that outlining relevant capabilities requires participation and discussion with the individuals involved (see also section ‘Climate Adaptation: A Community-Based Approach’), I consider some essential capabilities by drawing from the concept of ‘basic individual capabilities’ that correspond to ‘capabilities to meet basic human needs’ (Alkire, 2002: 163) and include survival, health, emotional and psychological well-being, education and social relations (De Biasio, 2024; Robeyns, 2017; Sen, 1980). These capabilities can be specified at the level of the affected communities and valuable capabilities could be further added. In what follows, I examine those fundamental capabilities for the I-Kiribati’s case.

Consider first survival. As reported by the Kiribati Integrated Environment Policy (Government of Kiribati, 2013), around 80% of the population relies on a distinctive subsistence livelihood. The atolls’ environmental conditions have shaped the I-Kiribati’s way of living, starting from survival, which is linked to continued access to key local resources, such as tree crops and fishing resources (Cauchi et al., 2019). Concerning (physical) health beyond survival, the I-Kiribati still rely on the use of specific plants available in Kiribati to treat diseases and heal, following practices of traditional medicine. Although there is an increase in imported (Western) medicines, traditional practices are a significant part of medicine in Kiribati (Schutz et al., 2019).

In addition, the I-Kiribati’s emotional and psychological well-being is linked to the specific territory where they live. Many of the natural resources available are fundamental elements that underpin traditional practices and culture, from the production of handicrafts to forms of knowledge, on which the I-Kiribati’s sense of identity and stability depend (Government of Kiribati, 2013, 2019). Land is extremely significant and carries an irreplaceable cultural and symbolic value for the I-Kiribati’s identity, history, sense of community and belonging (Campbell, 2010). Forms of traditional practices relate to the capability of education too, since the I-Kiribati’s traditional education and knowledge are linked to the specific cultural heritage and traditions rooted in their land (Woodham et al., 2018).

Finally, for what concerns social relations, it is helpful to consider the concept of ‘ontological security’ discussed by Farbotko (2019) to capture the sense of identity and temporal continuity and wholeness of the individual, conceived in relation to others and their territory. The I-Kiribati society is a communal type of society where communities, such as the larger social kinship and the village, are integral parts of an individual’s identity (Kuruppu, 2009). For instance, when the I-Kiribati living on outer islands had to leave their traditional meeting town halls due to flooding, their sense of community belonging was significantly damaged (Cleverley, 2023).⁴

This overview shows that the I-Kiribati’s most essential capabilities depend on access and use of their specific territory. When the basic capabilities held by individuals depend on access to (or use of) specific natural resources, as outlined above, those individuals should be entitled to rights (e.g. access, use) over the natural resources and the specific environment in which they are embedded. The ‘grounded nature’ of exercising valuable capabilities justifies the I-Kiribati’s claim to maintaining continued access to their particular territory. In addition, the framework just outlined explains the sense of incommensurability which occurs when a specific territory is lost for those individuals. The environmental conditions and specific natural resources available on the atolls have shaped the I-Kiribati’s ability to actualise their capabilities into functionings, impacting their ability to reach a certain level of well-being. In line with the above analysis, the I-Kiribati fear that their traditional livelihoods, forms of culture, knowledge, skills and their distinctive identity and ‘uniqueness’ as I-Kiribati will disappear in the event of forced relocation (Government of Kiribati, 2009, 2019).

This does not imply that environmental conditions in Kiribati are not already changing and will not continue to change. The I-Kiribati will inevitably have to adapt to some changes in their territory. Yet, as Capisani (2021) rightly suggests, the relationships between places and people are dynamic. In Kiribati, climate change does not irremediably hinder the I-Kiribati’s capabilities for now, since people can adapt, to a certain extent, to their changing environment. In case of forced relocation, however, the I-Kiribati’s capabilities would be disrupted by placing them into a completely different environment with which they have not established a prior co-constitutive relationship.

Two relevant implications follow from this analysis: (a) in situ adaptation measures would be the only ones that respect the I-Kiribati’s claim to that particular territory; in all other cases, that link would be irremediably severed; (b) if relocation eventually becomes inevitable, then the original connection between the I-Kiribati and their environment should be respected in the best way possible, by granting access to a similar territory where their livelihoods could be replicated (with the proviso that the I-Kiribati wish to do so). This does not exclude that ex situ relocation cannot be supported if the I-Kiribati decide to migrate. Capabilities represent possibilities for specific ways of beings/doings; as possibilities, they do not have to be endorsed. If the I-Kiribati want to relocate elsewhere, this is entirely legitimate. Still, relocation should not be imposed without exploring options for in situ adaptation since this disrupts the I-Kiribati’s capabilities and, additionally, violates the I-Kiribati’s agency, as I clarify below.

The Importance of the Timeframe

The effects of climate change on SIDS consist of multiple events happening throughout a span of time, which cannot be classified as ‘one-time’ occurrences or natural disasters. If we focus solely on the loss of territory that SIDS could face in the future, we miss the point that several issues affecting Kiribati should be addressed in the short- to medium-term future. In this section, I explore how the timeframe of adaptation versus relocation measures is normatively important in the context of SIDS and I highlight the significance of respecting the I-Kiribati’s agency in choices of (im)mobility.

Consider the current issue of increasing conflicts over scarce natural resources in Kiribati. These conflicts are worsening due to the deterioration of valuable natural resources (e.g. water, food sources) and due to internal migratory movements and overcrowding in safer areas (i.e. higher areas, such as South Tarawa and Kiritimati). There is an enhanced risk of conflicts over fundamental resources and land, where the most vulnerable individuals in the population (e.g. the elderly, women, children, individuals living on ‘outer islands’) are particularly affected since they are the first ones to lose access to vital resources (Heltberg et al., 2009: 90). Referring back to the concept of capabilities as relevant dimensions of well-being, for many individuals living in SIDS, access to the resources necessary to exercise their capabilities is hindered by worsening environmental conditions (coupled with already existing factors of disadvantage). This situation ought to be addressed right now and not in the future. The burden should be shifted from help in the event of future relocation to help for the increasingly challenging conditions in SIDS today. As Bell (2004: 138) argues, the responsibilities to actual environmental refugees and potential ones are two questions that should be treated differently. Although I have refrained from using the label of ‘refugees’ (following Baldwin, 2022; Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Perumal, 2018), the underlying idea is similar: some individuals and communities in SIDS are facing unprecedented risks and negative consequences to their livelihoods due to climate-related effects that require to be addressed today. Consequently, efforts should be made right now to provide the resources necessary for individuals to achieve (at least) their basic capabilities.

Given the scarcity of economic and financial means to tackle issues of deprivation in Kiribati (and other SIDS), it is not surprising that ex situ relocation is often portrayed as the best (and only) solution to the current problems. However, this is a future intervention unable to provide a satisfactory solution to a situation affecting the I-Kiribati in the short- to medium-term. Furthermore, conceiving relocation as the only option and disregarding the possibility of in situ adaptation disrespects the I-Kiribati’s agency in choices of mobility and immobility. There are agency-based arguments to grant people the ability to pursue and maintain their life plans where they are located and to give them sufficient time to coordinate an active process of relocation, in the eventuality that it becomes inevitable. In addition, there are also practical reasons to favour a delayed process of relocation since this would arguably allow a less painful conversion of the I-Kiribati’s specific livelihoods.

Individuals living in SIDS who have ‘place-based’ capabilities should be given the tools and resources to maintain their lives in their territory for as long as possible, with the proviso that they wish to remain in their country. The concept of voluntary immobilityis aptly captured by the notion of capabilities, also defined as ‘the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or [. . .] the freedom to achieve various lifestyles)’ (Sen, 1999: 75). Here, it is helpful to consider de Haas’ (2021: 20) conception of the capability of human mobility, that is, ‘the ability to decide where to live, including the option to stay at home’.⁵ The importance of agency recognised by de Haas (2021) is fundamental for any capabilities-based account given that capabilities represent ‘opportunities to achieve functionings’.⁶ Valuing people’s decision on whether to relocate is fundamental to respecting individual agency.

However, the problem with forced relocation is not only that it prevents people from exercising their capability to decide where to live. Straehle (2023: 463) helpfully suggests that

personal agency has a backward-looking aspect to it. We are not only projecting ourselves into relationships in the future; we are also defining ourselves with reference to the past. [. . .] at least some of these practices are territorially defined. It is not clear that individuals can develop a sense of place in just any territory.

Stilz (2019) similarly argues for a right against forced removal and the respect for the continuity of individual ‘plan-based’ interests. In some cases (such as for SIDS populations), imposed relocation causes an additional issue since it prevents individuals from maintaining the essential conditions for their peculiar livelihoods, which depend on a specific environment. Forced relocation has a negative impact on key dimensions of an individual capability set in addition to hindering the capability of ‘human mobility’ (see also Bonfanti, 2014).

Therefore, migration should not be portrayed as the only option for the protection of populations of SIDS since it negatively affects their agency. As Zickgraf (2018: 80) contends, ‘policies addressing abilities to migrate (or rather the lack thereof) must concomitantly address (im)mobility aspirations rather than assuming them a priori’. This is echoed by Farbotko and McMichael (2019) who argue that all in situ adaptation options should have been exhausted before imposing relocation as the only viable solution. While there is nothing wrong with allowing individuals to voluntarily migrate when available opportunities in the home country are ‘good enough’ (Ottonelli and Torresi, 2013), voluntary immobility should be respected (Farbotko and McMichael, 2019; Zickgraf, 2018). Taking the occurrence of future relocation for granted, what Straehle (2023) calls ‘anticipatory displacement’, instead of trying to create the conditions for adaptation, is a form of injustice towards the affected individuals.

In addition, guaranteeing suitable living conditions in Kiribati for the time being provides more time for planning relocation if that becomes inevitable. Having a sufficient period to plan relocation would grant more time to involve the population in a process of active consultation. This would arguably enable the I-Kiribati to find a more suitable destination for settlement and provide the necessary timeframe to coordinate the relocation process. In practice, this will give the local population the possibility of proactive migration, that is, anticipated and planned, rather than reactive migration following a rapid deterioration of living conditions (Draper, 2021: 7). As the IPCC stresses, ‘there is medium evidence and high agreement that the degree of migrant agency and choice in decisions about whether to move, where, when and how is an important determinant of success and therefore “adaptiveness”’ (IPCC, 2023: 2076; emphasis added). Ensuring enough time to coordinate an eventual relocation process would help respect the I-Kiribati’s agency and their choices regarding mobility, and would likely have a positive impact on the success of relocation plans.

Finally, there are also instrumental reasons to favour a delayed process of relocation in an attempt to prepare the I-Kiribati to take care of their needs after relocation to a different environment. Going back to the capabilities-based framework I have outlined, some of the basic I-Kiribati’s functionings (conceived as actualised capabilities) have taken a determinate shape due to the close and constant interaction with their environment. Although possible, a ‘conversion’ of their functionings would be a process, presumably a long one, with correlated ‘transaction costs’ (Venkatapuram, 2011: 72). Time is needed to facilitate this process of conversion before relocation. This provides further support for a delayed relocation process. The population should have the opportunity to ‘migrate with dignity’, as per the policy framework upheld by Kiribati’s former President Anote Tong (2003–2016), which focused on possible ways to empower the I-Kiribati in the event of relocation (Hermann and Kempf, 2019). For instance, people should be given the tools to ‘reconvert’ their resource-dependent livelihoods with as little damage as possible, via, for instance, working and educational training (Byravan and Rajan, 2010: 253). Taken together, all these considerations call for attempts to make the living conditions in Kiribati as sustainable as possible, at least in the short- and medium-term, even if relocation might eventually become the only option.

The Democratic Argument for In Situ Adaptation

In situ adaptation is the main current strategy promoted by the Government of Kiribati (2016). President Maamau explicitly asks the international community for aid and assistance to ensure a successful climate adaptation in Kiribati.⁷ Note that this does not entail that all I-Kiribati reject migration proposals or that the Government of Kiribati opposes all plans for relocation. Yet, even if opinions are mixed, giving enough space to adaptation measures could help ensure that potential choices for relocation are genuine and not a reaction to a precipitation of events. Seeing relocation as the only viable option carries the risk of significantly obscuring the actual political reality in many SIDS, including Kiribati, whose citizens and governments do not all share the same outlook on relocation as the only solution to the current environmental issues (Vaha, 2017: 231). As rightly stressed by Perumal (2018: 51), ‘given many Pacific Islanders’ reluctance to move, policy speculation about climate migration may sometimes lack the local context to ask the right questions and may obscure proposals for other adaptation options’.

In light of these considerations, there is a democratic argument to be made for respecting what the population wants (starting from choices of mobility or immobility that respect the I-Kiribati’s individual agency, as argued earlier). This entails listening to the affected communities’ voices without prescribing a top-down solution that would lead to disempowering outcomes. As I further elaborate in section ‘Climate Adaptation: A Community-Based Approach’, it supports developing adaptation (and relocation) policies informed by the actual preferences and needs of SIDS populations through a community-based approach.

In favour of cross-border relocation, it could be argued that populations of SIDS, such as Kiribati, already experience movements of cross-border migration driven by a lack of employment opportunities, adequate healthcare service and educational opportunities. Climate change thus would not drastically modify the current migration patterns. However, as noted by the UNU-EHS report on ‘Kiribati: Climate Change and Migration’ (Oakes et al., 2016: 41), cross-border migration is an uncommon occurrence for the I-Kiribati: between 2005 and 2015, it amounted only to 13% of the total migration movements. Still, as Perumal (2018: 9–10) notes, a different problem arises when there is no possibility of returning to the old land, as in the case of collective relocation after the territory becomes uninhabitable. Hence, the two phenomena are not comparable.

In practical terms, relocation is often considered the only viable solution in the context of SIDS because it is relatively cost-efficient. Farbotko et al. (2020: 703) rightly point out that planned relocation as a solution to climate change in the context of SIDS is ‘at risk of becoming a self-legitimizing tool of population and territorial control’. Referring to Kiribati, it would probably be easier – in the eyes of the international community, not in the eyes of the locals – to relocate approximately 120,000 individuals (ca. the size of a not-so-large city) elsewhere, rather than providing the scientific expertise, technical tools and financial means to address the changes in the country’s environment. However, this attitude reinforces a neocolonial discourse that ends up favouring relocation versus adaptation since it is more cost-efficient from the standpoint of rich and high-emitting states, which arguably are responsible for mitigating the effects of climate change in SIDS (see section ‘Climate Adaptation: A Community-Based Approach’). Barnett (2017: 10) observes that ‘it is as if research and policy is afraid of the idea of successful adaptation led by atoll peoples, and is rather more in awe of the possibility of their powerlessness and displacement’ (see also Jarillo and Barnett, 2022; McNamara et al., 2022). It is almost taken for granted that the populations of SIDS will eventually be relocated to Australia or New Zealand (Barnett, 2017: 5).

What the affected population wants is completely disregarded. Regarding adaptation, attempts to implement a more hopeful approach that does not consider these countries as ‘sinking islands’ are largely disregarded by the international community. As evidenced by President Maamau’s speech at COP27, the I-Kiribati’s hope to explore different possibilities rather than only planning for the worst-case scenario, without assuming a priori that those possibilities do not exist. Regarding relocation, the proposed solution of the Kiribati Government before 2016 consisted of buying land in the Fiji Islands, which display similar environmental conditions to Kiribati’s atolls. The underlying rationale was the recognition of the indissoluble link between the I-Kiribati and their environment that the population wishes to maintain as much as possible, which the international community substantially overlooks since it prioritises instead plans for relocation to Australia or New Zealand. The affected population, however, should have the final say on whether they want to relocate or not (and where) in a way that would guarantee the respect of their collective right to self-determination.

Political Realism and the Political Cost of Relocation

Finally, there are considerations of political realism at play in the event of en masse climate displacement for the populations of SIDS. The loss of a permanent territorial base for populations of SIDS is normally associated with a correlated loss of political autonomy and capacity for collective self-determination. This is the puzzle behind the discussion of those cases by several theorists of territorial rights. Among the main proposals, Nine (2010) argues for redrawing territorial boundaries to ensure territorial sovereignty for the affected populations. Stilz (2019: 6) argues for a form of ‘intra-state’ autonomy, and tailored policies to respect the culture of SIDS’ populations.⁸ Others suggest a reconceptualisation of ‘statehood’ without requiring permanent residence in a territory (Ödalen, 2014).

The different proposals advanced by theorists to guarantee SIDS populations’ ability to exercise collective self-determination and their capacity to maintain a degree of political autonomy remain, however, theoretical discussions unlikely to be matched with practical implementation, at least for the time being. What political theorists suggest, that is, the receiving state curtailing their political authority in favour of communities that have just been admitted, is something we have never seen before. It is unlikely that populations forced to relocate cross-border will ever be able to exercise political autonomy elsewhere. As explained above, as far as the international community’s expectations and actual planning go, it is anticipated that SIDS populations will be relocated to neighbouring countries. The proposed solutions are not drafted to ensure their political independence and sovereignty over a new territory nor less demanding forms of political autonomy which would require the destination countries to implement more costly and challenging arrangements, whereas a less demanding arrangement could be to accept them as immigrants. Therefore, it seems that the best way of guaranteeing political autonomy and collective self-determination for the I-Kiribati is not through relocation to a different country but rather through exploring options for in situ adaptation, as the I-Kiribati themselves believe.

Climate Adaptation: A Community-Based Approach

I have argued so far that it is an injustice to only explore plans for cross-border relocation to tackle the issue of climate change in SIDS, and that adaptation efforts, which are largely underfunded for the time being, should be promoted too. This section considers some of the normative implications and challenges for the prospect of in situ adaptation in Kiribati, which raises difficult questions related to how to manage a situation of increasing environmental degradation. Examining climate adaptation alternatives and questions related to loss and damage in the context of SIDS is beyond the scope of this article; these proposals matter at the level of policy implementation. Although several scholars have started to explore the possibility of in situ adaptation in SIDS, much more empirical research is needed in this context (Klöck and Nunn, 2019). Here, I focus on one implication of the preceding analysis from a normative perspective and argue for a community-based approach to adaptation, leaving aside further investigation of realities on the ground.

A required preliminary observation is the acknowledgement that the majority of SIDS, including Kiribati, do not have the necessary technical tools nor sufficient financial and economic resources to ensure voluntary immobility for the population. This creates a situation of asymmetry where the I-Kiribati are necessarily dependent on foreign aid and decisions. In addition, as a consequence of the ‘doomsday narrative’ endorsed at the level of political discourse, the international community is likely to increasingly support aid initiatives related only to ex situ relocation (Farbotko et al., 2023), which would result in an even more limited amount of funding available for in situ adaptation.

It is not my aim here to discuss in detail broader issues of responsibility for climate change as well as considerations of reparative claims of corrective justice for the precarious situation in which many SIDS were left after the end of colonial rule (see Baatz, 2013; Caney, 2005; Draper, 2022b). I follow the main scholars of climate justice who argue that it is the task of the international community, and especially of wealthy high-emitting countries, to bear climate-related costs (e.g. Caney, 2005, 2010; Gardiner, 2004; Meyer, 2013; Page, 2012; Shue, 2014). These include costs for adaptation planning and implementation, but also other types of compensation, including mitigation measures and means to cover loss and damage.⁹ Scholars have proposed different solutions to the question of who should bear responsibility for bearing the costs of climate change. Although these proposals differ, the main ones – polluter pays principle, beneficiary pay principle, ability to pay principle – would all converge on recognising that the responsibility for costs to tackle climate change should not fall on the shoulders of SIDS.

SIDS did not contribute to climate change to a considerable extent, do not benefit from climate-disruptive practices and do not have the economic means to address climate-related challenges. Although an account of responsibility in the specific context of SIDS could be further developed, it is evident that countries other than SIDS have obligations to bear costs.¹⁰ This reflects President Maamau’s request of ‘data, capacity building and technology transfer’ advanced to the international community at COP27. The share of aid for climate adaptation that SIDS currently receive is extremely small and overall insufficient to tackle the gravity of the issues (Barnett, 2017: 6). Therefore, the amount of international aid and support should be considerably increased, for instance, by developing a targeted internationally funded climate adaptation scheme for SIDS, which would provide adequate financial means, scientific expertise and technology to support adaptation planning and implementation.

Given that the means and resources necessary to plan and implement adaptation measures in SIDS would have to substantially come from the international community, relevant questions to address are: who should decide on adaptation planning; and how these plans should be brought forward and realised in practice. The President of Kiribati highlighted the current gap between potential solutions for adaptation and the expectations of the local population:

Yet the major solutions that we talk about remain distant as we are at the mercy of multilateral implementing agencies who continue to determine how we adapt and access financial resources. Nevertheless, we remain hopeful that our collective efforts and partnership will address these concerns.¹¹

Overall, it seems that a fundamental element for a successful in situ adaptation in Kiribati (and other SIDS) is the participation of the local population in the process of planning and implementation (Kirkby et al., 2017; Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010).¹² This idea relates to the concept of community-driven resilience building, according to which the affected communities should be involved in adaptation efforts to increase the population’s resilience to climate-related changes in their territory. The relevance of community-driven planning against climate change is defended, among others, by Perumal (2018: 46) who, in her analysis of Vanuatu, argues that ‘a community-based policy which inherently centers the perspectives, participation, and decision-making of affected communities, would allow for community member control over movement – including the decision of whether to move at all’. Local communities (also at the sub-state level) need to be active agents in their adaptation process, rather than only passive recipients of funds and top-down decisions, to avoid a disconnection between policies and the realities on the ground (Perumal, 2018: 55). In addition, given preferences for voluntary immobility, solutions for in situ adaptation must be seriously considered by researchers and policy-makers (Farbotko and Campbell, 2022; Farbotko and McMichael, 2019).

In the rest of this section, I provide a preliminary analysis of a community-based approach to climate adaptation by drawing from the capabilities approach. As I argue below, the capabilities approach offers a useful normative framework for community-led adaptation, since it targets the specific needs of affected individuals and communities through a bottom-up participatory approach, and aims at developing context-dependent policies. In addition, I argue that considering the I-Kiribati’s knowledge of their territory contributes to drafting efficient policy that respects their relationship with their territory. Finally, I conclude by sketching some practical benefits of a community-led approach.

Agency and Empowerment of the I-Kiribati

The main reason for endorsing a community-based approach to climate adaptation in Kiribati (and in other SIDS) stems from recognising the value of participatory engagement. Direct participation of the affected population ensures respect for their agency since their preferences and needs are heard and considered (Johnson, 2012: 317). In section ‘Against the “Doomsday” Narrative’, I suggested that the capabilities approach offers a useful theoretical framework to justify climate adaptation policies. Recall that the capabilities approach is responsive to the role of environmental conversion factors. Recognising the normative significance of specific environmental conditions (necessary for individuals to actualise their capabilities) avoids outlining policies that are disconnected from the realities on the ground. For instance, Perumal (2018) raises this worry in her analysis of Vanuatu, when she notes how non-community-based policy fails to consider how the population of Vanuatu’s identity is tied up with their land.

Furthermore, the capabilities approach is context-dependent and responsive to the local populations’ actual ‘lived experiences’ (Schlosberg, 2012; Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010). The capabilities approach directs the attention to the specific capabilities deemed valuable by the I-Kiribati, through establishing a dialogue with the involved individuals and communities to decide on relevant aspects of their well-being. This is significant in grasping preferences for (im)mobility and ensuring the respect of the agency of the affected individuals. At this point, it could be objected that promoting adaptation plans based on the preferences, perceived needs and priorities of the local population could be counter-productive in terms of realism and efficiency. For instance, informed by the will of the I-Kiribati to remain in their country, ambitious plans for building artificial ‘floating islands’ have been promoted by the Government of Kiribati. Some of these plans are considered theoretically feasible (Lister and Muk-Pavic, 2015), but would require significant financial means (around £20 billion) that the Government of Kiribati is not likely to receive.¹³ However, even in cases where desired plans ultimately prove impracticable, there is an undeniable value in recognising the input of the locals, since this means that their agency is acknowledged by the international community. As previously argued, disempowering populations of SIDS by a priori ignoring their demands is a form of injustice that perpetuates a situation of existing disadvantage and ends up reinforcing a history of colonial domination.

Community-led resilience building has also the important benefit of involving the most vulnerable groups of the population in the adaptation process, by listening to their specific challenges (Westoby et al., 2020). As stressed by the ‘Disaster Risk Reduction in the Republic of Kiribati: Status Report 2019’(United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction [UNDRR], 2020), the most disadvantaged groups in the population (i.e. women, children, the elderly and individuals living on outer islands) are often the most affected ones. Although there is still a potential risk of misrepresenting the challenges and needs of specific individuals and communities even with a participatory approach, locally led climate adaptation enhances the possibility of addressing groups’ specific needs. For instance, consider the I-Kiribati living on outer islands who are the first ones to experience ‘tipping points’ in their livelihoods due to the higher vulnerability to climate change of outer atolls. This makes them among the least resilient I-Kiribati to environmental degradation, which often leaves them with no other choice but to relocate internally (Byravan and Rajan, 2010: 240). A participatory approach would help identify how climate change specifically affects their relevant capabilities and how to promote targeted solutions. Adaptation plans which consider their specific challenges would need to try promoting adaptation on their atolls, for as long as it is feasible, even if it might be more cost-effective to offer internal relocation to safer atolls as the optimal solution. In this case, a participatory approach to adaptation planning helps identify the specific challenges faced by ‘outer islands communities’ and draft more effective solutions.¹⁴

Epistemic Reasons and the I-Kiribati’s Relationship to their Environment

Furthermore, the local population has valuable knowledge of their surrounding environment, which should be included in a decision-making process regarding adaptation to environmental changes. Including the local forms of knowledge in adaptation planning and implementation has three main benefits: it prevents a form of epistemic injustice towards their knowledge as opposed to Western-dominated science; it ensures the recognition of the non-substitutable connection between the local population and their surrounding environment; and finally, it has a potentially positive impact on sustainability.

Regarding the first point, consider that the general approach to climate adaptation is dominated by Western science and technical expertise, which usually takes priority over local and traditional knowledge (Farbotko and Campbell, 2022). As argued by Byskov and Hyams (2022), the exclusion of forms of Indigenous knowledge within the process of climate adaptation constitutes a form of epistemic injustice. This exclusion is a result of the past of colonial domination and an imbalance of power, which unjustly discriminated against the local populations and their specific forms of knowledge. The ‘in-depth experiential’ knowledge of Indigenous Peoples or resource-dependent communities was deemed inferior and not worthy of consideration. However, the local population’s knowledge of their environment is far superior to that of any external agents with the task of planning and coordinating the adaptation process.

Drawing from Capisani’s (2021) terminology, the I-Kiribati are in a co-constitutive relationship to their territory: they are used to living in that specific ecosystem, they have continuously adapted (or tried to adapt) to changes in their environment and they are witnessing in first person the ongoing environmental challenges due to climate change. In addition, as Farbotko and Campbell (2022) argue, the concepts of habitability and uninhabitability are culturally and socially constructed, subject to different ‘truth claims’; as such, they should be understood taking into account the beliefs of the affected population, without a priori assuming the trope of uninhabitability (as the dominant scientific discourse does). It seems that the local forms of knowledge, although not sufficient to tackle the gravity of climate-related issues, are a valuable addition to external forms of knowledge decoupled from experience (Boas et al., 2019). Traditional knowledge and forms of practice must hence be acknowledged and included to inform effective adaptation strategies (Kuruppu and Liverman, 2011). Refraining from placing too much pressure on traditional and local systems of knowledge, by burdening them with the whole task of planning adaptation, scientists and environmentalists should collaborate with local communities when planning adaptation efforts (Vandebroek et al., 2011).

For what concerns honouring the un-substitutable link between the I-Kiribati and their environment, community-driven adaptation is especially relevant. As mentioned in section ‘Against the “Doomsday” Narrative’, natural resources and land do not only have an economic value for the I-Kiribati but also a cultural one which is closely tied to their sense of community belonging and collective identity. Heyward (2016: 481) argues that ‘adaptation strategies should include measures to maintain the distinctive cultural identity of vulnerable groups’ in connection with their environment. Direct participation of the local communities in the adaptation process guarantees the respect of this connection, which is currently overlooked by the international community.

Consider also that climate change will inevitably lead to altering the environmental conditions in Kiribati. A successful process of climate adaptation should take those changes into account. The I-Kiribati’s knowledge is valuable in detecting the normative costs of what is at stake, and the resource requirements of their lives as they want to lead them. The I-Kiribati are arguably the ones who better understand how to maintain their relationship to their environment, especially if some changes to their livelihoods will prove inevitable to adapt to changed environmental conditions. For instance, it might be unavoidable that different resources from the local ones (e.g. imported food sources) will have to be provided to the I-Kiribati to account for changes in the environment and scarcity of vital resources. Consequently, their distinct forms of resource-dependent subsistence livelihoods will be impacted; in this scenario, continuity with older practices, which have cultural value for the I-Kiribati, would be best guaranteed by considering their preferences, values and system of knowledge.

Regarding the final point on sustainability, the local population is best attuned to its environment and its integrity. There is an emerging consensus in the literature on the positive impact of community-led adaptation to sustainability (Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010). This is generally contrasted with a capitalistic over-exploitation of the environment which has proven to be unsustainable since it has led to the disastrous situation in which we find ourselves now. Management of natural resources and land by resource-dependent populations, such as the I-Kiribati, and Indigenous communities is currently portrayed as a plausible way to address (and minimise) some of the ongoing environmental challenges. It is not my aim here to analyse the question of sustainability and the importance of traditional forms of resource management by groups who do not consider their environment only as an instrumental resource to exploit. Yet, in virtue of the value that the I-Kiribati attribute to their environment, there are valid reasons to think that they can take care of it in the most sustainable manner possible (Byskov and Hyams, 2022). It is worth recalling that Kiribati is among the countries that are most affected by climate change (IPCC, 2023); at the same time, Kiribati is one of the countries which have contributed the least to climate change, as it produces less than 0.1% of the global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The I-Kiribati have not significantly contributed to the environmental disruption ravaging their country; nevertheless, they bear some of the highest costs of climate change. Perhaps listening to what they want and need, and appreciating how they treat and value their surrounding environment, could teach an important lesson to all of us.

Pragmatic Benefits

Finally, involving the local population in the implementation of adaptation plans has relevant pragmatic benefits that should be acknowledged, starting from the provision of additional jobs. Given the high level of unemployment in Kiribati, providing jobs is a positive effect of involving the population in planning and implementing adaptation efforts. If we consider the ongoing programme of adaptation promoted by the Government of Kiribati since 2003,¹⁵ which consisted mainly of building sea walls, planting mangroves against coastal erosion, improving roads and settlements, and improving systems of rainwater collection, there is evidence that the I-Kiribati benefitted from direct participation, as new employment opportunities were created. Participatory engagement also helped the locals gain increased awareness of the environmental issues that their country is experiencing. The I-Kiribati became more informed about possible practical solutions to ongoing environmental issues and resource scarcity. For example, the population learnt different water collection systems and how to improve obsolete mechanisms for rainwater collection.

Overall, the population is the best judge of their situation including where priorities for adaptation should lie. The I-Kiribati are directly experiencing deprivation of relevant dimensions of well-being, know their territory and challenges, and are aware of which areas call for the most urgent intervention. If a community-based approach were not endorsed to promote adaptation, there would be a considerable risk of misunderstanding the actual challenges faced by the population and misjudging the most urgent needs that require immediate action.

Conclusion

This article has focused on the timely issue of the disruptive effects of climate change in the Republic of Kiribati. I have provided further support against the ‘doomsday narrative’ that conceives SIDS as no more than ‘sinking islands’ and often selectively examines the scenario of future territorial loss and cross-border relocation. Conversely, I have suggested that in situ adaptation is normatively significant in the context of Kiribati. I have proposed an original capabilities-based framework to account for the importance of in situ adaptation measures and argued against ‘anticipatory relocation’. I have also considered the relevance of respecting the I-Kiribati’s agency in choices of mobility/immobility and their collective right to self-determination. Finally, I have explored some of the normative implications of the analysis and defended a community-based approach to climate adaptation and resilience building.

A community-based approach, which is responsive to the specific needs of members of the affected communities, is imperative to draft more effective – and more respectful – policies to address the effects of climate change in SIDS. Overall, if the possibility of a more hopeful approach to tackling climate change in the context of SIDS is taken seriously, there is also scope for further analysis and research on the theoretical dilemmas that a closer focus on in situ adaptation brings about.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I want to thank Gabriele Badano and Martin O’Neill for their mentoring, help and constructive comments on several drafts of this article. I also want to thank the participants in the 2023 Tromsø Conference in Ethics and Political Philosophy (The Artic University of Norway), the 2024 Workshop ‘Territories, Peoples, Nations’ (Northwestern University in Qatar, Doha), the 2023 Political, Legal and Moral Symposium (Central European University, Vienna), and the 2023 Brave New World Conference (University of Manchester) for their helpful comments. I am grateful to the editor of Political Studies and two anonymous journal reviewers for their feedback and suggestions.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: My doctoral research was funded by the AHRC through the White Rose College of the Arts and Humanities (WRoCAH) and by a Doctoral Scholarship from the Society for Applied Philosophy for the academic year 2021/22.

ORCID iD

Virginia De Biasio

Notes

Author biography

Virginia De Biasio is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow for the project ‘Systemic Risk and the Transformation of Democracy’ (DERISK) in the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London (UK).

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